Fr. Luis de Lossada, S.J.

Philosophical Course of Salamanca 4

According to the Mind of the Eximius Doctor

Translated by Osvaldo R.

PHILOSOPHICAL COURSE OF SALAMANCA

FR. LUIS DE LOSSADA, S.J.

PHILOSOPHICAL COURSE OF SALAMANCA

ACCORDING TO THE MIND OF THE EXIMIUS
DOCTOR FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

TOME IV.

I. ON THE SOUL (CONTINUED).
II. METAPHYSICS.

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This rendering into English of the work of the Reverend Father Luis de Lossada, S.J., is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of the School of the Eximious Doctor, Francisco Suárez, from whose ocean of wisdom this most faithful disciple drew, and whose streams he caused to flow anew through the fields of his own age; he who, though ever reputed a true son of the Angelic Doctor, refuted the Thomists themselves by the authority of St. Thomas; that the light kindled by such great masters may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

To the Eximious Doctor Francisco Suárez
and to St. Thomas Aquinas.

August 15, 2026.

Osvaldo A. R. | Sol 5.6
Translator.

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TO THE VENERABLE FRANCISCO SUÁREZ AND
THE FLOURISHING OF HIS SCHOOL

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IHS
Francis Paul Mazzario.

Emmanuel de Prado,
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Madrid on 19 February 1724.

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DISPUTATION IV.
ON THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL.

In the soul, powers are said to be those faculties or forces with which the soul by its nature, at least insofar as it is united to the body, is permanently endowed, so that through them, as immediately operative capacities, it may produce vital acts. Such are intellect, will, the imaginative, visual, nutritive faculty, etc. Those which regard acts independent of the body, such as intellection and volition, are called "spiritual and inorganic powers"; those, however, which regard acts bound to a bodily organ are called "material and organic." The principal question concerning these is whether they are really distinguished from the soul. Here there are three celebrated opinions, omitting others of lesser note which grant the distinction to some powers and deny it to others. The first, held by all Thomists, adequately distinguishes the powers from the soul, that is, it says that they consist in accidents superadded to the soul, which are the whole and adequate capacity or principle of acting in such a way that the substance of the soul does not immediately influence vital acts, but is only their radical principle insofar as it roots and sustains those accidents. The second, at the opposite extreme, held by all Scotists with Scotus and by several of Ours, really and adequately identifies the powers with the soul, that is, it teaches that the whole active capacity by which the soul immediately influences vital acts really consists in the substance of the soul alone. The third, held by most of Ours with Fr. Suárez, distinguishes the powers from the soul only inadequately, that is, it asserts that the soul through its substance immediately influences vital acts,

but is aided by superadded accidents rooted by it, which at the same time partially influence those same acts, and therefore are called accidental but partial or inadequate powers. These accidents, if they are given, are indeed adequately distinguished from the soul, as no one doubts; but because by the name "power" is understood the capacity immediately active of a vital act, and this capacity consists in a complex of the substance of the soul and a superadded accident, which complex is inadequately distinguished from the soul as including from included, the powers are therefore said to be distinguished from the soul only inadequately. We shall prove and defend this third opinion by parts.

CHAPTER I.
The Soul Through Its Substance Immediately Influences Vital Acts.

1. This assertion establishes only a true immediate influx of the substance of the soul, whatever may be the case as to whether an accidental power is also given and simultaneously influences. In this sense it has as patrons all the Scotists with the Subtle Doctor, and almost all of Ours with the Excellent Doctor, disp. 18, Met. sect. 5. The contrary is held by all Thomists, who prove it from the fact that substance is not immediately operative of substantial and accidental effects. And indeed the argument weighed there for a substantial effect plainly applies to the nutritive power of the soul, whose effect is substantial. It also applies to every accidental power which, if it is the whole capacity of operating vitally, will produce an effect more perfect than itself, since such a power, because it is wholly for the sake of the act and is specified by the act, is according to the Thomists less perfect than the act which it produces. Nevertheless, we have particular arguments at hand by which to prove the stated assertion.

2. It is proved, therefore, 1º: a vital action, or production of a vital act, immediately and by reason of itself depends essentially upon the substance of the soul, and indeed *a priori*, or as upon a true principle and true cause; therefore it immediately arises from the substance of the soul, which consequently is a capacity immediately influencing the vital act. The consequence is evidently good, because for an action to arise immediately from something is nothing other than for it essentially and immediately to depend upon it *a priori*; for a vital action cannot in any other way arise immediately from a superadded power, nor indeed can any physical action arise from any created or uncreated capacity. The antecedent is therefore proved. First, that the dependence of that action upon the soul is *a priori* is

not doubted by the Thomists, who admit that the substance of the soul is a true principle and principal cause of the vital action, whose vitality and perfection it must precontain. Next, that this action depends immediately and by reason of itself upon the soul, understanding always the soul as to its substance, is efficaciously proved: that action does not depend upon the soul purely mediately, or by reason of an accidental power upon which it immediately depends; therefore it depends upon the soul immediately and by reason of itself. The antecedent is proved: it depends upon the soul essentially; but it cannot depend essentially through a superadded power; therefore it does not depend purely mediately by reason of that power. The consequence is evident, and the major premise is undoubted among the Thomists, who therefore deny that a power divinely separated from the soul can operate vitally, namely "because of the essential dependence of vital motion upon the intrinsic principle which is the soul, which is the first self-moving principle," as John of St. Thomas says in so many words, q. 2, *De anima*, a. 2. And certainly, although some authors hold that a vital act, if distinguished from its production, could be divinely produced without the soul and outside the soul, nevertheless no one has said that the very action by which a vital act is produced by the soul could, even divinely, exist without the soul.

3. The minor premise is easily shown, because an action cannot depend essentially upon the soul through a power which does not essentially depend upon the soul. This is evident from the terms and from the example of heating, which therefore does not depend essentially upon fire through heat immediately acting, because heat does not essentially depend upon fire, but can exist separated from fire, for example in water or iron. But an accidental power does not depend essentially upon the soul, since it can be divinely separated from it, as the Thomists rather commonly concede with Ferrariensis, Soto, Bañez, John of St. Thomas, loc. cit., and the Complutensian College, l. 2, *De anima*, q. 3, n. 70, where it says that this is the more common opinion. Nor does there seem any ground on which this separability can be denied, because an accidental power is an absolute quality and is connected with the soul by no other title than that of a connatural property physically emanating from it; this title indeed grounds natural inseparability, but not essential inseparability, as is clear in quantity and the other properties of bread in the Eucharist.

4. This is confirmed: if a vital act does not arise immediately from the soul but from the superadded power alone, that power, divinely separated from the soul, will be able to operate vitally, for example an intellective power will be able to understand. But this is false among the Thomists, nor

can it be conceded without grave difficulties, for example that without a soul the intellect could be beatified or see God, and the will merit or sin. Therefore, etc. The major premise is proved, because whenever the whole proximate capacity for some effect is present, even if the radical and principal principle is lacking, the effect can be produced. This is evident both by reason, because a radical principle which does not immediately influence is required for the effect only insofar as, by rooting the proximate capacity, it causes it to exist; hence, if the whole capacity is supposed to exist independently of such rooting, the presence of the radical principle is not necessary to the effect on any ground; and by examples, because in the Eucharist the qualities of bread and wine produce their effects without a radical principle; the heat of boiling water, where the radical principle is not present, for water is not the root of heat, exercises its activity; the power of seed effects generation even when the animal from which it was severed, and to which the effect is attributed as to the principal cause, is absent or dead; and generally, according to the Thomists in Physics, where the active capacity of substance is treated, accidents, whether conjoined with or separated from their proper substance, produce the same effects in the name of that substance.

5. Now thus: but according to the Adversaries the intellective power is the whole proximate capacity for understanding; and it is also the whole power proximately receptive of intellection. Therefore, divinely separated from the soul, it will be able to understand. The objection is urged: when the proximate first act of a created cause is posited, the concurrence of God is due for the second act. But when intellect without soul is posited, at least with the species of the object added, the proximate first act of the created cause for the act of understanding is posited; for a purely radical principle does not belong to the proximate first act. Therefore, etc. It may be said with the Complutensian College, cit. q. 3, n. 69, that powers separated from the soul therefore cannot operate vitally because in that state they are non-vital principles; for powers are vital only emanatively, insofar as they emanate intrinsically from and depend upon the soul, which they would not have in that state. But against this, 1º: therefore the powers identify no vitality with themselves; otherwise they would undoubtedly retain it when separated from the soul. How then do they identify with themselves the whole capacity of producing a vital act? Can a capacity which identically or entitatively is non-vital be the whole principle of communicating vitality to an act? If this is admitted, why could a capacity entitatively natural or material not be the whole principle of producing a supernatural or spiritual effect? Why are modern Thomists so anxious to posit vitality in grace and in an infused

habit, so that it may be the whole principle of producing a supernatural act? Again, what benefit for operating does a superinduced and separable vitality consisting in actual emanation give to the intellect, when that vitality is neither a capacity nor increases the capacity of the intellect?

6. Hence, against this, 2º: in a power divinely separated, the lack of emanative vitality subtracts nothing from its capacity, just as it subtracts nothing from the being of the power; otherwise the hypothesis would be destroyed. Therefore, notwithstanding such a defect, the whole active capacity of intellection remains, although separated from its radical principle. But, this being posited, the whole force of our argument remains with the proofs from reason and examples. Therefore, etc. Against this, 3º: for the intellect to effect a vital act, on your principles emanative vitality in aptitude suffices; but an intellect separated from the soul has this. Therefore. The major premise is proved: the intellect effects a vital act in the name of the soul and by the capacity of the soul, but not in its own name, since it is less perfect than the act and entitatively non-vital. But, for it to effect an act in the name of the soul and by the capacity of the soul, emanative vitality in aptitude suffices, as is clear in heat, for which, in order to effect a substantial effect in the name of substance and by the capacity of substance, substantiality emanative in aptitude suffices. Thus, according to the Thomists, heat separated from fire in glowing iron or in flint produces fire in the name of the substance of fire, of which it is the capacity and a property emanating in aptitude. Certainly a substantial effect requires a substantial capacity no less than a vital act requires a vital capacity. Therefore, just as for the former a capacity suffices which is substantial only insofar as it is apt to emanate from a substance, so, etc. But if a subject is desired by which the intellect may be sustained, suppose it to be divinely placed in a stone or a brute. What then will prevent it from understanding? The lack of a connatural subject? But the heat of water likewise is not in a connatural subject, and yet it heats.

7. It must therefore be admitted that it belongs to the nature of vital action that it arise immediately from a vital substance and be immediately received in it, and therefore cannot even divinely exist without it. Otherwise the vitality of the soul would stand materially with respect to the act, because it would neither be immediately communicated to the act nor through the power, since this does not receive from the soul a vitality which it pours back, because it is not entitatively vital. Thus the water of a spring is not communicated through a channel if the channel receives no water. Nor may recourse be had to emanative vitality. For, first, this is not vitality by identity, such as is poured into the act. Next, it is not true vitality if the very

emanation of the powers is not a vital action, as in fact it is not: both because, according to the Thomists, it is not an action of the soul but of that which produces the soul; and because, if it were a vital action, it would produce a power entitatively vital, just as the production of love produces an act entitatively vital.

8. It is proved, 2º: if the soul does not immediately influence an act of willing, the accidental volitive power will be the whole will, and therefore truly and properly willing and loving, since it alone immediately acts and receives the act of love. It will also be really and adequately distinct not only from the soul but from the whole intellect, and consequently it will love an object not known by itself but by another power wholly distinct from it, as the Adversaries admit. But it is repugnant for a will to love an object which it does not itself really know. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved, first, from that axiom, "Nothing is willed unless first known," surely by the very principle that wills; otherwise a man could will what only an angel knows. Again, because an object cannot be loved by a will which it does not move or entice, and to which it is not rendered intentionally present and applied. But for an object to move, entice, and be applied, or to become intentionally present, is most formally to be known. Therefore. Again, because for the will to love it must, according to all, be directed and enlightened by cognition; but no one is directed unless he himself perceives the direction, and no subject is enlightened by a light which it does not receive in itself. Again, because the will, just as it properly wills, also properly chooses among several objects proposed at once and prefers one to another by right of a free and elective power. But such choice and preference seems chimerical and inconceivable unless the will itself discerns between one and another, by knowing at least that this is not that.

9. The Adversaries answer that it is enough for the object to have been previously known by the same radical and principal principle, or by the one willing "as that which," namely by the same soul or man whose it is to know through the intellect what he wills through the will; and that it is not repugnant that one power be directed through the act of another action belonging to the same *suppositum*, namely by reason of sympathy or subordination, as is clear in the ambulatory power, which, existing in the feet, is directed through sight. But this answer is rejected, 1º, because our argument proceeds not only in the radical principle and in the one willing "as that which," but expressly in the will itself, as will be clear to anyone who rereads it. Surely, the soul therefore cannot will an object which it does not itself know because it itself is that which loves and chooses, and it cannot love unless it is enticed by the object and enlightened by cognition of it; nor

can it choose and discern among objects wholly unknown to it. But this reason plainly applies also to the will. For who doubts that the will simply speaking truly and properly wills, loves, chooses, and discerns, just as the intellect apprehends and judges, sight sees, and so with the other powers? Certainly I do not see how one who said that the soul loves what it does not itself know could be refuted, if this is conceded in the will. Nor does the added "as that by which" prevent this, just as it does not in the soul, which likewise is called willing "as that by which" with respect to the *suppositum*, to which alone willing "as that which" is attributed. Certainly, with such an addition it remains true that the will truly and properly elicits and receives an act of willing.

10. It is rejected, 2º, because cognition according to all is the intentional application or approximation of the object to the volitive power and of the volitive power to the object, no less but more necessary than in physical things the approximation of the agent to the patient. But physical approximation is required not only on the part of the radical principle or agent "as that which," but much more on the part of the proximate capacity which it must immediately affect, especially on Thomistic principles; for the application of the substance of fire to the patient would be of no benefit unless heat were immediately applied. Indeed, according to the Thomists, it often happens that the substance and *suppositum* are distant from the patient and yet the effect is produced because the capacity is immediately applied. Therefore, etc. It is rejected, 3º, because the human will and the Divine intellect in Christ belong to the same *suppositum*. Yet no one has said that an object perceived only by Divine cognition can be loved by the human will of Christ, although through both acts the same one would be loving and knowing "as that which."

11. It is rejected, 4º, because recourse to sympathy has no place in the will, which is a free power and, once cognition is posited, remains indifferent as to whether it loves or does not love the proposed object. For sympathy can be nothing other than a necessary determination of a thing, either by its nature or from a hidden impression, to operate on the supposition that another thing operates; such a determination is given in the ambulatory power so that, once the command of the will is posited, it immediately elicits motion. But it cannot at all be given in a free power without removing liberty. Hence the example of the ambulatory power adduced in the answer is beside the point, both because sympathetic subordination is not repugnant to such a power, since it is necessary, and because that power is not properly directed by sight, nor is it itself capable of intentional direction, since it is a purely physical power. It is therefore determined by the

command of the will to proceed along such a path; but the will is directed by the intellect, not adequately distinct from itself, which knows the path through a species received or begun from the eyes. Add that, if an example may be taken from this, one man could be directed to love through the cognition of another while himself knowing nothing, just as a blind man is directed to walk along a path which he himself does not see through the sight of a boy guiding him, and sometimes of a dog.

12. It is proved, 3º, from the ground of liberty. The soul freely loves truly and properly. But this cannot stand if the soul does not immediately influence the act of love. Therefore. The minor premise is proved: if the soul does not immediately influence, it does not determine love rather than hatred or the omission of love. But if it does not determine, it does not love freely and imputably, as is certain. Therefore. The major premise is proved: because, first, the soul does not determine immediately, for the immediate determination of love does not arise immediately from the soul, since it is the very action by which love is produced. Next, neither does it determine mediately, for before the production of love the soul does nothing by force of which love rather than hatred follows. It only roots the volitive power, and that power, just like the rooting itself, is of itself indifferent to love and hatred and does not infer one rather than the other. The objection is urged, 1º: the action of a servant is not imputed to the master unless the latter either immediately concurs or does something by which the servant is previously determined to operate; and this ought especially to be true among the Thomists, who favor physical predetermination. Therefore neither will the action of the will be imputed to the soul, which neither immediately concurs nor does anything by which the will is previously determined to act.

13. The objection is urged, 2º: he does not love freely who does not so dominate love that he can suspend it at will or prevent it. But the soul, if it does not immediately influence, cannot suspend or prevent love at will. Therefore. The minor premise is proved: because, first, the soul cannot immediately prevent the production of love, since this does not depend upon the soul as immediately influencing; thus God could not immediately prevent the action of a secondary cause if such action did not depend upon God immediately concurring, as all argue against Durandus. Next, neither can the soul prevent love mediately, for it could do so only insofar as it were within its power to impede some prerequisite for the production of love. But it can impede none: not cognition, which is often unavoidable and, according to the Adversaries, does not immediately depend upon the soul; nor the volitive power, since this is rooted by the soul necessarily and without liberty.

14. The Adversaries say that the soul freely determines or prevents love through the will as through its own instrumental capacity, whose actions are at the same time actions of the soul as radical principle or principal cause. Hence, they say, the same principle or determination is that by which the will determines by way of capacity and the soul by way of root; or, as others speak, by which the will determines "as that by which" and the soul "as that which," that is, as substance possessing the volitive capacity; for otherwise by the name of the principle "which," the *suppositum* is meant. And indeed they say this in such a way that the soul can be called an immediate determiner "as that which," because no other "which" intervenes between it and the act. But this does not resolve the difficulty. For the soul now does not determine immediately, since it determines only through the will. The immediacy of the principle "which," insofar as no other "which" intervenes, is highly improper, since it does not remove a medium simply, just as if a grandfather were said immediately to beget his grandson with the immediacy of a grandfather, insofar as no other grandfather intervenes. Moreover, it remains unintelligible how the soul determines mediately and freely if it freely determines no medium from which the production of love rather than hatred follows, just as it is unintelligible that the will itself should freely determine something mediately if it freely determines nothing immediately.

15. Moreover, the solution is attacked because for the soul to determine through the will in the Thomistic sense is, in reality, nothing other than for the soul to root and sustain the volitive power, upon which alone the determination or production of love immediately depends. But this does not suffice for the soul properly to be called freely determining love. Therefore. The minor premise is proved, both because in rooting and sustaining the volitive power the soul conducts itself as a necessary cause, and the rooting and sustaining are not free to it nor of themselves connected with love rather than hatred; and because, if this sufficed, Durandus could by equal right say that the action of a secondary cause can properly be determined and prevented by God without simultaneous concurrence, and indeed immediately with the immediacy of the universal and most principal Cause, to which the operation of created causes is attributed. For just as the soul roots the will, which can be conserved and operate only as rooted, so God produces secondary causes, which can be conserved and operate only as produced by God; and just as the will is an instrumental faculty of the soul, in whose name it acts, so secondary causes are instruments of God and, in the opinion of Durandus, are substituted to operate by the capacity and in the name of the first Cause.

16. It is further customary to attack the solution from the fact that rooting and sustaining an accidental capacity do not suffice for substance properly to be called an agent through an action arising from such a capacity, and consequently neither properly determining through the determination of that capacity. The assumption, which our authors develop at length, can be briefly confirmed by the following examples. Substance is not properly produced through an action immediately terminated at an accident which it roots and sustains; otherwise the substance of water would properly be said to be produced anew whenever it newly recovers lost coldness, and the soul would properly be rooted by itself when it roots its powers. Similarly, substance is not properly corrupted through the corruption of an accident rooted by it, nor intensified through its intensification, as is clear from the same example of water becoming lukewarm and becoming cold. Substance likewise is not properly seen or known because its proper accident, namely color, is immediately seen and known; for we often see color most clearly while remaining ignorant of the substance. Indeed, properly speaking, substance is always hidden from the eyes, although it is denominated seen "as that which." And to suggest an example even of an active denomination: when whiteness, which is a property of a swan, emits a visual species, the substance of the swan is not properly that which emits the species, nor can the species produced by its whiteness be called the proper species of the substance or properly its own, as love is a proper act of the soul; otherwise in this life we would know substance through its proper species, which no one has said.

17. Nevertheless, this argument taken from the propriety of acting, just as I passed it over in Physics, I shall not press further now. For it is liable to verbal dispute, nor will the Thomists cease to urge the example of fire which truly heats through heat, and of the sun which truly illuminates through light. Although in these cases it could be said that substance immediately concurs in the action of heat or light; and if it does not concur, the denomination and office of agent are not properly attributed to it, or certainly less properly than the denomination of lover is attributed to the soul. For according to the Thomists that denomination is attributed in the same way to fire which is absent and nonexistent, provided that heat is present and acts; but the denomination of lover cannot be attributed to the soul unless it exists and is present, even if a separated power is imagined to love. Finally, I note that of the proofs adduced for our opinion, the second and third, although they proceed directly only concerning an act of the will, are nevertheless indirectly or consequently general, because the contrary foundations either hold in every vital act or in none.

CHAPTER II.
The Contrary Foundations Are Resolved.

18. It is objected, 1º: no created substance is immediately operative. Therefore, since the soul is a substance, it cannot immediately influence vital acts. I answer by denying the antecedent, whose falsity remains sufficiently shown in tr. 2 of Physics, disp. 6, c. 1; and there, c. 2, everything alleged by the Thomists was abundantly resolved. Nevertheless, because the College of St. Thomas at Complutum, l. 2, *De anima*, q. 3, a. 1, again insists with great effort on three of the reasons alleged there, and in them lies the whole strength of the Thomistic opinion, we shall now again say something about them. The first reason: no substance is specified by operation as by an end, because operation is an accident, and it is repugnant for substance to be for the sake of accident, just as it is repugnant for accident not to be for the sake of substance. But every proximate power is specified by operation as by an end. Therefore no substance is a proximate power for operation. I answer: if by the name "proximate power" is understood a capacity wholly complete and ready, or furnished with all the requisites for operating, no created substance is through itself a proximate power for operation, at least for an operation distinct from simple emanation, because it is always completed and rendered ready by some accident; for example, the combustive capacity of fire by heat and application, the intellective capacity by the species of the object, and the volitive by cognition, and both by accidentally and inadequately active powers on our principles. In this sense St. Thomas is to be understood whenever he denies that in created things substance and power or proximate capacity are the same.

19. But if by that name is understood an immediately active capacity, even though not wholly complete and ready, a created substance can certainly be a proximate power. Nor does the syllogism objected stand in the way, since it must be answered by the Adversaries themselves, both in passive power, in which the doctrine concerning the specification of powers by acts equally proceeds, as John of St. Thomas admits, q. 2, *De anima*, a. 3, where he cites St. Thomas, and indeed it ought to proceed *a fortiori*, because an active power gives perfection to the act, whereas a passive power does not give but receives from the act; and nevertheless, according to the Thomists, the substance of the soul immediately receives accidental powers, the substance of the composite receives material accidents, and the substance of matter receives the eduction of form or passion, which

according to them is an accident. It also fails in the rooting power, which likewise must be specified by the act of rooting, even though accidental; hence the soul would be unable immediately to root powers. Moreover, the argument is resolved in two ways. 1º, the major premise being granted, I distinguish the minor premise: every proximate accidental power, let it pass; every substantial proximate power, I deny the minor premise and the consequence.

20. But, it may be said, if a substantial power is truly a proximate power, it cannot fail to be for the sake of the act as an end, because it belongs to the nature of proximate power generally that it is given by nature for nothing other than the act and for the sake of the act. But why is the same not said of a proximately receptive power? Why not also of a proximate rooting power? It must therefore be denied that it belongs generally to the nature of proximate power to be given solely for the sake of the act, since it can be given at the same time for another end, for example to exist and subsist in itself. Indeed, even the accidental power which is posited, for example the intellective power, is not given solely for the sake of the act; for it is also given to perfect the soul in the genus of formal cause and to constitute it in its connatural state, even when it can operate nothing, as during infancy.

21. I said "let it pass," because the Scotists flatly deny that minor premise and hold that a power is specified by an act not *a priori*, or as by an end "for the sake of which," but only as by an effect or by a sign manifesting the perfection and character of the power, and is not otherwise for the sake of the act except as for an end which is an "effect"; in the way in which the Incarnation of the Word is said to have been made for the sake of our salvation, and in the way in which the Thomists themselves with Cajetan explain that statement of Aristotle, "Each thing is for the sake of its operation as an end," which also includes substance. See the College of St. Thomas, l. 2, *De anima*, q. 4, n. 232. Add that in the common opinion of the Thomists according to John of St. Thomas, cit. a. 3, a power is not specified by an act as by an end but as by an extrinsic form, to which the power is proportioned and adapted. But proportion and adaptation can belong to substance with respect to an accident, as is seen in receptive power, which without doubt requires adaptation, as also does rooting power. For this reason the soul of a brute does not root an intellective power, because it is not proportioned and adapted to such a power. If the rational soul has so great a proportion with much less noble matter in the relation of informing to informable, why not also with an accident in the relation of productive to producible?

22. 2º, that syllogism is resolved by denying that substance cannot be specified by operation or by an accidental effect as by an end "which," redounding to the good of the substance itself as the end "for which" (we explained these terms in tr. 2 of Physics, disp. 2, c. 3), so that substance seeks operation almost in the way in which a sick man seeks health. For it is certain that every accident is essentially for the sake of substance as the end "for which"; hence it must ultimately be intended for the sake of substance by the active capacity. And specifically, vital operation is posited for no other end than that living substance be perfected through immanent acts, and consequently it is not intended in the abstract but in the concrete, that is, as perfecting substance. Hence in one way accident is for the sake of substance and substance for the sake of accident, namely by the diversity which exists between the ends "which" and "for which." Hence also substance is for the sake of accident in such a way that by this very fact it is ultimately for the sake of itself, because it intends itself as perfected by the accident. See cit. disp. 6 of Physics, c. 2, n. 5, and there also the support of the Thomists. Add the clear testimony of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 105, a. 5, corp., who says thus: "As matter is for the sake of form, so form, which is first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is second act; and thus operation is the end of a created thing." Note there the comparison, "As matter, etc.," so that it may be understood that he is speaking of a true end, but of the end "which"; for the end "for which" with respect to matter is the composite. Add also the testimony of Aristotle, *Ethic.* X, c. 7, where he places the ultimate natural happiness of man in the operation of the intellect.

23. It may be said: an end must be more perfect than the things ordered to it. I answer: this is true of things ordered to the end by way of a pure means, but not always of things ordered by way of a subject to be perfected by the end. Or say that it is true not of every end, but of an end composed of the ends "which" and "for which." It may further be said: substance cannot be specified by an accident without begging its perfection from it. Let it pass, if the discussion concerns superadded perfection; for it is evident and undeniable that substance is perfected by accident. But if the discussion concerns identified perfection, I ask whether substance begs that perfection from the accident when in your opinion it is immediately produced by that accident alone. If perhaps this is denied because the accident does not give perfection to substance in its own name but in the name of substance, I shall likewise deny the begging in our case, because the accident does not so much specify substance in its own name as in the name of the substance to whose good it redounds.

24. The second reason: operation is an act which is first and through itself an act, since it is the ultimate actuality in the operative line, just as existence is first and through itself an act because it is the ultimate actuality in the line of being. Therefore there must correspond to it some power which is first and through itself a power ordered to operation: both because such as the act is, such is the power, since power is given for the sake of act; and because, just as in the genus of substance there corresponds to an act which is first and through itself such, namely form, a power which is first and through itself such, namely matter, so it must occur in the genus of accident, since act and potency divide being and every genus of being. But substance cannot be a power first and through itself ordered to operation, since in its primary concept it is for itself. Therefore some accidental power must correspond to operation. It is remarkable how much force the Thomists think is contained in these terms "act and potency."

25. But that their dryness may be apparent, I retort, 1º: the existence of a rational soul, connatural to the essence of that same soul, is first and through itself an act, as you hold; and nevertheless the essence of the soul, which directly and immediately corresponds to it, is not first and through itself a potency. Therefore. The minor premise is proved, both because that essence is first and through itself an act, since the notion of act is most essential to every substantial form; but according to you it is repugnant for the same thing to be first and through itself act and first and through itself potency; and because, if existence is an accidental act, there must correspond to it first and through itself an accidental potency, which the essence of the soul is not. But if it is a substantial act, the essence of the soul cannot correspond to it as first and through itself a potency in the genus of substance unless it is confounded with the essence of matter. The same argument can be made in the existence of an angel with respect to its essence, which also is first and through itself an act. 2º: every accident is first and through itself an act, namely of the substance in which it inheres. This is proved: every accident by its definitive concept is "the being of a being, and a being in another," that is, a form superadded to and inhering in a substantial being. Hence nothing is more common than that "the being of an accident is *inesse*." Therefore, just as a substance which in its primary concept is not toward itself is repugnant, because substance as such is defined "a being through itself," so an accident which in its primary concept is not a form or actuality of substance is repugnant, since accident as such is defined "a being in another." From this it follows, 1º, that the soul cannot be the receptive power of the accidental intellect which you posit, because to this, as an act first and through itself, there must correspond a potency first and

through itself such, which the soul is not, since it is a substance. It follows, 2º, that neither will the soul be a rooting power of that same intellect, because both rooting and the intellect itself, since it is first and through itself an act, require a potency first and through itself such. It follows, 3º, that an accidental power cannot be immediately operative, lest otherwise it be at once first and through itself an act and first and through itself a potency, than which nothing is more absurd among you.

26. Directly to the contrary reason I answer by admitting the whole argument in light of what will be said in c. 3, where we shall acknowledge accidental powers cooperating with the soul. But if one wishes now to prescind from these powers, the first consequence can be denied, because it is not necessary that to an act first and through itself such there should always correspond a power first and through itself such; a power secondarily such suffices, just as, according to the Contraries, it suffices for rooting and reception, although these too are first and through themselves acts, as we showed. Nor does the division of being into act and potency require complete correspondence, as is clear in the example objected to us. For although matter is pure potency, devoid of all actuality according to the Thomists, form is not therefore pure act, free of every potentiality; for it is certain that form is receptive of properties. Add that this division, insofar as it falls within every genus of being, is only into the act of existence and logical potency, as we said elsewhere; for it has no other place in the genus of action, relation, and others.

27. One can also, once the enthymeme is admitted, distinguish the minor premise of the assumption thus: substance cannot be a power, etc., for operation taken in the abstract, I grant; taken in the concrete, or as perfecting its principle, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. The reason for the distinction is clear from n. 22. It may be said: substance is first and through itself ordered to being; therefore it cannot first and through itself be ordered to operation, for otherwise it would be ordered equally first to two ultimate acts of diverse lines. But this was abundantly resolved in cit. disp. 6 of Physics, c. 2, nn. 13–17. Now I object in the accidental power, which according to the Contraries is first and through itself ordered to operation, although it is also first and through itself ordered to being or to *inesse* in substance, from n. 25. Likewise in prime matter, which is first and through itself ordered to form and to the existence of form as to two very diverse acts in Thomistic doctrine. Next, it is falsely supposed that being or existence is an act really distinct from substance. Finally, I deny the consequence as regards operation in the concrete. Nor are existence and operation acts so diverse that one is not ordered to perfect the other.

28. The third reason: if the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whoever always actually had a soul would have the works of life, just as whoever always actually has a soul is living. We saw the ineffectiveness of this argument in the Physics, cit. c. 2, n. 21. I admit that it is St. Thomas's, Summa Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 1. But first, the Holy Doctor uses it to prove that the soul needs a superadded power, which we freely concede. Next, "immediate" or "proximate" principle in St. Thomas means the same as a principle wholly ready and furnished with all the requisites for operating. In this sense it is most true that if the soul were an immediate principle it would always operate, at least an act of understanding and other non-free acts, and indeed some free act if pure omission is repugnant. But this is not the sense of the Thomists, who aim to exclude every immediate influx from the soul. For this reason M. Aguilera, a modern but vigorous follower of the Thomistic School, admits that he does not grasp the force of this argument, just as of the preceding one. I am not surprised. For who could grasp force where there is none?

29. But to strengthen it, the Complutensian College argues thus: operation cannot immediately belong to the soul unless either by identity or because the soul itself is a power first and through itself ordered to operation. But the soul cannot be such a power, because it is first and through itself an act, and it is repugnant for the same entity to be in act and at the same time in potency to a further act; otherwise the same would be first and through itself potency and first and through itself act, which is absurd. Therefore, if operation belongs immediately to the soul, it belongs by identity; and consequently the soul will never be able to exist without operation. I object, 1º, in the soul itself, which, although it is act, is at the same time a passive and rooting power of the powers. If it be said that accidental powers are not first and through themselves acts, we have already shown the opposite. I object, 2º, in a superadded power, for example the intellective, which at once in its primary concept is an act and a power ordered to a further act. I object, 3º, in the essence of the soul, which is first and through itself an act and at the same time, according to the Thomists, must be a potency first and through itself ordered to the act of existence. If it is said that it is potency and act with respect to diverse things, take that as said to yourself.

30. Moreover, from what has been said, I answer, 1º, by denying the major premise, for it suffices that the soul be a power through itself secondarily, or from a secondary concept, ordered to operation, just as the Thomists say of the soul insofar as receptive and rooting of the powers. Yet that secondary concept, considered separately, can be called through itself

primarily ordered to operation, because in it as such the first thing appearing is an order to operation, just as in the concept of a root as such the first thing presented is order to rooting or to the rooted thing. I answer, 2º, by distinguishing the major premise: or because the soul itself is a power, etc., for operation in the abstract, I deny; in the concrete, I grant the major premise; and with the minor premise similarly distinguished, I deny the consequence. Nor is it unfitting that the same thing be first and through itself an act and at the same time first and through itself a potency to a further act of diverse nature which by its own nature is a perfection of the prior act, as is clear in the examples adduced, especially in the essence of the soul compared with existence.

31. It is objected, 2º: intellect, will, and the other vital powers are really distinguished from one another; therefore also from the soul, which consequently influences vital acts not through itself immediately but through really superadded powers. The antecedent is proved, 1º, because otherwise it would truly be said, "The intellect loves and the will understands; the visual power hears and the auditory sees." 2º, because the will is directed and moved by the intellect, and also commands the intellect and the sensitive appetite, which often resists it. But the will is not moved by itself, according to the dictum, "Everything that is moved is moved by another"; nor does it command or resist itself. 3º, because for supernatural acts of understanding and willing there are distinct supernatural capacities, namely the habits of faith and charity. Therefore for natural acts there must likewise be distinct capacities or natural powers. I answer: all these points can be reconciled by admitting accidentally and inadequately active powers. But because the names "intellect," "will," etc., principally, or directly, signify the substance of the soul if this immediately operates, therefore, speaking of powers as to their direct signification or principal thing signified, I deny the antecedent, notwithstanding the proofs.

32. To 1º: those expressions are true in a real and identical sense, but not in a formally precisive or reduplicative sense. And because we most frequently speak in this latter sense, for we speak as we apprehend, and commonly apprehend one predicate without another really identical with it because of a diverse connotation, therefore we do not say that the intellect loves or that the will understands, but conversely. By the name and apprehension "intellect," we conceive the soul precisely insofar as active of intellections; by the name and apprehension "will," we conceive the soul precisely insofar as active of volitions. The manner of speaking follows this manner of conceiving without prejudice to real identity. Thus we do not say, "The apprehensive power judges; the judging power apprehends," but

conversely. Nor do we say that man is similar to a brute in rationality, but in animality, although there is no real distinction between the two. Think the same of the visual and auditory powers taken as to the principal thing signified. Yet it cannot be said, even in a real sense, that the soul sees in the ears and hears in the eyes, because the acts of seeing and hearing are really exercised each in its own organ, not in the other.

33. To 2º: the will in a real sense is directed through cognition and moves, that is, inclines, itself to the act of love. It also commands itself insofar as by one act it efficaciously wills to elicit another; it also resists itself insofar as from contrary motives proposed at once it elicits appetitions in some way contrary, concerning which see above, disp. 1, n. 53. Nor is there in this any greater absurdity than in what all concede, namely that the same intellect through apprehension moves itself to judge and through premises to infer a conclusion; that the same will elicits some acts which command and others which are commanded; that through intention of the end it moves itself to the choice of means; that through simple complacency it inclines itself toward an efficacious affection; and that it often has various affections resisting one another, although not efficaciously. As for that axiom, we have already said elsewhere that it is to be understood either of motion through a transient action or of the concurrence of the first Cause, which every motion of a creature requires.

34. To 3º: first, a capacity for supernatural acts is not the whole principle of acting, but operates together with the soul immediately influencing, on our principles. In this sense we also admit distinct capacities for natural acts. Next, the consequence does not follow, both because it is certain that the habit of faith can really be separated from the habit of charity, which is not certain of intellect and will; and because the habit of charity does not love, nor freely determine itself, nor is it intentionally enlightened or enticed by cognition; hence there is no reason why it should identify with itself the capacity for acts of faith. But all these things are otherwise in the will. Add a clear counter-instance, for the capacity for supernatural acts of understanding is really multiple, namely one for acts of faith, another for acts of infused science, etc.; and similarly for acts of willing there are habits of charity, hope, obedience, etc. Therefore, by parity, for natural acts there will be a multiple intellect and a multiple will.

35. It is replied: grace, which is nature in the supernatural order, does not immediately influence supernatural acts but through habits, as though through powers of that order. Therefore the same must be thought of the soul in the natural order. I answer, admitting the antecedent, which many deny as regards acts of charity, by denying the consequence, because nothing

compels grace to be called immediately influential in vital acts, since it neither lives, understands, loves, nor freely determines itself, all of which compel us in the case of the soul. Likewise, because many supernatural habits can be separated from grace and operate without it, which no one concedes of natural powers with respect to the soul. Hence the objection is weakened.

36. It may again be replied: the will is at least formally distinguished from the intellect, and otherwise in no sense could it be called a blind power. Therefore it can also be really distinguished. The consequence is proved: because, if the will can formally love although it is not itself formally knowing, but rather, formally taken, tends toward an object not known to it, why could it not also really love although it does not itself really know the object? I answer: the will, taken completely, is really and inadequately distinguished from the intellect because it is a complex of the soul and a superadded accidental capacity. But if one speaks of intellect and will as to their direct signification, then, given a formal distinction, that is, a distinction of reason, I deny the consequence, because it is wrong to argue from the formal sense to the real, as is clear in the Divine attributes, in risibility compared with animal, and in the radical volitive compared with the radical intellective. The disparity therefore lies in this: the formal sense is merely precisive, whereas the real sense is exclusive. When it is said that the will formally taken does not know, it is by no means denied that the will simply knows, but only that it knows according to the connotation of volition; for the name "will" presents only this connotation. Hence it is only denied that the will knows through the act of willing and that it tends toward an object known by itself through volition. This is indeed most true; but it does not exclude that the same will through another act, namely understanding, really knows, and that the object is not simply unknown to it, as it would be if the will were really distinguished from the intellect.

37. I add that, as to the direct signification of each, no other distinction of reason between will and intellect should be admitted than one according to implicit and explicit, in the way namely in which good is distinguished from true, or lovable from knowable. The reason is that, although the will does not explicitly express the capacity of knowing, it nevertheless cannot be perfectly prescinded from it, but essentially imbibes it or includes it formally and implicitly. First, because the will is essentially a rational power; therefore it essentially contains the capacity of reasoning. Again, because it is formally apt to be moved, enticed, and attracted by the goodness of an object as known; but to be intentionally attracted by an object cannot be prescinded from the function of knowing. For just as an object cannot be

conceived as attracting the will except as known, so the will cannot be conceived as attracted by the object except as knowing. Again, because the notion of good or lovable which corresponds on the side of the object to the will formally as such, and insofar as it corresponds, cannot be prescinded from the notion of true or from aptitude to be known. Therefore neither can the will, insofar as it reciprocally regards the notion of good, be prescinded from aptitude to know. Finally, because the will as such is formally apt to be applied to willing, certainly through cognition, which is an application simply necessary. Therefore it is formally apt to be immediately affected by cognition, since application must immediately affect the proximate capacity, from what was said in n. 10. But what is immediately affected by cognition is formally intellect.

38. Nor does it prevent this that intellect and will connote very diverse genera of operations, for these same genera are connoted and specified by true and good, and nevertheless the notion of good is not perfectly prescinded from the notion of true. Cognition and volition are indeed very diverse connotations, but one of them essentially supposes the other, and therefore they do not stand as the connotations of sensation and discourse with respect to animal and rational. Nor does the example of the habit of charity prevent this, which is not formally an active capacity of cognition; for we already gave the disparity in n. 34. From what has been said it may be inferred in what sense the will is called a "blind" power, namely only explicitly, that is, with a blindness denying the capacity of seeing through those acts which the name "will" explicitly connotes; for those acts are not visions or cognitions but volitions. In other respects the will is also called a "rational" power or "rational" appetite, and therefore seeing or capable of seeing through an act of reason.

39. It is objected, 3º: at least the powers for sensing and vegetating must be really distinguished from the rational soul. 1º, because the separated soul does not carry these powers with itself, since in that state it does not sense. 2º, because these are material and organic powers, that is, affixed to bodily organs; they are also acted upon by a corporeal object and elicit only material acts. 3º, because the visual powers of man and horse are of the same species, as are the acts of each, while their souls are diverse in species. 4º, because the visual and auditory powers can really be separated, both from the soul, as when a man becomes blind and deaf, and from one another, as when a man becomes deaf but not blind. 5º, because these powers are fatigued in operating and admit of more and less, for the same man can now see more intensely and now more weakly. I answer: that these powers, taken adequately, are really and inadequately distinguished from the soul is true

even among the Scotists, because the power of seeing, for example, signifies not only an active but also a receptive capacity of vision. Hence, since vision is received in the bodily organ, the power of seeing is constituted from this organ and from the activity of the soul. Therefore the Scotists identify powers of this kind, taken completely, with the whole composite, but with the soul insofar as they signify the adequately active capacity. We differ from the Scotists in this, that we do not attribute the whole active influx to the soul, but to a complex of the soul and an accidental power partially influencing.

40. Therefore, if the discussion concerns partial powers, we concede the assumption with its proofs. But if the objection is restricted to the powers according to the principal capacity, or, what is the same, according to their direct signification, I deny the assumption. Its first proof is true only of those powers taken adequately, or insofar as beyond the substance of the soul they imply various accidents required both for acting and, on the side of the body, for receiving the vital act. Ask the Adversaries why the separated soul in that state does not root the visual power and other such powers, nor actually inform a body, although it carries with itself the whole capacity of rooting and informing. To 2°: whatever is said there has place in accidentally and inadequately active powers, for that which is given for seeing, for example, is entitatively material and affixed to the body, receives the impression of a corporeal object, and elicits only a material operation. By reason of it the whole visual power, although it principally implies a spiritual soul, is denominated a material and organic power, just as man by reason of matter is called material and corruptible. But this has no place in the visual power, and think the same of the others, according to the principal capacity. For thus this power is material and organic only with this addition, "in operating such a genus of acts," because namely it cannot operate in that genus except dependently upon matter and a bodily organ. The Thomists are bound to say the same of the power rooting the powers, which they identify with the soul; for in rooting the visual power it depends upon matter and the organ.

41. It may be said: if the soul depends upon matter in operating, it therefore also depends upon it in being, because "the mode of operating follows the mode of being." But the mode of rooting equally follows the mode of being; for this reason the character of an essence is gathered from the properties it roots. Therefore the soul will not be able to depend upon matter in rooting without depending upon it in being. That maxim, therefore, is true insofar as the mode of operating cannot be of a higher order than the essence of the principle, because it must be contained in it

either formally or eminently. It can also be understood of the adequate mode of operating, or of a mode than which no better belongs to the same principle. Such is not the present material mode, since a higher mode independent of matter also belongs to the same soul through acts of understanding and willing. Thus a soul which roots only material powers is material, but not one which at the same time roots other immaterial powers. In sum, on no ground is it more difficult for a spiritual soul immediately to produce a material act than immediately to root a material power. Whether, however, the human soul also receives material acts will be discussed in c. 5. If perhaps the argument concerning specification of powers by acts is brought in here, I shall object from the specification of the root by the rooted, and then say that the visual power in man is specified by a material act according to the accidental capacity, but not according to the substantial or principal capacity. For this latter at the same time contains acts of understanding, by which, as more noble, it must be specified in the manner stated above.

42. To 3º: granting that acts of seeing do not differ in species in man and horse, which can easily be denied because of their intrinsic relation to diverse souls, it does not thence follow that the powers of each according to their direct signification do not differ in species. For if, according to the Adversaries, souls diverse in species root visual powers of the same species, why could not powers diverse in species produce acts similar in species? Thus also the sun and fire effect heat of the same nature. To 4º: those powers according to their indirect signification, or according to the accidental capacity, can be separated both from one another and from the soul, so as to perish while the soul remains; not so according to their direct signification or principal capacity, which remains entire in a blind and deaf man although accidentally impeded. Indeed, although nothing of the active capacity perishes, a man is called deaf or blind if some condition or necessary disposition is lacking on the part of the organ, for example the influx of spirits. For a man whose optic nerves are obstructed is said to be absolutely blind although in other respects he suffers nothing in the eyes. Thus also an infant or a fool is said to lack intellect or to be unable to use reason, although the intellective power remains entire in him, as no one doubts. It may be said that it is absurd for a blind man to have the power of seeing. I distinguish: a power ready for operation, I grant; one impeded by some lesion of the organ, I deny that this is absurd. And I ask whether it is absurd for a little infant to have the power of using reason. It may again be said: therefore no miracle will be needed for sight to be restored to the blind.

I object: therefore neither will a miracle be needed for a newly born or newly generated infant to use reason. Whatever is said, let it be said for me.

43. To 5º: the counter-instance is the power rooting the powers, which will likewise weaken with age and admit more and less, since it does not always root an equal visual power. That fatigue, therefore, or intensity and remission, can be admitted on the part of the accidental power which we posit. Indeed, it is enough that it be on the part of the organs, which either from old age, lack of spirits, or some other cause become less apt for vital action to be exercised in them.

44. It is objected, 4º: a soul which operates only through really distinct powers is not repugnant, just as an inanimate substance which produces its effects, at least accidental ones, only through accidents is not repugnant. This is clear in the substance of fire, which heats only through heat, and in the substance of heavy and light bodies, which are moved upward and downward through heaviness and lightness. Therefore every soul must in fact be judged such, for our arguments either prove concerning possibility or do not prove concerning fact. I distinguish the antecedent: if the discussion concerns a soul which not only is not free nor appetitive, unless perhaps through a power immediately knowing, but is moreover of such a character that vital action does not depend upon it essentially, immediately, and *a priori*, let it pass; if concerning a soul of the opposite character, such as in fact is the soul which we know, I deny the antecedent and the consequence, because that character is in no way consistent with a purely mediated operation. The alleged examples, even if admitted, prove nothing, because they are taken from non-vital operations, not all of which must arise immediately from substance, just as not all essentially depend upon it, but can arise from its separated capacity. Thus heat even without fire heats, and the heaviness of bread and wine weighs in the Eucharist without their substance. But vital action, as the Adversaries admit, essentially depends upon the soul and cannot be produced by a separated power.

45. It is objected, 5º: if cognition and love immediately arise from the soul, the soul will be able to elicit love without prior cognition, just as it elicits cognition without prior love. I deny the inference, because the soul is constituted in the relation of proximately capable of loving by cognition as by an application simply necessary, not conversely. Ask the objector why the intellect does not judge without prior apprehension, just as it apprehends without prior judgment. It will be insisted: love itself must be cognition, since it arises from an intellective capacity, just as an action arising from heat is heating. And otherwise opposed actions could arise from the same capacity. But this amounts to nothing. On your principles does not the

production of substance arise from heat, and yet it is not heating? Is not the will rooted by the same soul radically intellective? Do not love and hatred, and many other very diverse, indeed contrary, species of effects arise from the same will? Nothing, therefore, prevents diverse actions from arising from the same equivocal capacity. Nor are intellection and love opposed otherwise than by the opposition of diversity, which does not prevent partnership in the same principle and subject. The solution of certain other objections is to be sought from Physics, cit. disp. 6, c. 2, and from the same disp., c. 3, § 3, where the mind of St. Thomas is explained, who indeed establishes distinct powers but does not exclude the immediate influx of the soul.

COROLLARY.
On the Formal Distinction of the Powers from the Nature of the Thing.

46. The Scotists, although they really and absolutely identify the powers with the soul, nevertheless assert here their formal distinction from the nature of the thing, by force of which it is verified that the powers are actually distinct both from the soul and from one another before the work of the mind. For this Mastrius, disp. 2, *De anima*, q. 1, a. 2, argues, 1º, from the authority of the Fathers, who distinguish the powers from the soul. 2º, because the powers, both among themselves and in relation to the soul, ground contradictory predicates. He proves this both because the powers flow and originate from the soul, and some are called organic, others inorganic; and because the soul is the form of the body, but not the intellect, according to Aristotle. 3º, because the will is a free power, the intellect a natural or necessary power. Therefore they are not wholly the same. The consequence is proved both because free and necessary are primary differences dividing an active principle in common; but the primary differences of a genus cannot simultaneously belong to something, as is clear of rational and irrational; and because a necessary principle is by its nature determined to act, whereas a free principle is not. But it is repugnant that the same thing be determined and not determined. This is confirmed: either the soul is related in one way to the production of volition and in another to intellection, or not. If the first, then there is some distinction between intellect and will. If the second, then volition and intellection will be of the same nature, because the same, remaining the same, is naturally apt to do the same, as the maxim has it.

47. Nevertheless, this Scotistic distinction, which is actual before the work of the mind or before the precision of reason and yet is not an absolute real distinction, remains rejected generally in Logic as impossible. Nor is it now necessary to attack it otherwise than by resolving, countering, or retorting the arguments just proposed insofar as they can be directed to the powers according to the principal capacity. The first, taken from authority, proves against the Scotists an absolute real distinction, since the Fathers speak absolutely. But it does not harm us, who posit powers really and inadequately distinct from the soul and from one another, although all are identified both with one another and with the soul according to the principal capacity.

48. The second with its proofs must also be resolved by the Scotists. For if powers truly flow from the soul as properties from an essence, they cannot fail to be really distinguished from it, both from the example of properties flowing from fire, water, etc., and because the flowing or emanation of properties from essence is a true production, as we have shown elsewhere; but what is produced must be really and absolutely distinguished from the producer, according to the Scotists. Likewise, for powers to be organic or inorganic means the same as to be material or spiritual, because organic powers depend upon the body, inorganic powers do not. Therefore, if there is no absolute real distinction between them, material and spiritual will be really identified, which no one has said. Likewise, to be and not to be the form of the body are predicates grounding an absolute real distinction; for on this ground especially we distinguish the rational soul from an angel, and on the same ground we would distinguish the soul from prime matter even if there were no other reason for distinguishing.

49. It must therefore be said that those predicates are properly verified of accidentally and inadequately active powers, but not of the powers insofar as they are really identified with the soul. For taken in this way they do not flow from the soul except improperly or from our manner of conceiving, as true and good are said to flow from being as though attributes. Nor likewise are they organic in the rational soul except with the addition discussed above, n. 40. But that the same capacity is organic in operating one genus of acts and inorganic in operating another genus imports no contradiction and no subjective distinction, but only a terminative one; otherwise it would import a real distinction, against the Scotists. Finally, the intellect taken substantially is the form of the body, as St. Thomas well proves, Summa Theologiae I, q. 76, a. 1. Aristotle, however, is to be understood of the accidental intellect, or even of the substantial intellect taken not specifically but as reduplicating intellections; for these are received in no bodily organ.

50. The third likewise excludes the real identity of the powers against the Scotists, for such identity cannot be given between the primary differences of any genus, for example between rational and irrational, sensible and insensible, living and non-living, corporeal and spiritual substance, natural and supernatural quality, etc. An evident counter-instance is also made in the passive or receptive power of intellection, which power the Scotists do not formally distinguish from the intellect; and yet passive and active principle are primary differences dividing principle in common. It often happens, therefore, that members dividing some common concept are in a particular species distinguished only by reason, as when soul in common is divided into vegetative, sensitive, and intellective, which differences are really identified in the human soul. Indeed, sometimes they are distinguished only as to the explicit, as in the example adduced of the active and passive powers. It must be seen whether differences dividing one another essentially exclude one another from their proper concepts. If they do, they can nowhere be identified; if not, they will not be members of a real division but of a rational division unless the exclusive note "only" or "purely" is added to each, as is customary in the division of soul in common. But we deny that free and necessary exclude one another from their proper concepts unless it is added that the necessary be such "purely," or "only," or "with respect to every genus of acts which it contains." For there is no contradiction in the same power, containing two genera of acts, being determined and necessary as to one and indeterminate and free as to the other; this infers only an extrinsic distinction, or one according to connotations. Indeed, even the will as such often operates non-freely, as in first-first movements.

51. The confirmation is similarly opposed by a real distinction. For either the soul is really related in another way, or not. If the first, there will be a real distinction. If the second, volition and intellection will really be of the same species, for the same, remaining the same, is naturally apt really to do the same. A real distinction, or a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, could likewise be proved between intellect as apprehensive and as judicative or discursive, and also between will as pursuing and as avoiding, or as productive of love and hatred. The soul therefore is related in one way to the production of volition and in another to that of intellection, not by a diversity of the principal capacity which it really identifies with itself, but by a diversity of the accidental capacity which we posit in the superadded powers. Indeed, a diversity of application or prerequisite condition could suffice, consisting in this, that the soul is applied to understanding through the species of the object and to willing through intellection. For although

volition sometimes determines intellection, nevertheless the order of willing is never begun without prior intellection. In this way also the intellect is related otherwise to the production of apprehension than to that of judgment, because through apprehension it is applied to judging, not conversely.

52. Therefore, speaking of powers according to their substantial and principal capacity, it must generally be held that they are distinguished from one another only by a distinction of reason. In particular, however, the will, first, from what was said in n. 37, is distinguished from the intellect only as to the explicit, although perhaps the intellect is distinguished from the will by a greater distinction of reason; just as according to many the Divine essence is formally included implicitly in the relations, not conversely. Next, will and intellect pertain formally to the essence of the human soul according to the rational grade, as the powers of sensing also pertain to the same essence according to the sensitive grade, and the powers of vegetating according to the vegetative grade; these grades are distinguished in the soul by a reasoned distinction of reason. But the powers themselves, both sensitive and vegetative, are distinguished from one another by a perfect distinction of reason, except the materially appetitive power, which is distinguished from the sensitive power by whose act it is directed only as to the explicit, just as the will from the intellect.

CHAPTER III.
Accidental Powers Are Given Which Aid the Soul in Producing Vital Acts.

53. This is the other part of the third opinion related at the beginning of the Disputation; and, as we said there, the proposed assertion conveys the same sense under these terms: "The powers are really and inadequately distinguished from the soul." The Scotists hold the contrary, and very many of Ours agree with them: Hurtado, Arriaga, Compton, Oviedo, Alphonsus, Peinado, and others. But the stated opinion is held by the Excellent Doctor, l. 2, *De anima*, c. 1, and disp. 18, Met. sect. 3. It is also held among Ours by Fonseca, the Coimbrans, Toletus, Pereira, Vázquez, Valentia, Rubius, Amicus, and others whom Fr. Quirós cites and follows, disp. 83, sect. 2, saying that this opinion is common to "almost all our leading authors who have committed their writings to the press." All Thomists agree, prescinding from the immediate concurrence of the soul; and the Angelic Doctor led the way for all in this matter, Summa Theologiae I, q. 54, a. 3, and q. 77, a. 1. This opinion chiefly needs proof as regards the spiritual powers of the rational

soul; for as regards the organic powers it is rendered credible by experience and by an evident reason, as will soon appear.

54. It is therefore proved thus: the rational soul must have certain accidental properties by which it is permanently and invariably perfected from an innate exigency and constituted in its connatural state. But properties of this kind must be powers by whose activity the soul is aided in operating vital acts. Therefore there are accidental powers aiding the soul in producing vital acts. Each premise needs proof. The minor premise will be proved later. Now the major premise is proved: every created substance must have properties of this kind. Therefore also the rational soul. The antecedent is proved, 1º, by induction, which Fr. Suárez weighs very well in the cited place of Metaphysics, for every substance which we experience possesses properties of this kind: heavenly bodies light; the elements the primary qualities; mixed bodies also, whether animate or inanimate, various temperaments of the primary qualities and many secondary qualities as well. Hence we rightly infer that spiritual substances likewise possess their properties, because where nothing follows against the concept of spiritual substance, concerning it we must philosophize according to the experience of corporeal things, which with respect to spiritual things can be called mediated experience, since invisible things are known from visible ones. Thus we assert that an angel cannot simultaneously be in two adequate places, nor act at a distance without operating through a medium, and other such things, from an argument taken from corporeal things.

55. 2º, because fire, for example, does not require accidental properties precisely because it is in such a species or proximate genus; otherwise no other substance diverse in species or genus would require properties. Nor does it require them precisely because it is a corporeal substance and less noble than spirit; for from this ground it ought only to require less noble, namely corporeal, properties, and no reason can be devised why material substance should require corporeal properties rather than spiritual substance incorporeal ones. Fire therefore requires properties because it is a created substance; and consequently every created substance must require its own properties. If it be said that accidents are required by fire and other bodies in order to dispose matter for receiving substantial form, a reason which does not apply in an angel and a separated soul, the reply is easy. First, because prime matter, although received in no subject, roots quantity as its property. Again, because a complete simple body, possible according to many, would not lack its own accidents. Again, because besides accidents preparing matter, bodies root other properties resulting from form already existing, such as fire light, air and water transparency, herbs, liquids, stones,

and metals various capacities, whose accidental character is evident from their intensity and remission. If it again be said that proper accidents are due to fire by title of proportion to its other effects, the reply is again easy, because the substance of fire does not have a lesser proportion with its effects than the substance of an angel with its own; for it no less surpasses or equals their perfection.

56. 3°, because it is good for every created substance to be permanently affected by some accident which reflects and savors of its perfection; for from the terms it is good for every imperfect thing to be permanently perfected according to the mode of its nature. Moreover, such a good is naturally possible for every substance, because it is neither contrary to nor above its nature. It is not contrary, because it is supposed to be its good, or apt to perfect it; it is not above it, because it is also supposed to savor of its own nature and character. Therefore every created substance innately desires an accident of this kind, since innate appetite tends toward a fitting and naturally possible good. But such an accident is certainly a property. It may be said that we suppose what had to be proved, namely that every created substance is capable of such an accident. But we do not suppose this; rather, we prove it from the fact that every created substance must be capable, indeed naturally appetitive, of a good fitting to it and not surpassing its condition. But, it is said, it still must be proved that such a good is not repugnant. Yet this scarcely needs proof. For whatever substance is designated must be perfectible by some accident, as is clear even from the very name "substance," which is taken from standing under accidents. Then let an accident be conceived which of itself is apt permanently to perfect such a substance and which in some way savors of its nature, as heat does of the nature of fire. Surely no repugnance or contradiction whatever appears in an accident so conceived.

57. 4°, because a spiritual substance cannot lack a prerogative or excellence of active capacity which belongs to corporeal substance, since the nobility of substance is especially commended from this. But it would lack it if spiritual substance rooted no property as corporeal substance does. This is proved, because to be able to root a property, and this rooting occurs through a true action and exercise of its own capacity, as the Adversaries do not doubt, is to be able to produce an effect with only the general concurrence of God and without any created co-principle or assistance. For matter to root quantity, or fire heat or light, no application or completion of capacity is required beyond the bare existence of the substance and the general concurrence of God. But in this mode of acting a certain special excellence of capacity and commendation of fecundity shines forth, for a

created capacity imitates the Divine capacity more insofar as it needs fewer aids, or insofar as it more suffices for itself in operating and perfecting itself. But this commendation is lacking to a spiritual substance which roots no property. For the rational soul, for example, needs a co-principle or superadded application for its other effects: namely, to understand it needs a species, to will it needs cognition, and for local motion it needs volition. And generally, property alone is that which needs no addition on the part of substance; hence it is a permanent and of itself invariable effect, because the proximate and wholly applied capacity is always present to it.

58. Finally, whatever may be the case concerning created substance as such, some spiritual property is not repugnant to the rational soul; therefore it necessarily belongs to it. The consequence is correct, because once the existence of the substance is supposed, a property, if it is not repugnant, is necessarily given, since from its concept it is a due and naturally necessary accident, and by no means indifferent so that it may be present or absent without corruption of the subject. The antecedent is clear from the fact that properties of this kind are not repugnant to the rational soul from the concept of substance in common, as is manifest, nor from the concept of such a substance; for if one runs through all the predicates which we know of the rational soul, none will be found which excludes such a property. Nor should it be said that the property is excluded because it would be superfluous and idle. For besides what will be said below, against this is the fact that such a property will at least be useful so that the rational soul from the very first instant may exercise the fecundity proper to a spiritual form; for it appears absurd that the human soul, although the most perfect of all forms, alone among all others should be wholly unable to exercise its specific fecundity by producing some spiritual effect during the first seven years, during which the use of reason is commonly delayed.

59. Now the minor premise of n. 54, namely that the asserted properties must be powers aiding the soul in producing vital acts, is proved thus. The properties of the rational soul are not acts, nor habits, nor species, nor bodily organs alone. Not acts, because these suppose the connatural state of the soul, are variable, and do not accompany the soul perpetually. Not habits nor species, because these too admit variation, are not rooted by the substance of the soul alone, and do not pertain to its connatural state, since they supervene long after the soul's first existence. Finally, not bodily organs alone, because although these are required by the soul for the state of union, nevertheless they are not simply properties of the soul insofar as rational and spiritual, since they neither accompany it perpetually nor reflect its spiritual nature. Therefore the properties of the rational soul are other

incorporeal accidents permanently rooted and sustained by it. But these accidents must together with the soul influence vital acts. Therefore they are the powers which we intend.

60. The minor premise is proved, 1º, because such accidents, since they are spiritual, present no disproportion to acts of understanding and loving. Moreover, they must be presupposed from the nature of the thing prior to those acts, for every substance roots properties before it operates other effects. The acts themselves also are produced only in the presence of such accidents. No difficulty, moreover, follows from their partial influx, for nothing prevents the soul from being aided by accidental co-principles, as is clear in species and habits. Therefore those accidents must influence vital acts, for from these grounds we attribute influx in various effects to created things. 2º, because the properties of corporeal things are conferred by nature not for ornament alone, but at the same time so that they may actively concur in other effects of the substance, at least accidental ones, as is clear in light, heat, cold, etc. Therefore we must reason similarly concerning the properties of spiritual substance. Surely spiritual properties, because they are more perfect than corporeal ones, ought not to be more sterile, since sterility argues imperfection. But if they do not influence vital acts, it does not appear of what effect they are fecund. 3º, because the said properties must in some way reflect or imitate the nature of the soul insofar as rational, and thus insofar as intellective and volitive. Therefore they must in some measure participate in the active capacity of intellection and volition.

61. What has thus far been said proves inorganic powers in the human soul. Once these are conceded, no one will refuse to admit organic or material powers distinct from the soul in man and in every other living thing. But, besides this, that organic powers of this kind must be admitted is easily shown. For experience establishes that for seeing, for example, besides the species of the object, there is required through itself on the part of the principle a certain disposition and temperament of the ocular organ, and indeed such that the perfection of that disposition stands formally with respect to the perfection of the act; for a man sees better insofar as the organ is more perfectly disposed. But this disposition is not a mere condition for seeing, but an instrumental capacity which together with the soul influences vision. First, because it is not prerequisite by title of application, since the object can be equally applied to eyes unequally disposed. Again, because by equal right a species or acquired habit could be asserted to be a pure condition, against the common doctrine. Again, because such a disposition, which is not purely modal but implies some absolute quality, lacks no proportion to influence: not from the ground of

materiality, since vision too is material; not from inferiority of perfection, since the species also is less perfect than the act of vision; not from the presence of a superior principally influencing cause, since habit and species likewise do not influence except with the soul present and influencing; nor, finally, from any other difficulty following from it, since none appears, at least in the special quality of which we shall speak shortly.

62. Certainly, if a thing which through itself and necessarily is always presupposed for effect A, which must be most present to it, which on no ground shows a disproportion to influencing, and whose perfection is the measure of the perfection of the effect—if, I say, such a thing does not influence effect A, there will be no general physical rule by which active influx is discerned in created things. But once it is posited that organic disposition influences the vital act, it must be called a "power," because under this name in the present matter falls the active capacity of vital operations which is distinguished from habit and species and permanently stands on the part of the soul or living thing. Hence it may be gathered that accidental organic powers consist in those qualities which ultimately dispose the organs of the body so that the united soul operates vitally. If it is asked whether those qualities are distinct from the elemental ones, it seems that they should be affirmed to be distinct, because for the soul to actualize matter insofar as it is the form of a mixed body, and *a fortiori* insofar as nutritive and sensitive, beyond the temperament of the primary qualities other specific qualities are required, as we sufficiently and, I think, efficaciously showed in the *Synopsis de Caelo et Elementis*, c. 4, nn. 5–6. To these qualities, which can be called "secondary" because they suppose the primary qualities not as causes but as conditions, the office and name of nutritive, visual, etc., powers will most aptly be attributed.

63. If it is again asked whether the elemental qualities which are in the organs also influence vital acts, it seems that this should be denied. For if they did influence, they ought likewise to influence all effects of mixed bodies, since all effects on the side of the cause presuppose a temperament of the primary qualities. But if this is admitted, the capacity of these qualities is extended too far, since universal activity toward all sublunary effects is attributed to them. This seems absurd and alien to their imperfection. Hence, by the same reason by which disproportion is proved in prime matter and quantity for partially influencing effects of substantial form, it is likewise proved in the primary qualities with respect to the proper effects of mixed bodies. But when St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 115, a. 1, ad 5, says that heat is an instrument of the soul for the generation of flesh, he can be understood of a purely dispositive instrument, or also of a remote

or remotely aiding instrument insofar as heat alters and digests food. Generally, however, the temperament of the primary qualities can be called an instrument aiding in the genus of disposition toward operating vitally, because it disposes matter to receive and retain the soul and, with it, other specific qualities.

64. The same can be said of the vital and animal spirits, which all agree are altogether necessary for the works of material life, and experience proves it. Yet it seems more true that these spirits also actively concur instrumentally in the material acts of the soul, because it does not appear under what other title they are required. Nevertheless, they need not therefore be included under the name "powers," which in the present matter means a capacity through itself stable and permanent; for spirits frequently flow and are commonly dissipated. These spirits, to state this once, are held to be particles of the most refined blood, exceedingly subtle and mobile. Some, manufactured in the heart, serve the works of the nutritive part and are called "vital spirits"; others, purer and elaborated in the brain, are instruments of sensations and are called "animal spirits."

65. Finally, our opinion concerning the powers of the soul can be confirmed by the authority of the Holy Fathers. Since they often distinguish and often identify the powers with the soul, they cannot otherwise be brought into concord than by saying that they proceed by the middle way on which we proceed, namely by identifying the powers according to their direct signification and distinguishing them according to their indirect signification. Thus Augustine, l. 10, *De Trinitate*, c. 11, expressly teaches that memory, intelligence, and will are not three lives, three minds, or three substances, but one life, one mind, and one substance; and he teaches similar things elsewhere more than once. And yet the same Augustine, l. 6, *De Trinitate*, c. 6, says that the human soul falls short of Divine simplicity because of the multitude of capacities and operations; and l. 15, c. 7, says that mind is distinguished from soul; and serm. 3, *De tempore*, he says, "The soul is one thing, reason another, etc." Bernard also, serm. 11, *In Canticum*, says: "In the soul I contemplate three things: reason, memory, and will; and these three are the same soul." Yet the same Bernard, *De interiori domo*, c. 7, after saying that the soul understands, wills, and remembers, adds: "Nevertheless there are not three souls, but one soul and three powers."

66. Moreover, Isidore, l. 11, *Etymologiae*, c. 1, expressly teaches that the powers are so joined to the soul that they are one thing, and that the soul receives diverse names according to the diversity of operations. "While," he says, "it vivifies the body, it is soul; while it knows, it is mind; while it wills, it is spirit; while it recollects, it is memory; while it senses something, it is

sense." On the contrary, Damascene, *Dialectica*, c. 51, places vital powers in the category of quality. And Anselm, *De casu diaboli*, c. 8, says that the powers of the soul, although they are not substances, are nevertheless not nothing. But the same Anselm most openly presents our opinion in *De Concordia*, c. 29, otherwise under the title or q. 3 after the middle, where he says thus: "The soul has in itself certain powers which it uses as instruments for fitting uses. For there is reason in the soul, which it uses as an instrument for reasoning, and will, which it uses for willing; for reason and will are not the whole soul, but each is something in the soul." It is as though he said: although reason and will are identified with the soul, nevertheless not adequately, because each superadds something which the soul uses as an instrument.

67. Add that the Holy Fathers frequently explain the mystery of the Divine Trinity by the example of the powers of the soul, which, although three, intellect, memory, and will, are nevertheless one and the same soul. But in this example there will be no proportion unless the powers are partly identified by reason of the one soul and partly distinguished by reason of the accidents which they also imply. For if they are adequately identified with the soul, they are in no way three in a real sense, but three names of the same power. If, however, they are adequately distinguished, they are in no way one. I admit that even in our opinion there is not complete proportion with the Divine Trinity; there is nevertheless some, whereas on the principles of the Adversaries there is none at all. But complete proportion can be found in no example.

CHAPTER IV.
Contrary Arguments and Solutions.

68. It is objected, 1º: capacities and entities are not to be multiplied without necessity. But there is no necessity for asserting powers distinct from the soul. Therefore. The minor premise is proved, 1º, because a soul without superadded powers, connaturally operating, is possible, since it appears repugnant on no ground. 2º, because the soul is sufficiently proportioned of itself to produce vital acts, since it eminently contains their whole perfection. Therefore distinct powers are superfluous. 3º, because if the soul by itself roots the powers which we assert, there is no reason why it cannot also by itself produce vital acts. To the objection I deny the minor premise. To its first proof, the possibility of such a soul must be denied, as the Excellent Doctor supposes it must be denied, disp. 18, Met. sect. 3, n. 16, and l. 2, *De Angelis*, c. 1, and as is shown by the arguments by which we

proved that it belongs to the concept of every created substance to be perfected by properties cognate to it, and that those properties must influence the other effects of the same substance with which they have no disproportion. Therefore a soul to which no property or power were naturally due would involve a contradiction, for it would at the same time be and not be by its nature perfectible through some accident proper in the fourth mode. I add, whatever may be the case concerning another soul in which the use of reason is natural from the first instant, that at least a soul of the same species as ours which does not root spiritual powers is repugnant, and this because of the argument of n. 58.

69. To the second proof: although the soul eminently contains the whole perfection of the acts by containment of nobility or entitative perfection, insofar as its substantial perfection is nobler and superior to the perfection of the acts, it does not therefore have to contain vital acts eminently by containment of adequate capacity; for such containment is not inferred from equality or superiority of perfection, otherwise the sun could generate the sun, or man a lion. It may be said: at least such containment is inferred in a thing which it is otherwise certain truly influences an equal or less noble effect. But not even this. For according to a very probable opinion pleasing to many Adversaries, in brutes the soul of the generating female truly influences the soul of the offspring, which nevertheless, although it equals it in perfection, it cannot produce without the concurrence of the paternal seed. Likewise the rational soul, although it truly influences intellection, which it surpasses in perfection, cannot produce it without the aid of an impressed species. If it be said that the soul does not contain the formality of representation, I ask why it does not contain it eminently, just as it contains the formality of love and hatred, although the soul is not formally love or hatred; and just as light eminently contains heat, although it is not formally heat; and just as the first Cause eminently contains the specific formalities of gold, the sun, a lion, etc., although it does not have them formally in itself.

70. Experience is added: for if the organ is injured or the influx of spirits is lacking, vision, hearing, smell, etc., are not elicited although the soul is present and the object applied. By this it seems sufficiently shown that the soul is not an adequate capacity for vital acts, for where the whole capacity and application are present, the effect follows. Therefore, although in Physics it seemed more probable to me that substance is aided by accidents in such a way that nevertheless it is of itself adequately productive of another substance, now the opposite seems more probable concerning the soul in relation to vital acts because of experience and the examples just

alleged, and also because power gives simply the capacity to be able, and in this differs from an acquired habit, which gives only the capacity to be able easily. Hence it may be gathered that if the soul were divinely deprived of powers, it could elicit no vital act unless God supplied the concurrence of the powers from elsewhere. It is replied: the capacity of the soul is identified with its perfection. But the perfection of the soul is superior to intellection. Therefore its capacity is also superior. A weak objection, which equally proves that the capacity of the soul does not need the concurrence of a species. I concede that the capacity is superior only in that sense in which the perfection is superior, namely by a superiority by which each is called a better being, but not by a superiority by which either can be called superabundant or sufficient to give being to intellection; for these superiorities are not everywhere identified.

71. To the third proof: the soul by itself roots the powers because these pertain to its connatural state, which state every substance by itself acquires for itself. But vital acts through themselves suppose the connatural state of the soul, nor proceed from it except as clothed with its properties, which on no ground are unfit to influence. Hence there is sufficient foundation for judging that they cannot proceed from the substance of the soul alone. Thus prime matter by itself roots quantity, but not extension without quantity. A stone likewise by itself produces heaviness, but not downward motion without heaviness. And the intellect by itself, or with a phantasm, produces a spiritual species, although without this species it cannot produce intellection. Nor does it matter that powers are said, if one pleases, to be more perfect than acts; for acts, because of a special character of perfection which supposes the connatural state of the soul, can still need several co-principles, as is clear from the example of extension and downward motion.

72. It is objected, 2º: although the soul has spiritual properties, it does not therefore follow that they are partially active of vital acts. Therefore it does not follow that they are powers. The antecedent is proved, 1º, because no special formality of acts corresponds to those properties. 2º, because the property of prime matter, namely quantity, is not partially receptive of substantial form. Therefore neither should the properties of the soul be partially active of the operations of the soul. 3º, because the soul can need those properties not as capacities but as prior conditions for the production of acts, in the way in which the intellect needs apprehension in order to judge and premises for the conclusion, and the will intention of the end for choice of means. I answer by denying the antecedent, whose falsity was shown in the preceding chapter.

73. To the first proof: a correspondence or likeness of formalities more than generic is not necessary in equivocal causes, for these need only contain the effect either eminently, if they are more perfect, or purely virtually, if equal or less perfect. Thus God contains creatures, for example the sun or a stone, to which He is similar only in the most general notion of being or substance. Thus also heaviness contains motion, light heat, and so with others. It sometimes happens that partially concurring causes in some way divide among themselves the formalities of the effect, for example when an act of faith is produced by the soul because vital, by the infused habit because supernatural, and by the impressed species because it is representation. But even in this example the correspondence of formalities is no more than generic, nor is such a division always necessary, since one cause can purely virtually contain the same formalities of the effect which another contains formally or eminently, as is clear in an acquired habit when it concurs together with the soul toward an act, and in the seed of the male concurring with the soul of the female to produce in the offspring a brute soul. See what was said in a similar matter, tr. 2, Phys., disp. 6, c. 3, n. 27 sqq. Therefore, as regards correspondence or agreement in formalities, with the other indications of activity supposed, it is enough that the properties of the soul agree with the acts in the notion of a spiritual accident pertaining to the perfection of the soul insofar as intellective or volitive. Nor is it necessary to assert that they are vital except "as that by which," by way of a principle cooperating with the soul in living, from what was said above, disp. 1, n. 37.

74. To 2º, I deny the consequence, because quantity and every accidental property are disproportionate to the reception of substantial form, since they cannot constitute one through itself. But there is no difficulty in an accidental property having proportion with accidental effects, such as the acts of the soul. Hence the proof is retorted: quantity is apt to receive other accidents of matter; therefore a property of the soul is apt to produce other accidents of the same soul. It is also objected that the argument proves that no accident, and therefore neither species nor habit, can concur with the soul toward vital acts, just as no accident can concur with matter toward receiving substantial form.

75. To 3º: the activity of properties is not proved by us precisely from the fact that the soul needs them prior to acts, but from this together with the other indications enumerated in the preceding chapter. In the examples objected, however, activity can probably be admitted, especially that of the premises toward the conclusion and of intention toward choice. But even if it is denied, the disparity lies in this: if a vital act had activity toward another act of the same power, any act could produce another, for example vision a

vision, hearing another hearing, discourse a new cognition, choice a new affection, and this another new one, and so to infinity. But no difficulty of this kind occurs in the activity of the properties of the soul. To certain other examples we gave the disparity in Physics, where the activity of accident toward substance was treated.

76. It is objected, 3º: although material substances are aided by accidents toward transient operations, they are not toward immanent ones. For fire, for example, in producing heat in itself is aided by no accident. Therefore, since vital acts are immanent, they will be able to be produced by the soul without the concurrence of other accidents. This is confirmed: if it is legitimate to argue from the properties of bodies, then just as heat separated from fire produces heat, so an accidental will could produce love if divinely separated from the soul, which is absurd. I answer by denying the antecedent stated without distinction, for the motion of a stone toward the center and the extension of matter in place are not produced by substance alone, although they are immanent effects. Every material substance also, through the primary qualities, produces secondary qualities in itself, as is commonly said. But if the discussion concerns principal properties which primarily constitute the connatural state of substance, I admit that they are produced by substance alone, lest there be a process to infinity; but I say the same of the properties of the soul. Vital acts do not constitute the connatural state of the soul but suppose it, just as the transient actions of corporeal substance do. Therefore they are to be compared with these rather than with corporeal properties as regards need of an accidental co-principle. Add that the soul needs at least the concurrence of a species in order to produce intellection, although fire needs the concurrence of no accident for the production of its proper heat.

77. To the confirmation I deny the inference, and I object from quantity, which, divinely separated from matter or in the Eucharist, does not cause the extension of the parts of matter; likewise the heaviness of bread, although it moves itself, does not in the Eucharist produce the motion proper to the substance. If it be said that extension and the motion of substance, as modes of it, are inseparable from substance, I shall similarly say that the act of love either is a mode of the soul or, at least by title of an act through itself immanent and intrinsically vital, so requires the influx of the soul that without it it cannot be produced by any natural capacity, although perhaps it can be produced by God supernaturally operating. Hence the disparity to the production of heat is evident, which is neither vital nor through itself immanent. But the argument is rightly drawn from

corporeal to spiritual properties when neither reason nor experience stands against it; otherwise not, as in the inference of the objection.

78. It is objected, 4º: the soul alone understands, loves, and freely determines itself, not an accidental power. Therefore the soul alone is intellect and will. I distinguish the antecedent: the soul alone, such that "alone" excludes another co-principle which understands and loves, I grant; such that it excludes another co-principle co-effecting intellection and love, I deny the antecedent. Then I distinguish the consequence: the soul alone is intellect, and understand the same of will, when intellect is taken for the subject formally understanding, I grant; when taken for the active capacity of intellection which the soul has of itself and permanently, I deny the consequence, for this capacity arises from the soul and the superadded power. Not every principle concurring in an act of intellection or love must through that act live and therefore understand, love, or freely determine itself, as is manifest in species and habit. Otherwise there would be as many freely determining principles as there are things physically co-effecting free volition, and consequently none of them would truly be free. The soul alone, therefore, understands, etc., properly, or "as that which," because, since to understand is to live in second act, this properly belongs only to that principle which is living in first act, or alive; and this principle is substance alone, as St. Thomas notes, Summa Theologiae I, q. 18, a. 2.

79. Hence, when the name "intellect" or "intellective power" is taken for the principle which understands, it supposes for the substantial intellect alone, or for the soul alone as co-distinguished from every accident. But when that name is taken for the active capacity of intellection which belongs to the soul intrinsically and independently of species, habit, and every undue co-principle, then it signifies a complex of the soul and accidental property, yet in such a way that this complex directly or principally implies the soul and indirectly or less principally the property. In this way the intellective power simply, or intellect absolutely said, is taken; and insofar as so taken it is truly said to understand, for it suffices that it understand according to the direct signification, especially since the indirect signification does not stand materially or accidentally, as music does when it is said, "The musician builds," but conduces through itself to the exercise of understanding by way of capacity, although not by way of subject. Thus we truly say, "The faithful man believes God revealing," where "faithful" denotes a concrete composed of man and the habit of faith, because although this habit does not believe "as that which," or perform the office of the subject believing, nevertheless it contributes through itself to believing by way of a capacity co-effecting the act of faith.

80. Moreover, to understand, at least connaturally, signifies not only to receive but also to produce intellection. And although the soul under the office of recipient does not imply an accidental power, it certainly does under the office of agent. This suffices for the soul through that power to be constituted in the relation of simply capable of understanding, and therefore in the relation of intellect absolutely said, which implies both offices. But the superadded power itself, taken separately, will not rightly be called "intellect" or "intellective power" except with the addition "accidental" or "instrumental," expressed or understood.

81. It may be said: that power is in no way intellective if it in no way understands, just as that is in no way a calefactive power which in no way heats. I object from the habit of faith, which, although it does not itself believe, nevertheless is a believing power or capacity of believing. If it be replied that the habit believes "as that by which," I may likewise say that the accidental power understands "as that by which"; for in it there is a similar ground verifying this expression, namely the office of a capacity enabling the soul to elicit the act by which it understands, just as the habit enables a man to elicit the act by which he believes. But the example objected is disparate, because, since to heat is nothing other than to produce heat in some subject, whatever is calefactive or active of heat by acting itself heats. But not whatever is active of intellection by acting itself understands, as is known in species and habit.

82. It may again be said: therefore by equal right the impressed species will be called an intellective power or intellect, and a habit a volitive power or will, at least with the addition. But this is now a dispute about a name. We intend only that the soul, besides species and habits, has innate accidental faculties by which it is aided in producing vital acts. If we obtain this, we shall care little whether the name "intellect" or "will" ought to be attributed to the soul alone or also to the accidental faculty, or whether to this rather than to species or habit. Nevertheless, because, as we have already said more than once, by common usage "power of the soul" is said only of that capacity which the soul of itself naturally and permanently has, independently of the object, from which the species comes or in whose name it is posited, and independently of acts, through which a habit is acquired, therefore the consequence is to be denied.

83. Finally observe, 1º, that the superadded powers, even spiritual ones, do not seem more perfect than their acts, because they contain neither formally nor eminently the intentional life found in the acts; and certainly the accidental nutritive power is not more perfect than the substantial effect of nutrition. Yet although other powers may be called more perfect than

their acts, they can still be called "instrumental" at least in the broader sense in which faculties subordinated and due to another are called instrumental, so that they operate for its sake, its utility, and at its command. Observe, 2º, when it is said that the concurrence of a power in a supernatural act cannot be supplied by extrinsic assistance, this is to be understood of the concurrence of the substantial power, namely the soul, which must necessarily concur in the act by which it physically lives. For there is no reason why the concurrence of the accidental power cannot be divinely supplied through extrinsic assistance. Observe, 3º, that for our opinion thus far defended, as regards the human soul insofar as rational, it is enough that there be in the soul some spiritual property which is partially active of the immaterial operations of the soul. Whether, however, a property of this kind must be one or multiple, and in how many forms, will be resolved in the following chapter.

CHAPTER V.
Several Other Questions Concerning the Powers of the Soul Are Decided.

84. The questions to be resolved in this and the following chapter proceed only concerning accidental powers, which we have acknowledged as really superadded to the substance of the soul. It is asked, 1º, what are the genera of powers? I answer: Aristotle, *De anima* II, 4, 27, enumerates five, namely vegetative, sensitive, locomotive, appetitive, and intellective. The reason for this enumeration can be seen in St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 78, a. 1. But the following are to be noted. 1º, this division is not immediate, for it could have been made fourfold by comprehending sensitive and intellective under the name "cognitive," just as material and spiritual appetite are comprehended under the name "appetitive." It could also, and quite conveniently, have been made threefold by distributing powers into three classes corresponding to the soul according to the threefold grade, vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. Indeed, it could have been made still more immediately twofold, by dividing the genus of power into the operative of purely physical life and the operative of intentional life, or into the active principle of material life and of spiritual life.

85. 2º, locomotive can be taken for the more perfect sensitive power to which progressive motion is due, and thus it is not a genus of power distinct from the whole sensitive power but only from the imperfect sensitive power which does not imply the capacity of moving itself. See above, disp. 1, n. 35. But in the present matter it seems to denote the executive power of local

motion. This power does not regard an operation intrinsically and formally vital, but presuppositively and denominatively, according to what was said concerning local motion, disp. 1, nn. 17–22. To these add now in passing the authority of the Excellent Doctor, disp. 35, Met. sect. 3, n. 12, where he says, "Local motion through itself is not an action of life except insofar as it proceeds from cognition and appetite." Add also the support of the College of St. Thomas at Complutum, l. 2, *De anima*, q. 1, n. 9, and more broadly n. 197, and often elsewhere. Nevertheless, locomotive power is rightly numbered among the powers of the soul because it truly belongs to the soul as such, just as the power of digesting food in the stomach and forming chyle, whose operation certainly is not intrinsically and by reason of itself vital.

86. 3º, the said division is not ultimate, since each member is subdivided into others. For vegetative power is subdivided into nutritive, augmentative, and generative; sensitive into internal and external sense, and each of these into further members; locomotive and appetitive into spiritual and material; intellective also into memory and intellect, etc. 4º, neither does that division from the terms of its members import a distinction among them greater than formal, just as from the terms no other distinction is imported by the division of the soul into vegetative, sensitive, and rational. Whether, however, a real distinction among the powers is to be admitted, and whence it is to be taken, will be resolved in the following chapter.

87. It is asked, 2º, what are the causes of the powers? I answer: the powers have no formal cause, since they themselves are forms. Concerning the active, final, and material or receptive causes, St. Thomas says thus, Summa Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 6, ad 2: "The essence of the soul is the cause of all the powers as an end and as an active principle, but of some also as receptive." Most truly. For first, accidents are for the sake of the subject as end, or for the sake of the substance whose proper accidents they are, as St. Thomas teaches there in the body of the article, and as is known. This nevertheless does not prevent the powers also from being for the sake of acts, as we shall say later. Next, that the powers actively flow from the soul is taught expressly by St. Thomas, cit. a. 6, and proved at length and forcefully by Fr. Suárez, l. 2, *De anima*, c. 3, showing that the emanation of powers is a true action of the soul distinct from its production and explaining in what sense properties are said to be from the generator. See what we said generally of properties in Physics, tr. 2, disp. 6, c. 4. Whether some material powers are produced immediately by the generator in the first instant, although afterward conserved by the soul, will be stated shortly. Finally, that

the soul is the subject or passive cause of some powers is beyond doubt, for spiritual powers cannot be received in a corporeal subject.

88. A doubt nevertheless remains concerning the subject in which material powers are received. St. Thomas, cit. q. 77, a. 5, says that they are received in the whole composite of soul and body. Fr. Suárez, cit. c. 3, n. 3, holds that they are immediately received in matter alone through quantity, as we said of other accidents, disp. 2, *De generatione*, cc. 5–6, but that they can be said to be received in the whole composite insofar as they presuppose the whole and are subject only in matter already animated. To me it seems more probable that they do not immediately inhere in the soul even as a partial subject, both by parity with other material accidents and because it should not be asserted without urgent necessity that a spiritual soul is immediately affected by a corporeal accident, and no such necessity is present here. For the fact that by these powers the whole composite is rendered capable of operating more properly than by spiritual powers only proves that they are properties not so much of the soul as of the whole composite and denominate it more properly, because they through themselves require the union of soul with body, without which they can neither be rooted by the soul nor conserved in matter. Perhaps St. Thomas intends nothing else when he uses this argument.

89. It is asked, 3º, whether there is an order among the powers of the same soul, especially the rational soul. I answer: it is certain that some subordination is found among the powers of diverse grades concurring in the same soul. For the vegetative serve the sensitive powers, whose organs they perfect and conserve; the sensitive powers serve the rational, to which they minister species of objects. The ministering powers themselves are also reciprocally directed and protected by the superior ones. Yet there is doubt concerning order of duration, perfection, and active causality. I say, 1º: the rational soul in the first instant in which it is created and animates roots all spiritual powers in itself and has vegetative powers in the body; consequently there is no order of duration among these powers. This is certain concerning the spiritual powers, since they are properties of the soul according to itself and there is no reason why one should be rooted in time before another. Concerning the vegetative powers it is clear from the fact that the soul does not inform the body unless it is disposed for living, at least through an act of vegetating. Yet these powers, as I think, are not effected by the soul in the first instant, but are supposed under a prior sign to have been produced by the generator, because they perform the office of the ultimate disposition to the soul, as I already touched upon above, c. 3. I think the same of the tactile power or sense of touch, which likewise seems

necessary on the part of the body in the first instant of animation. After the first instant, however, these powers are rooted by the soul by way of conserving, as we said elsewhere of the properties of fire which are the ultimate disposition to form.

90. Other sensitive powers, however, are not rooted in the first instant of animation and consequently follow the aforesaid powers in order of duration. The reason is that they are not rooted until the organ of each is disposed by the figure and temperament due for operating, since they either consist in this organic disposition or presuppose it. But it seems certain that the organs of sight, hearing, etc., although already somewhat delineated in the minimum natural state, do not yet have their due figure and temperament at the first animation. Nor does it prevent this that these powers are called properties of the sensitive composite. For they are not such in the strictest sense, as though pertaining to its connatural state for every time, but in a broader sense insofar as they are due to the composite after some time and thereafter through themselves accompany it perpetually. If perhaps it is inferred from this that their production is vital, there is no difficulty.

91. I say, 2º: there is also an order of perfection among the powers, so that the rational are more perfect than the sensitive, and the sensitive than the vegetative. Thus all hold or suppose as known by the light of nature. It is objected: the vegetative power produces a substantial term, whereas the sensitive and intellective produce only an accidental term. Therefore the vegetative power should be judged more perfect. I answer: if the objection has force, it will equally prove an angel less perfect than fire or a tree, and the human soul insofar as rational less noble than the soul of a brute, and insofar as sensitive less noble than the soul of a plant. Therefore the consequence must be denied, because the perfection of a power is to be weighed not so much from the entitative perfection of the act as from the mode of vitality shining forth in it. If this more closely imitates the essential life of God, it requires a nobler power. But the imitation of Divine life is greater in an act of sensing than of vegetating by title of intentional life, and much greater in an act of understanding. Thus greater capacity is needed for the creation of an accident than for the eduction of a substance, because the mode of acting is nobler.

92. I say, 3º: it seems more true that among the powers there is no order of properly active causality. The reason can be that the natural activity of each power is circumscribed, according to common philosophy, by a certain formal notion "under which," or by a certain line of vital acts; but wholly outside that line would be the action by which one power produced another,

for example the intellective the volitive. Moreover, if the superior powers influenced the inferior, namely the intellective the sensitive and these the vegetative, as St. Thomas seems to hold, cit. q. 77, a. 7, it would follow that the human soul influences its sensitive powers otherwise and less than the brute soul influences its own, and likewise that the brute soul influences its vegetative powers less and otherwise than the soul of a plant, since the inferior soul would not need the aid of another power as the superior does. But this appears absurd. Nevertheless it must be admitted that one power results prior to another and is a prior condition for the other to emanate from the substance of the soul, just as is commonly said of subsistence in relation to other effects. This priority is reduced to the genus of active cause, just as the priority of a disposition on the part of the subject is reduced to the genus of material cause. In this sense St. Thomas can be explained, and similarly is to be understood what is commonly said, that among properties of the same essence one is rooted through another. Thus the intellective power is prior to the volitive, and both in man prior to the remaining powers, among which the vegetative precede the sensitive, as is gathered from what has been said.

93. It is asked, 4º, whether powers are capable of intensity and remission. Concerning spiritual powers this is commonly denied, because they have no contrary, arise and are conserved only from the soul which is always the same and most present, and exhibit no indication of such variation. Concerning material powers it seems to be affirmed, because we commonly experience these powers, for example the visual and nutritive, to be weakened. They also have a contrary at least mediately, namely by reason of the temperament which they require as a disposition on the part of the subject; for this reason they can be destroyed while the soul remains. It is asked, 5º, whether the powers are separable from the soul. I answer, 1º: all can divinely be separated, or exist separated from the soul, because there is no repugnance in this, as we saw above, c. 1. Nevertheless they could not produce a vital act without the soul, since of themselves they do not have adequate capacity. I answer, 2º: spiritual powers cannot naturally be separated from the soul, nor fail while it remains, because they are properties of the soul immune from a contrary, to which neither root nor subject can be lacking. Material powers likewise cannot naturally exist without the soul, both from lack of a root and from lack of an end, namely operation. Yet all can fail while the rational soul remains, as happens at the death of a man, because they are properties of the composite and because the root departs. While a material soul remains, or while the rational soul remains united to the body, several of them, especially those pertaining to

the external senses, can fail without a miracle though not without violence, as experience shows; not all, however, because unless the nutritive power at least in a remiss grade endures, death will follow.

On the Power Receptive of Vital Operations, Especially Sensations.

94. It is asked, 6º, whether accidental powers receive vital acts. I answer negatively from what was said in n. 78, because such powers do not properly live in second act; but they would live if they not only produced but also received vital acts. Hence, as regards the mode of concurring, they stand in the same way as habits and impressed species, although by a special title they are called intellective, volitive, etc., powers. Reread what was said in n. 80 sqq. Nothing nevertheless prevents accidental powers from being receptive of species and habits. Moreover, the power receiving vital acts is substance alone. Spiritual acts in man are received by the soul alone and by no means the body, as all agree. Concerning material acts, specifically human sensations, there is dispute among authors as to the substance in which they are received. For some hold that they are received in matter alone; others, if there are any, in the soul alone; most of Ours, in the whole composite, or in soul and matter simultaneously. This is also commonly held by the Thomists, whom the College of St. Thomas cites and follows, l. 2, *De anima*, q. 3, a. 4, speaking of material powers and also of sensations in the opinion denying powers distinct from the soul. This third opinion, which I think true, scarcely needs proof insofar as it says that sensation is received and sustained in matter. For since sensation is material, by its nature it must intrinsically adhere to matter, from what was said, disp. 2, n. 12 sqq. There is no reason for it thus to adhere except by title of eduction from matter as the presupposed subject.

95. It is more difficult to prove that sensation is also received in the soul. Some prove it from the fact that the soul truly senses and therefore lives through sensation; but to live is to operate immanently, that is, simultaneously to produce and receive an operation. The Contraries reply that not the soul but the composite or whole man properly senses, which Aristotle expressly taught, *De somno et vigilia* II, c. 1. This will scarcely be attacked, since it pertains to a manner of speaking, although it will be harsh to deny that the soul in the body and through the body truly imagines, sees, etc., and this against St. Augustine, who, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, cc. 19–20, says that the soul senses through the body. Others prove it because, for sensation to be vital to man, it does not suffice that it arise from one part of

the *suppositum* and be received in another. For this reason the production of habitual grace by the Word in the humanity is not formally vital to Christ the Lord, although both the Word and the humanity pertain to the constitution of Christ. Yet this proof must be rejected by us, who above, disp. 1, n. 13, said the contrary with Fr. Suárez, provided the action is immanent in the *suppositum* according to species, and there, n. 39, thence inferred that the formation of blood and seed is vital to the *suppositum*. Indeed nutrition or nutritive action, since it is without doubt vital, perhaps is immanent in the living *suppositum* in no other sense. But the production of grace, supposing an action distinct from God, although immanent in Christ, is therefore not formally vital because it does not have such immanence through itself or from its species, since it does not through itself suppose the hypostatic union.

96. Therefore the reception of sensation in the soul is better proved thus: imagination or internal sensation must be received in the soul. Therefore every other sensation also must be, since the contrary arguments either apply to none or to all. The antecedent is proved: internal sensation must enlighten and apply the soul to eliciting a material act of appetite, namely by representing to it the goodness of the object and thus intentionally moving and enticing it. But sensation cannot perform these offices except in the genus of formal cause by immediately affecting the soul itself, as is evident from what was said in c. 1 concerning intellection, which similarly enlightens and entices toward an act of the will. Therefore internal sensation must inform the soul or be received in it. It may be said: just as material appetite is not the soul appetizing but the man, so not the soul but the man must be enlightened for appetite. But against this: whatever may be the case whether the soul is denominated appetizing, there is no doubt that it, not matter, elicits the act of appetizing. Therefore it itself must be excited, moved, and enlightened in order to elicit it. For intentional excitation and motion toward appetite will be in vain if it does not modify that principle to which it belongs to elicit the act of appetite; it will be music or shouting to the deaf.

97. It may again be said with Fr. Oviedo that from this it is proved only that sensation is united to the soul as to a subject of information, but not that it is educed from the soul passively causing and inheres in it as a subject of sustentation. I admit that from the terms nothing else is demonstrated by the proof given. I also admit that generally it is not repugnant that an accident passively caused by one subject be at the same time united to another subject of pure information, for we admitted something similar, disp. 2, *De generatione*, n. 78. But in the present matter, once the union of

sensation with the soul as an informable subject is admitted, there is no reason to deny the passion and inherence or sustentation of the same sensation in the same soul. For passion adds above union only dependence of the form in being made and conserved upon the presupposed subject. But sensation by force of its proper eduction can neither be made nor conserved, indeed essentially according to Oviedo, without having the soul as presupposed subject, that is, produced by another action. Certainly, if the rational soul depended upon matter in this way, no one would deny that matter was its subject, not purely informable but sustentative. The objection is urged: sensation is produced through an action essentially affixed to the soul as presupposed subject. Therefore it is educed from the soul. The consequence is clear from the concept of eduction explained elsewhere. The antecedent is proved because sensation, just as intellection, in the opinion of Fr. Oviedo is essentially its own production by the soul; and at the same time, according to the same author, it is through itself essentially united to the presupposed soul, certainly as a form to a subject.

98. It is objected, 1º: matter is not denominated sensing. Therefore it does not receive sensation. I object: matter is not denominated generating. Therefore it does not receive generation. The consequence will be denied because for matter to receive generation it suffices that it participate from it in some denomination or formal effect, namely the denomination "undergoing," or "passively aiding generation," although it does not participate in every denomination which generation can furnish, specifically the denomination "generating," which implies a relation to the active principle. By equal right I deny the consequence of the objection, because sensation is a relative form containing several denominations which are not to be attributed to one subject, and it suffices that it give some to the matter in which it is received. It contains the denomination "known" or "perceived by sense," to be attributed to the object alone; the denomination "sensing," which imbibes a relation at once to the active and passive principle, to be attributed to the soul or composite; and the denomination "sensified," or "passively aiding sensation," to be attributed to matter alone. If it is asked what "sensified matter" signifies, it signifies the same as "accidentally vivified" in the sensitive order, in the way in which matter through the brute soul is rendered "substantially vivified" in the same order.

99. It is objected, 2º: sensation is material. Therefore it cannot be received in a spiritual soul. The consequence is proved, 1º, from the common maxim, "Whatever is received is received according to the mode of the recipient." 2º, because, since a material act is divisible and extended, it would render the soul divisible and extended. 3º, because a spiritual act

cannot be received in matter even as in a partial subject. Therefore neither conversely, etc. 4º, by parity with other material accidents, which are received in matter alone through quantity, not even powers being excepted. And the objection is urged: if the soul is rendered capable of seeing through a visual power received in matter alone, why is it not rendered seeing through a vision received in matter alone? 5º, because sensation could otherwise be received in a separated soul; hence the soul could sense without the body. 6º, from Oviedo: because if the soul is a partial subject of sensation, there is no reason why it cannot be an adequate subject, not from weakness or defect of perfection, as is clear, nor from disproportion or unbecomingness, because this is already supposed to have been overcome in the office of partial subject.

100. To the objection I deny the consequence if the discussion concerns the soul as a partial subject. This expression, to warn beginners of this, does not denote that one part of sensation is received in matter and another in the soul, but that the whole sensation is received in each as in subjects neither of which by itself suffices to sustain or passively cause it. Therefore the whole sensation is received in the soul with totality of effect, not with totality of passive cause; in the same way the whole sensation is elicited by the power and the whole simultaneously by the species of the object, as by partial causes. To the first proof: that maxim, taken crudely, proves that an accident cannot be received in substance, nor a supernatural form in a natural subject, nor a vital act in a non-vital subject, and consequently neither sensation in matter. It must therefore be understood of connatural reception, which must imply some denomination or perfection congruent with the character of the subject, so that no subject is connaturally receptive of a form by which it cannot in some way be perfected and denominated according to its nature. In this way sensation, although material, is received according to the mode of the spiritual soul, because, since this is sensitive by its nature, it is denominated and perfected in the *esse* of such by that act.

101. To 2º, I deny the inference, because a form need not furnish to the subject all the denominations which it contains in itself. Otherwise grace would render the soul accidental, supernatural, intense, and divisible or gradually composite. It therefore needs to furnish only those of which the form itself is the formal principle, in the way grace is the formal principle of sanctifying, light of illuminating, soul of vivifying, extension of extending; and indeed, if a form contains several, not all but only some denomination congruent with the character of the subject, as is seen in sensation itself with respect to matter. But sensation is not the formal principle of extending or of having integral parts, since it is not extension or divisibility in the

abstract. And even if it were, it would not therefore furnish those denominations incongruent with the soul, but another congruent one, namely "sensing." Moreover, for sensation to be proved absolutely divisible and extended, it suffices that it through itself inhere in matter as a partial subject, just as from the same ground it is proved absolutely material, as I shall soon say. Yet those parts of sensation which are coextended with matter, when received in the indivisible soul, do not make intensity, both because they are not heterogeneous and because they are not received in the soul except as united to extended matter and therefore as existing in a divisible place or in many partial places. Hence it comes about that those parts, insofar as received in the soul, are not penetrated by one another, because they are not united to the soul in the same place, just as the head and feet do not penetrate one another although united to the same indivisible soul.

102. To 3°, I deny the consequence, because an accidental act received in matter as a partial subject truly depends upon it; hence it cannot be spiritual, because spirituality is explained negatively through independence from matter and consequently excludes dependence on every ground. Materiality, however, is explained positively through dependence upon matter, and this dependence is verified if an act is truly received in matter as in a partial subject, even though it is simultaneously received in spirit; for it now does not belong wholly to spirit. See above, disp. 2, n. 13. Thus, although a spiritual and incorruptible substance cannot be constituted from a corporeal and corruptible part, nevertheless a corruptible and corporeal substance, such as man, can be constituted from an incorruptible and spiritual part.

103. To 4°, the parity is to be denied, because the proofs adduced do not apply to other accidents nor to organic powers, since through these the soul does not properly and formally live, nor is it intentionally excited or enlightened for operating. But for the soul to be rendered capable through them as capacities completing and rendering ready its substantial power, reception and immediate union are not required. For every secondary cause is rendered capable through Omnipotence applied by the decree of God; one horse through another joined to it becomes capable of drawing a cart, and one man through another of raising a weight to which he alone is unequal; matter is rendered proximately capable of receiving the form of fire through heat united through quantity; and when the integral parts of fire act by way of one, each is rendered capable of acting not only through the immediately united parts but also through others mediately united. It therefore suffices that those powers be locally present to the soul and united to it through

matter. But for the soul to be intentionally excited and moved by the previously known goodness of an object toward appetite, immediate union of sensation is necessary; for no one is enticed by a goodness which he does not immediately perceive. It may be said: therefore the accidental power too must receive sensation in order to be moved to elicit the act of appetite. I deny the consequence, or rather the supposition, namely that such a power must be intentionally moved. It suffices that the substantial power be enticed and invited, to which the other capacities minister and of themselves are determined to cooperate when it operates. Thus the habit is not invited to elicit love, but the will.

104. To 5º: this cannot occur naturally, because sensation by its nature requires to inhere in matter and presupposes its union with the soul. Nor likewise can it occur divinely if sensation identifies with itself its own eduction and passion, for thus it will be essentially inseparable from an animated body. But if sensation consists in an absolute quality and, in furnishing the formal effect "sensing," is not constituted by eduction from a connatural subject, Fr. Quirós here, disp. 82, c. 5, concedes the inference, citing several authors. To 6º: the true reason why the soul cannot be the adequate subject of sensation is the imperfection not of the soul but of sensation, which, since it is material, necessarily requires dependence upon a material subject. It obtains this if the soul is its partial subject, not if its total subject. If it is asked whence it is established that sensation is material if it can be received in a spiritual soul, I answer that this must be supposed from elsewhere, namely from the fact that we experience acts of imagining, seeing, hearing, etc., necessarily to depend upon the disposition of a bodily organ, while they never attain an object except a corporeal one, and are of the same genus as the acts of brutes.

105. Finally note, 1º, that from the fact that matter is the adequate subject of the human soul, purely informable, not sustentative, it is not rightly gathered that it is also the adequate subject of sensation. For the soul is the act of matter alone, whereas sensation is an informing act also of the soul, which it must immediately affect, as we showed. 2º, the soul does not properly live through the action of nourishing by which it ultimately converts food into the substance of the nourished thing, because this action seems to be received in matter alone. Therefore only the composite or *suppositum* properly lives through such an action and nourishes itself. And certainly in man the rational soul does not nourish itself, although it is properly called the nutritive soul because it is in man the first intrinsic active principle of nutrition, or because it is the first act of an organic body capable of nourishing itself. 3º, the sensations of brutes are likewise received

not only in the soul, in which the same reason of n. 96 applies, but also in matter, although others suppose the contrary. The reason is that the rational soul alone, as a form subsisting independently of the body, has operations proper to itself, namely spiritual ones, which do not passively depend upon matter. Concerning other forms the general rule is that, with respect to the proper motions of the composite, they share with matter in the office of nature, insofar as nature is defined as "the principle of motion and rest, etc.," so that toward motion the form concurs as active principle and matter as passive. Nor does it seem doubtful that sensation in a brute is no less proper to the whole composite and no less properly caused by the whole composite than human sensation.

CHAPTER VI.
On the Distinction and Specification of Powers.

106. The common doctrine is that powers are distinguished and specified through acts and objects: through acts immediately, through objects mediately, insofar as acts are immediately specified through them. They are specified in this way, I say, not as through something intrinsic, for the intrinsic distinguishing and specifying element of each power is its entity and specific difference, which certainly does not consist in acts and objects, but as through extrinsic or distinct terms with which powers must have an intrinsic adaptation or proportion diverse according to their diversity. Thus the instruments of an art are diversified among themselves through the uses and works to which they are destined; for from this a hammer differs formally from a saw, a brush from forceps, etc.; indeed often also through the matter, since diverse instruments are required to form a statue from bronze and from wood. In this sense it is most truly said that powers take their species from acts and objects, that is, that their essential perfection must be such as is required for producing those acts and attaining those objects which correspond to each power rather than another; and consequently that it must be diverse in powers which regard diverse acts and diverse objects. For "to be specified" and "to be diversified," even generically, are taken as the same. For this reason, and also because the diversity of objects and acts is better known to us, we judge the diverse character of powers from the diverse character of acts and objects. An evident example is found in the visual and auditory powers compared with one another. Yet this truth, clear under these terms, is commonly not a little confused and obscured by many when it is further unfolded.

107. I say, 1º: the real distinction of powers, namely that which makes powers really several, prescinding from specific or purely numerical diversity, is not sufficiently taken or proved from diversity of acts or objects unless some other assistance is added. Thus Fr. Suárez expressly holds, l. 2, *De anima*, c. 2, n. 19. Nor does the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas seem otherwise, who, when they say that powers are distinguished through acts and objects, speak of formal or specific distinction, supposing from elsewhere a known real distinction which is commonly called material and numerical or entitative. In the same way, those who hold that the parts of the brute soul are rendered heterogeneous or specifically dissimilar from the diversity of accidents and operations suppose from elsewhere that it is proved that the brute soul is not indivisible but consists of really distinct parts. Indeed, unless this were known from elsewhere, it would be proved in vain from diversity of organs and acts, as is clear in the rational soul. Hence the reason for our assertion is given, from which several Thomists seem to dissent, at least in manner of speaking. For if the rational soul, really one, suffices in man for the whole variety of vital acts and objects, why would not an accidental power really one likewise suffice, as far as the ground of this variety is concerned? Or at least a twofold power, so that each may be less universal in operating than the soul: one for all spiritual acts, the other for all material ones?

108. It may be said that there is a disparity because a power is specified by acts and objects, but the soul is not. But I ask again: why could not one really single power be specified by the whole collection of spiritual acts and of the objects corresponding to them? Or, what comes to the same, by some notion common to all those acts or objects? Certainly powers are not specified by acts however diverse. For very diverse acts arise from the same power; for example, from the same intellect science, opinion, and error; and from the same will love and hatred; and under each of these genera innumerable species of acts. The same occurs in objects, for one intellect regards the objects of all sciences, surely very diverse, regards substance and accident, corporeal and incorporeal being, and every genus of beings; nor is the extension of one will less. Therefore each power is specified only by that common notion in which all and only the acts producible by such a power agree, or by that formal notion in which all the objects which it regards through the whole collection of acts agree. For this reason the intellect is said to be specified on the side of acts by the common notion of "intellection" or "spiritual cognition," and on the side of objects by the notion of "true" or "being."

109. But in order to know what that common notion is, it is necessary from elsewhere to know beforehand to which acts the power is really limited or extended, and to which objects. For one who wishes to say that intellect is not really distinguished from will nor limited to intellections but extends also to volitions will consequently deny that intellect is specified by the notion of "intellection," since that notion is not common to all acts of such a power, and he will assign another more universal one, namely the notion of "spiritual vitality in second act" or "incorporeal intentional tendency," and in the object the notion of "being" insofar as objectifiable by immaterial acts. This notion comprehends "true" and "good" and sufficiently diversifies spiritual power from sensitive powers. How will such a speaker be attacked from the ground of specification? Moreover, if I were to say that there are really several intellects and that each is specified not by true as such but one by true as opinable, another by true as knowable scientifically, or one by mathematical truth, another by physical truth, etc., and similarly by acts limited to these objects, just as there are several senses which are not specified by sensible as such but one by sensible colored, another by sensible sounding, etc.; or just as there are several habits of sciences, namely Physics, Mathematics, etc., supposing each to be a simple quality, each of which is specified by a limited genus of intellection and truth—if, I say, I were to assert this, what could be opposed to me from the ground of specification?

110. If it is said that the notion of mathematical truth is material with respect to intellect and formal with respect to habit, the principle is begged, because that notion is said to be material to one and not to the other precisely because one rather than the other extends beyond it to acts and objects of diverse nature. Once this extension is denied, that notion will without doubt be formal both to intellect and to habit. Therefore it is supposed what had to be proved, and what will never be proved by this specifying principle, namely that there is no intellect limited to mathematical truth and really distinct from an intellect regarding all truth. If it is again said that some power must be specified by the notion of intellection as such, I again insist: why by this notion rather than by the notion of intentional life as such, or spiritual life as such, which comprehends intellection and volition? Likewise, why will there not be, beyond the universal intellect specified by intellection as such and by intelligible as such, a multiple particular intellect for mathematical intelligible, physical intelligible, etc., just as beyond common sense specified by sensible as such there is a fivefold particular sense for sensible as tasteful, sonorous, etc.? Why will tasteful and sonorous specify distinct powers more

than a physical and logical object, or knowable and opinable, or substance and accident?

111. Add to these, 1º, that "true" and "good," although they are distinguished not really but only formally or as to the explicit, nevertheless cause in the genus of end or specifying principle the whole diversity found between acts of understanding and willing. Why, therefore, could not one really single power, formally or explicitly multiple, cause that diversity in the genus of efficient cause? Add, 2º, that a purely physical power is also specified by its actions and their terms, which are as though objects to it; and yet the same light is a power of illuminating and heating, which seem functions no less diverse than understanding and willing. Add, 3º, that passive power also is specified by the passions and forms which it receives; and yet the same matter or quantity is a passive power for every genus of corporeal qualities, among which, for example between light and taste, there appears no lesser diversity than between volition and intellection.

112. I say, 2º: the real distinction of powers among themselves must be proved from other grounds. First, from separability as to place; for from this it is sufficiently evident that sight, hearing, taste, and smell are really distinguished both among themselves and from imagination or internal sense. Next, from separability in existing, at least not mutual. Hence the powers just enumerated are really distinguished not only from one another but also from touch and the nutritive power, because they can perish while touch and some nutrition remain, even in their organs, for example in the ears or nostrils. Similarly the distinction of intellect and will from organic powers can be proved, because the latter cannot exist without a body, whereas the former can. Finally, among powers which are in the same place and are never separated in existing, namely intellect and will, or imagination and sensitive appetite, a prudent conjecture must be used to prove a real distinction. For it can scarcely be proved by metaphysical arguments or ones convincing the obstinate, as is sufficiently gathered from what has been said, especially since intellection and volition seem acts more connected or reciprocally ordered than science and opinion; for every volition supposes intellection, and several intellections suppose volition. To this also pertains the absence of real distinction between true and good.

113. Fr. Suárez, loc. cit., says that this distinction must be gathered "from the great diversity in the mode of operating and attaining the object, with the limitation and imperfection of created powers added." These indications, together with the common judgment of the wise, ground an argument prudentially efficacious for real distinction. For it is highly fitting that one accidental power should not have as broad a sphere of activity as

the rational soul itself insofar as spiritually operative. But if the modes of operating and attaining objects must be divided among distinct powers, none have greater right than those implied by intellection and volition, since there are none in the genus of immaterial life more diverse. For intellection attains the object by way of a certain penetration and assimilation, whereas volition by way of a certain weight toward the object itself. The common judgment of the wise also favors this; for if very few are excepted, once distinction of powers from the soul is supposed, they also acknowledge a real distinction between the intellective and volitive powers. Nor does it prevent this that the substantial will is distinguished from the substantial intellect only as to the explicit. For just as acts of understanding and willing nevertheless turn out to be mutually distinct and very diverse, so too accidental powers. But the arguments which we gave above for the substantial will do not apply to the accidental, since this latter does not properly will, love, or become enticed by the object, etc.

114. The same reason does not hold for a plurality of intellects, both because common judgment resists it, because through the distinction of intellect from will the limitation of accidental power in comparison with the soul is satisfied, and because all intellections agree in a mode of tending by assimilation. Nor likewise is there the same reason for spiritual memory, specifically taken, to be really distinguished from intellect; hence the common opinion with St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 79, a. 7, denies it to be distinct. For memory is a power conserving or retaining species and recollecting things previously known. But both capacities pertain to intellect, which, just as it first receives, also retains species; and just as it first knows objects, so it recollects or recognizes that it has known them. Memory, however, reduplicatively taken insofar as retaining species is inadequately distinguished from intellect, namely insofar as it expresses actual retention of species. And because this retention, or treasury of species, once had, permanently accompanies the soul, it is therefore not unfittingly comprehended under the name "power" and together with intellect and will effects a certain trinity of powers. The same is to be judged concerning the absence of real distinction of material memory from imagination. Moreover, between imagination and sensitive appetite there is almost the same reason for distinction as between intellect and will. The same or a similar reason holds between the nutritive power and touch. Likewise between any power productive of a formally vital act and the locomotive power, both corporeal and spiritual, proper to the rational soul. Concerning certain other distinctions which are disputed, we shall speak in their proper place.

115. I say, 3º: once a real distinction is supposed, and therefore once it is discovered to what genus of objects and acts each power is limited, the specific distinction or essential diversity of powers, and also their unequal perfection, is rightly gathered and taken from the diversity of acts and objects and from their unequal perfection. The reason is clear, because accidental powers, of which alone we speak, are for the sake of acts and intrinsically and essentially express a transcendental order to them, and through acts to objects. But since such an order is necessarily diversified from diversity of the term, if it is established that one power regards a collection of acts diverse from the collection of acts of another power, it is necessary that it differ essentially from that other. It must also be more perfect than the other if its collection is more perfect, because it virtually contains better acts. To this pertains the analogy of instruments of art discussed above, n. 106. I speak of the collection of acts because, if one power contains many species of acts, it is not said to be specified by each of them. First, because from this it is not sufficiently evident how much the power can do or how great its essential perfection is. Again, because for a power to be specified by an act is for it to be rendered essentially diverse from a power regarding a diverse act. Hence, when the same really single power regards acts diverse in species, for example visions of whiteness and blackness, if it were specified by one of them, it would be rendered essentially diverse from itself, which is repugnant unless the discussion concerns precisive diversity according to inadequate concepts.

116. It comes to the same when it is commonly said that a power is specified by the notion "under which," that is, by that common predicate found in all its acts and not in others of a diverse power, for example intellect by the notion of "immaterial cognition." For that notion specifies the power not as prescinded from its inferiors, but as truly belonging to all of them, and therefore coincides with the whole collection of acts. Nor for specification is more than a fundamental unity of univocal or analogical notion required. We must reason similarly concerning objects. For a power is not specified by an inadequate object or a particular species, when it regards several diverse in species, but by the adequate object, that is, by the collection of all formal objects corresponding to the collection of acts, or by the predicate common to all, which is the notion "under which" on the side of the object; for example intellect by the notion of "being" or "true" in common. This notion alone is called "formal" with respect to the intellective power. But the notion of "being" limited, for example the notion of "substance," is called "material" with respect to the same power, not because it is a material object or is not attained for its own sake, but because

it stands as though materially for intellect truly to understand and to show itself diverse from will; for to this it suffices that it understand accident.

117. If it is asked how the notions of "true" and "good," since they are distinguished only formally and as to the explicit, can derive a real diversity between intellect and will, perhaps someone may say that these powers are diversified not so much from the object as from the mode in which their acts tend concerning the same object, and that the diversity of not all powers is taken from the object but only of those which it is established tend toward really diverse objects, such as the visual and auditory powers. For in other respects it seems clear that powers can differ among themselves from a diverse mode or diverse perfection of operating even though they agree in the adequate object, as in angelic intellects, which, compared both with one another and with the human intellect, can scarcely be reduced to the same lowest species, although all regard the same objective notion under which. But, to omit this, as regards intellect and will it can be said that "true and good" of themselves derive only a formal or rational distinction in the powers. But such a distinction, if a real distinction accrues or is supposed from elsewhere, as is supposed in these powers, becomes a real specific or generic diversity. Thus the grades of soul, vegetative, sensitive, and rational, from the terms imply only a formal distinction and therefore are really the same in the human soul; but where a real distinction is proved from elsewhere, as in a brute and plant, that formal distinction becomes a real diversity.

118. Whether, however, a power can also be specified by a material object, for example if two powers were given agreeing in formal object, one of which could not attain the material object of the other, and whether from this they would become diverse in species, seems to be answered affirmatively if the discussion concerns a material object immediately attained in itself, which among many also deserves the name formal object. For a power has an intrinsic order to such an object, and this order, if it belongs to one rather than the other, induces a difference greater than individual or purely numerical, since it is not grounded precisely in the fact that this power is not that one, or that there are two. For this reason, if two habits of abstaining are posited from the same motive of temperance, but one from food and another from drink, they differ from one another in species.

119. But it will be asked whether the specification of a power through act and object is *a priori*. Many answer that it is only *a posteriori*, or as from an effect or sign manifesting the character of the power, in the way in which the essence or substance of a thing is also specified from its properties. The

Thomists hold that specification is *a priori*, or as from a true cause of the perfection and diversity of the power. But to explain in what genus of cause, since it is certain that the act is neither the efficient nor material nor intrinsic formal cause of the power, some say that specification from the act is as from an end or final cause; others, as from an extrinsic formal cause, by which name they understand that to which the power must be adapted and proportioned although it is not constituted from it. Both can be admitted. First, an act is truly called the end of a power, and a power is truly said to be for the sake of the act, since it therefore has such a character or quiddity because it is destined for such a genus of acts, and indeed so that "because" denotes a reason *a priori*. This is no otherwise than we truly and *a priori* say that instruments of art therefore have such a form because they are destined for such uses or works. Next, the act truly is that whose idea the Author of nature must have before His eyes, so to speak, in order to adapt and proportion the character of the power to its character, that is, to give the power such a quiddity as is required for producing such an act and through it attaining such an object. Hence, if "extrinsic formal cause" means nothing else, there is no reason to exclude it. It must nevertheless be noted that the object is not the end of the power except as to be attained through such a genus of acts; nor does the act finalize the power except as the end "which," for the end "for which" is the soul or living subject.

120. But from this it will again be asked whether powers are also specified by the soul or substance whose properties they are, so that from diversity of souls powers necessarily become diverse in species even though they seem similar in operations and objects. An example can be the visual powers of man and brute, or dog and wolf. The negative part pleases some, because it is not repugnant that the same property belong to diverse essences insofar as it is a property not in the fourth but in the second mode. Thus the light of fire and sun is of the same nature, and also the heat of fire and air, at least prescinding from heterogeneity of grades. Add that visual powers are rooted by wolf and dog according to the generic grade of animal whose perfection they express, not according to species. Yet to others the affirmative part seems more probable, because powers are truly for the sake of the soul as the end "for which." For they are given by nature to perfect the soul not only through acts but also immediately through themselves, since they are properties constituting the soul in its connatural state. Therefore, just as they are specified by acts because they are for the sake of them, so, etc. Moreover, a vital act, even if it consists in an absolute quality, is by title of immanence peculiarly connected with the soul whose act it is; from this ground it is probably said to differ in species from an act of a diverse soul

even though otherwise similar. The same can therefore be said of a power, because by title of capacity for acts through themselves immanent it is peculiarly connected with such a soul. In this it differs from the properties of inanimate things. This part seems more probable, and from it it is gathered that powers can be diversified from various grounds, any one of which suffices even if the others are lacking. To this can also be referred the diversity of intellects in diverse angels, or in angel and man. See Fr. Suárez, l. 4, *De anima*, c. 1, nn. 7–8.

Corollary on the Specification of Acts Through Objects.

121. Since the occasion presents itself, something must also be said here about the specification of acts, which it is certain are so specified through formal objects that, if it is established that the object of one is diverse in species from the object of another, it is legitimately inferred that the acts themselves differ from one another in species. Such specification can be called *a priori*, as in powers, for an act is for the sake of the object as the end "which," not indeed to be produced, unless the act is practical, nor to be perfected, but only to be attained, and in such a manner as conduces to the perfection of the soul, as the end "for which," to be obtained through the acts themselves. But if it is not desired that the object properly be the end of the act, say that it is an extrinsic formal cause in the sense explained in n. 119. Whether acts can also be specified by the material object, at least philosophically, is to be decided according to what was said above concerning powers. Now concerning the specification of acts certain things must be noted. 1º, acts even of the same power are diversified among themselves through their peculiar objects, for example visions of whiteness and blackness, because although the specific notion of such an object is called material with respect to the power, see above n. 116, nevertheless it is without doubt formal with respect to the particular act by which it is attained through itself. Otherwise acts diverse in species could not arise from the same power, which is evidently false.

122. 2º, acts do not derive their diversity from the object alone, but can also be diversified from the mode of tending concerning the same object. Thus it happens, even when the object is the same, in simple complacency and efficacious affection, in apprehension and judgment, in conditional judgment and absolute causal judgment. Hence the distinction between certain acts of diverse powers is easily taken which, although unequal in perfection and diverse, nevertheless do not differ in object; for example

when the same individual color is simultaneously perceived by ocular vision, internal sensation, and intuitive apprehension of the intellect. For the diverse essential perfection of these acts is not derived from the object, especially in the immaterial apprehension. It may be said that it is derived from the object not "which" but "by which," that is, from the formal notion "under which"; for ocular vision attains that color under the notion of "color" or "luminous," internal sensation under the notion of "sensible," intellectual apprehension under the notion of "being" or "true." This is indeed commonly said, but is not easily understood. For none of those acts attains the notion of "being," etc., taken in common; but as contracted to such a color all attain it, and all implicitly, since none has any expression other than that corresponding to these words, "such whiteness."

123. Specification from the notion "under which," for example "being," is easily understood with respect to a power when it can attain whatever is being; likewise with respect to the collection of all acts producible by such a power, compared with the collection of another power tending under a diverse notion. But it is difficult to grasp with respect to a particular act limited to an individual object, such as any one of those three concerning the same color. Something similar occurs when the will appetites good A, which the intellect proposes to it as such a good. For then the diversity of volition from cognition is easily referred to the mode of tending, but with difficulty to a diverse notion "under which" in the object.

124. Nevertheless, the specification from an objective notion "under which" among particular acts, not of the same power but of distinct powers tending under a diverse notion, can be explained in some way if it is said that this notion diversifies the genera of acts and consequently individuals of one genus from individuals of another, so that those three acts concerning the same color designated in n. 122 differ generically. That common notion diversifies, I say, because although it is not attained in common or explicitly by such an act, it is nevertheless necessary for the object to be rendered attainable through an act of such a genus, to such an extent that, if that notion were lacking, even though by a possibility or impossibility the object retained the remaining predicates, it would not be attainable through any act of such a genus. Suppose whiteness A not to be a being while remaining sensible and a color: it could not be attained by any act of intellect. Suppose it not to be sensible while remaining a being and a color: it would be attainable by no internal sensation. Suppose it not to be a color while remaining sensible and a being: it could be attained by no ocular vision. Those three acts in the individual will indeed be lacking when the notion of "such a color" is lacking, but they will not necessarily be lacking in their

genus, because provided the notion "color" remains, even if not "such," the object can be attained by another act of the same genus, namely by another ocular vision; and so with the others. The same reasoning is to be made concerning acts of understanding and willing about the same individual object.

125. 3º, finally, it is sufficiently probable that acts are also specified or diversified, at least in the physical sense, by the power, both accidental and substantial; so that if two acts arise from diverse powers or substances, they differ intrinsically from one another even though they agree in object and mode of tending. For example, if an angel and a man, or an angel and an archangel, will the same object with equal efficacy; or if a dog and a wolf equally see the same object. The reason is that a vital act, if it is its own production, must be specified by the active principle, as every physical action is; for, as St. Thomas says, Summa Theologiae I, q. 77, a. 3, "From these two an action receives its species, namely from the principle or from the end or term." But if it is an absolute quality, by title of vitality and immanence it is naturally connected with the principle from which it arises. This specification is *a priori*, as from the efficient cause; nor is it opposed to the specification of power through act as an end, for mutual causality between final and efficient causes is not repugnant. The soul also, or living substance, specifies the act not only as efficient cause but also as the end "for which."

DISPUTATION V.
ON THE MATERIAL POWERS OF THE SOUL.

We now undertake to discuss the powers in particular, and first those which are material and organic, or which pertain to the sensitive and vegetative grades of the soul. We shall survey all of them in this disputation, so that thereafter our entire labor may be devoted to explaining the spiritual powers and their acts. It is customary, indeed, to treat intentional species before the sensitive powers; but it is better to defer them for a little while, lest the continuity of the treatment of the material powers be broken.

CHAPTER I.
On the Vegetative Power.

1. Here we must recall what we said about the generation of living things and about nutrition, disp. 1, de Gener. c. 2 and 3. Supposing those points for the present, we shall add certain others pertaining to the vegetative faculty. The vegetative power is that which, by converting food into living substance, increases and repairs that substance and often renders it fit for the propagation of its own species. It is customarily divided into the nutritive, augmentative, and generative powers. Although "nutritive" is commonly taken for the vegetative power in general, it is specifically taken for the faculty of repairing, by the accession of new parts, the loss of matter dissolved from the living body; "augmentative," for the power of growing to due magnitude; "generative," for the power of producing another living

thing of the same species through generation strictly so called, which was defined in the place cited. The Thomists really distinguish the augmentative power from the nutritive. But, lest the matter be treated confusedly, it should be noted that augmentation may be taken either accidentally, that is, for an increase of quantity, or substantially, that is, for an increase of substance. It may be said: an accession of substance is not augmentation, because by this name an increase of magnitude is signified, and magnitude consists in quantity. But this is futile, for augmentation, by the force of the word, signifies increase; and who could doubt that, when a man grows, an increase of matter takes place, and that he acquires more corporeal substance? Therefore, although "magnitude of bulk" comes from quantity alone, nevertheless "magnitude of substance," that is, a plurality of integral parts requiring a greater quantity, comes from the addition of matter.

2. I say 1º: both augmentations, substantial and accidental, proceed from the same power of the soul, because the addition of bulk is, as it were, an appendage or necessary consequence of the increase of substance, and therefore is not primarily intended essentially, but as resulting from the addition of matter. Nor in vegetation is a new quantity produced, since quantity is coeval with matter; only its continuative union with the preceding quantity is produced, and this union necessarily results from the continuation of matter. But if one wishes that, just as quantity results from matter, so the continuation of quantity should result from the continuation of matter, let that pass. No new power of the soul must therefore be added, because this resultancy can be attributed to the power which regards the increase of substance, just as the resultancy of properties is attributed to the generator. Otherwise the nutritive power would likewise have to be really divided into a power repairing substance and one restoring quantity; for it is certain that nutrition also restores magnitude of bulk. Yet no one makes such a division.

3. I say 2º: the nutritive power and the augmentative power of substance are not really distinguished from one another, because each formally operates by converting food into the substance of that which is nourished; and this conversion is of the same nature whether a man grows or repairs a loss of matter. Otherwise, for as long as a man grows, up to the twenty-fifth year, since even during that period some matter is dissolved and restored by food, there will be a twofold conversion of food specifically distinct, one for augmentation and another for restoration, which is ridiculous. For this reason the same ministering faculties, of which below, serve both powers. It may be said: to restore and to increase substance are very different functions; they are also separable, for after the twenty-fifth year of life

augmentation ceases, but nutrition does not. I answer: these functions differ accidentally, that is, by reason of circumstances, but not by the intrinsic nature of the work, namely, the transmutation of food. Hence they belong to the same power, just as building or enlarging a house and repairing it are functions of the same art.

4. Every nutrition, therefore, is in reality augmentation, not only for the reason we gave disp. 1, de Gener. n. 31, but for another, clearer reason which may serve as an explanation of that one. Namely, nutrition, in the instant in which it takes place, always adds something to the living substance, which it presupposes as already existing in a prior sign as its cause. That substance certainly is not diminished in that instant; for if at that time some part of the previously possessed matter is simultaneously dissolved, that part is not presupposed for nutrition in the sign of cause, otherwise in the same instant it would both be and not be proper to the living thing. Nutrition therefore always joins a new part to the whole substance from which it arises, and accordingly always increases it in the instant in which the living thing nourishes itself. When, however, as much or more matter is lost in the same instant, or had been lost at an earlier time, as happens in advanced age, then nutrition is called not so much augmentation as restoration, because it is compared with the integrity previously possessed at an earlier time or instant. In this sense augmentation is truly said to cease after the twenty-fifth year, although in reality it does not cease when comparison is made with that integrity which, in the instant of nutrition, is presupposed in a prior sign. From this one will more readily understand what we said for preserving the vital character of nutrition in this treatise, disp. 1, n. 30. For nutrition always presupposes on the side of the cause the original matter, either in itself or in its equivalent; hence in its own instant it is always beyond the connatural state of the living thing and does not immediately repair that state. But if afterward something of the original matter is lost and a part of matter acquired through nutrition is substituted in its place, that part is then no longer conserved by a nutritive action.

5. As regards the generative power, it includes two powers: one formative of seed, and another intrinsic to the separated seed, which immediately executes the generation of the offspring. These powers are indeed really distinct from one another, for the same power cannot be that by which seed is produced by the living thing and that by which the offspring is immediately produced from the seed. The first also, and of the second there can be no doubt, is really distinguished in animals from the nutritive power of animated parts, because although the formative power of seed may be called nutritive insofar as it forms in the animal a secondary part,

nevertheless it forms an inanimate part, one which, unlike blood, is not ordered to nourishing animated parts, at least insofar as it contains a spirituous and prolific substance. The generative power, insofar as it includes those two powers, is commonly judged more perfect than the nutritive: both because it includes a vital action, namely, the formation of seed, and in addition regards a more perfect terminus, namely, the substance of a living offspring capable of subsisting by itself; and because it presupposes a more perfect living thing and one in a perfect state. Hence it does not belong to monsters, mules, and the like; it is also lacking in the aged and does not yet *inesse* in children. Aristotle called generation "the most natural work of a living thing." Various interpretations of this saying are found among the commentators cited by P. Suar. The easiest and plainest is that which takes "most natural" to mean very natural. Whoever wishes to know more about the generative faculty should consult P. Suar. l. 2, *De anima* c. 10 and 12.

6. I return to the nutritive power, in which five faculties are contained. Namely: the attractive faculty, which suitably attracts food into the stomach and thereafter into the other parts of the body; the digestive or concoctive faculty, which alters food and transmutes it into chyle and blood; the retentive faculty, which retains the useful parts of the food lest they pass away; the expulsive faculty, which excretes the feces, or parts useless for nourishment; and the nourishing, or substantially assimilative, faculty, which finally converts duly disposed food into the substance of that which is nourished. The locomotive faculty may be added, by which the lung, heart, and blood are moved in a peculiar manner, of which later. Concerning these faculties it is asked 1º whether they are really distinguished from the soul. The affirmative position must be maintained by us from what was said generally about the powers of the soul in the preceding disputation. Some except the power by which the substance of chyle and blood is produced and by which food is converted into that which is nourished, because, they say, an accident cannot actively influence substance. Thus P. Suar. held in l. 2, *De anima* c. 9. He himself, however, afterward maintained the contrary, d. 18, Met. s. 2, generally defending the concurrence of accidents toward substantial effects, which we defend with the same Distinguished Doctor in the Physics.

7. It is asked 2º whether these powers consist in the temperament of the primary qualities, especially in heat. We already defended the negative in the preceding disputation, nn. 62 and 63. But this must be understood of the power productive of the substance of chyle, blood, and the living thing, and also of the locomotive power; for it cannot be denied that temperament, and

especially heat, is a disposing power, that is, one which alters the matter of food and produces in it a suitable temperament, and in this sense pertains to the nutritive faculty of the soul. Hence it is commonly and truly said that heat is an instrument of the soul for nutrition, that is, for the digestion of food, the generation of flesh, etc. It must also be admitted that heat, in the first instant of generation, in which the vegetative power, taken specifically although not under the function of a power, is produced in a prior sign relative to the soul, actively concurs toward it as an instrument of the generating cause. Some specifically distinguish the heat proper to a living thing from elemental heat, calling it "natural" and "vital," or "vivifying," and some "celestial." This opinion is not improbable and is quite consonant with Aristotle and St. Thomas; it also pleases some Thomists with Ferrariensis, as well as other authors cited by P. Suar. 2, *De anima* c. 9. If this is true, the nutritive power must be placed in this vital heat. P. Suar. himself, however, ibid., attacks this distinction of a twofold heat and says that heat considered in itself and apart from temperament is called "elemental," while as tempered by other qualities according to the disposition of the living thing it is called "natural," "vital," etc. He also notes in c. 11 that the heat implanted from generation in animated parts is customarily called "natural" or "innate," while that which *inesse* in the blood and spirits is called "vital" and "inflowing."

8. It is asked 3º whether the said faculties are really distinguished from one another. It seems that this must be denied, at least as regards whether the first four, to which add the locomotive, are adequately distinguished from the fifth taken integrally. For all their acts are intended and posited only as dispositions toward the ultimate act of the nourishing faculty. Hence, although those powers are called ministers or servants of the fifth faculty in the formal sense, in the real sense it is fitting that the same power which intends and executes the end should procure for itself the means as such. It may be said: the effects are very diverse, and none except the last is properly vital. I answer: diversity does not prevent this when it is not intended for its own sake, but as conducing to one end. The production of blood is vital; the other motions also, although not formally, are at least dispositively or vitally vital. It may again be said: the formative power of chyle and blood resides in a determinate part; not so the nutritive, which is dispersed throughout the whole body. I answer: this proves only that the chylific faculty, for example, is not identified with the whole nutritive power, but only with that part of it which simultaneously has the power both of nourishing the stomach and of forming chyle. This part will be heterogeneous with respect to the others. For, once an accidental power is admitted, it follows that the nutritive

power, insofar as it is dispersed throughout the whole body, consists of heterogeneous parts, so that the power which nourishes bones differs from that which nourishes flesh, etc. It is nevertheless called one because it is integrated from all these parts continuatively united, just as the organization of the whole man is called one, and his temperament one, although it imports heterogeneous accidents in flesh, bone, nerve, etc.

Something on Food, Hunger, and Thirst.

9. The matter upon which the nutritive power is exercised is food. Food is divided into remote, intermediate, and proximate or ultimate. Remote food is food not yet taken in or concocted; intermediate food is food already changed into chyle; proximate or ultimate food is blood formed from chyle. Indeed, blood also pertains to intermediate food, at least with respect to the bones, whose ultimate food is marrow formed from blood. Moreover, with respect to flesh, blood perhaps must, before nourishing it, pass into a viscous and whitish humor which the ancients call "gluten," and the moderns "nutritive juice." There are also those who acknowledge two prior humors, "dew" and "cambium." And although many maintain that humors of this kind, as also milk by which the breasts are nourished, do not differ substantially from blood, the opposite nevertheless seems truer, because milk, marrow, gluten, etc., differ from blood no less than blood differs from chyle, from which it is commonly presupposed to differ substantially.

10. Drink must therefore be joined to food, as being necessary both for concoction and for the fluidity required in chyle and blood, and also for cooling, that is, restraining the sometimes excessive force of heat and dryness in the throat and stomach. According to Aristotle, food should be hot and dry; drink, cold and moist. This does not mean that these qualities must be present alone, otherwise no food would be better than pure fire, by which nevertheless no animal is nourished, but that they must predominate in the temperament of the edible or drinkable thing, at least virtually. Physicians treat of the various natures of foods. For now it is enough to observe that the same sort of food does not suit all living things, for what agrees with some is poison to others, and what is easily concocted by some cannot be concocted by others at all. This arises both from the diverse temperament of qualities and from the diversity of the acid or dissolving juice in the stomach; for there can be a diverse power in juices of this kind, just as in aqua fortis and aqua regia, the former of which dissolves silver and the latter gold, not conversely. But radically the whole variety must be reduced to the diverse power of souls.

11. Food, therefore, must be "suitable" relatively, so that it can easily be assimilated to the living thing which takes it, not indeed by retaining its whole substance and changing only the texture of its particles, as the modern Corpuscularians maintain, who are therefore compelled to acknowledge no difference in substance between an ox and hay, between a wolf and a sheep, and so with the rest, but by admitting suitable qualities by which the matter of food is prepared, upon losing its own form, to receive the soul of that which is nourished. But Aristotle's statement, 2, de Gener., t. 50, "We are nourished by the same things from which we are constituted," which the Corpuscularians allege for themselves, must be understood of the four elements as regards matter and qualities, as is clearly evident from the context and doctrine of Aristotle.

12. Hunger is defined as "an appetite for the hot and dry," that is, for food; thirst as "an appetite for the cold and moist," that is, for drink. Hunger is aroused when the stomach is empty and its inner coats are plucked or bitten by a certain humor. Some think this to be an abundance of melancholy drawn from the spleen, which gnaws the mouth of the stomach; others think it to be the acidic juices given to the stomach for dissolving food, whose sharp points, while food is absent, unpleasantly irritate the coats of the stomach, and especially its upper opening. From this there arises a sensation there which seems to pertain to touch, and whose species, communicated through the nerves to the brain, causes in the common sense an experimental and quasi-practical cognition of the need for food, from which appetite immediately arises. Thirst is aroused by excessive dryness mixed with heat, which scorches the stomach and throat and arises from saltness and from any causes inducing heat. Hence there is an unpleasant sensation which, likewise as in hunger, informs the brain of the need for drink, so that it may desire it.

On the Motion of the Heart, the Circulation of the Blood, and Respiration.

13. Since the life of the animal, especially its vegetative life, depends greatly upon these three, something must here be said concerning their manner and causes. It must be supposed that there are two cavities in the heart, or two recesses, which they call the "ventricles of the heart," one right and the other left; and that into each are inserted the openings of two blood-vessels, that is, a vein and an artery, through which blood enters and departs. Blood enters the right ventricle of the heart through the "vena cava," which collects blood from the liver and the rest of the body through various

branches, as it were; it leaves the same ventricle through the "pulmonary artery," which others call the "arterial vein," and which runs from the heart to the lungs. Blood enters the left ventricle through the "pulmonary vein," which others call the "venous artery," and which carries it from the lungs to the heart; it leaves through the "great artery," which is also called the "aorta," and which, branching in many ways, disperses throughout the whole body the blood coming from the heart.

14. Thus blood enters the heart through the two veins inserted on either side and exits through the same number of arteries, not conversely. This is evident from the membranous valves visible in the openings of the veins and arteries joined to the heart; for the valves in the veins are so disposed that they readily yield to blood flowing toward the heart, but close against reflux, while in the arteries the arrangement is the contrary: they open to blood leaving the heart and close against its return. The same is evident by experiment: for if the vena cava is tied or compressed near the heart, the part nearer the heart is emptied, while the more distant part swells, and the heart is in danger of extinction from lack of blood. The contrary occurs if the pulmonary artery or aorta is tied or compressed, and then the heart is in danger of suffocation from an abundance of blood.

15. As regards the motion of the heart, it is certain that the heart is unceasingly moved by alternating motions of contraction and dilation, which by Greek names are called "systole" and "diastole." In dilation, or diastole, the heart receives blood from the veins; in contraction, or systole, it presses the blood out, as it were, and pours it into the arteries. But the cause of this twofold and restless motion is disputed, with no small disagreement among the modern Corpuscularians. Some reduce the cause to the motion of the blood flowing in and out; others, to the motion of the lungs; others, to the impulse of spirits descending from the brain through the nerves all the way to the heart. But the first opinion is rejected because the motion of the blood proceeds rather from the heart than conversely; hence blood flows with greater force through arteries nearer the heart. Otherwise an even greater difficulty will remain in explaining whence the circulation of the blood proceeds. Add that in the heart torn from certain animals, especially a viper and an eel, the motion of the heart continues for many hours without any influx of blood. By this experiment the second opinion is also rejected, and likewise because the fetus enclosed in the womb has motion of the heart while the lung is at rest, as do fish, which lack lungs. The third is rejected both because motions proceeding from the brain presuppose cognition and are spontaneous, whereas the motion of the heart is not of this kind, and

because no cause is assigned which introduces so orderly an abundance of spirits and governs the heart's motion in so fixed a manner.

16. Descartes thinks that, as soon as blood enters the ventricles, a sudden effervescence and consequent rarefaction occurs because of the heat implanted in the heart, by which the heart is dilated; then, as soon as the valves of the arteries are opened, the blood is poured into them, and when it departs the heart, left to itself, contracts again, although this occurs almost in the blink of an eye. Many Atomists attack this opinion because, they say, there is not so much heat in the heart as to make the blood suddenly boil, indeed no more than in the other viscera, and the heat of the heart seems rather to arise from the blood than conversely. But the Atomists use this argument inconsistently, since they themselves must admit a boiling of the blood throughout the whole body, seeing that in place of the soul they posit in brutes, and even in man as regards bodily motions, a vigorous and active flame of fire inhabiting all the inner parts of the body. For why should blood applied to living fire not boil? Or indeed why should it not be fried or roasted, as happens in kitchens?

17. Moreover, they unjustifiably deny that there is more heat in the heart than in other viscera, or that the heat of the blood comes rather from the heart than conversely. For the heart, as the Atomists themselves suppose, is the workshop of the vital spirits, which excel especially in heat; and arterial blood is hotter the more recently it has departed from the heart. Indeed, the principal utility discovered in the circulation of the blood consists in this, that by constantly passing through the heart the blood renews the heat which elsewhere it has lost or which has been diminished. Hence venous blood is more tepid than arterial blood, because it has made a longer journey since flowing from the heart. That blood therefore becomes considerably heated in the heart is manifest. And Descartes's opinion is better attacked by the experiment of motion in the torn-out heart of a viper.

18. In general, however, all these authors must be rejected because, being utterly forgetful of the power of the soul, as though the soul did nothing in moving the body, they devote themselves entirely to searching for mechanical causes, usually with unhappy success, since they often seek them where they do not exist. The principal cause of the motion of the heart, therefore, is the soul, whose quiddity or nature is such that it effects vital motions, or motions useful for life, in a duly disposed body. For this reason even the Corpuscularians themselves posit in brutes and plants, in place of the soul, something subtle and capable of causing motions. But when afterward, without making any mention of this, they derive the causes of bodily motions from elsewhere, they sufficiently show that they were

induced to posit such a soul for political rather than physical reasons. I grant, however, that in moving the heart the soul uses vital spirits, not descending from the brain but formed in the heart itself, as instruments moved by itself. If it is objected that a torn-out heart continues to move although the soul is now absent, I answer: in the torn-out heart of a viper and of other imperfect animals, part of the soul remains for some time; but in the heart of a man or perfect brute no orderly and alternating motion through systole and diastole remains. Sometimes only a disordered motion is observed for a short time, which must be attributed to the spirits while they continue to endure.

19. The circulation of the blood consists in this: all the blood of animals, excepting those portions which the living members imbibe when sufficiently concocted and retain adhering to themselves, flows from the capillaries, or extreme branches of the veins, into the trunk of the vena cava, by which it enters the right ventricle of the heart; leaving there through the pulmonary artery, it returns through the pulmonary vein to the left ventricle of the same heart, whence it again flows out into the aorta, and is then distributed through the whole body by the branches of the aorta and the smaller branches of those branches; until, having left the arteries and entered the capillary branches of the veins, it flows back into the vena cava. Returning again through this to the heart, it unceasingly completes the same circuit. This circulation, unknown to the ancients, is beyond doubt among moderns and is demonstrated by many observations and experiments.

20. It is certain that all arteries communicate both with one another and with the veins, for whichever artery or vein is ruptured, all the animal's blood flows out unless it is stopped. It is also certain from what was said in n. 14 that blood is carried through the vena cava to the heart and leaves it through the aorta, not the reverse. It is further certain that blood flows through the arteries from the center of the body toward the extremities, but through the veins from the parts toward the center, or toward the trunk of the vena cava joined to the heart. For if an artery is cut in the thigh or throat of an animal, the part nearer the heart emits abundant blood, while the more distant part emits almost none. Conversely, if a vein is cut, blood flows abundantly from the more distant part, but not from the nearer. Hence phlebotomists bind the leg or arm above the place intended for the incision of the vein, so that blood coming from the extremity, its course toward the heart being impeded, may spring more abundantly through the incision; and consequently its flow is easily stopped if the vein below the incision is pressed with a finger. This is also demonstrated by the valves which anatomists observe not only at the openings near the heart, as we said in n.

14, but also at almost all the junctions of the veins where branches meet. These are so constructed as to yield to blood coming from the branches toward the trunk but to prevent its return should it happen to be driven back from the trunk toward the branches.

21. Moreover, it has been established by experiment, concerning which see the author Philos. Burgund. tom. 6, tr. 2, d. 2, c. 3, that an external liquid introduced into the aortic vein enters the branches of the vena cava dispersed through the liver, and thence passes into the trunk of the same vena cava, then into the right chamber of the heart, then into the pulmonary artery, then through the pulmonary vein into the left ventricle of the heart, thence into the aorta, and finally into the branches of the aorta. Finally, omitting other things which may, if desired, be seen in Tosca tr. 10, lib. 3, propos. 33, the heart at each pulse of the artery pours some blood into the aorta, which many maintain to be half an ounce. But even if it is only one scruple, since more than three thousand arterial pulsations are counted within an hour, the heart will pour out more than ten pounds of blood in an hour. Hence within two or three hours all the blood must pass through the heart, since the quantity of blood in the human body scarcely ever exceeds twenty-four pounds. Therefore, if the same blood does not return to the heart, within three hours the veins will remain emptied and the heart bloodless, for a new supply of blood cannot be generated in so short a time. But if one imagines that it is generated anew, I ask, where does all the blood poured into the aorta go? How does it not rupture the arteries and even the skin, so as to flow outside the body?

22. If it is asked by what impulse blood is driven from the arteries into the veins, and by what route it is carried into the small branches of the veins, since there are no anastomoses or inosculations of vessels between arteries and veins, I answer: the blood is chiefly driven by other portions of blood pressing from behind, which perpetually burst forth with force from the heart as from a fountain; it is also greatly assisted by the continual pressure of the nerves together with the motion of the diaphragm and other viscera. It is probable, moreover, that there are some anastomoses between arteries and veins; and where there are none, it can happen that blood leaving the arteries enters the veins through blind passages in the flesh, just as rainwater flows through the pores of the earth into the veins of springs. Hence wherever flesh is punctured, blood springs forth. However this happens, it must not be doubted that blood passes from the arteries into the veins, both from what has been said and because, if an artery near a vein is tightly bound, blood does not flow from the opened vein until the ligature of the artery is loosened. Finally, in the economy of the blood, as in the other

things pertaining to life, something must be attributed to the power of the soul.

23. Lastly, two things should be noted. 1º Arterial blood differs from venous blood only accidentally, namely, insofar as it is hotter, more spirituous, and flows more swiftly, since it has been more recently emitted from the fountain of the heart, from which it draws heat, an abundance of spirits, and impetus. But the farther it proceeds into the smaller branches of the arteries, the more gradually its heat and impetus are diminished, and many spirits are dissipated. Hence, when it enters the small veins, the blood is more tepid and slower. Nature has therefore provided that it return to the heart, where it may again become heated and be driven onward. And this is the principal utility of circulation: to renew heat in the blood, by which the heat innate in the members is fostered and new spirits are supplied to the whole body. There are also other utilities which physicians consider. 2º The arteries participate from the heart in a certain diastole and systole as well. For in the systole of the heart the artery is dilated by the accession of new blood, while in the diastole of the heart the artery subsides because it has expelled an equal quantity of the blood previously contained. From this alternating motion comes the pulsation of the artery. This indeed occurs throughout the whole artery, although it is not felt by a pressing finger except where the artery is near the skin and, supported by some bone, manifests the force of its motion against the skin, as happens at the wrist. Nor are there lacking those who think that arteries possess a proper pulsific power by which they continually move themselves with a peristaltic motion.

24. Respiration includes two motions: inspiration, by which air is drawn into the lungs, and expiration, by which it is sent out. Both take place through the internal tube which is called both the "trachea" and the "rough artery." This extends through the front part of the neck from the mouth into the lung. Its uppermost part, nearest the mouth, called the "larynx," consists of many muscles and cartilages which leave a slit suitable for receiving and expelling air. When needed, this slit is covered by a certain cartilaginous tongue called the "epiglottis," whose use is both to prevent any food or drink from slipping into the trachea, and also, by its motion and reverberation under the impulse of exhaled air, to regulate the voice and vary it by tones, especially in singing. Articulated voice, however, of which words consist, is subsequently formed in the mouth by the ministry of the tongue, palate, teeth, and lips. The aforesaid tube, before reaching the lungs, divides into two branches, which enter the right and left lung, where they thereafter send out various smaller branches. The lung, enclosed within the cavity of the chest, is a spongy substance consisting entirely of small tubes and vesicles

contained within the membrane which covers it; it is also interwoven with small veins and arteries, as with so many branches of the pulmonary vein and artery, through which it communicates blood with the heart. By the mediastinum it is divided into two parts, right and left, which are therefore called in the plural "lungs" and in a certain way embrace the heart on either side.

25. The immediate cause of respiration, therefore, is the dilation and constriction of the lungs. For when the lungs are expanded, air is drawn in through the trachea, whether by an attractive force implanted in the lungs, by the pressure of the surrounding air, or by the law of nature prohibiting a vacuum; but when they are contracted, air is expelled through the same tube. The question is whether contraction and dilation of this kind proceed from a proper motive power of the lungs, or from the muscles which at the same time move the thorax with its parts, namely, the breast, diaphragm, and ribs. Most today judge the latter to be the case. But there is no reason to deny the former. For since the soul informs the lungs as principal instruments of respiration, why should it not communicate to them a power suitable for discharging this function? It therefore seems truer that the motions of the lung and thorax are mutually connected and are simultaneously [illegible] by nature caused by the proper power of each. The spirits, however, contribute greatly to them, not only the vital spirits but the animal spirits, which serve spontaneous motions. For respiration is a motion partly natural, as is evident in those sleeping, and partly voluntary, insofar as it can be accelerated by the will or appetite, or even held for a time.

26. The principal question is for what end respiration has been granted to most animals. The common opinion hitherto has been that respiration was instituted by nature principally so that the viscera might be cooled by inspired air. But the modern Corpuscularians, whom Tosca follows tr. 10, l. 5, prop. 9, contend that the principal use of respiration is that something from the air infused into the lungs may be transmitted into the blood, by which its heat and effervescence are conserved and increased. They maintain that this "something" is spirit of nitre and ammoniac salt, with which ferments, being highly volatile, the air is abundantly filled. But this opinion plainly seems contrary to experience.

27. For we desire respiration most of all when we are hot, as in a burning fever, violent bodily exercise, and excessively hot surrounding air. Hence dogs in summer, even when fatigued by no work, breathe more frequently and vehemently. At such times respiration is without doubt desired for the sake of cooling; or at least it is not sought for the increase of the heat and effervescence of the blood, which is already boiling more than is proper. And

if new ferments were needed, they would not be found more in cold air than in hot. Moreover, it is not evident why so frequent a summoning of new ferment should be so necessary that, when it is interrupted, the life of the animal is immediately extinguished. For why should ferments previously received or extracted from food not suffice to preserve the effervescence of the blood at least for some hours? The Atomists could more easily explain the necessity and use of respiration if they remembered that fire in which they maintain the sensitive soul to consist. For such a soul, in order that it "be conserved," will need ventilation and respiration, since nothing is better known than that fire is extinguished unless it breathes.

28. As far as we are concerned, we say that the principal use of respiration is to cool in the lung the blood passing through it, so that it may again flow into the heart as is required. For blood newly emitted from the right ventricle of the heart, because of the effervescence contracted there, excessively fills and distends the lungs and cannot easily enter the narrow branches of the pulmonary vein through which it must be carried to the left ventricle of the heart, unless by the admission of air it cools somewhat and is reduced to a smaller bulk. Hence, when respiration is interrupted, no blood or very little returns from the lung to the left ventricle of the heart, in which blood consequently fails while it abounds in the lungs. From this immediately follow suffocation of the lungs, extinction of the heart, and the death of the whole animal. If the fetus enclosed in the mother's womb does not need respiration, the reason is that it then uses more temperate blood. It must not, however, be denied that from qualities, ferments, or vapors mixed with inspired air something is transmitted into the viscera and blood; for for this reason it greatly affects health whether one uses wholesome or unwholesome air. Indeed, exhaled air in turn receives something from the viscera; hence it is contagious when exhaled from infected bodies.

CHAPTER II.

That Sensation Does Not Consist in Local Motion Alone, Demonstrated Against the Corpuscularians.

29. The modern Corpuscularians, namely, Cartesians, Atomists, and the other moderns who disdain the Peripatetic school, since they acknowledge no corporeal action except local motion, maintain that every sensation consists solely in such motion. Tosca embraces their doctrine and explains it more openly than the others in Compend. Philos. tr. 10, especially lib. 2 and 6. I shall principally follow his positions, omitting the various modes of explanation which others devise, each according to his pleasure. The sum is

this. Sensible objects make some impression upon the organs of the external senses, that is, they move their nervous coats and fibers by pressing, curling, plucking, striking them in waves, contracting, stretching, or otherwise moving them. This affection or motion shakes the nerves which extend from those organs, like strings on a cithara, as far as the common sensorium, or organ of the common sense, situated in that part of the brain where lies the origin of all the nerves dispersed throughout the body. Some of these are "motor" nerves, that is, destined to move the hands, feet, and other members; others are "sensory" or "sense-bearing" nerves, that is, destined to communicate to the brain the impressions of external objects.

30. Thus, as soon as the sense-bearing nerves are shaken, they transfer to the aforesaid part of the brain the motion received from the object, just as a string of a cithara, struck at one extremity, immediately transfers the motion to the other. This transmission or propagation of motion depends greatly upon the animal spirits, which are exceedingly subtle vapors extracted from arterial blood and are contained and float within the fibers of which the nerves consist, hollowed out like small tubes. For these spirits both distend the nerves so that they may tremble more, and are themselves shaken by the impulse of the object and agitated within the fibers by a certain undulation, which they communicate to the brain by driving other spirits before them up to it. From the nerves and spirits thus moved by the object there consequently results a similar motion in the common sensorium, namely, in the texture or plexus formed in the aforesaid part of the brain from a great many small fibers, which are, as it were, the roots of the nerves. There then follows in this plexus a certain pulling apart, by force of which, according to the variety of objects, now these and now those small mouths or openings of the nerves serving motion are immediately opened; through the opened entrances the animal spirits at once rush from the sensory nerves into the motor nerves, and by their impulse and influx they set the muscles in motion, contract, extend, twist, or otherwise move them. From this finally follow the animal's walking, running, leaping, etc. By this series of local motions the whole work of sensing is completed; nor, in brutes, is sensing anything else.

31. In man there is further added a spiritual perception or cognition of that affection or motion of the organ. This cognition, however, is wrongly said by Saguensius, whom Tosca cites and approves dict. lib. 2, prop. 3, to constitute perfect and complete sensation. For all cognition, according to these authors, is an act of reason and true intellection, and therefore must be wholly distinguished from sensation, since sensation is acknowledged by all to be an organic and material function, and consequently, according to

the Corpuscularians, includes nothing even in man except local motion. "Since every corporeal action," says Tosca ibid. prop. 8, "is nothing other than local motion, certainly every sensation, however perfect, must be thought to be nothing other than a certain local motion, though immanent." To what has been said the Corpuscularians add that, properly speaking, there is only one sense, namely, the internal or common sense, which uses various external organs to receive the various impressions of objects. Hence, they say, sensation is only begun in the external sensorium but completed in the internal.

32. This whole doctrine is a necessary consequence of that "intolerable opinion and great paradox," to use the words of the Distinguished Doctor cited elsewhere, by which a cognoscitive soul, or one capable of perceiving an object, is denied to brutes. The new philosophers are compelled to defend this paradox lest they admit a substantial form entitatively distinct from all matter. And since they are ashamed openly to deny that brutes sense, see, hear, etc., they are driven by a wretched necessity to overturn common notions and to say, against the sense of mankind and, as it is reasonable to believe, against the resisting light of reason itself, that for an object to be sensed, seen, heard, etc., is not for it to be perceived, cognized, or made known to the one seeing, hearing, etc., but precisely for it locally to move the fibers of the brain. Thus, if the gods permit, anyone is egregiously mistaken who in good faith thinks that a dog recognizes its master, or by some perception cognizes an enemy, food, drink, or a stick, no matter how much it sees, smells, tastes, or senses these objects; or that an ox knows its owner, an ass its master's manger, and sheep the voice of their own shepherd, although Divine Scripture expressly asserts these three things; or even that a man, insofar as he uses the senses, unless he simultaneously uses reason, perceives anything by seeing the sun, hearing music, tasting food, or touching fire; and consequently that an infant recognizes anything sensible, not even the breasts of its own nurse. These [illegible] are worthy rather of laughter and contempt than of philosophical refutation.

33. They can nevertheless be abundantly refuted from what was said in the preliminary Dissertation to the Physics and in this treatise, disp. 1, c. 4. In particular, the argument drawn from the concept of life must be pressed. For since sensation is a vital motion, it must be immanent and from an intrinsic principle, as the adversaries admit. But the motion of the nerves and spirits in which they maintain sensation to consist is no more from an intrinsic principle than the motion of strings in a cithara or the trembling diffused through an entire stick struck at one end. Nor does it matter that the internal construction of the machine and the elastic power of the fibers

and spirits greatly contribute to the motion of the sensorium. For this also happens in automata made by art, for example in a wheel-clock and in a pneumatic organ; yet in these no philosopher acknowledges the immanent motion necessary for life. Nothing indeed occurs in Corpuscularian philosophy by reason of which these automata should not be said to live and sense, especially the pneumatic organ, which Tosca, after Maignan, cit. l. 6, prop. 5, thinks very similar to a sensing animal.

34. Add that the Atomists very inconsistently call motions proceeding from sensation "spontaneous," since no appetite and no cognition precedes them; nor, contrary to all dictionaries, can a motion be said to be "borne spontaneously" by a subject when it mechanically results from the impulse of an external agent in a subject knowing nothing. Certainly, if there is any spontaneity in these motions, it must be ascribed not to the animal moved but to the object, just as the motion and conception of a pneumatic organ are spontaneous not to the organ but to the organist. For according to Tosca the object performs the function of the organist by striking the keys of the vital organ. Add further that the animal spirits will truly sense, see, hear, etc., which Tosca denies cit. l. 6, prop. 13. For they receive the motion in which vision, etc., consists. This motion is no less immanent in the spirits than in the fibers of the brain; nor do the fibers any more than the spirits integrate the sensitive faculty, as Tosca teaches ibid. prop. 1.

35. Hence also must be rejected what the Atomists say, that sensation takes place only inchoatively in the external sensoria. For why should the motion of fibers in the brain deserve the name of sensation more than the motion in the eyes, since in both places the motion is merely local, takes place in parts of the living machine, and occurs in the presence of the soul? For the soul, whether rational or fiery, is diffused throughout the whole body according to Tosca. Would not everyone laugh at someone who, from among the parts of a wheel-clock moving together, selected one, for example the pendulum or principal wheel, and said that this alone senses or lives by its motion? What is better known by the light of nature than that the eyes see, the ears hear, the hand touches, etc.? It may be said: only the motion of the brain is properly sensation, both because it alone immediately communicates motion to the motor nerves and because, when it ceases, the external sensoria sense nothing, as happens in apoplexy. But against this is the fact that an animal often senses without any motion being communicated to the motor nerves, as happens whenever a man or brute, remaining in the same position, attentively regards something. Indeed, a new sensation often removes motion from the motor nerves, as when an animal running or walking suddenly stops at the sight of a new object and

remains motionless. But the fact that the external senses cease in apoplexy or a similar disease arises from the interception of the influx of spirits, which the soul needs as an instrument in order itself to elicit in the eyes the act of vision, etc. But if from the dependence of the spirits on the brain it is inferred that not the eyes but the brain properly sees, by the same reason one could infer that not the feet but the brain walks.

36. Besides these, I add certain other arguments, perhaps more effective with the new philosophers. 1º If for an object to be sensed is nothing other than for the fibers of the sensory organ to be moved by its impulse, every sense will in reality be touch, nor will the five external senses differ from one another except by a more or less exquisite tactility. Many adversaries grant the consequence, and all are bound to grant it. For sensation of any kind of impulse undoubtedly pertains to touch, whether it be pressure, undulation, curling, plucking, etc. Thus a ray of light, which according to the adversaries is a trembling line of ethereal globules directed from the object to the eye, causes vision insofar as by its contact it presses and makes the fibers of the eye tremble; and sound, which according to them is an undulation of air resulting from the percussion of a sounding body, is heard insofar as by its contact it strikes and vibrates the tympanum of the ear. But the absurdity of the consequence is easily shown. First, because if only greater or lesser tactility distinguishes the senses, there will be more than five external senses, contrary to the judgment of everyone, including the Corpuscularians. The proof is that what is commonly called touch and is diffused through almost all parts of the body will have to be divided into several other senses, since tactility is not equal everywhere but duller in some parts and sharper in others, as experience makes known.

37. Next, because so elaborate an apparatus of organization in the ears and eyes, for example, would be useless. To receive the impulse of light or sound, a simple and exceedingly subtle coat woven of very delicate nerves could suffice, since the whole difference between the impulses of light and wind lies in the greater subtlety of the pressing bodies; and there is no reason why a corresponding tactility could not exist in a simple coat such as that of the intestines, where objects which could scarcely alter the external organ of touch often excite the most intense pains, as Tosca says cit. l. 6, prop. 8. Certainly ordinary touch is sufficient for sensing the vibration of air coming from a sounding body, and therefore we sense it with the whole body when a cannon is fired. The whole body, then, will hear. Indeed, the glass windows of houses will then hear when shaken by the vibrating air, for that motion is no less immanent in them than in the tympanum of the ear. Likewise, since touch in living flesh from which the skin has been removed is

exceedingly acute, why does it not sense the pressure of light or sounding air? Nerves are everywhere, animal spirits are everywhere, and these certainly are not of a different nature for ordinary touch and for the other senses. For even in the organs of sight and hearing common touch is present, since pain often occurs there from the acrimony of a humor, from heat, and from other tangible qualities. It would be ridiculous to imagine two kinds of spirits there, one of which is moved only by a tangible object and the other only by a visible or audible object.

38. 2º Given the adversaries' doctrine, the distance of objects could not be perceived by the eyes and ears. At most it would be perceived that the nerve is affected by a more or less vehement impulse; but whether from a distant or nearby object could by no means be known, since the organ can be struck strongly by a distant object, for example the sun, and gently by a nearby one, for example a dim lamp. In the same way, when touch is struck by a thrown stone, it perceives the violence of the blow, but does not discern whether the impulse comes from a nearby or distant thrower. And hence, just as only the surface of bodies is properly touched by the hand, so only that part of a luminous ray or vibrating air which is contiguous to the organs of the eyes and ears will properly be seen or heard. Nor does recourse to the radiant pyramid or the angle considered by perspectivists as formed by visual rays help, as though the impulse of light varied from the variation of this angle, which becomes more or less acute or obtuse according to the varying distance and magnitude of objects. For first, pyramids or angles of this kind have no use in hearing. Next, visible objects unequal in bulk can be placed in such proportion that because of their unequal distance they form equal angles in the same sight.

39. If perhaps it is said that not the brute but man perceives the distance of an object by intellect, I ask whence man perceives it. For if he knows nothing else about the object, he has no source except the impression made in the eyes, for example; and this can be made equally by a nearby dim lamp and a distant bright one. But if a brute does not perceive the distance of an object, why does a dog run very swiftly toward prey seen far away lest perhaps it escape? Because, it will be said, an impulse from the visual nerves results in the motor nerves. But this is easily rejected: both because the impulse of light reflected from distant prey is too weak and subtle to cause such violent motion in the feet; and because one will never explain why that impulse causes running toward the prey rather than in the opposite direction, as happens when an enemy is seen; and because often a dog is moved toward a distant object but not toward a nearby one although it is the same object, as when it leaps to seize bread shown from a height but, when

the same bread is offered nearer, receives it without moving its feet; or when it runs hostilely toward an unknown dog seen from afar but, approaching nearby, either stops or moves slowly. In these and countless similar cases, since the visual nerves should be more strongly struck by a nearby object, why does a lesser or no impulse result in the motor nerves which are so violently agitated at the sight of a distant object?

40. From this I take a third argument. If sensation is a motion of the fibers of the brain opening the tubes of the nerves which serve motion, so that the moved spirits rush into them, it follows that from every sensation there is an opening of such tubes and an excitation of the muscles to move the members. Why then do we often read, hear, and imagine attentively while the locomotive faculty is entirely at rest? Certainly at such times the roots of the nerves in the brain are moved, otherwise according to the adversaries there would then be no sensation. It may be said that by the command of the soul the tubes remain closed and thus the progress of the spirits is prevented. But this does not escape the difficulty. For first, as I argued elsewhere, if the structure of the machine requires the motor nerves to open by force of the brain's motion, the soul will not be able to prevent this without doing violence to the machine and quickly dissolving or rupturing its exceedingly subtle mechanism. That the construction of the machine requires this is certain for the adversaries, who therefore posit communication between the organs of the sensitive and locomotive faculties, so that, with spirits freely passing from the sensory nerves into the motor, spontaneous motions may result from sensation. What obstacle or stopper is placed by the soul to interrupt this communication and block the motor tubes while we read quietly? Secondly, when the motor tubes are closed by command of the soul, the spirits excited in the sensing brain, which by mechanical law flow with force toward their openings, will be driven back when passage is prevented and, being turned into a vortex, will cause a great commotion in the brain and a violent and disturbed sensation. But experience proves the contrary, for we read and imagine more tranquilly and serenely while sitting at rest.

41. Moreover, in brutes there is, according to the adversaries, no command of the soul and no cognition freely impeding the passage of spirits from the sensory nerves into the motor nerves, but all things there are carried out according to mechanical laws and the structure of the machine left to itself. Nevertheless, it very often happens that a brute hears and sees, and therefore senses, yet produces no bodily motion. Indeed, we commonly see a brute abstain from every motion by force of sensation, not only when it remains astonished at the sudden occurrence of a new object, but also as

though by intention or design. Consider a fox or cat lying in wait for a little bird: how it hides itself with its body stretched along the ground; how it permits itself no motion; how it even restrains respiration itself; how it feigns itself dead, especially the fox, so that the incautious bird may approach more confidently. Tell me, since undoubtedly there is then an intense and vivid sensation in the brain and no command of the soul, what then blocks the little openings of the tubes in the motor nerves so that no spirit and no impulse is carried to the muscles? Or what suddenly opens those same openings when the cat or fox abruptly leaps upon prey that has come sufficiently near?

42. 4° An impulse proceeding from the brain through the spirits into the motor nerves is insufficient to excite the vehement and varied motions of running, leaping, etc. The proof is first that, as Tosca says cit. tract. 1. 3. prop. 13, "the motion of the spirits proceeding from the brain is slight"; and reason itself persuades that from a soft substance such as that in the brain and its fibers no great impetus can proceed, especially one which persists for a long time and by which a dog, after a long and exceedingly swift run, rushes upon a wolf and struggles with it most violently. Secondly, because the impression of light on the optic nerves, since it is exceedingly subtle, otherwise it would be sensed by touch, shakes the small fibers of the brain only very slightly. Their motion, according to the adversaries, is not greater but entirely similar to that which is excited in the external sensorium. Therefore a sensation of the brain received through sight can impress only a very slight impetus upon the motor nerves. How, then, can that enormous impetus result from such an impulse by which a hunting dog runs at the greatest speed toward a hare seen from afar? Add that the optic nerves, since they are softer than others, as Tosca notes cit. l. 3, prop. 21, will scarcely be able to transmit any motion. Indeed, generally, to note this in passing, Descartes's fiction that sensory nerves are stretched like strings in a cithara is undeservedly adopted by Tosca. For the nerves are neither straight nor hard or rigid, but bent, soft, and slack; nor are they attached to fixed termini but to soft substance, namely flesh, spinal marrow, and brain. I omit that the commotion in the eyes and brain is greater, and the sensation more vivid, from a nearby object than from a distant one, yet it often excites a lesser and sometimes no impetus in the motor nerves, as in the examples of n. 39 and countless others.

43. Finally, the adversaries must be pressed to give from their system of sensations some reason, even apparently adequate, for the so great and marvelous variety seen in the spontaneous motions of animals. What excites a dog anxiously to seek its absent master by solicitously running here and

there? Memory, it will be said, or a phantasm of the master left in the dog's brain. But against this: a phantasm of an absent object causes less sensation in the brain than the sight of a present object, as Tosca grants with the others. How then does the dog, once it finds its master, cease running and remain quietly at rest, since from the vision of the present master there is now a greater sensation and commotion in the brain? Why also does it sometimes leap and rejoice in the presence of its master and afterward, especially if the master gives no sign of approval, suppress these motions although it does not cease looking at the same object? Nor should recourse be had to habit. For a dog performs motions of this kind the first time it loses and finds its master. Again, why does bread offered by its master impel the dog's muscles to run toward it, whereas the same bread offered by a stranger renders those same muscles inert? What motion results from bread in the muscles of a satiated dog when it hides the bread in a remote place and seeks it there when hunger returns?

44. Furthermore, what excites and directs the manifold and most orderly motions of bees? What impels birds and most animals to construct nests suitable for receiving their offspring, to abstain from food in order to feed their young, to defend their offspring even at their own peril, to move them elsewhere, as foxes are accustomed to do, if they see that they have been observed by a man, and to perform other marvelous things which could be recounted without end? If the motions of beasts were always of one kind, the Corpuscularian hypothesis might perhaps seem tolerable. But that so great a variety of motions even in one and the same brute should be reduced solely to the impetus of spirits running by a mechanical law from the fibers of the brain into the muscles is altogether repugnant to reason and experience. They say that the sensing power of brutes is an exceedingly hidden thing, and admit that it is very difficult to give the reason for their various particular motions. But in truth, what is obscure in itself they themselves render utterly unintelligible, since they make the explanation of innumerable motions not merely difficult but nonexistent. They fabricate for themselves as many inscrutable mysteries of nature as there are spontaneous motions of brutes.

45. As for us, we explain these mysteries without difficulty, namely, through directing cognition and determining appetite. The soul is what moves the bodily machine by means of the locomotive faculty chiefly implanted in the nerves and muscles. This faculty is subordinated to appetite and determined by it to this or that motion. Appetite, however, is directed by a preceding internal sensation, which truly is perception and cognition, not only in man but also in the brute, although material. The soul

elicits this sensation in the brain with the aid of the quality which they call an "impressed species," see the following disputation, and which the external senses supply when, having been altered by objects, whether through local motion or through other prior species, they themselves elicit their own sensations, that is, perceptions of the objects. Here is the whole process of sensation and spontaneous motion, explained quite intelligibly. To this there is added in man the act of reason and the command of the will, which subjects to itself even the material appetite.

46. Therefore, just as to one asking whence there comes to man so great a variety in spontaneous motions, the reason given is the subordination of the locomotive power to the command of the soul directed by spiritual cognition, and even the Corpuscularians themselves immediately acquiesce in this reason as sufficiently clear, so a similar question concerning the motions of beasts is lucidly answered through the subordination of the locomotive faculty to the appetite of the soul, which material cognition directs. Material cognition is impossible, they say. They do indeed say so, but entirely gratuitously, without adducing any argument of weight, as we saw disp. 1, c. 4. It must therefore be maintained that every sensation, internal and external, is not a mere local motion, but a certain perception or cognition of an object, after the manner of the simple and apprehensive apprehension of the intellect, sufficiently known to us through experience, concerning particular sensible objects. It differs from such apprehension only under the title of materiality, that is, attachment to a corporeal subject, and sometimes also of clarity.

The Incredible Fiction Concerning Phantasms Serving Memory.

47. We must not pass over here what Tosca teaches cit. l. 6, from prop. 22 to 25, concerning the impression, conservation, and excitation in the brain of phantasms, by which name he calls memorative species of an absent object sensed previously, although elsewhere "phantasm" means an act of the imagination, which call objects back to memory or present them to the imagination in dreams. Take the summary. A phantasm is nothing other than a certain affection in the fibrous tract of the cerebrum and cerebellum which rests upon the origin of the spinal marrow; namely, a certain change of position or figure, for example entanglement, drawing together, separation, tension, etc., made in the fibers of that tract by force of internal sensation. This change remains there, but is not sensed until those same fibers are struck by the blood or by something else. Then they reflect a similar

affection into the common sensorium, by which the same object is again sensed. And this is for a phantasm to be excited and for the memory of an object to be renewed. But since many phantasms are customarily preserved serially in memory, indeed several unconnected series of phantasms, it must be supposed that in this tract there are some primary fibers which are intertwined with other likewise primary fibers and divided, as it were, into segments, and others secondary, likewise intertwined among themselves in a manifold plexus and arising from the primary as small branches.

48. Thus phantasms are impressed in the secondary fibers, that is, separations, entanglements, knots, or something similar are made, each in its own fiber, or at least in another segment of the same fiber. The primary fibers, however, direct the lines of phantasms, so that when there are many series of them, each adheres to branches of only one primary fiber according to the same segment intercepted among other primary fibers. By the motion of this primary fiber the line or series of small branches is moved in due order, either by receiving related phantasms or by reflecting them into the sensory plexus, where their memory is renewed serially. For this reason, while we commit something to memory, we employ a laborious effort so that these impressions may be placed in the same uninterrupted order of fibers, and by this effort we strive greatly lest other fibers succeed which are preoccupied by phantasms of a different order. When afterward we wish to remember, if some rebellious fiber refuses to reflect its phantasm, we rub our forehead, so that by this rubbing the resisting fiber may be plucked. When one reads these things, I fear one may think a fable or dream is being recounted. Yet this is doctrine confidently asserted by waking philosophers. It must be refuted, so that from it may appear the necessity of the species which we shall afterward assert.

49. It is therefore refuted, 1º. The fibers of phantasms must be connected or continued with the nervous plexus of the common sensorium; otherwise they could neither receive motion from it nor reflect motion back to it. They must also, insofar as they are diffused from it through the aforesaid tract, have some tension of themselves after the manner of strings in a cithara. For if they are wholly slack, like threads lying negligently on the ground, neither will they be moved in that tract by the motion of the sensory plexus nor will they reflect their motion back to it even if they are struck there, as one can experience with silk threads drawn from some plexus and slackened over a tract of earth, especially soft earth, such as the substance of the brain. But if those fibers are stretched from their tract all the way to the sensorium, it follows 1º that, just as according to this doctrine there can be no motion in them without a corresponding motion in the sensory plexus, so

no change can remain in them without remaining also in the sensorium. Therefore a phantasm, if it consists in such a permanent change, will *inesse* in the sensorium for as long as it lasts and accordingly will be actually sensed; or at least the sensory plexus will not be able to be struck by a new sensation without the previously existing phantasm being excited. Both are plainly contrary to experience.

50. It follows 2º that tension must especially be posited in the primary fibers, since through them motion is communicated from the sensorium to the secondary fibers and reflected from these into the sensorium. Therefore a primary fiber cannot be struck anywhere without being moved as a whole, like a string of a cithara, and consequently without suddenly communicating motion to all the small branches or secondary fibers arising from it, at least those belonging to one series or to the same segment of the primary fiber. Therefore someone who has learned a long sermon serially will not be able to remember a single word without a whole crowd of phantasms of that sermon being simultaneously excited and reflected in one impulse into the common sensorium, contrary to manifest experience. The consequence is evident, because if the phantasm of even one word occurs, its fiber necessarily shakes the primary fiber from which it arises; and since this primary fiber thereby trembles as a whole, it necessarily communicates its shaking to the other secondary fibers, whose shaking is the excitation of all their phantasms. Indeed, all the series of phantasms whatsoever that are preserved in memory will necessarily be immediately excited by the excitation of one, since both the primary and secondary fibers are all intertwined with one another and consequently, supposing tension, must be moved at the motion of any one of them.

51. It is refuted 2º. If a phantasm consists in the position of some fiber having been changed, no phantasm can be erased by forgetfulness without thereby returning to memory, so that to forget is to remember, which is contradictory in terms. Yet it is proved: a phantasm is not abolished except when the change of the fiber ceases to remain, that is, when the fiber returns to its former position. But to return thus is to be moved; and for a fiber to be moved is for a phantasm to be excited and reflected into the common sensorium, or for its memory to be renewed. 3º Either several phantasms adhere in the same fiber, or each in its own. If the first is said, when one phantasm is excited, since that fiber is now struck, the others must awaken simultaneously. If the second is said, which Tosca seems to maintain, first, this is imagined without foundation, since one fiber can admit several knots along its tract. Next I ask, in the series of fibers dependent on a primary fiber, to which fiber does the first phantasm adhere? Perhaps one will choose

the first, which is nearer the sensory part. By what leap does the second phantasm pass to the second fiber, and the hundredth to the hundredth, leaving untouched the earlier fibers which it encounters in transit while coming from the sensorium through the primary fiber? At least in passing it must shake them and the hundredth phantasm cannot be impressed without exciting all the preceding ones. But if one maintains that the first phantasm adheres to the second fiber or one farther removed, besides the fact that this too is maintained gratuitously, the same difficulty returns concerning the leap over the earlier fibers.

52. Truly amusing is that effort or striving to place new phantasms in the same order of fibers and to take care lest by chance they fall into fibers of a different order. As though we had before our eyes the fibers of our own brain and their number, position, and order, so as to designate certain ones at pleasure, leaving the others aside, for the impression of phantasms. Most men know nothing of fibers, yet they employ an effort to commit something to memory. Whatever anatomists know, they certainly no more than peasants have their own fibers under their control. No less amusing is the plucking of a rebellious fiber resulting from rubbing the forehead. For this end one would surely have to rub not the forehead but the back of the head, for the tract of phantasms, since it chiefly pertains to the cerebellum, is nearer the occiput than the forehead. And why is only the resisting fiber plucked when the rubbing shakes the whole head? But if all the fibers are plucked by the same rubbing, how do all the phantasms not tumultuously enter the imagination?

53. 4° There is no reason why phantasms should not be impressed upon the primary fibers, since these are more immediately connected with the sensory part and receive the motion proceeding from it before it reaches the secondary fibers. But if they are impressed, since those fibers are not numerous, they will soon be filled with knots and other changes so that they can receive no more. Indeed, the secondary fibers also, if they receive only one phantasm each, cannot suffice for the almost innumerable phantasms which reside simultaneously in the memory of some men. There are some who know very well several languages, ten, namely, or more; likewise various arts and sciences; and in addition know innumerable objects pertaining to human use and commerce. How many secondary fibers must the brain of such men possess? How many segments, and how long, in the primary fibers, to contain so many diverse series of phantasms? And if all the words, conjugations, declensions, agreements, tropes, figures, tones, etc., of one language pertain only to one series, what segment will suffice for a series of so many thousands of phantasms? It must therefore be admitted that

phantasms of things are retained in memory in no other way than by penetrable qualities which the Peripatetics call intentional species, and which, although many and diverse, can exist in the same place and be received in the same part of the brain. The matter is indeed very obscure, especially as regards the excitation of species, but by the doctrine of the Corpuscularians it is confused rather than explained.

CHAPTER III.
On the External Senses.

54. An exact description of the organs, and many other matters pertaining to the external senses which are more suited to delight minds than to sharpen them, may be seen in anatomists and in those physicists who have leisure to pursue natural philosophy more curiously and to treat it at length. Much material discussed in scholastic fashion will be supplied by the Fathers of Coimbra in 2, *De anima* from c. 6, and by the Distinguished Doctor, lib. 3, *De anima* from c. 8. At present we shall briefly touch according to the custom of the School upon those matters which seem more useful.

On Sight.

55. Sight may be defined as "the external sense perceptive of light and color." Its organ resides in the eyes, whose structure, contained beneath the eyelids, as it is explained by most, is composed of three humors, five coats, seven muscles, and two nerves, in the following order of composition. The figure of the eye is spherical. Its center is occupied by the "crystalline humor," enclosed in a transparent coat which is called "specular" and "arachnoid." The hemisphere or posterior half of this humor and coat toward the brain is covered by the "vitreous humor," itself covered by the "reticular," "retina," or "net-like" coat, so called because it is woven with many small veins and arteries. There follows a further coat, whose anterior part is called the "uvea" and posterior part the "choroid." This coat clothes the entire globe of the eye in such a way that in the anterior part it leaves a circular opening called the "pupil," though others call the crystalline humor the pupil, so that through it visual species or rays of light may enter the crystalline and vitreous humors. This same coat, in the part called the uvea, is somewhat curved and receives the superposed "aqueous humor," which externally is contained by another coat surrounding the whole eye. The posterior part of this coat is called the "sclerotic" because of its hardness; the anterior part is called the "cornea," because like an exceedingly thin

plate of horn it is transparent, especially insofar as it is stretched across the opening of the pupil. After this follows a white coat or membrane called the "adnata." Surrounding the circumference of the eye, it ends at the colored circle formed from the uvea around the opening of the pupil and called the "iris." At this iris terminate certain small fibers proceeding from the retina, which are customarily called "ciliary processes."

56. Seven muscles serve the various motions of the eye. Four bend the eye upward, downward, to the right, and to the left; two turn it around; the seventh supports the eye and binds it to its seat. Two nerves take their origin from the right and left sides of the brain. After proceeding a little distance they unite, and then, separating again, one reaches the right eye and the other the left. They are called "optic" or "visual," both because through them the animal spirits absolutely necessary for vision are carried from the brain to the eyes, so that if these nerves are obstructed and passage denied to the spirits, the eyes see nothing even though otherwise uninjured, and because through the same nerves the species of objects are transmitted from the eyes to the brain, as many believe. The substance of each optic nerve, as of the other nerves, is threefold: first the innermost, which is white and medullary and derived from the marrow of the brain; then a twofold coat, inner and outer, the first of which is a continuation of the pia mater and the second of the dura mater. The "pia mater," or "pia meninx," is that subtle coat which immediately surrounds the soft substance of the brain; but the other coat superimposed upon it, which lines the interior cavity of the skull, is called the "dura mater," or "dura meninx." Three of the five aforesaid coats of the eye arise from the threefold substance of the optic nerve, as so many expansions of it: namely, the retina proceeds from the marrow of the nerve, the choroid from the inner coat, and the cornea from the outer.

57. It is now asked 1º which of the parts thus far enumerated is the proper organ of vision. The common opinion of the Peripatetics, with Aristotle, in P. Suar. lib. cit. c. 18, maintained that vision takes place in the pupil, that is, in the crystalline humor. The modern Corpuscularians, whom Tosca follows tr. 10, l. 6, prop. 16, with some Peripatetics agreeing, commonly teach that vision takes place in the retina. Several of them, however, defend the choroid; their foundations are indicated by the author Philos. Burgund. part. 3, tr. 1, dissert. 3, c. 5, and attacked by P. Jo. Bapt. de Benedictis tom. 3, l. 4, q. 4, c. 2, § 2. It seems to me that the retina must be defended, not because it is woven from nervous fibers endowed with exquisite sense, as Tosca supposes, for those who defend the choroid expressly deny this, but because in the retina the rays or lines of visual species, which penetrate the entire crystalline and vitreous humors as being

transparent, are gathered and terminate. From this it follows that vision does not take place within the crystalline humor, since it is neither credible nor useful that species destined for seeing should penetrate more deeply beyond the workshop of vision. It also follows that the choroid must be excluded, since the species do not reach it, being situated behind the retina. For the retina, although somewhat translucent, has sufficient opacity to terminate the progress of the species, just as paper does although somewhat translucent. Other proofs will be found in the authors just cited.

58. It is asked 2º what the crystalline humor contributes to vision. I answer: it contributes greatly. For since it has a lenticular figure, like that of the glass in an optical tube, it so refracts and gathers the rays of species falling upon the opening of the uvea according to the laws of dioptrics that those which come from the same point of the object terminate at the same point of the retina, as is required for a clear and distinct vision of the object, or, as opticians speak, for delineating the image of the object on the retina. It has been established by experiment that if a glass lens is fitted to the opening of a completely dark room, the rays passing through the lens depict upon an opposite sheet the figure of the external object, like so many brushes. The same happens if an artificial eye, which opticians fashion from a double glass and a sheet placed behind it in place of the retina, is fitted to the opening of a window; likewise, if the eye of a recently slaughtered calf is similarly fitted, concerning which see Tosca cit. l. 6, prop. 16. Hence opticians and modern physicists infer that the same occurs in the living eye, namely, that rays transmitted through the natural crystalline lens distinctly delineate on the retina an image of the object, though in an inverted position, so that the right part of the object is left in the image, and so with the rest. This also happens in the aforesaid experiments.

59. Some suppose that vision consists in this image. But wrongly: both because vision is a vital act and therefore from an intrinsic principle, whereas that image, if there is one, is produced purely from without; and because the same image can be produced when the eye sees nothing, as when the optic nerve is obstructed. Others maintain that through the act of vision only the image painted on the fundus of the eye, or retina, is perceived, while afterward it is compared with the external object through an act of the imagination or intellect. But this too is equally wrong and contrary to the sense of everyone, to whom nature has persuaded that objects placed outside the sight are perceived by sight, as are their distance, magnitude, and true position of parts. Therefore this image is nothing distinct from the species of the object, which by their reflection from the retina, or from the sheet opposed to the glass lens in the experiment just

mentioned, make the figure of the object appear in that place, as though in a certain mirror. I say appear, not to the sight itself reflecting the species, for it does not reflexively look upon such an image or upon the object as though located in its own retina, but to another looking from outside. The position of the parts appears inverted because their species terminate at those parts of the retina from which the parts themselves of the object can be viewed in their proper position through a straight line. Such a line can only run from the right part of the retina to the left part of the object, and so with the others.

60. From what has been said one will infer that the opinion of those who, following Plato, thought vision to take place not so much by receiving inwardly as by sending outward, that is, not so much through light or a species sent from the object into the eyes as through an emission of rays or spirits from the eyes toward the object, is false. This opinion is refuted by P. Suar. l. c. c. 17; and since today it has no patron, it need not detain us. But it may be said that certain animals emit rays from their eyes by which they see at night. They do indeed emit them; but first, this radiation does not belong to most animals and is of no use by day but only by night. Next, it does not arise from the fundus of the eye but from the outermost part, namely, from the adnata coat; nor does it contribute to vision otherwise than by illuminating the object so that the object may send its species to the eyes. There is also commonly opposed the example of a certain man who always had an image of himself before his eyes, of whom Aristotle makes mention 3, Meteor. c. 4, and gives as the cause that the weakness of his sight could not drive the air away, evidently by emission of rays. But it is answered that Aristotle there spoke not according to his own opinion but according to Plato's; the genuine cause was that the man, by abundant evaporation from his body, condensed the nearby air, which served him as a mirror. Perhaps also, his imagination being injured, he seemed to himself to see what he did not actually see with his eyes, as sometimes happens to melancholics.

61. It is asked 3º why one object does not appear double to someone looking at it with two eyes. Some, among the Fathers of Coimbra l. c. in c. 7, q. 7, ar. 2, thought the cause to be that a twofold vision is not made by the two eyes, but only one, and nowhere except at the place where the optic nerves are joined before they diverge toward the eyes, because the species received by both eyes are united there. This, however, is now rejected by everyone, particularly by the Fathers of Coimbra ibid. and by P. Suar. cit. c. 18. Certainly the junction of the optic nerves remains one and the same when one eye is slightly raised with a finger, and yet then the object appears double. The true cause, therefore, is that each eye is altered by the same

object from the same place through a straight line in the same part of each retina, and consequently each vision and each optic or visual axis is directed to the same place. For it is false, as some maintain, that the axes of the two eyes are always mutually parallel. This is also the reason why the same object, viewed simultaneously by many men, appears one to all. Besides, it must not be doubted that the two eyes elicit two visions, through two visual powers, which nevertheless are regarded as parts, as it were, of one power because in the same *suppositum* they conspire to perceive the same objects simultaneously and uniformly and to report them to the same brain.

On the Object of Sight.

62. It is agreed by all that the proper object of sight is light and color. But it is asked 1º what light is. Before answering, observe the difference between primary and secondary light, illumination, ray, and splendor. "Primary light" is that which *inesse* in a body luminous of itself, such as fire and the Sun; "secondary," that which is received from without, as in the Moon. Hence "luminous" or "light-bearing" differs from "illuminated," because the former shines with its own light, the latter with an adventitious one. Sometimes that is called primary light which is diffused from the luminous body in a straight line, while that which is dispersed laterally from this itself is called secondary. "Illumination" is light as existing in a transparent medium, such as air. A "ray" is light diffused in a straight line, which is divided into "direct, reflected, and refracted" rays, concerning which see disp. 3, de Gener. nn. 87 and 88. Finally, "splendor" is customarily called that more intense light which results from direct and reflected light around an obstructing body. It is the common opinion of philosophers that by these names light of the same species is signified with only a diversity of intensity, place, or subject, if the Scotists are excepted. For they call only that which inheres in a luminous body "light," while that which is diffused outside the luminous body they call "illumination," and they divide this into "primary and secondary." They call primary illumination the ray which proceeds directly from the luminous body and that which is reflected from a polished and clean body; secondary, that which is dispersed from these rays in every direction of place. They distinguish both specifically from one another and from light. For primary illumination, they say, is an intentional species for seeing light, and secondary illumination similarly for seeing the primary. Hence they attribute to illumination both real and intentional being: real insofar as it can be seen and can cause real effects outside the soul; intentional insofar as it concurs as a species toward the vision not of

itself but of another object. See Mastr. here disp. 5, q. 2, ar. 2. We shall at present speak indiscriminately with the common opinion of light, illumination, etc.

63. Light, therefore, to answer the question, is defined by Aristotle 2, *De anima* c. 7 as "the act of the transparent insofar as it is transparent," that is, the form constituting a body in the being of the transparent, which is a definition through its formal effect. Aristotle, however, defines the transparent by order to sight; but to avoid a circle, it may be said that a "transparent" body is the same as a "clear" body and light is the "clarity of a body." One would strive in vain to render these terms clearer, as though something clearer than clarity itself could be found. One thing is called a "terminated transparent," namely, an "opaque" body, which indeed receives light but terminates it at the surface, or compels it to stop; another, an "unterminated transparent," namely, a "diaphanous" or "transparent" body, which is wholly penetrated by light. Diaphaneity and opacity are contrary dispositions, the one facilitating and the other impeding the progress of light, and they are often mixed in a diminished degree. Yet a body is not called simply diaphanous unless it is transparent. But what is not permeable by light, although it has some diaphaneity on the surface, otherwise it would not receive light, is called simply opaque. Moreover, we suppose with the whole Peripatetic School that illumination is not a body, since it is compenetrable with air, crystal, etc., nor a motion of a body, since it is diffused in an instant from heaven to earth, but a true quality, which nevertheless in the diffusion of rays by its nature in some way imitates the motion of an impelled body and is therefore metaphorically said to be reflected and refracted, whatever the Corpuscularians may protest. See what we said by reference in the Synopsis de Caelo etc. c. 2, n. 28, and consult Conimbric. in 2, de Cael. c. 7, q. 2.

64. It is asked 2º what color is. Aristotle gave two rather obscure definitions of color. The first, 2, *De anima* c. 7, is: "that which moves what is actually transparent," that is, that which through its visual species can move or alter a diaphanous medium actually illuminated. The other, lib. *De sensu et sensib.* c. 4, is expressed in these words: "the terminus," or "extremity, of the transparent in a terminated body." Some understand this definition to mean that color is the very surface of an opaque body insofar as illuminated; others, that it is a terminus resulting from the mixture of transparent and opaque; others, that it is a visible accident on the surface of an opaque body; others, that it is that disposition of an opaque body which terminates or ends a tract of transparent medium; others explain it otherwise, almost as each pleases. Both definitions admit various objections, nor should one fight

for either as for hearth and home, for the genuine definition of color depends upon the opinion one holds in the following question.

65. It is therefore asked 3º whether color is a quality distinct from light. It must be supposed 1º that no color can be seen unless suffused with light and through a diaphanous medium, as universal agreement and experience persuade. Hence must be rejected that deceitful class of men commonly called "Zabori," who claim to see treasures and corpses buried underground; concerning whom see P. Delrius lib. 1, disquis. magic. c. 3, q. 4, and more fully in Comment. ad Senecam Tragic. in Medea. Veins of water and metals, however, can become known from indications in the earth. It must be supposed 2º that there are two "extreme" colors, or colors opposed in the extreme, namely white and black; several other "intermediate" colors, or colors not so dissimilar from one another, which nevertheless are regarded as simple, such as red, green, blue, etc.; and certain "mixed" colors, or those composed from others, such as brown from black and white. It must be supposed 3º that some colors are called "true," others "apparent." Those are called true which are seen as the same under any aspect and light, such as the colors of snow, a rose, an emerald, etc. Those are apparent which depend entirely upon the radiation of light from a certain position and, when this is changed, immediately vanish, such as the colors of the rainbow and those seen under the rays of the sun from a certain position on a dove's neck, and many others. Most Peripatetics assert that these colors are indistinct from light. There are nevertheless some who say that they are distinct and should be called not so much apparent as transitory or fleeting because in their production and conservation they depend upon light; colors of the first kind they call fixed or permanent.

66. Concerning true or permanent colors, the first opinion maintains that, taken formally and properly, they are not distinguished from a modification of light, that is, from light as variously modified by the surface of an opaque body by reason of roughness, smoothness, porosity, and diverse opacity according to the diverse figure or texture of particles. From this there proceeds the disorderly reflection of light in every direction and the varied mixture of rays with shadows. Shadows differ from darkness in that darkness removes all light, while shadows remove only rays, or primary illumination, as is evident in the shadows of trees while the Sun shines. This mixture diversifies colors according to the diversity of proportion. Hence color in general should be defined as "illumination modified by opacity," or also "light shadowed by opacity," a definition taken from St. Thomas in 2, *De anima* lect. 14, at the end, where he says: "Color is nothing other than a certain light in some way obscured by an admixture of an opaque body."

Understand this of color properly so called, or in second act. For color in first act, or foundational color, is that disposition of a body on its surface which can modify light, or as has been said.

67. This opinion, thus or somewhat differently explained, is embraced with some of the ancients by the Cartesians and Atomists generally, and Tosca follows it at length tr. 4, l. 4, c. 3. Among Peripatetics Aegidius, Cajetan, Javellus, Soncinas, and others cited by P. Suar. l. c. c. 15 agree with it; among moderns some subscribe to it, such as Fathers Quiros and Jo. Bapt. de Benedictis. Aristotle is alleged in the second definition mentioned above in n. 64; likewise St. Thomas in the words just cited and those soon to be cited; likewise the hymn of the Church at Lauds on Wednesday, "And now color returns to things at the appearance of the shining star"; and the Poet's line, *Aeneid* VI, "Black night took color from things." The opinion is then proved, 1º because the object of one power must be one. But if color is a quality other than light, the object of sight will be multiple, for there will be no one notion common only to color and light unless perhaps that of "visible." Yet by this the nature of the power is certainly not specified or explained without a vicious circle. Hence St. Thomas cit. lect. 14, at the end, solves this difficulty in these words: "Since light is in a certain way the substance of color, every visible thing is reduced to the same nature," namely, to the nature of light, which is distinguished from color only insofar as it is pure or received in a diaphanous medium, as he signifies there. Hence it is said indifferently that sight tends now under the notion of light, now under the notion of color, because each notion is one and the same as regards substance; and even pure light, or light outside the opaque, is a certain color which may be called "sidereal color," or with Aristotle 2, *De anima* t. 69, "the color of the diaphanous."

68. 2º Because apparent or transitory color is not a quality other than light; therefore the same must be judged of true or permanent color. The antecedent is granted by most adversaries and is easily shown against those who deny it. First, because it often happens that, while the same light and the same illuminated body remain, a different color appears merely from a change in the observer. But what does the position of the observer contribute to the resultancy of one and another quality of color? Secondly, because rays of the Sun passed through a crystalline prism or glass triangle display vivid colors of the rainbow which, when the shape of the glass is changed, do not appear. But what does the figure of the prism contribute to producing qualities? Thirdly, because light passing through green or red glass, or glass otherwise colored, tinges the nearby air or wall with the same color. But what does the color of the glass contribute to a new production,

since color is not active? The consequence is proved because the nature of both colors is the same apart from firmness or duration. First, because each alters sight and imagination in the same way and induces no diversity of perception. Secondly, because each is perceived by sight not as pure light but as color. Therefore, just as whatever is perceived by the ear as sound truly and really is sound, so likewise here; for the external senses do not fabricate. Thirdly, because transitory and permanent color intensify one another. For if a ray of the Sun already reddened from elsewhere falls upon a red body, it becomes redder; and when passed through a glass prism onto a green body, it renders it greener. Fourthly, because the true nature of color will hardly be denied to blue, since it is seen as though inhering in the heavens; yet this consists in light mixed with innumerable shadows or little shadows caused by particles of the atmosphere, or at least it must be numbered among apparent colors, for what the adversaries call "true" does not belong to the heavens or the air.

69. 3° Because a mere change in the figure or texture of particles on the surface of a body changes its color. Thus black glass and black stones, if ground into powder, become white. Thus the white of an egg, when repeatedly stirred, becomes white from being transparent; the same happens to water converted into foam, without a change of temperament, and foam becomes whiter the smaller the bubbles of which it consists. Thus snow, as soon as it melts, loses its whiteness when its texture is dissolved. Thus also, although snow and ice differ only in the texture of particles, snow is white and ice diaphanous like crystal. Finally, although the production of the various colors in particular is difficult to explain in any opinion, in this one it is said with sufficient fitness that whiteness is produced by abundant and disorderly reflection of light interrupted by few or almost no shadows; blackness, by slight reflection mixed with very many shadows, because most rays, being buried in the little pores or cavities of which a black surface chiefly consists, cannot be reflected back upon themselves; intermediate colors, partly by refraction of light alone and partly by this together with reflection; and generally by the varying proportion of light and shadow.

70. The second opinion, so commonly received among the Peripatetics that it is unnecessary to cite authors by name, asserts that color is a special quality distinct from light and resulting from the temperament of the primary qualities or from a mixture of the elements. Hence it is commonly denied that pure elements and celestial bodies possess true color. But because there are many mixed bodies of diverse temperament which nevertheless are uniformly colored, for example snow and wool, some therefore further require for the production of colors a certain degree of

density, others a certain mixture of diaphaneity with opacity, from which some also think color can result in a pure element and in a celestial body. Color, therefore, may be defined as "a quality proper to a mixed body insofar as it has transparency," or "some diaphaneity terminated by opacity"; or, if color is also posited in an unmixed body, "a quality akin to light, essentially presupposing an admixture of the diaphanous with the opaque."

71. But since color needs illumination in order to be seen, the reason for this need is variously explained. 1º According to many, illumination is an objective condition so that color may by its own power adequately produce its visual species. 2º According to others, color is so subordinated to illumination that it cannot emit its own species unless illumination first emits its own from the same place. 3º According to many others, color of itself has only an inchoate or incomplete power for sending a species and is consequently visible only incompletely or in potency until illumination arrives, by whose power it is aided to produce the species, which, as many maintain, represents color and illumination in the manner of one. Hence color in the being of the visible is completed by illumination, and from both there is made one visible object in which illumination is something formal and color something material; or, as the Thomists say, color is the object "which," or the "which" notion, while illumination is the notion "under which" with respect to sight. This third manner of speaking, favored by St. Thomas in various places cited by P. Suar. lib. cit. c. 16 and by Colleg. S. Th. Complut. 2, *De anima* q. 7, n. 26, seems to constitute formal or actual color through illumination. For since visibility belongs to the concept of color, if this visibility formally consists in illumination, color without illumination will not formally be color but only materially, incompletely, or in potency. This approaches very closely to the first opinion explained in n. 66.

72. Nevertheless, that color is a special quality besides light modified by the surface of a body is proved, 1º because color is contrary to color, whereas light has no contrary. 2º Because colors differ specifically from one another although the illumination is the same. 3º Because it is incredible that when the Sun departs all colors and paintings perish and are produced again at dawn. 4º Because sight distinguishes in an object color from illumination. It often sees two objects equally illuminated by the Sun and nevertheless discerns that one is white and the other black or of another color. Sight likewise perceives illumination to be diminished while color is not diminished; for if, for example, one sees a purple object from some distance under intense illumination, afterward under diminished illumination one will see it no less purple if one approaches more closely.

73. Against the explanation of the first opinion it may further be added that many things are of one color although they do not have a uniform texture on the surface. For who would believe that the surfaces of snow, an egg, a swan, milk, linen, etc., are uniformly textured? The disposition of the surface depends greatly on temperament; hence men of different complexions have a skin more or less rough or smooth. Therefore the temperament in milk and snow, or in salt and sugar, will be uniform, which is plainly false. Certainly temperament and the texture of particles differ more in these than in an Ethiopian and a Belgian, whose color nevertheless is so diverse. But if one imagines that the Ethiopian's skin is entirely perforated with little pores and cavities while that of the Belgian is so compact that scarcely any ray of light is buried in it, one will not easily persuade others even if one appeals to the microscope. Add 1º that color is often changed without a change of surface: hair does not change its texture when it grows gray, nor an apple when it ripens, nor the face of the same man when it grows pale or red. Add 2º that a black body is often denser than a white one, as is evident from weight, which is greater in black marble than in ivory or wool of equal dimensions. It is therefore less porous and cavernous, since according to the Corpuscularians density consists in the paucity or constriction of pores. Therefore it will not bury more rays of light than the lighter white body. Add 3º that in certain black stones, when polished and smooth, the observer's face is seen as in a mirror. Therefore blackness does not prevent reflection. I omit other things which could be objected.

74. I likewise pass over another opinion, well attacked by P. Jo. Bapt. de Benedictis cit. l. 4, q. 4, c. 2, § 1, which explains the nature of color through a certain innate light incorporated into the opaque. The two aforesaid opinions are the more celebrated; I have touched upon their principal foundations and refrain from further examination. In what follows, however, I shall speak, as hitherto, according to the Peripatetic opinion. Supposing it, I note certain things. 1º Although color cannot be seen unless joined to illumination, illumination nevertheless can be seen apart from color, as it is actually seen in the Sun and stars, for color is not believed to *inesse* in them. Illumination is also seen in air devoid of color, and not only as the object "by which" but also as the object "which." For although vision does not stop in illuminated air but proceeds through it, as it were, toward some color, an apparent color is sufficient, such as the blue or azure attributed to the heavens; nevertheless the illumination of the air truly is that which is perceived by sight, as though in passing. 2º To see color or illumination, light is not required on the side of the medium, at least not of the whole medium,

nor on the side of the power, but it suffices on the side of the luminous or colored object, provided that the intervening medium or space is diaphanous. Thus holds the more common opinion, which experience favors when at night we see a very distant fire and snow placed nearby, or when from a dark recess we see illuminated objects outside. Many nevertheless contend that the medium is always illuminated, at least faintly, all the way to sight. 3º The notion "under which" of the visual power comprehends light and color and is a notion common to both, not univocally but analogically. It may be called either color as such or light as such, for color too is a certain participation in light, and the name of color is extended to light, following Aristotle 2, *De anima* c. 7 and often elsewhere. Analogical unity in the adequate object of one power is sufficient; hence the notion of being, although analogical according to many, corresponds wholly to the intellective power.

On Hearing.

75. Hearing is defined as "the external sense perceptive of sound." Its organ is protected by the external cartilaginous auricle attached to the solid bone called the "petrous." From this toward the brain there runs a winding passage ending in a cavity filled with common air, which is terminated by a tense membrane attached to a bony ring after the manner of a military drum and therefore called the "tympanum of hearing." After the tympanum follows another cavity which is believed to be filled with a certain airy but animated substance called "innate air." Three small bones are observed there, mutually connected, which as it were support the tympanum and by their own motion relax or tense it; from their figures they are called the "hammer," "anvil," and "stirrup." This same cavity communicates through two openings, the "round" and the "oval," with two other inner cavities, one of which is called the "labyrinth," the other the "cochlea," or also the "blind cavity," because it has no exit, although an entrance into it is open from the labyrinth.

76. Now, if it is asked which of these parts is the proper workshop of hearing, there is no single answer from all. Some favor the three small bones, especially the stirrup, which has its own cavity and a small membrane stretched above it like a smaller tympanum; many others favor the principal tympanum; far more, the innate air; not a few modern physicists favor the subtle coat which clothes the cochlea and is believed to be propagated from the marrow of the auditory nerve, standing in the ear as the retina does in the eye. For it is the last part of the organ reached by sounds or their species,

for whose propagation a further cavity would have been prepared in vain if hearing took place in the tympanum or in some other part before the cochlea.

77. The object of hearing is sound, concerning which nothing certain is held except that it does not occur without motion, that it results from a violent percussion, collision, or division of bodies, and that it is usually diffused through the air as far as the ears. The best-known question concerning its nature is whether it consists in the motion of air or of the sounding body, or whether it is a quality resulting from motion or together with motion. All Corpuscularians and some others assert the first; almost all Peripatetics, the second, whose opinion is much more probable. From the opposite there absurdly follows that sound is perceived by touch and sight and thus is heard by the hands and eyes. The consequence is proved because the trembling or vibratory motion in which sound consists according to the adversaries is perceived by touch and sight, as is evident in the trembling of a sounding bell, which is sensed by lightly applying the hand; in the vibration of the strings of a musical instrument, which is perceived not only by touch but also by sight; and in other examples. The adversaries themselves assert these things so that by the testimony of the eyes they may prove sound to consist in a rapid trembling motion. See Tosca tr. 4, lib. 5, c. 1, who nevertheless makes no mention of this absurd consequence although it is obvious and commonly objected by the Peripatetics, perhaps because he despaired of a solution.

78. Nor will it help to say that sound is not the trembling of any body whatever but only of air, which is not perceived by sight or touch. Against this is, first, that the trembling of air is of the same nature as the trembling of a sounding body. For a string of a cithara, for example, sounds insofar as it trembles and by a similar trembling moves the air, as Tosca says. If therefore the trembling of the air is sound, so is the trembling of the string, and indeed of any body whatsoever. In the same way, because heat according to Tosca consists in the internal vibratory motion of particles, wherever this motion is found, whether in air, iron, wood, etc., heat is found, and especially in fire, which causes heat just as the string causes sound. 2º The adversaries themselves commonly admit that sound can be diffused through bodies other than air, even hard and solid bodies, provided they are capable of trembling. There is at least no doubt concerning flame, in which the trembling coming from a sounding body is observed by the eyes, as Tosca warns l. c. prop. 4, by the example of lamps whose flames within a closed room visibly tremble at the harmony of a lyre.

79. 3º The trembling of air is also sensed by touch, especially when at the thunder of a cloud or a cannon the whole body is suddenly shaken, evidently by the violent trembling of air, from which there then also proceeds the shaking and trembling of buildings, especially of glass windows, as Tosca notes. Therefore at such a time, since all the members of the body tremble, all will hear the sound, for according to Tosca the ears hear precisely because trembling is impressed upon them by the trembling air. Add against this author another absurdity, namely, that heat would not be distinguished from sound, nor could air become heated without sounding most sharply. For according to him tr. 4, l. 6, prop. 2, heat consists in the vibratory motion of particles, and it does not otherwise differ from the motion performed by sounding bodies except because it is much swifter. But greater speed of vibrations does not remove motion from the nature of sound but rather constitutes a more acute sound. For as he himself teaches cit. lib. 5, prop. 20, the difference between acute and grave sounds consists in greater and lesser speed of vibrations. Heat, therefore, will be a most acute sound which, marvelous to say, touch alone will perceive in silence.

80. Aristotle is customarily objected, who more than once asserts that sound is motion. Likewise, if sound were a quality, since it has no contrary, it would be diffused through the whole space in an instant, like light, contrary to experience. To the first I answer that Aristotle speaks not in a formal but in a causal sense, because sound depends upon motion at least by way of a condition. Thus according to him 2, *De anima* t. 90, voice is a blow or percussion of the air drawn by respiration; yet even according to the opponents voice does not formally consist in percussion or impact, but in the motion of air resulting therefrom. To the second, sound is diffused successively because it depends upon motion for its production and conservation; or, as others prefer, it is diffused instantaneously throughout the whole sphere of the sounding power, and therefore the voice of a preacher reaches simultaneously hearers unequally distant in a church. But because the air carrying that power successively approaches other places beyond the first sphere, it therefore carries the sound to them later.

81. It is customary here to treat of voice properly so called, which from Aristotle 2, *De anima* c. 8 is defined as "sound emitted from the mouth of an animal with some imagination." Hence every voice is sound, but not conversely. We said something in connection with respiration, c. 1, about the instruments supplied by nature for forming voice. It is also customary to treat of reflected sound, which is called "echo" and which occurs when sound or its species, encountering a solid and somewhat concave body, is reflected in the same order in which it falls upon it, almost as visual species

are reflected from a mirror. Various further questions are customarily raised concerning sound; on these see Conimbricenses in 2, *De anima* c. 8 and in Problem. sect. 2 and 3; P. Star. l. c. c. 19 sqq.; and Mastrius the Scotist, who collects more than the others, disp. 5, de Anim. q. 3.

On Smell.

82. Smell is "the external sense perceptive of odor." Its organ pertains to the nostrils, whose lower part is fleshy and upper part bony, namely, from the bone they call "cribriform" because it abounds in many openings, all nevertheless blocked by numerous fibers derived from the brain into the subtle coat with which the inner cavities of the nostrils are clothed. Above the cribriform bone, now within the cavity of the skull, there are two tubercles of soft substance called the "mammillary processes" or "papillary caruncles." Most place the power of smelling in these caruncles. But others dissent, especially among modern physicists and anatomists, both because the power of smelling ought to be outside the region of the brain, as occurs in the other external senses, whereas these processes are within the skull, and because the olfactory nerves destined for communication of smell with the brain do not run to these processes but to the inner coat of the nose or to the thin and papillose flesh which some anatomists observe hidden beneath that coat. Hence they place the power of smelling in either this coat or this flesh; and experience favors them, since we sense odor within the nose.

83. Odor, the object of smell, is said by many to consist in a substantial vapor or effluence of corpuscles emitted from odorous things. The Corpuscularians adhere to this opinion in a body, Tosca supporting it tr. 4, lib. 7, where he asserts the same concerning flavor. This author warns, however, that both flavor and odor in first act consist in a configuration of corpuscles apt to move the small fibers of the tongue or nose by pricking, tickling, plucking, or stretching them; but flavor or odor in second act is nothing other than this very motion of the fibers. If it is asked why the same is not said of color in second act or of hardness in second act relative to sight or touch, there is no reason except the will or inconsistency of Corpuscularian philosophy, which, little concerned for coherence of doctrine, rashly embraces whatever appears convenient for the occasion. The motion of fibers, according to Tosca cited elsewhere, is the actual tasting and smelling itself, evidently the tasting of flavor and smelling of odor. If, therefore, it is itself flavor and odor, it will be the tasting and smelling of itself, which no one would tolerate. Moreover, if salty flavor, as

the adversaries maintain, consists in particles of salt pricking the sensorium like little needles, and if sweet flavor and pleasant odor consist in particles of the odorous or sapid body gently affecting the small fibers, that is, softly licking them and in no way biting them, as the same authors hold, it absurdly follows that a flayed hand truly tastes and smells when its small fibers are pricked by saline needles, as experience teaches, and when they are gently and without biting licked by particles of honey or pleasant ointment.

84. It must therefore be maintained with the Peripatetics that odor is a quality, which is commonly believed to result from a temperament of the primary qualities in which dryness prevails over moisture and heat dominates absolutely. Hence odorous things smell more strongly when they become heated. The various passages of Aristotle in which he sometimes asserts and sometimes denies that odor is a vapor are well reconciled by P. Suar. l. c. c. 23. It is nevertheless true that odor is not exhaled or diffused without some effluence, that is, without some vapor or substantial exhalation which may be called, as it were, the vehicle of odor; for this is evident from countless experiments. It is customarily proved by reason as well, because odor is not a univocally active quality, nor is air, through which it is diffused, a suitable subject in which a new odor can be produced, because it lacks a mixture of primary qualities. Therefore odor is diffused insofar as it is carried by the vapor of the odorous thing dispersed through the air. Whether, however, odor must reach the nostrils really or only intentionally, that is, through its species, is disputed; concerning this see P. Suar. c. 24.

On Taste.

85. Taste is "the external sense perceptive of flavor." Its organ is commonly placed in the tongue, though some extend it also to the palate, not according to its external coat but according to the inner one woven with nervous fibers, which is covered by tender and porous flesh such as is required to imbibe the juice which serves as the vehicle of flavor. For sapid things do not affect taste unless dissolved in some liquid or juice. To this end saliva assists in drier foods, possessing no small power of dissolving.

86. Flavor, the object of taste, arises from a temperament of the primary qualities in which heat predominates together with moisture. That it is a quality, and not a mere local motion in the fibers of the tongue, is evident from what was just said in n. 83. Add that, in the contrary opinion, every liquid or fluid will be sweet, especially pure and natural water, whatever experience may say to the contrary. The proof is that according to Tosca tr.

4, lib. 7, prop. 9, sweet things are those whose particles or corpuscles have a quasi-spherical or cylindrical figure, and from this it arises that they gently affect the organ of taste; for if they were roughened by angles, they would prick or bite the fibers. But according to the same author, preceding lib. 6, prop. 21, particles of fluids must likewise be spherical, oval, or cylindrical in figure and have smooth or slippery surfaces. Sweetness therefore ought to belong to all fluids, even vinegar or juice of wormwood, but especially to natural water, which is very fluid and gently moistens the tongue without biting. How, moreover, this doctrine concerning fluids coheres with the claim that the particles of air, which is exceedingly fluid, are branched, as the same author often teaches elsewhere, he himself may see.

On Touch.

87. Touch is "the external sense perceptive of the primary qualities" and "also of many secondary ones," such as hardness, softness, smoothness, dryness or rigidity, viscosity, thickness, thinness, and also heaviness and lightness, which are sensed by touch through resistance or impulse. It is called an external sense not because it is absent from internal parts, as is evident in colic, nephritic, and other pains, but because it resides to a great extent in the external skin and because it does not need the ministry of another sense in order to perceive objects. The organ of touch is commonly placed in flesh and nerves, especially in the latter. Under the name "flesh," as far as the present matter is concerned, are also comprehended membranes, coats, muscles, tendons, liver, spleen, etc., so that touch *inesse* in all animated parts except bones, to which it is commonly denied, and likewise hair and nails, if these are animated.

88. The object of touch comprehends the qualities just enumerated, all of which are customarily signified by the common name of "tangible" or "tactile" quality. For although they agree in some proximate genus in which tactility is founded, this genus is "unnamed," as St. Thomas says 1, p. q. 78, ar. 3, ad 3. The modern Corpuscularians maintain that these are not entitative and absolute accidents but consist in a certain figure and motion or rest of the particles of a body, as we saw in Synopsis de Cael. etc. c. 3, n. 28. But how weakly they proceed may be gathered from what was said concerning sound, odor, and flavor; nor do the limits of the present work permit us to say more.

89. It is asked here 1º whether touch senses qualities received in its own matter, or only those received in distinct matter, or both. It is certain that qualities of foreign matter are sensed by touch, at least those which are not

primary, such as hardness, softness, and others, although they do not produce similar qualities in the organ. Indeed, concerning two of the primary qualities, dryness and moisture, the same is evident, for the dryness of earth need not dry the hand while it is touched, nor need the fluidity or moisture of water necessarily moisten it, at least if it is touched mediately, for example by a stick. It is also certain that manifestly active primary qualities, namely heat and cold, are not sensed unless they cause the sensorium itself to become somewhat cold or hot. Nevertheless, supposing this alteration as a necessary condition, the heat or cold of the foreign body is truly sensed, for when the hand is applied to fire it senses a heat greater than that which it receives; as soon as the hand is withdrawn that sensation ceases, although the heat received in the hand does not immediately perish. It also seems certain that qualities constituting the due temperament of the sensorium are not sensed by touch, at least unless some novelty intervenes; otherwise we would continuously experience a sensation of our own temperament. Nor should it be said that this sensation, because continuous, is not noticed. For at least it ought to be noticed after distraction or sleep.

90. Concerning qualities contrary to or beyond nature received in the sensorium, however, there is great disagreement and great probability on both sides. P. Suárez l. c. c. 26, whom many others follow, denies that these qualities are sensed by touch, except perhaps in another nearby part of the body in which they do not *inesse*. First, by parity with the other senses, none of which perceives a quality inhering in itself. Secondly, because there would be no reason why qualities even in a connatural degree should not be sensed continuously. Thirdly, because experience teaches this in hardness and other secondary qualities. For the hand or skin often becomes somewhat hardened beyond its due state, yet it does not sense that hardness; and the same reason applies to the others.

91. The opposite is judged by many others. 1º Because those qualities are truly tactile and are applied to the organ in the highest degree through compenetration and inherence. 2º Because heat, just as it is successively produced in the sensorium, is successively sensed. But if only foreign heat were sensed, it ought to be perceived all at once in the instant of application. 3º Because various experiments prove it. For a hand previously cold, when it recovers its due heat, senses it. Someone burning with fever senses vehement heat throughout the whole body. Someone who leaps senses the resistance of his own gravity; and someone running down a slope, if he wishes to stop, senses within himself a resisting impetus; likewise someone who is pushed by another senses the impulse in that part in which he

receives it. Finally, a dolorific quality is sensed in the part in which it inheres.

92. These points, however, although sufficiently pressing, can in some manner be solved. To the first, there is a counter-instance in the due, uninterrupted temperament. That application rather impedes than facilitates, because no sensible quality acts intentionally, that is, by sending its species, except upon a distinct subject, as is evident in the other senses. For the tongue, for example, does not sense a flavor innate in itself, nor taste an adventitious one except as received in a foreign subject, from which the tongue itself does not receive flavor by inherence, since flavor, odor, and color are not regarded as active qualities. To the second, real alteration in touch is prerequired as a condition for intentional alteration when the quality is active. Hence the intentional action becomes successive, yet in such a way that it is more intense than the real alteration. For a hand applied to fire quickly senses a most intense heat which it cannot itself receive in so short a time.

93. To the third, a hand, while returning to its proper temperament, senses the heat of the blood and spirits flowing to it, but not the heat received in its animated and tactile parts; otherwise it would sense it perpetually. Similarly, someone burning with fever perceives heat inhering in the blood, spirits, humors, and inanimate juices of which no part of the body is devoid, but not that inhering in animated parts, which is always somewhat more diminished because of the resistance of the soul. To the examples of leaping, etc., it may be said that the sensation of gravity and impulse pertains only to the nerves and muscles as the proper instruments of local motion. The nerves do not sense their own gravity or the impulse impressed upon themselves, but only the weight of flesh, bones, and humors, or the impetus impressed upon these. But if a bare nerve were pressed from without, it would sense the pressure in the immediately affected part. Finally, a dolorific quality, if there is one, does not inhere in the animated part which hurts, but in the contiguous body or harmful humor contained in the pores, of which again in the following chapter.

94. It is asked 2º whether touch senses only excesses or surpassings of qualities, that is, whether qualities, in order to be sensed by touch, must be more intense than those which naturally *inesse* in the sensorium. Almost everyone affirms this concerning the primary qualities, and experience seems to favor it, at least in heat and cold. A reason can be given from what was just said, because an active quality does not act intentionally upon touch unless it first alters the sensorium; and it cannot alter it unless it exceeds it in degree, because like does not act upon like, nor what is diminished upon

what is intense. Yet only the higher degree is not sensed, but the whole intensity in the manner of one. Concerning secondary qualities the authors disagree. But it seems that this must be denied, because if one hand touches another of equal temperament, it senses in it a hardness and softness very similar to its own. It may be said: it senses these indirectly, insofar as it does not sense anything greater or lesser. Against this: this indirect sensation is merely negative, that is, a mere non-sensation. Yet the hand then positively senses something, otherwise it would touch nothing, just as if it were applied to a vacuum. But it does not touch substance, nor quantity alone, since quantity without quality is not sensed. Therefore it positively touches and senses the qualities of the other hand, in which there is no excess.

What Are Called Sensibles Accidentally, and What Common Sensibles?

95. The objects of the external senses are divided into "sensibles essentially and accidentally." Those are called sensibles essentially which immediately terminate sensation by themselves; those accidentally sensible do not immediately terminate sensation by themselves, but by force of that sensation they are immediately known without investigation to the intellect or internal sense, as naturally united to the sensible essentially. Of this kind are material substances and also objects of one sense referred to another, for example the moisture, odor, and flavor of milk as referred to sight. Material substance itself, which sustains an immediately sensible accident, is also said to be sensible and sensed "as that which," although only mediately and denominatively. Such sensibles do not send their own proper species to the external sense. Sensibles "essentially" are subdivided into "proper and common," of which the former are said to be sensed "essentially first," the latter "essentially second." Proper sensibles are those which we have thus far explained together with the organs of the external senses, namely, those which correspond individually to individual senses in such a way that one cannot be perceived essentially by two senses. "Common" sensibles are those which are immediately sensed by several external senses, though not necessarily by all. Aristotle assigns five of these: "magnitude, figure, number, motion, and rest." "Distance" is customarily reduced to magnitude, "roughness and smoothness" to figure, "unity" to number, and "presence" to motion and rest.

96. There are some who think that these common sensibles are not perceived by the external senses but only by the internal sense or intellect on the occasion of external sensation, because, they say, no sense can range

outside its proper sensible, by which it is specified and circumscribed. The contrary, however, is commonly asserted throughout the School, because although they are not perceived according to quidditative or relative concepts, they nevertheless are sensed in a certain crude and material manner. Number, for example, is sensed insofar as it is a certain multitude of the proper sensible. Nor is it therefore granted that some sense ranges outside its proper object, because the common sensibles are not sensed apart from the proper sensible, but together with it and insofar as they are its circumstances or affections. How they alter the sense is doubtful. Some maintain that these sensibles send their own partial species; others, that they concur less principally toward the species of the proper sensible; others, and this is the more common opinion, that they merely modify the species of the proper sensible. They modify either by adding a modal entity, as some think, or, as others more probably maintain, by determining the proper sensible by way of a condition so that it sends a species representing itself insofar as affected by such circumstances. Color, for example, has the power to emit a species representing it not in just any manner, but with such presence, figure, magnitude or extension, etc.

97. In this matter it seems that we should say, 1º that every external sense perceives the presence of its object, for none perceives its proper object except as present, that is, as existing somewhere. Hence either presence sends a partial species or determines the object to send a species by which it is represented as present. 2º The other common sensibles are perceived insofar as a varying combination of presences is perceived. This is explained by going through each. Magnitude is clearly perceived by sight and touch insofar as by both are perceived the mutually exclusive presences of many united parts. The same may be held of hearing when it perceives a sound extensively great. Taste and smell do not seem to perceive magnitude unless perhaps intensive magnitude is meant. Nor does the tongue sense by taste the bulk of a sapid body, but by touch.

98. Distance is cognized by sight and touch through perceiving the magnitude of the intervening space or body. Hence where the intervening space is not perceived, the extremes, although very distant from one another, appear contiguous, as when we see the Sun near the horizon as though contiguous to the mountains. Hearing likewise, though less distinctly, perceives the distance of a sounding body, either insofar as it perceives the extension of sound through the medium, if sound is really diffused, as many judge, or, if it is not thus diffused, insofar as species of sound peculiarly represent in some manner the presence and extension of the space through which they are propagated. For recourse to the

diminution of sound does not suffice, since a nearby sound can also be diminished. Taste does not perceive distance, nor does smell, although the latter sometimes gives occasion to the internal power, otherwise taught by experience of the other senses, to cognize a distant object. Figure is sensed insofar as a certain distance of the extreme parts from the center or middle is cognized. This pertains only to sight and touch, not to the other senses. For although, when the sound of a bell is heard, the figure of the bell is presented to the mind or imagination, this proceeds from a species formerly received through sight which is then excited. The tongue, however, discerns by touch the figure of food taken into the mouth. Number, or multitude, is sensed by any sense insofar as present objects divided or not united to one another are perceived. Motion is sensed insofar as distinct presences of the same object successively posited are sensed. It is sensed not only by sight and touch but also by hearing, which customarily senses the approach and recession of a sounding body; perhaps also by smell, and even by taste when food moved over the tongue successively affects different parts of the sensorium. Finally, rest is perceived by every sense insofar as the same presence of the object is continuously sensed.

99. It should be observed here that quantity is numbered among the common sensibles, but not as something distinct from magnitude or extension. It should likewise be observed that, if qualities are rendered formally present and extended solely by the presence and extension of quantity, the aforesaid sensibles will truly be common. But if every quality claims for itself its own presence and extension, although rooted in quantity and accommodated to it, the related sensibles will be common only insofar as they pertain to diverse senses under the same name of "presence," "magnitude," etc. In reality, however, the presence and magnitude or extension of color, which is perceived by sight alone, will be one thing; that of sound, which is perceived by hearing alone, another; and so with the rest. Nor is quantity perceived by any external sense except through the medium of extension or circumscribed presence, which it roots in a quality, just as gravity is not sensed except through impulse. But because quantity roots presence, and the other common sensibles are reduced to presence, it can truly be said with St. Thomas 1, p. q. 78, ar. 3, ad 2, that all sensibles of this kind are reduced to quantity.

CHAPTER IV.
On the Internal Sense and Appetite.

100. The internal sense is "an interior material potency capable of perceiving all the objects of the external senses." That a potency of this kind, distinct from the external senses, really exists, not only in man but also in brute animals, is certain to all. For otherwise the memory of brutes, evident from innumerable experiments, cannot be explained; nor can there otherwise arise the solicitude by which brute animals commonly seek absent objects, or objects not then perceived by any external sense, as a dog seeks its master, a tiger its cubs, and a wolf its prey. Nor is there any other cause of the dreams that occur in sleepers, even in brutes; for "even the dog in dreams barks at the hare's tracks." Finally, in brutes whose soul is divisible, the agreement and harmony of the parts in spontaneous movements cannot otherwise be maintained.

101. This potency, whether it is really one or multiple, on which more later, performs various functions and from them receives various names, which St. Thomas enumerates in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4. 1º It is called "common sense" insofar as it perceives present objects actually perceived through any of the external senses, and discriminates among them, for example between heat and taste. Hence the name "common" does not denote community of predication, nor a relation only to the common sensibles discussed at n. 95; rather, it is taken from the community of the object, which is not visible rather than tangible, etc., but is anything sensible through the external senses. It is also taken from its communication or commerce with every external sense through the nerves proceeding from the brain. 2º It is called "phantasy" insofar as it preserves the species of a sensed object, through which it knows that object even when absent, or no longer perceived by any external sense. "Imagination," or the "imaginative faculty," coincides with phantasy and is usually assigned the function of forming for itself one composite from several objects, as a golden mountain from gold and a mountain. Yet this function is also commonly attributed to phantasy, just as the imaginative faculty is also assigned the function of knowing an object in its absence; hence the names of the two are regarded as virtually synonymous.

102. 3º It is called the "estimative faculty" in brutes insofar as it discriminates between what is advantageous and disadvantageous and, by a kind of practical judgment that such an object is suitable or harmful to itself,

moves the appetite to pursue or avoid it. In man the "cogitative faculty" is posited in place of the estimative, adding a peculiar perfection in the manner of discriminating the harmful from the harmless. 4º It is called the "memorative faculty," or "memory," insofar as it retains the species of things previously known and knows objects as past, or as previously known. This memory in man is called "reminiscence" because of the power of recollecting things previously known when they do not immediately occur, through a certain search or inference. Father Suárez, however, attributes this power not to sensitive but to intellectual memory.

103. It should be noted, however, that according to St. Thomas, l.c., whom the Thomists follow, it belongs to the estimative faculty of a brute to perceive objects, not indeed insofar as they are delightful or troublesome to the senses, namely as tasty, odorous, etc., but insofar as they possess certain aspects or properties perceived by no external sense, which for that reason they call "unsensed." For example, when a sheep flees a wolf at first sight, and when every bird and wild animal not domesticated or tamed avoids a man before suffering any harm from him, it does not merely dread his external color or figure, which is more dreadful in other things that are not hostile to that same animal. It therefore dreads and flees that object because it knows it as hostile to its own nature; and this hostility is an unsensed aspect, since it is perceived by no external sense. To this also belong the example of a bird gathering straw for nest-building, a brute recognizing a medicinal herb even before experience, and innumerable others.

104. Several of our authors and of the Scotists deny that such unsensed aspects are perceived by any internal sense, nor do they acknowledge an estimative faculty in brutes for them, except at most for advantages or disadvantages known by sensory experience, such as a dog has when, after having previously been struck, it flees from a man who picks up a stone or raises a stick; for such an action arouses in it the memory of the blow it felt. But when a brute desires or flees certain objects of which it has not yet had experience, they refer this to sympathy or antipathy, by virtue of which, once the external accidents of certain objects are known, the appetite at once avoids or seeks them, although it expects no advantage or fears no harm from them; just as certain men shudder at the sight of a corpse or another person's wound, although they conceive no evil as threatening themselves from it. The reason is that a brute has no species of the unsensed suitability or hostility of the object. First, it has none transmitted by the object; for a wolf transmits to a sheep a species of the same aspect as it does to another wolf, to which nevertheless it is not represented as hostile. Nor, secondly, is such a species fashioned by the internal sense; for this sense is more perfect

in man, in whom nevertheless no such species is fashioned. Nor, finally, is it infused by God as Author of nature; for why should that species be infused into a brute rather than into man? Moreover, if knowledge of an unsensed object follows in a brute from knowledge of a sensed object, there will be reasoning in a brute, which is absurd.

105. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that brutes apprehend something advantageous or disadvantageous when they first seek or flee certain objects. For St. Thomas both asserts this in the cited place, and Father Suárez supposes it in De anima III, c. 9 and 30, and the common judgment of men conceives it. For what else? Does a thirsty dog apprehend no suitability when it first desires water? Or a hungry dog when it devours bread it has never tasted before? Certainly, if mere sympathy intervenes here, no cognition will be needed, just as a magnet needs no cognition to attract iron, nor a sponge to absorb water. Hence all cognition and elicited appetite could easily be eliminated from brutes, and all their movement reduced to sympathy and antipathy or to innate appetite. Elicited appetite differs chiefly from innate appetite in that it tends toward a good apprehended by the one appetizing. Therefore, since a brute, according to the adversaries, elicitedly desires those objects, it must apprehend something good in them. They say that it must, but merely materially, namely by knowing the good thing, but not as good. I answer to the contrary: a good thing need be apprehended for no other reason than that by its goodness it may allure the appetite. But the goodness of an object that is not apprehended as good does not allure at all, as we experience in ourselves. Nor indeed can it be conceived how cognition of bread should arouse the appetite if it presents no greater allurement in bread than in a stone.

106. As regards the species of unsensed objects, there are some who think that these too are unsensed, that is, not received through the ministry of any sense, but permanently implanted by the Author of nature. For just as He bestowed on brutes other aids necessary for their preservation, so He also bestowed the species of many objects that can either harm or benefit them. Yet these species are commonly aroused only through sensed species, for example through the species of the external accidents of a wolf which a lamb receives by sight, and the reception of which is the occasion or condition for the estimative faculty to use the unsensed species of hostility, certainly without reasoning; just as frequently in us, without any reasoning, a new species arouses another that had lain dormant. This opinion seems to me very probable. That nature did not give similar species to man is not surprising, since it is established that a brute surpasses man in many things pertaining to bodily life, such as strength, speed, smell, and others. Nor do I

see why this superiority is more absurd than the prerogative of sympathy and antipathy, which man lacks though it is very useful, or more absurd than the power of using species of external accidents to discriminate between harmful and harmless things without reasoning or investigation, a power likewise denied to man. Nature gave man reason, which surpasses every endowment of brutes; it also gave him the cogitative faculty in place of the estimative, which according to St. Thomas, l.c., participates to some extent in the power of reasoning, wholly denied to brutes. In this respect the internal sense can be said to be more perfect in man than in a brute.

107. Most, however, reject such unsensed species, or species implanted by nature, and maintain that unsensed objects are known through sensed species, that is, species newly received through the ministry of the senses. Father Suárez, cited c. 9, thinks these are precisely the same species by which sensed objects are known, so that the same species which represents to a lamb the color and figure of a wolf simultaneously represents the wolf to it as hostile. Why a similar species does not so represent it to another wolf must be explained from the different disposition of the recipient: namely, the estimative faculty of the lamb, but not that of the wolf, has the power of using that species according to its whole representative force, because such a power is necessary for the preservation not of the wolf but of the lamb. From this chiefly arise the differences among the instincts of brutes. This manner of holding the opinion is sufficiently probable, although not without difficulty. Certainly those Thomists do not avoid the difficulty who require more perfect species for unsensed objects, either produced by the object in the estimative faculty through sensed species as intermediaries, or caused by the estimative faculty itself in the presence of those species. For, to omit other points, it can equally be asked why such species are not produced alike in every brute, or even in man.

108. After this it is asked whether the internal sense is really and specifically one or multiple. Some divide it into two potencies, others into three, others into five or six. Father Suárez, l.c., c. 30, reports and refutes these opinions, which are now antiquated. The Thomists, with St. Thomas in the cited q. 78, a. 4, distinguish four potencies in the internal sense really and specifically: namely common sense, imagination or phantasy, the estimative faculty, and the memorative faculty, with the cogitative faculty and reminiscence in man in place of the latter two. Among these they distribute the functions discussed in nn. 101 and 102. Against them, the Scotists and our authors commonly, with the Excellent Doctor in the cited III, c. 30, acknowledge only one internal sense, that is, a really single potency which, according to its order to different functions or to the various acts it contains,

is denominated common sense, phantasy, etc. This opinion is proved 1º because there is no compelling foundation for the distinction, as will shortly appear. 2º By parity with the intellect, which contains a greater variety of acts and yet is really one.

109. 3º Because phantasy, the estimative faculty, and the memorative faculty are really identified with common sense; therefore they are also identified with one another, according to the principle, "Things which are the same as one third thing, etc." The antecedent is proved: because it belongs to all of them to elicit the first act of common sense, namely to know an object intuitively, or to perceive a present object simultaneously with the external sense. For whenever we attentively see an object, phantasy perceives it first. This is so both because the intellect at once knows it, and the intellect does not operate without the operation of phantasy, as even the adversaries suppose; and because phantasy at once receives the species of the object externally sensed, as many Thomists admit and Father Suárez demonstrates, l.c. Yet it is repugnant that a necessary and attentive potency, upon first receiving the species of a present object, should not perceive it. Next, the estimative faculty undoubtedly also knows an object as present; for when a sheep sees a wolf it does not know hostility in the abstract, but as contracted to the object sensed by the eyes, as though practically judging thus: "This object which I see is hostile to me." This act undoubtedly perceives the external accidents of the wolf as present. Finally, since the memorative faculty also is immediately affected in the presence of the object and receives its species, whether this is the same species used by the estimative faculty or is produced without delay through it as intermediary, as the Thomists maintain, it cannot fail immediately to use such a species regarding the present object, as we said of phantasy.

110. One may object: it belongs to common sense to know only in the presence of an object, whereas it belongs to phantasy to know not only in its presence but also in its absence. I answer to the contrary: in the word "only" the principle is begged, since it supposes that there really is a common sense so limited and distinct from the potency that knows in absence. This limitation and distinction are wholly arbitrary unless founded in the character of the acts, or in the fact that knowledge of present and absent things cannot be attributed to the same potency; for only those actions "which cannot be reduced to one principle require diverse potencies," as St. Thomas says in the cited q. 78, a. 4. But that both cognitions belong to the same potency or principle is clear from what has just been said; for phantasy, which according to all knows absent things, also knows present things, as we have shown. Add the example of the intellect, in which no one imagines a

potency of understanding "only" in the presence of the object. They say the reason is different, for the intellect, being immaterial, ought to be a more universal potency than sense. But this does not satisfy, because sense sufficiently yields to intellect through its limitation to sensible objects alone, to a lesser variety of acts, and to a cruder mode of operation. Otherwise, what prevents the internal sense from being a universal potency within its own genus?

111. Add further that common sense extends even to absent things, as often happens in dreams according to St. Thomas. There is therefore no ground on which it is distinguished from phantasy. The College of St. Thomas of Alcalá, here II, q. 8, n. 16, acknowledges that the consequence is good, but denies the antecedent and that it is founded on any word of St. Thomas. Yet St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2, teaches so expressly that common sense in sleepers perceives an internal object and discriminates objects that no one who has seen this passage can call his meaning into doubt. For this reason most Thomists cited by the same College, nn. 16 and 24, grant the antecedent but add that this happens accidentally. Yet this solution cannot be maintained on their principles; for if cognition of present things is the adequate act specifying common sense and distinguishing it from phantasy, as they maintain, it is as repugnant that common sense accidentally know absent things as that sight accidentally hear or hearing accidentally see.

112. John of St. Thomas answers otherwise, here q. 8, a. 3, namely that common sense sometimes perceives an absent object, but only as apparently present, or after the manner of a present object; whereas it is proper to phantasy to perceive an object as absent. I answer to the contrary: this does not avoid common sense's exercising an act of phantasy or imagination; for, as St. Thomas says in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 11, "Imagination most often apprehends a thing as it is not, because it apprehends it as present when it is absent." Moreover, the Holy Doctor himself teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 6, that vision occurring through likenesses of bodies when the bodies are absent is common "to all interior apprehensions." Because of these points it seems that the Angelic Teacher, in that a. 4, handed down the Thomists' opinion because it was then more common, not because it was more probable; nor did he adhere to it very firmly, since both there and elsewhere he gave doctrine favoring our opinion. He also favors us in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 81, a. 3, ad 2, teaching that appetite can be moved by imagination and common sense, although the movement of appetite is commonly attributed by Thomists to the estimative faculty alone. See the College of St. Thomas, cited q. 8, n. 40. Nor is it likely that St. Thomas

altogether disagreed with Aristotle on this matter, who acknowledged only one internal sense, as Father Suárez shows in the cited c. 30.

113. Objection 1º: common sense receives species, whereas phantasy retains and preserves them. But in corporeal things receiving and retaining require different organs and temperaments, for moist things receive well and retain badly, as is evident in soft wax, while dry things do the contrary, as is evident in marble. Therefore, etc. I grant the major premise understood in this way: that the really same potency, insofar as it receives species of present objects, is called common sense, and insofar as it retains them in absence, is called phantasy. But I deny the minor premise, which as stated is plainly false, since it is evident that no quality or figure is retained except by the subject in which it is received, as is clear in marble and in phantasy itself, which according to the Thomists retains only those species it receives. One may say that the argument speaks of easy reception and long retention. Granted; but even so the argument fails in several ways. 1º Although that minor premise is often true of figures or characters, it is not so of other qualities. For iron applied to fire easily receives heat and does not easily lose it; a new earthen vessel very easily receives an odor, and yet, as Horace said, "The vessel will long retain the scent with which, when new, it was once imbued." Children, although abounding in moisture, both receive species easily and retain them for a long time.

114. 2º Although moisture conduces to the reception of species and dryness to their retention, both can belong to the same organ in such a tempered degree that reception is rendered easy and retention long-lasting. To this should be referred what is reported of St. Thomas, Alfonso Tostado, and very many others, namely that they were accustomed to retain with tenacious memory a book rapidly read through. A temperament of this kind belongs essentially to human nature if it is not prevented from attaining the perfection due to it. That it is not found in most men, but moisture predominates in some and dryness in others, whence arises greater or lesser facility or tenacity of memory, a variation occurring even in the same man over the course of life, should be regarded as accidental, as we said in a similar matter, disp. 2, n. 89; and it has no bearing on a distinction of organs for phantasy and common sense. 3º Phantasy perceives present objects whenever common sense attends to them, as we saw above; therefore it receives their species just as easily. 4º If common sense alone possesses facility in receiving species, without any power to retain them once the object is removed, as the Thomists maintain, its organ will be a substance not merely moist but fluid; for a non-fluid body, even if moist, retains an

impression for some time after the seal is removed. But a fluid substance is unfit for sensation, as everyone knows.

115. Objection 2º: cognition of an absent object tends under a more abstract and less material aspect than cognition of a present object, as also cognition of an unsensed object compared with cognition of a sensed object. Therefore it belongs to a distinct potency. Omitting the antecedent, I deny the consequence, because nothing prevents both acts from belonging to the same potency, as is clear in the intellect and also in sensitive appetite, which according to the Thomists is the same when it appetizes present and absent, sensed and unsensed things. Nor can they themselves disagree, since they admit that phantasy also knows a present object and that the estimative faculty knows the sensed object conjoined with the unsensed.

116. Objection 3º: it sometimes happens that in the same animal the power of imagining is injured while the power of estimating remains unharmed; likewise, through illness or old age memory may diminish or fail while common sense remains intact. Therefore these potencies are separable and consequently distinct. I press the point: it often happens that the imaginative faculty of the same man is disordered in some definite matter while remaining sound in others; likewise, a madman may correctly estimate some objects but not all. Therefore there will be multiple potencies of imagining or estimating in the same man. All must therefore admit that one potency which contains various acts can accidentally be impeded regarding one while remaining free regarding another, because perhaps on the part of the organ it requires different dispositions for different acts, although these dispositions are compossible in the same organ.

117. But it will now be asked: where is the organ or seat of the internal sense? Aristotle seems to place this sense in the heart, although there are some who interpret his meaning otherwise. Today, however, all place the internal sense in the brain, because there the sensory nerves converge and originate, through which the external senses communicate with the internal. It is not the heart but the head that becomes fatigued through imagining, and it is in the head that we experience dreams and thoughts as occurring. When the brain is injured, phantasy is injured; and remedies for insanity are applied to the head. In Scripture also dreams and visions of phantasy are attributed to the head, as in Dan. 2 and 4. Nor is it an objection that thoughts are also attributed to the heart in Matt. 9 and 15; for there the name "heart" is taken for the whole soul, as often elsewhere in Sacred Scripture. But the doubt remains in which part of the brain the internal sense resides.

118. For this it should be noted that within the cavity of the cranium or skull is contained a soft and white substance covered by two membranes

which in Greek are called "meninges" and in Latin "dura mater" and "pia mater." The outermost part of this substance is called "cortical" and "gray," because it approaches somewhat to a gray color, whereas the innermost part, which is entirely white, is called "medullary," or the "medulla of the brain." This whole mass is divided into two as it were portions. The larger belongs to the forepart of the head and is properly called the "cerebrum"; the smaller belongs to the back of the head and is called the "cerebellum," as though a little brain. In the same mass four cavities are commonly observed, although some acknowledge only three and others only one, which are called the "ventricles" or "cells" of the brain. The first two, right and left, run from the vicinity of the forehead to the middle of the brain and terminate in a third cavity hollowed out there, from which proceeds the fourth, which is longer and extends to the cerebellum. In the third ventricle is seen a certain gland which, because of its shape like a cone or pine nut, is called by the Greeks "conarion" and by the Latins the "pineal gland." Some add two tubercles of fibrous substance adjoining the brain which, because of their worm-like shape, are called "vermiform processes."

119. Of these parts there is none that lacks an advocate for the function of organ of the internal sense. Descartes chooses the pineal gland; others prefer the meninges, others the vermiform processes, others the cortical part of the brain, and others the medullary part. The Thomists stand for the cells, which they think are four precisely so that they may receive the same number of potencies. But since these cells are occupied by a serous and excrementitious humor, as anatomists testify, the power of sensation is without justification placed there. The more common opinion among the moderns favors the medulla of the brain, because in it converge all the sensory nerves, or their roots, through which the internal sense has commerce of spirits and species with all the external senses.

120. It may be objected: the "oblong" or "spinal" medulla, namely that which extends from the head to the sacrum through the canal of the spine, is continuous with the medulla of the brain and is believed to be of the same substance; several nerves also arise from it. Therefore the whole of it, wherever such medulla extends, will be the organ of the internal sense. With the common opinion I grant the whole argument as regards imperfect and annelid animals, which live after being cut apart. But as regards others, it must be denied that the medulla in the spine and that in the brain are altogether of the same substance, or of the same conformation and temperament, although the diversity is not detected by anatomical observations in a corpse. For many things pertaining to organization escape the sight or perish immediately at death, though their existence is proved

from their effects. Many nerves do indeed proceed from the spinal medulla, but together with that medulla they derive their first origin from the brain, where their fibers or roots begin; just as the small rootlets of a tree are not at the place from which the trunk is seen to emerge.

121. Nothing remains to be said about the object of the internal sense except that it embraces all the objects of the external senses, both proper and common, and also the external sensations themselves, which are perceived by the internal sense together with their objects in almost the same way as common sensibles are perceived together with proper sensibles by the external senses. It is also probable that the internal sense reflexively perceives its own acts and the acts of appetite. The proximate genus of all these lacks a name by which it may be signified in the being of a thing; hence it is usually signified only in the being of an object by the common and relative name "sensible," and the internal sense is said to tend under the aspect of "the sensible in common."

122. Something should be added here about sleep, which Aristotle calls a passion of common sense, not because it does not belong also to the other senses, but because it is proximately caused by some alteration of the brain. Sleep is usually described from Aristotle, De somno et vigilia, c. 1, as a binding or impediment of the power of sensing; waking, on the other hand, as the freedom of that same power. Yet not every impediment is sleep, but only that which prevents the free commerce of spirits between the brain and the organs of the external senses. This usually arises from some obstruction produced in the sensory nerves by fumes or vapors rising into the brain from other parts of the body, especially the stomach. For these, being condensed by the natural coldness of the brain, so occupy the small channels of the nerves arising from it that they deny passage or outflow to the spirits into the external sensory organs, which consequently cease to operate. The same vapors overwhelm those same animal spirits and in a manner suffocate them in the brain, while preventing the formation of new spirits there; whence the internal sense also is wholly or partly bound. Sometimes sleep arises from a deficiency of spirits, a great part of which has been consumed by the exercise of operation and cannot be replenished quickly enough when the body is weakened, as happens when sleep overtakes one from fatigue. But when either a new supply of spirits is generated or those which had been impeded are allowed, after the vapors have been dispersed, to flow through the proper passages of the brain and nerves, the animal is released from sleep and awakens.

123. Moreover, it often happens in sleepers that the spirits of the brain are neither so deficient nor so overwhelmed by soporific vapors that they

cannot concur in various internal or imaginative sensations, although they are unable to break through the impediments to their outflow into the external sensory organs. Then dreams occur in the brain. Their confusion and disorder arise from the irregular movement of the spirits, which, partly agitated by fumes newly rising and partly repelled by obstructed nerves, move the particles of the brain without order and, by disturbing the species of phantasy, impede perfect discrimination by the sense and consequently perfect judgment by the intellect. It is enough merely to have touched upon these matters here.

On the Sensitive Appetite.

124. From what was said in Physics, where the appetite of matter for form was discussed, the difference between innate and elicited appetite is established as consisting chiefly in this: innate appetite is identified with the thing appetizing and is therefore invariable, whereas elicited appetite in creatures is an act produced by the thing appetizing and admits variation. Likewise, innate appetite follows the natural form, elicited appetite the apprehended form; that is, innate appetite is not directed by a prior cognition of the object possessed by the thing appetizing, but results, or as it were results, from the natural perfection of the thing, whereas elicited appetite presupposes an object known by the thing appetizing. That there is therefore in brutes an elicited appetite concerning sensible objects is rightly regarded as evident from experience, for brutes pursue or avoid various objects according to the variety of their cognitions. This appetite is material, because no other belongs to brutes and because it does not pass beyond the limits of a corporeal object. It is called sensitive because it tends only toward sensible objects and because it is immediately directed or aroused by sensation, namely internal sensation, at least when speaking of the principal appetite, whence it tends even toward absent objects.

125. It is likewise certain that a similar appetite exists in man besides the will, which is called the rational appetite. For sensitive powers are found in man no less complete than in brutes, as all agree. And that corporeal appetitions contrary to rational ones exist in man is clearly gathered from various passages of Scripture, especially that of the Apostle in Gal. 5: “The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these are opposed to one another.” An appetite of this kind is called “sensuality,” though this name often has a bad sense but is taken here indifferently, and its acts are called “passions,” because some passion or physical commotion usually results from them in the body, such as a drawing of blood toward the

heart or face. That it imports a potency distinct from the soul and also from the internal sense, and indeed a material or organic potency, since it is limited to material acts, is established from what was said in the preceding disputation.

126. The celebrated division of this potency is into the concupiscible and irascible. The function of the concupiscible is to appetize sensible advantages, or things suitable according to sense, and to avoid disadvantages or harmful things. Its acts are love and hatred, desire and flight or abhorrence, joy or delight, and sadness or pain. The function of the irascible is to defend desired goods, or repel contrary things which impede the possession or attainment of good or inflict evil, and to take vengeance upon them. Its acts are hope, despair, daring, fear, and anger. St. Thomas discusses the acts of both at length in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 25 sqq. The Thomists maintain that these are really distinct and diverse potencies, while our authors and the Scotists commonly disagree. St. Thomas favors the Thomists in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 81, a. 2; yet perhaps he intends only a distinction of reason, which suffices for a doctrinal division, for there he indicates foundations by which real identity can be proved. He gives, namely, the example of innate appetite, which certainly both appetizes the good and resists obstacles through the same power; in a stone, for example, the same gravity which inclines it downward resists what impels it upward.

127. The Holy Doctor also indicates the great kinship between the acts of both potencies, whereby some arise from others and look to the same end. "All," he says, "the passions of the irascible begin from passions of the concupiscible and terminate in them; as anger arises from sadness inflicted and, upon inflicting vengeance, terminates in joy." Hence he adds with Aristotle that the fights of animals concern concupiscible things, namely food and sexual matters. From this it follows that an act of the irascible stands in a certain way to an act of the concupiscible as the choice of a means stands to the intention of the end. For because a dog desires food, it becomes angry with one who prevents it and bites him, as though choosing this means as necessary for possession of the food. But appetition of the end and of the means belongs to the same potency. Add the parity of the will, in which, although there are also acts of both kinds, no one acknowledges two potencies on their account. See Father Suárez, De anima V, c. 4, where the contrary arguments, which are not of great force, are resolved.

128. The object of sensitive appetite is sensible delightful good, or good knowable through sense. If one wishes to discriminate between the objects of the irascible and concupiscible, appetites distinguished at least by reason or by their functions or connotations, this is not easily achieved. They are

usually distinguished as arduous and non-arduous good. But because this is difficult to grasp, as Father Suárez shows, l.c., it can be said with the same Suárez that the concupiscible regards sensible good simply as delightful in itself, whereas the irascible regards it as defensible. Thomists acknowledge in man's sensitive appetite a special inclination toward sensible morally good. But this pertains to theologians. There are also some who maintain that the appetite of a brute also regards useful good. This is true of useful good taken materially, but not of what is formally known as useful; otherwise brutes would properly act for an end, which we rejected with the common opinion in Physics, tr. d. 2, c. 3. A bird, therefore, when gathering straw that is in fact useful for building its nest, does not know utility as such, but apprehends some unsensed aspect of delightfulness in the very movements or actions of gathering, carrying, and suitably arranging it for the construction of the nest. That it apprehends in this way at such a time comes from instinct or the determination of nature.

129. Many, especially Thomists, place the organ or seat of appetite in the heart, with our Suárez favoring them in the cited c. 4. First, because we experience passions of appetite in the heart, which is expanded by joy, constricted by fear, and heated by anger. Second, because love is attributed to the heart, and therefore in Scripture we are commanded to love God "with the whole heart." Third, because the seat of appetite ought to be that part which is the principle of all movement, and such a part is the heart. Fourth, because Aristotle so holds in De partibus animalium III, c. 4. Yet Fathers Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Quirós, and commonly our moderns, with whom the Scotists Cavellus and Mastrius and others agree, maintain that the seat of this potency is not the heart but the brain. We said above, disp. 3, n. 33, that their opinion is preferable. The reason is that common sense resides in the brain, as all now admit. But if appetite were elsewhere, it would follow that in brutes one part of the soul would know and another would appetize. That this should not be admitted is established from disp. 4, n. 8 sqq.

130. This reason does not immediately press in man, whose soul in its substance, which alone properly knows and appetizes, is the same in the brain and in the heart; hence although the accidental potencies are distant from one another, the principle knowing and appetizing will be the same. The same would likewise be verified in perfect brutes, while in imperfect brutes appetite, like common sense, is commonly believed to be diffused through the spinal cord, if they consisted of an indivisible soul. And because Father Suárez in his work De anima agreed with the Thomists on this point, he therefore also placed appetite in the heart. I believe he would have retracted this opinion had the occasion arisen, as he retracted the earlier one

in the Metaphysics. Nevertheless, the reason adduced indirectly presses even in the appetite of man, because regarding the sensitive potencies, their seat, and their order, no one philosophizes differently in man than in a perfect brute.

131. Nor do the contrary foundations stand. To 1º: that experience is deceptive, since through fear and other passions all the viscera too are moved, the face is altered, the eyes disturbed, and the hair stands on end. This therefore comes from various movements of the blood and spirits, because these have a great sympathy with the affections of the soul. To 2º: in Sacred Scripture, when love and charity are discussed, not only the heart but also the viscera in the plural are commonly named, as in Ps. 50, v. 12 and Jer. 31, v. 33. Mercy too is attributed to the viscera, Luke 1, Col. 3, and often elsewhere. Will appetite therefore be located not only in the heart but also in the lungs and other viscera? The heart is therefore taken, as we already noted above, for the whole soul or for the rational appetite, which certainly does not inhere in a corporeal organ. To 3º: the heart is the principle of natural, that is, non-spontaneous movement, which does not depend upon appetite. Spontaneous movement, which alone depends on appetite, instead originates from the brain, from which all the nerves destined for it proceed. Nor does it depend upon the heart except remotely, insofar as the vital spirits are formed in the heart, which the brain afterward perfects and employs for spontaneous movement. To 4º: just as Aristotle placed the internal sense in the heart, so too he placed appetite there; but as he is commonly abandoned regarding the former, so he should be abandoned regarding the latter.

132. The appetite so far explained, which is immediately directed by the internal sense, should be called the common or principal appetite, because it concerns all sensible objects and as it were commands the whole body and moves all the members so that they cooperate for the common advantage and defense. Besides this, it is very probable that there are five particular appetites corresponding to the five external senses, attached to the same organs and immediately moved or aroused by external sensations. This opinion is usually rejected as recent or newly invented, but without justification, since it is the opinion of Scotus in the passages cited by Mastrius here, disp. 5, n. 299, whom his school follows, and among our authors of Fathers Hurtado, Compton, and Quirós. It is proved 1º because every cognitive potency ought to have a corresponding appetitive potency which it moves. For this reason, besides the rational appetite moved by the intellect, a sensitive appetite corresponding to the internal sense is posited in man. Nor is it enough that it move only remotely or mediately, for in that

way even the internal sense moves the will. 2º Because according to the common doctrine there is in fact no cognitive substance, at least, which is not also appetitive. But if there is no appetite in the organ of sight, for example, the part of a brute's soul existing in the eyes, although cognitive or perceptive of the object, will in no way be appetitive.

133. 3º Because in the very organs of the external senses we experience delight no less than sensation: in sight from beauty, in hearing from music, but especially in smell, taste, and touch from objects pleasing to each. Likewise we experience there displeasure, bitterness, and pain, which are affections of appetite. One may say: delight is only in the internal appetite, but from there it regards its object as existing in the external organ. I answer to the contrary: why is the same not said of sensation? Certainly the tongue as manifestly delights as it tastes; the foot or hand as manifestly hurts as it senses. Therefore, if this experience does not prove delight or pain there, neither will it prove sensation, and consequently all senses except the internal could be denied. One may say again: external sensation itself essentially and formally delights. I answer again to the contrary: delight is numbered by all among the acts or passions of appetite. Therefore it must be distinguished from sensation or perception of the object; otherwise acts of both lines will be confused, and desire, sadness, fear, etc., could equally consist in sensation. Add to these that hunger affects the stomach, and thirst the throat and also the tongue, as all are persuaded; yet both are defined through appetite. But, one says, so many appetites are superfluous. I ask in return: why then are so many senses not superfluous?

134. Something should be said here about pain, weeping, and laughter. Pain is an act or passion of appetite, as St. Thomas proves in *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 35, a. 1. Nor does it belong only to sensitive appetite but also to the will, as is evident when we grieve over sins. It is opposed to delight and is therefore a certain bitterness and disquiet of appetite concerning a present evil, or something apprehended as harmful. According to St. Thomas, ibid., a. 2, it is related to sadness as genus to species. For sadness is a species of pain which follows an internal apprehension without an actual external sensation of evil, whereas pain also follows external sensation, especially touch. Indeed it is then especially and almost antonomastically called pain when it results from bodily injury as perceived through touch. Then it is also called pain of the body, namely by reason of its cause or motive, to distinguish it from sadness, which is called pain of the soul. Some think that this pain specially so called consists in the sensation of touch; but without justification, since it is an affection contrary to delight, just as hatred is contrary to love, and consequently ought to belong to the

same potency. Otherwise even pain over sins could consist in cognition. Sensation or cognition, therefore, is delightful or painful only radically.

135. For the same reason those should be rejected who say that this pain is not a passion or act of a vital potency but the object of sensation in touch. They prove this 1º because often touch senses no object except mere pain, especially in the internal parts. 2º Because the hand, for example, senses pain, yet does not sense an act of appetite. But these arguments do not press. To 1º: touch does not sense or perceive formal pain, but causal pain, that is, some object harmful to the body; and when it discriminates that object in no other way than under the aspect of harmfulness, it is said to sense nothing except pain. To 2º: if "to sense" is taken for "to experience in act," since by reason of this we also say that the hand senses itself touching, then the hand indeed senses pain because it vitally receives pain in itself and is tormented by it. But it does not sense pain signately, or as the object of a sensation existing there. For only through the internal sense do we signately sense the pain existing in the hand, just as only in that way do we sense that we touch, taste, see, etc. It must therefore be said that this pain, as first aroused, is an act of the particular appetite corresponding to touch and accompanying it everywhere, although in the appetites of the other senses there can also be some pain or discomfort, though less notable. Thereafter, by virtue of the internal sensation of the pain of touch, pain is also aroused in the common appetite concerned for the well-being of the whole body, in which some call it sorrow rather than pain.

136. Philosophers disagree considerably about the cause of pain, or the tangible object which immediately moves to pain of this kind. Many, especially physicians, say that it is a solution of continuity in the body, or some division of parts continuously united, an opinion Aristotle teaches in some places. Indeed he defines pain as "division of the continuous," certainly in a causal sense. But this is a difficult opinion, as Father Suárez shows in De anima V, c. 5. Others therefore have recourse to a certain distemper of the humors which, when sensed by touch, causes pain. Others refer it to such a tension or stretching of the fibers as places them in proximate danger of rupture. Father Suárez admits a dolorific quality special among tangibles and resulting from distemper. Others, perhaps more probably, approve all these causes and hold that the object of pain can be multiple and various, namely everything perceived by the external sense as harmful to the body. But it should be noted that, if the opinion denying that qualities inhering in the organ are sensed by touch is maintained, a dolorific quality or affection, whatever it may be, does not cause pain except insofar

as it inheres in the humors or fluids contained within one's own body; or, if it inheres in an animated part, it will cause pain only in the nearest part.

137. Weeping is an effusion of tears from the eyes insofar as it arises from pain and sadness. Hence, if tears flow from another cause, it is not properly weeping, but only apparently, improperly, or purely materially. Sadness causes weeping insofar as it constricts the heart and the parts near the eyes, by which constriction a certain watery and salty humor is expressed, regarded as a kind of serum of the blood and constituting the matter of tears. Yet for weeping properly so called, sadness of the sensitive appetite does not suffice unless there is also sadness of the will arising from intellectual cognition of the painful object; for the capacity to weep is numbered among the properties of man insofar as rational. Hence brutes do not weep, although through pain and sadness they may break into howling. Infants too, before every operation of intellect, do not properly weep but groan or cry materially. If, however, one wishes to say that they properly weep, it may be said that their sensitive appetite, through its connection with the rational appetite, possesses this property in preference to the appetite of brutes.

138. Laughter is a certain vibration of the transverse septum or diaphragm, together with the muscles of the thorax and mouth, insofar as it arises from delight in something humorous and in some way novel. Hence, if that vibration arises from other causes, it will not properly be laughter but only apparently or purely materially, as we just said of weeping. Some believe laughter arising from tickling to be of this kind, not without reason, for tickling causes more discomfort than delight, and hence those whom it makes laugh greatly fear and avoid it. Most, however, regard this laughter as genuine because tickling induces some delight and wonder, either because it is furtive and sudden, or because, however much foreseen, it is in some way apprehended as novel and unusual in parts endowed with keener sensation. Moreover, the delight required for laughter presupposes some wonder caused by the novelty of the object; hence children, who wonder at everything as new, readily break into laughter. But since wonder is an act of the intellective soul, as St. Thomas proves in Contra Gentiles IV, c. 33, it follows that laughter presupposes an act of reason and risibility presupposes rationality as its property. Nor is that cheerfulness which infants or even dogs display on their faces properly laughter.

139. Finally, it may be asked concerning appetite whether it identifies with itself the locomotive potency. There is a twofold local movement in sensitive living things. One is called "natural" or "vital," namely that which belongs to the work of nutrition and does not depend upon appetite, for

example the movement of the heart; and its efficient potency seems really indistinct from the nutritive potency, from what was said in this disputation, n. 8. The other is called "spontaneous," because it arises from cognition and appetite, for example progressive movement. Many think that this is immediately effected by appetite; and if they admit any other motive potency, they maintain that it is not active but passive or dispositive, whereby the members are rendered fit to receive movement produced by appetite. Yet the more common and truer opinion is that an efficient potency of spontaneous movement must be admitted, subordinated indeed to appetite as commanding or determining, but distinct from it and inhering in the nerves and muscles of the members. St. Thomas teaches this according to the Complutensian College, here II, q. 8, a. 3, Scotus according to Mastrius, cited disp. 5, q. 11, and Father Suárez here, De anima V, c. 10, where he resolves this and other minor doubts concerning such a potency very well.

CHAPTER V.

Various Questions Concerning the Senses Decided.

140. While explaining the sensitive potencies in particular, we deliberately omitted various minor questions lest they excessively interrupt the sequence of doctrine. All of them must now be gathered and resolved in the present chapter. Question 1º: whether there are more or fewer external senses than five. That there are fewer is indicated by Aristotle, De anima III, t. 64, and often elsewhere, when he says that "taste is a certain touch." That there are more seems to be taught by Aristotle himself in De anima II, t. 107 sqq., where he proves that there are several specifically diverse kinds of touch because there are several contrarieties in the tangible object, namely hot and cold, dry and moist, hard and soft, etc. Add that some sensitive faculty must be assigned whose function is to attend to external objects; for if attention is lacking, even with our eyes open we do not see a present object. Yet such a faculty is not the internal sense, because its operation does not precede but presupposes external sensation.

141. Nevertheless, the fivefold number of external senses is supported by the common judgment of learned and unlearned alike. St. Thomas gives a sufficiently suitable reason in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 3, from the different manner of alteration possessed by sensible objects. Experience itself also teaches us that all external sensations are reduced to five genera and that five diverse and really separable organs are instituted for them. Taste is called "a certain touch" because it requires prior contact with a

sapid body, for the tongue tastes only what it touches. Yet the power of touching in the tongue is different from that of tasting; when the latter is lost, diminished, or impeded, the former often remains intact. Aristotle did indeed say in the cited place that touch ought to be multiplied according to the number of contrarieties in the tangible object, but only in the course of disputing or investigating; hence he taught the contrary elsewhere, according to Father Suárez here, De anima III, c. 28. Nor is there any reason why one sense must be confined to only one contrariety; for perhaps there is a multiple contrariety in the object of taste and smell. Add that all the contrarieties of tangibles can be reduced to one generic contrariety, namely quality beneficial or harmful to the temperament of the body.

142. Moreover, identity of the organ favors this position, for whatever part of the body touches one contrariety also touches the others. There is only a difference of more and less, insofar as touch is sharper or more vivid in certain parts; from this some diversity in partial species will result if the degrees of intensity are heterogeneous. Yet diversity of this sort is not the matter presently disputed, but only that which results from diversity of objects. Attention to a present object, taken positively, is not distinct from external sensation itself; for to attend to what is seen is the same as to see. Taken negatively, however, it is nothing but the absence of distraction, or cessation from another operation so distracting or occupying the soul that it does not allow it to operate in the eyes, for example, although the species of the object is ready at hand. In this way attention indeed precedes vision, but requires no new sense.

143. Question 2º: what order of perfection do the external senses observe, both among themselves and when human senses are compared with those of brutes? I answer 1º: comparing the senses among themselves, the common opinion prefers 1º sight, 2º hearing, 3º smell, 4º taste, and places touch last, although touch is the foundation of the others and is most necessary for the preservation of life. The superiority of sight is evident because it regards light, the noblest of qualities, as its object, and in its mode of perception comes nearer to intellect. In the others superiority of perfection is taken from a subtler, less crude, and less material mode of sensing. But if the external senses are considered in man insofar as they are useful for the acquisition of sciences, smell holds the lowest place and taste nearly the lowest, while the remaining three mutually surpass one another, although sight simply surpasses the others. When sciences are acquired by way of teaching, hearing serves; when by way of discovery or experience, touch and sight serve. Father Suárez explains all these points more fully in the cited III, c. 29, where he also explains in what way a better sense of touch

indicates a better intellect, Aristotle saying that those soft in flesh are apt for intelligence; and from Albert the Great he gives the reason why this rule does not hold in women.

144. I answer 2º: man surpasses all brutes in touch and taste, because these two senses are better in proportion as the constitution or temperament of the body is better, and this is most excellent in man. In the remaining senses man is surpassed by brutes, not by all but by some; for example, in sight by the eagle and lynx, in hearing by the mole and hare, and in smell by the dog and vulture. Hence the familiar verses:

> *"The boar surpasses us in hearing, the lynx in sight, the ape in taste,*
> *The vulture in smell, the spider in touch,"*

must be corrected as regards taste and touch. For the gestures of an ape while eating prove only a nature prone to gesticulation; and for a spider immediately to sense the movement of a fly in its web it does not need exquisite touch, since it is always lying in wait and joined to the web, whose threads readily tremble together with the slightest movement. Indeed Father Suárez, l.c., maintains that the other senses too, absolutely and all things considered, are more perfect in man than in brutes, although they are surpassed in force, namely in the power of perceiving a distant or subtle object. For human sight is essentially delighted by beauty, hearing by music, smell by the scent of a rose and other odors separate from taste.

145. On this occasion it should be noted that no animal lacks touch, because this sense is as it were the first foundation of sensitive life. The same is commonly said of taste, at least imperfect taste, both because it is very closely related to touch and because it is necessary for animals to take nourishment in a more perfect manner than plants, namely with some discrimination of the harmful from the harmless. Smell is usually denied to animals lacking progressive movement, such as oysters and others of this kind, which are called "zoophytes," or "plant-animals," as though occupying a middle place between plants and animals. But the matter is uncertain, as is also whether these animals and certain other imperfect but progressively moving animals, such as flies, fleas, and the like, lack hearing. Sight also is denied to zoophytes and to certain other imperfect kinds, especially to the mole, and indeed by some even to the whale. But perhaps it is truer that no progressively moving animal lacks sight, at least dull and weak sight. Certainly no species is assigned whose blindness is not disputed, not even the mole. Concerning it and the whale, see the Conimbricenses on De anima III, c. 1, q. unic., a. 4. It should further be noted that no animal lacks the internal sense, because none lacks the common appetite by which it desires

advantageous things and avoids harmful ones. Hence even zoophytes contract and expand themselves by spontaneous movement. Yet this sense is very imperfect in some and does not possess the functions of phantasy and memory, that is, it does not perceive an absent object. On this see Father Suárez, cited III, c. 31.

146. Question 3º: whether every sense, or any sense, judges, reasons, or is reflexive. I answer 1º: no sense properly judges or reasons, at least in brutes. This is the common opinion, whose reason we gave above, disp. 1, n. 69 sqq. I said "properly" because judgment belongs broadly and improperly to the senses, even the external senses, when taken for a vivid apprehension that so bears upon the existence or suitability of an object as to arouse and determine appetite. Such an apprehension also often occurs in the intellect and is called a "persuasive and virtual judgment," because in removing doubt and arousing appetite it is equivalent to judgment, or has the force of formal judgment. By reason of this sort of improper and virtual judgment we commonly say that sight judges colors, taste discriminates flavors, etc., and that brutes through the estimative faculty judge this or that object to be harmful or advantageous to themselves. Similarly, reasoning improperly belongs to brutes in the internal sense, namely when cognition of one object arouses the species of another and thus occasionally causes another cognition. Yet the connection of antecedent with consequent is never formed in a brute as is required for reasoning properly so called. I also said "at least in brutes" because the Thomists make the cogitative faculty of man discursive concerning singulars, and reminiscence likewise; and St. Thomas favors them in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 78, a. 4, with the addition of "as it were." See, however, Father Suárez, cited III, c. 6.

147. I answer 2º: reflection is here taken for cognition of one's own act and can be taken either exercitively or signately. Taken exercitively, it is nothing other than experience of oneself, insofar as vision, for example, while actually existing, through itself and without another reflection renders the potency formally experiencing itself as seeing and sensing this in exercised act, although it does not see the vision after the manner of an object. In this way, certainly improperly, every sensation is a sensation of itself and every sense senses itself sensing, as all grant. Taken signately, however, reflection is cognition by which one regards one's own act of the intentional line as object. If it regards an act of the same potency, the reflection will be properly such; but it will be improper or less proper if it regards an act proper indeed to the same *suppositum* but belonging to another potency. Both modes of signate reflection are commonly denied to the external senses, because sight, for example, sees neither its own

sensation nor that of another potency, since neither is contained under its proper or common sensible. But the internal sense undoubtedly knows external sensations, both because it remembers an object as previously sensed and because a brute often desires to hear, taste, etc. It also knows the act of appetite, at least of a particular appetite; for a brute remembers a previous delight or pain and therefore returns to or avoids certain places.

148. There remains the doubt whether the internal sense also reflexively knows its own acts. Many probably affirm this, because we often remember internal sensations, for example acts of phantasy. One may say with the Thomists: memory is really distinct from phantasy and therefore can know its act, though not its own. I answer to the contrary: first, because a real distinction among the internal senses is falsely constructed; second, because we experience reflection even within the same genus of acts. For we often remember that we remember, imagine ourselves imagining or having imagined, and dream that we are dreaming, and by a reflexive dream examine the dream itself. Add that appetite reflexively appetizes its own act when it desires to repeat a previous delight. Moreover, although it belongs to intellect alone to know its act as to "what it is" and from what causes it arises, it is not proved to be beyond the power of sense to know its own act as to "whether it is."

149. Nevertheless, many others also probably maintain the contrary, as may be seen in Father Suárez, cited III, c. 11. To the experience alleged, which applies only in man and not in brutes, it can be said that those acts belong not to sensitive memory but to spiritual memory or intellect, which is not always altogether bound in sleep, as St. Thomas teaches in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 84, a. 8, ad 2. It may also be said that the common appetite appetizes a delight not its own but proper to some particular appetite. Certainly St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 66, establishes this difference generally between sense and intellect: "No sense knows itself or its own operation; but intellect knows itself and knows that it understands."

150. Question 4º: whether the senses can err or be deceived. Whatever the Academics once said, it is certain that the senses are not always deceived nor always report uncertainly. Otherwise all human science would collapse, since it takes its origin from sensory experience. Moreover, even the infallible knowledge of Faith is acquired through the mediation of sense, for as the Apostle says in Rom. 10, "Faith comes from hearing," and again, "How shall they believe him whom they have not heard?" And John the Apostle, 1 John 1, invokes the testimony of the senses for the truth of the things he announces. It is also certain against the Epicureans that the senses do not stand in such a relation to the sensible that they never provide an occasion

of error. They often do so: first, by reason of an ill-disposed organ, as when one suffering from jaundice sees white things as yellowish and a sick man tastes sweet things as bitter; second, by reason of a medium not sufficiently pure, as when one sees all things green through green glass and the sun appears red because of intervening vapors; third, by reason of excessive distance, as when great objects seem small to one viewing them from afar, moving objects seem stationary, square ones round, and spherical ones flat; fourth, by reason of refraction or reflection of species, as when a stick partly immersed in water appears broken or bent, and when in mirrors variously positioned the figures and sizes of things are altered in many ways. Yet these and similar cases do not favor the Academics, because they do not always occur; and whenever they occur, the intellect can always suspect the error from the circumstances and correct the sense.

151. But concerning error of this kind it should be noted that, just as judgment does not properly belong to the senses, neither do truth and falsity properly belong to them, since these are properties of judgment alone, from what was said in Logic, tr. 5, disp. 2, c. 5. The senses therefore are said to err or be deceived only occasionally, insofar as by an imperfect, confused, or incongruous mode of representing they provide the intellect with an occasion for error; just as a statue or painted image which expresses its prototype with little fidelity commonly provides such an occasion. According to Aristotle, De anima II, t. 161, and St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 17, a. 2, this kind of error can occur in the senses concerning the proper sensible, the common sensible, and the accidental sensible; but more rarely concerning the proper, more frequently concerning the common, and much more frequently concerning the accidental sensible, as when vinegar is taken for wine, salt for sugar, and so with others. Between proper and common sensible this difference is usually established: the sense never errs concerning its proper sensible in genus, but only in species; for sight cannot see as colored what has no color at all, at least no transient color indistinct from light, although it can indeed see as yellowish, for example, what is white. Concerning the common sensible, however, it can err both in genus and species. Yet this doctrine, as regards the common sensible in genus, is rejected by Father Suárez, cited III, c. 40.

152. It should further be noted that in the foregoing examples, although the external sense is commonly said to represent what does not exist, this manner of speaking is improper or false unless "occasionally" is added or understood. For if, according to the common doctrine, an external sense cannot attain an absent object, how will it attain something nonexistent? Certainly it has no proper species of a nonexistent object, whether proper or

common, nor can it know it through another's species, since an external sense does not know abstractively but only intuitively. Therefore, when snow is seen as red through red glass, sight does not represent redness in the snow but whiteness. Yet because the vision of whiteness is as it were overwhelmed by the vision of the intervening redness, an occasion is thereby given to imagination or intellect to apprehend in the snow a color which is not there. When a sick man judges sweetness to be bitter, taste indeed perceives the sweetness; but because it simultaneously perceives the bitterness of the bile wetting the tongue and mingling with the food, this latter taste overwhelms the former and likewise provides an occasion for error. When a stick appears broken under water, sight sees no break at all; it merely sees the part of the stick through a refracted line because the species passes from one medium into another of different density. When the body of the sun, because of distance, appears small, flat, and motionless, sight actually perceives its magnitude, spherical figure, and motion, but so faintly or imperfectly that imagination or intellect at first glance confuses this vision with other visions of a small object, etc. These matters require greater discussion, but others call us onward.

153. Question 5º: whether, or to what extent, certain commonly cited propositions concerning sense and sensible are true. 1º "Sense is injured by a vehement" or "excessive sensible." This is taken from Aristotle, De anima II, t. 123, and is evident from experience; for excessive brightness injures sight, a violent noise hearing, excessive heat touch, etc. But there is a doubt whether it injures solely by physical or natural action, that is, by production of a quality contrary to the temperament and distinct from the species and sensation, or by intentional action, that is, by production of an intense species or sensation. On this it should briefly be said that injury sometimes occurs in the former way. Thus touch is injured by fire through a physical alteration destroying the temperament of the organ; likewise excessive light can injure sight by producing undue heat, and excessive noise can injure hearing by impact of the air. Most often, however, the injury arises from intentional action, not indeed essentially, since neither the species nor the sensation is contrary to the potency or temperament of the sensory organ, but accidentally, insofar as a vehement action of the object is followed by vehement attention of the soul, on whose occasion an excessive quantity of spirits flows toward the sensory organ. Since these are excessively hot, they impair the due temperament of the organ.

154. 2º "A sensible placed upon the sense does not cause sensation." This is taken from Aristotle, De anima II, t. 98 and 116. As regards sight, all admit that a colored object is not seen if contiguous to the organ, or immediately

placed upon the eyes; otherwise we would see our eyelids when closed over the eyes. The reason is that color is not visible unless illuminated, and it cannot be illuminated on the side by which it touches the eyes. If the object is luminous of itself, for example a flame, it cannot be seen when immediately applied because it injures the organ by physical alteration. Sight therefore requires some intermediate space between organ and object; yet it perhaps sees as it were in passing the light diffused in the medium even in the part immediately adjacent to the organ. The Thomists maintain the same of the other senses: namely, that none perceives an object contiguous to the sensory organ, but all require a medium through which the species is transmitted, either an extrinsic medium such as air or water for sight and hearing, or an intrinsic medium, namely a part of the animal continuous with the organ, such as they say the skin and outer flesh are for touch and taste.

155. Against this, the Scotists with Scotus and our authors commonly with Father Suárez, cited III, c. 27, deny that this proposition holds in the other senses, especially taste and touch. For although taste is placed in the interior nerve of the tongue, flavor penetrates all the way to it, since for this reason the flesh of the tongue was made spongy and saliva was given to dissolve the food. Touch also manifestly senses a contiguous tangible. Nor does it help to say that the flesh senses through the skin as intermediary, or the inner flesh through the outer flesh, or the nerve through the flesh. For against this stands, first, that we experience sensation in the skin; second, that when the skin is removed, the flesh senses more vividly; third, that inner and outer flesh are of the same nature, and hence there is no reason why one should be the organ of touch and the other a mere medium; fourth, that touch would without justification be located only in the nerves against the common opinion and experience; and even if so located, it would not therefore require a medium, since a nerve stripped of flesh senses more sharply when touched ever so lightly. One may say with the Complutensian College of St. Thomas, here II, q. 5, n. 64: if the nerve is touched by the sensible throughout its whole extent, it will not sense; if only in one part, not that part but another nearer part will sense it. Yet this solution, incredible in itself, would have to be established by a valid reason, and none is produced. It is also against experience, since nerves are often intimately suffused throughout the whole arm or whole leg by a harmful humor and sense its acridity there.

156. The authority of Aristotle is objected, who in the cited t. 116 extends that proposition to all the senses. I answer: he does indeed extend it, although some interpret his meaning otherwise; but it is not necessary to

assent to the Philosopher in all things, especially against manifest experience. It is sufficient for his primacy that he attained the truth in most matters. St. Thomas too, although he sometimes speaks with the Philosopher on the present matter out of regard for him, suggests the contrary elsewhere according to Father Suárez, cited c. 27. But if the Philosopher speaks of a sensible placed upon the sense not by mere contiguity but by inherence in the sensory organ itself, we readily subscribe.

157. 3º "What exists within prevents what is extraneous." This is taken from Aristotle, De anima III, t. 4, although he did not say "what exists within" but "what appears within. " It is usually proved or explained by this other principle: "The recipient must be stripped of the nature of what is received." Its meaning is that a cognitive potency must lack the real nature of its object in order to know it and receive its intentional species. For if within itself or within its proper organ it has something of the nature of the object, either it will know nothing or it will know only that particular thing which it has within and not others of the same genus which are outside. Thus the organ of sight must lack every color in order to see all colors; and if it happens to be tinged with some color, either it sees nothing or discriminates no color except that one, because "what exists within prevents cognition of what is extraneous." Likewise, while the tongue is internally preoccupied by bitter bile, taste discriminates no other flavor arriving from outside, because in order to receive its species it must first be stripped of every flavor, according to the principle, "The recipient must be," etc. This maxim does not hold in the intellect, as St. Thomas warns in *De veritate*, q. 22, a. 1, ad 8, for otherwise, since the intellect regards every being as its object, it would have to lack the nature of being and be nothing. It is therefore applied only to corporeal and sensitive potencies, in which many, especially Thomists, believe it holds generally and without exception.

158. But Father Suárez, De anima I, c. 9, from n. 23, learnedly and extensively discusses this maxim or these maxims and shows that they have little solidity even in organic potencies. Certainly, although a physical form existing within prevents another of the same nature, and therefore the subject must be presupposed as stripped of the specific nature of the form to be received, since like does not act univocally upon like, nevertheless, since intentional species are not of the same physical nature as the object, as all concede, for otherwise the species of color would be color and, according to the maxim itself, would hinder sight more than assist it, it is not sufficiently apparent, speaking universally, why a potency cannot receive such a species from an externally placed object even though it participates in the physical nature of the object either in itself or in its organ. For like can act upon like

by an equivocal accidental action, as when one hand is struck by another hand or one foot by another foot. Moreover, intentional being is not incompatible with real being. Hence we see the eyes of another although they are of the same nature as ours; we also see our own in a mirror.

159. Add the experience of touch, which, although it does not lack the primary qualities and other tangibles, nevertheless perceives them in another thing. One may say: it perceives them only according to excess, that is, only as possessing a degree more intense than its own. But this is rejected, first, because touch perceives at least some secondary qualities in an equal degree, as we saw in its place. Second, because intensity does not vary the nature of a quality according to the Thomists, since they deny the addition of degrees. Third, because a hand hot to degree 4 does not sense only four degrees in a fire hot to degree 8, but senses its whole heat, as experience teaches. Fourth, because the maxim is stated generally concerning "what exists within," without distinction between intense and remiss, and is therefore proved by the example of sight, which, if it has any color within, cannot discriminate any other, even one more intense or specifically diverse.

160. Moreover, it is not easy to believe that the tongue of itself lacks every flavor and the nose every odor, since these qualities result from the temperament of the primary qualities and seem to belong to every mixture. The retina in the eyes also, since it is not wholly transparent, must possess some color. These qualities are not sensed because no quality inhering in the organ, at least if connatural, can be sensed, as we experience in touch. Hence they do not prevent cognition of what is extraneous, because although they exist within, they do not appear within, that is, they are not known. In this way Aristotle is satisfied, who spoke only of "what appears within." I admit that vision is impeded if the pupil or crystalline humor is tinged with some color. But why? Because the medium through which the species of the object must be transmitted to the retina is rendered opaque. If it is not rendered altogether opaque, it will at least behave like green or red glass, by which discrimination of another color lying beyond is impeded. Yet in this way what exists within no more prevents cognition of what is extraneous than something existing in the medium prevents cognition of what lies farther beyond.

161. Question 6º: whether the senses know negations or privations of sensibles. Some affirm this with Father Arriaga, at least regarding the internal sense, and appeal to experience. A female brute grieves over the absence of her young; a dog shut inside a house does not try to leave through the wall but through an opening, in which it notices the absence of an

obstacle; a bear takes up not a rock but a small stone to throw at a man, from cognition of smallness, which is a privation of magnitude; a hen is terrified by the shadow of a hawk, which is a privation of light. Add that hearing is pleased by a pause in music, which is a mere negation of sound, and sight is delighted by beauty resulting from proportion of parts, which imports absence of excess. The common opinion, however, denies this. First, because if cognition of privation by the intellect is difficult to explain, how much more by sense? Second, because the senses have no species of privations. These species are neither produced by the privations themselves, since privations have no entity, nor are they unsensed species implanted in brutes by the Author of nature, as Arriaga maintains. For, to omit other points, either individual privations have corresponding individual species or one species corresponds to all. If the former, a dog will have infinitely many species, since when it knows that there is no small obstacle in an opening, it knows the privations of infinitely many bodies by which the opening could be blocked; and these privations, if they have any objective being, are distinct and separable from one another and therefore infinite, like the bodies themselves. If the latter, that species, as representing infinitely many objects, will be most universal and far more perfect than any species of a positive sensible, which no one would say. Unless one wishes that the species, or the sensation arising from it, represents privation in common and forms a universal, which is likewise foreign to the senses.

162. The experiences adduced to the contrary prove, if they prove anything, that privations are known even by an external sense. Yet this is difficult to believe, since privations in no way participate in the formal aspect of the object under which an external sense tends. For of what color is the privation of color that it should be presented to the eyes? Therefore the senses are determined, on the occasion of a privation, to various acts of delight, sorrow, etc., not because they perceive the privation but because they do not perceive some positive thing. Thus a female brute desiring to see her young where she left them, and not finding them, grieves greatly, not because she sees their privation but because the absence of the desired vision is the occasion or condition for the species of some evil to which perhaps the young are subject to be aroused. A dog sees no privation in an opening, but lacks a vision of an obstacle, which vision, when present, restrains it. Hence at night, because it does not see the wall, it also tries to go out through it. A bear does not see the smallness of the stone as to its negative aspect; it merely lacks the sight in it of a greater mass, which, if it saw it, would cause it to desist from such an action. A hen is not terrified by the shadow but by the figure of the hawk represented by the boundary of the

surrounding light. Hearing is pleased by a pause insofar as it is allowed to rest at intervals, or insofar as the absence or interruption of hearing is the condition for its being pleased by the song. Finally, vision terminates only at the positive element of beauty; but in order to arouse complacency it needs not to terminate at excess.

163. Suppose in these very examples that the positive objects are really most present, but do not emit a species of themselves because God prevents it. Then brutes certainly would not see their privations, and nevertheless would elicit the same sensations as they do now. Whatever the adversaries say under such a hypothesis will therefore have been said for us. A greater difficulty is that the internal sense seems unable otherwise to know absent and past things except by knowing the privation of present external sensation. It may nevertheless be said that the object is not formally known by sense as absent or past, but that the object and its previous sensation are merely known internally without the intuitive clarity resulting from external sensation while the object is present, and from this the brute is determined to seek the object and desire to sense it externally. Or it may be granted that privation is known by the internal sense, not directly or through a proper species, as the first opinion seems to maintain, but indirectly or by removal, insofar as an absent object or a previous sensation is known by a certain quasi-negative judgment which virtually denies that it is present here and now. See Father Suárez, De anima III, c. 2, n. 28.

164. Hence question 7º: whether a sense can naturally perceive an absent object. An object is called absent which either exists nowhere or is not so present as actually to emit or conserve a species of itself. As regards the internal sense, all affirm it can, because experience establishes that the conservation of species in phantasy and memory does not depend on the objects. Regarding the external senses some affirm it and cite certain experiments. For one who looks at the sun, if he suddenly closes his eyes, still sees for a short while some light which is nevertheless now absent, that is, no longer emitting a species. When a burning brand is rapidly moved in a circle, a fiery circle is seen in the air which does not really exist. By the art of a demon objects which do not exist appear in the air or in mirrors. And whenever a sense is deceived, certain circumstances or certain sensibles, at least common sensibles such as motion, rest, roundness, etc., which do not exist, appear on the part of the object.

165. The common opinion, however, denies this, because the species used by the external senses depend upon their objects in being produced and conserved. Otherwise they could remain for a long time in their absence, as heat remains in iron after the fire has been removed, which

plainly contradicts experience. To the first two experiments it is answered that there is then no external vision but a vehement imagination which presents the object as though present to the eyes, as also sometimes happens in sleep. To the third, that by the art of the demon the vapors of the air are so disposed that, by reflecting or modifying light, they assume various colors and figures after the likeness of absent objects. The fourth, in my judgment, does not press those who absolutely grant that sight, for example, is deceived in such a way as to represent a difference of color that does not exist, or otherwise than it exists, namely with motion, figure, etc., which are not there. It does not affect us, however, because of what was said at n. 152.

166. There remains the doubt whether at least by divine power an external sense, for example sight, can perceive an absent object. We are not speaking of perception of the absent as absent, prescinding from presence or virtually denying it according to what was said at the end of n. 163. For such a perception, as Father Quirós well notes, disp. 85, n. 17, since it is properly abstractive, seems to import a new mode of living to which an external sense cannot be divinely elevated, just as sight cannot be elevated to hearing or conversely. We are speaking, therefore, of a sensation representing an object as present when it is really absent or nonexistent. Or more clearly: whether, when the object is removed or nonexistent, there can by divine power be a vision of the same nature and clarity as if the object were really present. Many Thomists and Scotists deny this, because such a vision would be intuitive, as every external sensation is, and yet it would not be intuitive, because it belongs to the nature of intuition to terminate at a really present object.

167. But our authors commonly affirm it with Father Suárez, cited III, c. 12, because God can conserve in the absence of the color a species transmitted to the eyes by a present color, or can Himself supply the influx of the species, since this belongs to the genus of efficient causality. Then, since all the co-principles of vision are present, there is no reason why a vision should not be elicited that is the same or of the same nature as if the color were present. For vision does not require the physical existence of the object except mediately, namely through the species, which naturally can be produced only by the object; or, if perhaps by reason of its mode of tending it is immediately connected with such existence, it does not appear why that connection must be incapable of being divinely frustrated. Whether that vision should be called intuitive is a question about the term. If the name "intuitive" imports physical coexistence of the vision with the presence of the object, it would belong to such a vision only radically or by demand; and in those circumstances it could be called abstractive broadly or improperly.

But if it merely denotes that the vision occurs through the proper species and represents the object as really present, that vision would indeed be intuitive, because it would occur through the object's proper species formally or eminently, and would express the real presence of the object just as if that presence existed.

168. Such a vision would indeed provide the intellect with an occasion of error unless God revealed the absence of the object. But it is not thereby shown to be impossible, because God could add a revelation, just as He revealed the cessation of the substance of bread in the Eucharist, where also from the vision of the accidents an unbeliever takes occasion to err regarding the substance. Finally, no external vision has a transcendental relation to an object as really present, but only to an object as representable as really present. This representability belongs to an object even in the state of possibility, as is evident whenever an object existing nowhere is represented as actually present by dreaming imagination.

Whether Sense Can Perceive a Spiritual Object.

169. Finally it is asked whether a sensitive, material, or organic potency, at least when divinely elevated, can perceive a spiritual object. Theologians also commonly dispute this under the title: Whether the corporeal eye can be elevated to see God. As regards the senses that actually exist, all theologians cited by Father Henao, Empyreologia VIII, exercit. 28, sect. 1, deny it; otherwise the utterly absurd consequence would follow that a brute could be elevated to see God and enjoy the ultimate end. Regarding a possible sense or material potency nobler than those presently existing, Fathers Valencia, Arriaga, and Quirós incline toward the affirmative, joined by some moderns. But nearly all the remaining theologians and philosophers cited by Henao, l.c., sect. 8, maintain the negative. Their opinion is proved 1º by the clearest testimonies of Councils and Fathers which Henao reports there, in which it is taught that God is in no way visible or perceptible by corporeal senses, and "spiritual" or "incorporeal" is taken as equivalent to "invisible" or "non-sensible."

170. 2º Because the cognition by which a corporeal potency perceived a spiritual object would be neither spiritual nor material; therefore it would be chimerical. The antecedent is proved. First, it would not be spiritual, because in its production and conservation it would depend upon a material potency or corporeal organ and by its nature would intrinsically and perpetually adhere to it, as seems to be supposed in the present case. Indeed, in man, if the potencies are identified with the soul either

adequately or as regards the direct component, no cognition is called an act of a material potency for any other reason than that it is itself material and dependent on an organ. But if we speak of the potency of a brute, or even of a human corporeal potency such as the Thomists posit, namely one adequately distinct from the soul, receiving an act, and properly living and knowing, then its act must intrinsically adhere to such a potency, since it is essentially immanent in a living principle; and therefore it cannot fail to become corporeal, according to what was said in disp. 2, n. 13, concerning the concept of a corporeal thing generally. Add that if this cognition were spiritual, it would not differ from intellection; for what is intellection except immaterial cognition? But a corporeal potency cannot know through intellection unless it is confused with intellect or chimerically assumes its nature.

171. Next, neither would it be material. For a spiritual object must communicate spirituality to the cognition; from this very point all prove the immateriality of the acts of the human intellect when treating the spirituality of the rational soul. And at least this power of communicating and specifying cannot be denied to the first and supreme object, namely God, especially when clearly seen. Therefore, if a material potency were elevated to see God, that vision would necessarily be immaterial. Nor should one perhaps say that there can be a corporeal potency perceptive of a created spiritual object, though not of God. Against this stands, first, that if a corporeal potency can know any spiritual object, certainly none more easily than God, because there is none to whose cognition visible objects lead so spontaneously, or which so manifests itself and as it were offers itself for contemplation in the entire visible constitution of the world. Second, if God is not unknowable to a material potency by reason of spirituality, neither will He be unknowable by reason of infinity; for this title applies equally with respect to a created intellect, yet does not render God unknowable to it. And if a corporeal potency can know God at least abstractively or confusedly, it will also be able to know Him clearly and intuitively when a supernatural light is added, as is evident from the example of the human intellect.

172. Hence it is proved 3º because that potency, since it would be cognitive of God, could know any created being, since all are contained eminently in God. Therefore it would tend under the aspect of true, or of being, and consequently would be an intellect, not a sense or corporeal potency; for there is no more certain or clearer notion of intellect than that it is a potency representatively tending under the aspect of the true or of being in common. One may say: that potency would differ from intellect in this, that naturally it would regard only corporeal being and could not tend

toward a spiritual object except insofar as it possesses obediential potency and is supernaturally elevated.

173. But I answer to the contrary, and this can be an *a priori* reason: no cognitive potency can be elevated to know an object that in no way pertains to its natural objective sphere or to the formal aspect under which it knows, such that the object can be known by it naturally at least in a confused and imperfect manner. Therefore, since a spiritual object in no way belongs to the natural sphere of a corporeal potency, lest the latter be confused with intellect, it cannot be divinely elevated, etc. The antecedent is usually held as an unshaken principle and is established by induction. For sight, even when elevated, cannot know sound, nor hearing color or flavor. I suppose for clarity that these potencies are adequately distinguished from one another or consist in heterogeneous parts of a divisible soul. Nor can intellect be elevated to know any object which it cannot naturally know by at least a confused concept, such as this one, "every being."

174. To this also pertains another common argument, namely that no vital potency can be elevated to a mode of living or degree of life different from its connatural one. Hence a purely vegetative potency or soul cannot be elevated to sense, nor a purely sensitive one to understand; and among sensitive potencies a visual potency cannot be elevated to hear, nor an auditory potency to see. For just as a potency which by its nature possesses no degree of life, for example a stony potency, cannot be elevated to live, so one which by its nature does not possess a definite degree of life cannot be elevated to live within that degree, because in relation to it the potency stands as a nonliving or inanimate thing. Yet it can be elevated to live supernaturally within its own degree, because supernaturalness does not vary the degree of life, since it is a formality capable of belonging to all degrees and modes of life. But if a potency naturally limited to a corporeal object were elevated to know an incorporeal one, it would indeed ascend to a new mode and degree of life. First, because that cognition would have to be immaterial, from n. 171, and from this standpoint intellection imports a degree of life diverse from sensation. Second, because an incorporeal object differs far more from a corporeal object than sound or flavor differs from color. Therefore, if color and flavor ground diverse modes of living in potencies, much more so here.

175. Objection 1º: a purely physical potency can be elevated to operate beyond its natural sphere, as water to produce grace; therefore an intentional potency can likewise be elevated. 2º God as intuitively knowable is not contained within the natural sphere of a created intellect, yet can be intuitively known by it when supernaturally elevated. 3º A created potency

can know an uncreated object; therefore a corporeal potency can know an incorporeal one, where the distance is less. 4º Supernatural light is perceived by the blessed through corporeal sight, though it exceeds its natural sphere. 5º A material union can terminate at a spiritual extreme, as the union of matter to the rational soul; indeed at a Divine extreme, as the hypostatic union of the body to the Word. Therefore likewise a material vision, etc. 6º A spiritual object can be signified by material words, for example "God, Angel," and also by a material picture. Therefore it can be represented by corporeal cognition. 7º From Father Quirós: the temporal union of a cognitive principle with a body does not prevent cognition of spiritual things, as is clear in the rational soul. Therefore neither does perpetual union with a body; for what does not impede once never impedes, whence if heat in any instant cohered with cold, it would never be contrary to it. Therefore, although a cognitive principle requires perpetual union with a body and is consequently corporeal, it will not on that account be incapable of knowing spiritual things.

176. These arguments prove too much, namely that actually existing eyes, even those of a horse or ass, indeed even a stone or tree, could be elevated to see God clearly. They are also easily answered. To 1º, I deny the consequence concerning an intentional potency insofar as it operates vitally or elicits an operation by which it lives or knows. A corporeal potency can indeed be elevated to produce, for example, the vision of God, at least if this is an absolute quality; but it cannot be elevated so as to see through it, because the denomination "seeing God" is essentially constituted by a spiritual act and subject. Hence for corporeal sight to be elevated to see God is for it to be elevated so as to become a spiritual potency and change its essence. See what was said in Physics concerning the elevation of anything to anything.

177. To 2º: whatever in God is intuitively knowable can naturally be known abstractively and confusedly by a created intellect. Hence it is not the object but intuitive cognition of God that lies outside the natural sphere of a created intellect. Yet this cognition is outside it, not because on the part of the object it ranges beyond the formal aspect under which the intellect is naturally constituted, nor because it imports a mode of knowing diverse from the connatural mode, for spiritual intuition as such belongs naturally to a created intellect, but because the combination of an intuitive mode with such an object exceeds the active powers of a created intellect unless it is strengthened by the supreme light. From this it follows only that a corporeal potency can likewise be elevated to operate supernaturally concerning its own object, which we do not deny. To 3º, I deny the consequence, because

the greater proximity of the object in the being of being is irrelevant to the present issue if it does not participate in the formal aspect under which the potency naturally tends. To 4º: supernatural light, if it is corporeal and truly light, that is, the act of the transparent or brightness of a body, can naturally be perceived confusedly by corporeal sight and after the manner of a distant color; for nothing prevents supernatural things from being naturally known confusedly. But if it is an incorporeal quality, it must be denied that it is perceived by the blessed through corporeal sight.

178. To 5º, I deny the consequence, because it is not contrary to the concept of a corporeal union to pertain to a spiritual extreme, provided it does not belong wholly to it but also pertains to a body from which by its nature it is inseparable. But, as we have seen, it is contrary to the concept of a corporeal intentional potency either to include spiritual things within its objective sphere or to pass beyond that sphere. It is replied: the union of a body with a rational soul can be known by a corporeal potency insofar as it is a nexus of the soul, since even under this reduplication it is material. But then the spiritual soul would simultaneously be known, for the nexus as such cannot be known while its extremes are unknown. I answer: granted that this union can be known by some possible corporeal potency under some absolute expression, for example "this material mode"; yet it cannot be known under a comparative expression by which it is referred to both extremes. Thus the sight of an ass perceives color and all its formalities on the part of the object, and consequently its transcendental relation to the First Cause; nevertheless it cannot elicit an expression by which the color is referred to the First Cause.

179. To 6º, I likewise deny the consequence. If the inference from instrumental signification to formal signification were valid, it would prove in every creature, even an inanimate one, a power of knowing the First Cause. In a word or picture, therefore, there is no intrinsic or immediate expression of the spiritual object, but only a certain occasion arousing in memory a species through which the intellect can arrive at cognition of that object. To 7º: the decisive point lies in the spirituality of the cognitive principle, which perpetual union with a body excludes, whereas temporal union does not. If it is said that this is true because perpetual union is an argument for materiality, I shall say in turn that perpetual union is for that very reason an argument for incapacity to know spiritual things, because this incapacity is founded on the materiality of the cognitive principle, as we have shown. I speak of perpetual union naturally due; for the union which joins the soul to the glorified body, just as it does not exclude the spirituality of the soul, neither does it exclude its power of perceiving spiritual things.

180. Finally, it will be objected that sensitive appetite takes delight from the consideration of spiritual things and is sometimes moved even to tears. To this pertains Ps. 83: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." Add Job 19: "In my flesh I shall see God my Savior, whom I myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold." Yet all must resolve these passages, since they would prove the point not merely as possible but as actual. I answer, therefore, that when the mind considers God, a phantasm is simultaneously elicited by the internal sense, in which some supremely suitable good is presented under a sensible aspect; and from this a material delight is aroused which terminates not at God Himself but only at that sensible good presented to phantasy as a certain image of God, in nearly the same manner in which the phantasm of a winged youth occurs to us when we think of an Angel. See Father Suárez, De anima V, c. 6, n. 7. St. Job does not promise himself a vision of God which is an act of the flesh, but one which is an act of the soul existing in the body after the resurrection. He also signifies that he will then see the Savior with his bodily eyes according to His humanity.

DISPUTATION VI.
ON SPECIES AND HABITS.

The mention that has repeatedly occurred in this treatise of intentional species rightly requires that we delay their explanation no longer. And since habits have an affinity with species, we shall also treat them in the present disputation. "Species," so far as concerns the present matter, means the same as "image," or "likeness of the object," not indeed in being, in the way sons are called images of their parents, but in representing, insofar as it manifests and makes the object known to the cognitive potency, as though expressing or declaring its lineaments; and it is called "intentional," because through it the potency attends to, or intends, the object. It is twofold, expressed and impressed. An "expressed species" is the cognition itself, or the vital quality that causes the object formally to appear. An "impressed species," which alone is to be discussed here, is a quality sent forth by the object, or produced as it were in its name, which comes to the potency so as to complete it and assist it in eliciting cognition of the object. Hence it is called "impressed," because it is impressed upon the potency by the object, either immediately or mediately. Hence it is also called the "seed of the object," because through it the potency, as though a mother, is made fruitful by the object, as though a father, so that it may bring forth cognition; whence arose the common axiom: "Knowledge is born from the object and the potency." The name "concept" in an act of the mind likewise alludes to this. This metaphor, or analogy, of seed and offspring in the present matter is taken from St. Augustine, l. 10, *Confessiones*, c. 14; l. 9, *De Trinitate*, c. 17 and

final c.; and l. 11, c. 5. Moreover, a species of this kind, when it pertains to sense, is called "sensible," and when it pertains to intellect, "intelligible."

CHAPTER I.
Various Opinions Having Been Reported, Various Arguments Against Impressed Species Are Proposed.

1. Impressed species were denied by Porphyry, Galen, Themistius, Durandus, Bacon, Henry, and others, whom John Caramuel reports and follows in *Severa argumentandi methodus*. Yet these and others, whom the Conimbricenses report in 2, *De anima*, c. 6, q. 2, and in 3, c. 5, q. 3, do not all speak of impressed species in general, but some only of sensible species, others only of intelligible species. Some of the more recent Scholastics favor both groups, as do all modern Atomists or Corpuscularians, who admit no other species besides those impressions or local changes made in the sensory organs, of which we spoke in the preceding disputation, c. 2, or besides the motions of corpuscles from which those impressions arise. Nevertheless, that impressed species, both sensible and intelligible, must be admitted is a philosophical doctrine and almost a principle established by the consensus of the Schools, and asserted not only by Aristotle but also approved by the Holy Fathers, such as Augustine, Damascene, and Anselm, whose passages, together with those of Albert the Great, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, Scotus, etc., may be seen in the Conimbricenses at the place just cited. This opinion is most true and must altogether be held, although it is subject to not a few difficulties, the chief of which I shall propose in the present chapter.

2. Therefore, on behalf of the negative opinion, objection 1: there is no necessity for admitting species; therefore they should be rejected. The antecedent is proved in the senses. For in touch, taste, smell, and hearing, objects are not sensed unless they are contiguous to the organ; therefore they will be able of themselves immediately to concur with the potency toward sensation, since neither the proper object nor its application is lacking. For species were invented for no other purpose than to make up for the disproportion, distance, or absence of the object. For this reason, in these senses, especially touch and taste, even many Peripatetics deny species. In sight also, the object is sufficiently applied to the organ through light diffused through the medium; by the aid of which not only distant light but also color can assist the potency in seeing, since through illumination it is rendered visible. The internal sense, however, is determined to cognize a present object through the external sensation, or even through the motion

of spirits flowing back from the external sensory organ; and to cognize an absent object it could, with species excluded, be determined through those same causes that the Peripatetics devise for exciting species dormant in the imagination or memory. Finally, since the intellect operates nothing unless the imagination is operating, it will be more than sufficiently determined through the operation of the imagination.

3. Confirmation 1: the human intellect cognizes various objects whose species it does not have, namely spiritual beings, material substances, universal notions, relations, modes, and beings of reason; why, then, should it need species for the remaining objects? Confirmation 2: a species is necessary neither to determine the indifference of the intellect nor to assist it by partially influencing cognition. First, not to determine it. Both because the imagination suffices for this office, just as in the contrary opinion it suffices for determining the intellect to the production of a spiritual species; and because the species itself, if there is one, needs another determination, both in the intellect and in the imagination, since very often it sleeps deeply and generates no cognition. Nor, secondly, in order to assist by influencing. Both because, if assistance is needed, the phantasm, although material, could immediately concur toward intellection, just as, according to the more common opinion, it concurs with the agent intellect toward a spiritual species; and because there is no reason why the intellect should need the assistance of an adventitious power, for it contains its own acts no less than the will contains its own. But the will is an adequate power for natural acts of willing. The same argument holds in the senses, with the similar example of appetite. Add that the intellect, adequately taken, includes the substance of the soul, whose perfection, since it far surpasses every natural intellection, can eminently contain all its formalities, as is again clear from the example of love and of other affections.

4. Objection 2: if the intellect received species, it would retain them perpetually. For they could perish neither through defect of the subject, since it is incorruptible; nor through opposition of a contrary, since they lack a contrary; nor through defect of the conserving cause, since they are said to be conserved not by the objects but by the agent intellect, or by God. But from this it follows, contrary to experience, that the intellect would never forget objects whose species it had once acquired; indeed, that it would always be in the actual exercise of cognizing what it had once cognized. For just as sight, once it has a species, necessarily sees, so the intellect, etc.; and just as the intellect itself, when it first receives a species, cannot fail to use it for cognizing, so also when it afterwards retains it, for it is no less completed or made fruitful by it afterwards than before. If you say that after the first act

the species sleeps until it is excited by a new phantasm, or act of the imagination, I object 1º: there is no reason why the species should sleep, since after the first act it remains whole and vigorous. I object 2º: when a new phantasm occurs, a new species is generated in the intellect; therefore there is no need to awaken a previously possessed species from sleep.

5. I object 3º: it still remains to explain how species retained in the imagination or sensitive memory are excited; why they awaken sometimes and not always; why some and not all, especially while the external senses are doing nothing; why sometimes older ones rather than more recent ones, and sometimes conversely. On this matter the patrons of species admit that nothing but darkness is found; and they likewise never sufficiently explain how corruption of species and forgetfulness of things previously cognized occur in the sensitive memory. Add that species retained in the intellect and imagination are the very same ones that at their first origin generated intuitive cognition; why, then, do they later, in the absence of the object, generate only abstractive cognition? Do they lose something of their fecundity? But if the presence of the object is said to be a necessary condition for the species to produce intuition, why will it not equally be a condition with respect to the potency when the species is excluded?

6. Objection 3: sensible species are neither material nor spiritual; therefore they are fictitious. The antecedent as to the second part must be certain, since these species are qualities received in a corporeal subject and educed from it; they are also produced by a corporeal quality, for example in the eyes by color, which certainly cannot produce an effect of a higher order. The first part is therefore proved. 1º, because Aristotle, 2, *De anima*, t. 121 and 124, calls the species of the senses forms without matter; and St. Augustine, 12, *De Genesi ad litteram*, c. 16, calls the same species spiritual; and St. Thomas, I^{a}, q. 78, a. 3, calls the change that occurs in the senses through species, especially in sight, spiritual. 2º, because if these species were material, they could certainly themselves be seen and sensed; yet this is commonly denied. 3º, because if they were material, they would also be divisible, so that to each point of the object there would correspond a point of the species. Hence in the pupil, which at one glance sees the immense expanse of the heavens, there would be amassed as many points or particles of species as there are in the matter of the celestial expanse. But this surpasses all credibility; nor is it apparent how the penetration and inextension of innumerable parts can cohere with materiality, especially since they do not constitute intensity; otherwise they would pour an immense clarity into the act of vision. To this pertains what the Atomists

object, namely that species of this kind are neither bodies nor spirits, and therefore no idea of them can be formed.

7. Objection 4: either the object immediately produces a species in the eyes, for example, without operating through the medium, or it is assisted by a power diffused in the medium. The first cannot be maintained, both because nothing acts at a distance except through a medium, and because, if the object of itself immediately causes a species in sight, there is no reason why it cannot of itself concur toward vision without a species. But the second is attacked because the power diffused in the medium will be the visual species propagated from the object through the air as far as the eyes, as is commonly supposed. Yet this propagation seems impossible. 1º, because a species by its nature is a disposition toward vision; therefore it cannot be received in air, which is incapable of vision, for a subject incapable of a form is also incapable of a disposition toward it. 2º, because air is incapable of the formal effect to be supplied by the species, namely the denomination "completed," or "determined," for seeing; but no form is received in a subject to which it cannot supply its formal effect. 3º, because every visible object, as a necessary cause of species, would have to diffuse them all around through the air, even if no one were looking at it and even if no sight existed in the nature of things. But this continual outpouring of species would be foreign to the natural genius of things, which abhor useless expenditure of their proper power. Add that such great fecundity of species is attributed without justification to things otherwise inert or non-active, such as colors, especially since the species are more immaterial, or less gross, and therefore nobler than the colors themselves.

8. Objection 5: since species are images and likenesses of objects, they ought to reflect and savor of their nature; therefore the species of whiteness and blackness ought to be contrary, and consequently could not coexist in the same potency. How, then, do we simultaneously discern contrary objects? Confirmation: either species are formal likenesses of objects or purely virtual likenesses, insofar as they have the power to effect cognition. If formal, there cannot fail to be contrariety between the species of white and black, just as there is between painted images of a white man and an Ethiopian in relation to the same panel. If purely virtual, they ought no more than the potencies themselves to be called species and images of objects, for the power to effect cognition also belongs to the potencies. If you say that they are formal likenesses, not in being but in representing, you confuse impressed species with expressed species, or cognitions, to which representation of this kind properly belongs. Add that species, since they ought to be signs of objects, are neither formal signs, because they are not

cognitions, nor instrumental signs, because they are not cognized before the objects. Final objection: species of the intellect and imagination are not produced by objects; nor can they fittingly be produced by another cause, since they are seeds of the objects.

CHAPTER II.
The Necessity of Species Is Proved Both in the Senses and in the Intellect.

9. To prove the necessity of species in cognitive potencies generally, various arguments are usually brought forward which do not seem especially pressing. First argument: a cognitive potency is passive, as Aristotle and St. Thomas frequently teach, because, namely, it must be acted upon or changed by the object through a species; indeed, it is commonly called a pure potency in the intentional order and, as it were, a "blank tablet on which nothing is depicted," because of itself it can have no act of cognition until it receives from without a picture of the object, that is, a species. But it will easily be denied that it is passive, except in respect of the cognition which, since it is immanent, it must receive as produced by itself; likewise, that in any other sense it is a pure potency or blank tablet, except insofar as it has in itself no cognition either identified with it or implanted by nature. Yet this does not prevent it from acquiring various cognitions by its own power when occasion is given. Nor do the contrary authors dispute about the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas, who are clearly patrons of species, and therefore call cognitive potencies passive because they hold that they do nothing unless they are first acted upon by objects.

10. Second: created cognition is an image of the object; but an image ought to arise from that of which it is an image. For this reason divine cognition is a representation, but not an image, of creatures; and for this reason also the Divine Word is an image of the Father alone, by whom He is generated. Therefore every created cognition ought to derive its origin from the object, either immediately or mediately, that is, through a species. But the adversaries will deny the major premise and will say that created cognition is indeed a representation of the object, but not properly an image; and they will object with the cognition of a spiritual object and of the others mentioned at n. 3, since such cognition seems in no way to arise from its object.

11. Third: every cognitive potency must in some way have within itself the object that it cognizes; for, since cognition is an immanent act, through it the potency senses or cognizes the object within itself. But the object for

the most part is not within the potency according to physical being; therefore it must exist within according to intentional being, which it has in the species. Confirmation 1: because, as St. Thomas says, I^{a}, q. 84, a. 2, "It has been commonly implanted in the minds of men that like is cognized by like." Hence the ancient philosophers, whom St. Thomas there refutes, imagined that the natures of cognizable things, even material ones, were physically participated by the soul. The Platonists, however, whom the same Angelic Doctor attacks in the following a. 3, posited species of all intelligible things connatural to the soul, which in the course of life would be excited when occasion was offered, so that our learning would be nothing other than remembering. Therefore, since the cognitive potency by reason of itself is not like the object, it must be made like it through a superadded and newly acquired species.

12. Confirmation 2: because to cognize is somehow to become the same as the cognized object, and to be transformed into it, or to draw it to oneself by intimate union or unity; so much so that the Commentator said, "From the intelligent and the intelligible there is made something more one than from matter and form," with which agrees the saying of Aristotle: "The intellect by understanding becomes all things." But this cannot be done otherwise than through a species. Thomists commonly attribute such force to the species that many of them maintain that the nature and quiddity of the object are really and identically contained in it, not in the being of an entity but in intelligible being, or according to a mode of being that is not physical but intentional, yet in such a way that the quiddity of the object, insofar as it is identified with the species, is really the same as it is in itself and differs only according to the mode of being. Hence they infer that by means of the species the potency becomes the object itself through a true and real identity, not in natural being but in representative being. Other Thomists deny a real identity of species with object; yet they posit, which is very remarkable, an individual identity when the species represents an object in the individual. Others, speaking more moderately, maintain that the species is of the same nature as the object through univocal and specific agreement. And each, according to his own manner of speaking or thinking, cites St. Thomas.

13. But all these things will move the enemies of species very little. They say that a cognitive potency need not have the object within itself except while it actually cognizes; but then it has it within itself representatively, that is, it has its representation, which is the cognition itself, and no other mode of having it is required. It does indeed sense or cognize the object within itself if "within itself" is referred to "senses" or "cognizes"; otherwise

if it is referred to the "object." For although the potency has sensation or cognition within itself, through it nevertheless it generally regards the object as placed outside itself, for example when it looks at the sun. Thus the will always loves within itself, but it does not always love an object placed within itself. To confirmation 1: in order that like be cognized by like, there is no need for the potency to be presupposed as like the object before cognition. It suffices that it be rendered like through cognition itself, which is more a likeness of the object in representing than is an impressed species. But the potency or soul precontains this likeness virtually and eminently from itself, since it truly effects cognition and is superior to it in perfection no less than the will is with respect to love. Or explain, why must the intellect be less assimilative of itself than the will is affective of itself?

14. To confirmation 2: all that identity, transformation, or unity, even if crudely admitted, can be preserved through cognition, or the expressed species, much better than through the impressed, since the former reflects the nature of the object much more distinctly. But in truth these expressions are improper and metaphorical; they signify nothing other than that the species, whether impressed or expressed, is a representation of the object. Hence the potency is said to draw the object to itself insofar as it depicts it, as it were, within itself by receiving the species; it is said to be transformed into the object insofar as it assumes its representation by assuming the species, in the sense in which we say that a rough piece of wood is transformed into Caesar when it assumes Caesar's figure and becomes his statue. It is also said to become one or the same with the object by almost the same trope, or manner of speaking, by which a statue or painted image of a king is called the king and is displayed or honored as though it were the king. Or, if you prefer, the potency as cognizing is one and the same with the object as cognized, with respect to the reduplicated form; just as also the potency as proximately intellective is one with the object as proximately intelligible, because the same cognition renders the potency cognizing and the object cognized; and, if there is an impressed species, one and the same species renders the intellect proximately intellective and the object proximately intelligible. And in this sense the statement of the Commentator, or Averroes, must be taken; if he intended anything else, he must be rejected.

15. This entire explanation pleases the Peripatetics except the Thomists alone, and not even all of them. For the Dominican Fathers of the Complutensian College, here, l. 2, q. 5, a. 3, expressly attack those Thomistic opinions reported at n. 12 by reason and by the authority of St. Thomas, and indeed so effectively that I think it superfluous to dwell now on refuting

them again. Certainly, since a species is a quality inhering in a potency, for example the intellective potency, as the Thomists do not doubt, it is immediately apparent how repugnant is its identity with an external object, for example a stone. You will say: the species is identified with the object not in the being of a quality but in representative being. I object: these two kinds of being are really the same; otherwise the species, which is representative by its proper concept, would not really be a quality. If, therefore, the species in representative being is really or individually a stone, it follows that the stone is a quality, and indeed a spiritual one, since it inheres in the intellect. It also follows that a horse, an ass, etc., really are within the intellect and dwell there no less properly than in a stable or in Noah's ark; indeed, the intellect itself through true identity will be transformed into such objects. Almost similar absurdities follow from the univocal and specific agreement of the species with the object. If you say that you mean only agreement and identity of the potency or species with the object in intelligible being, I ask: are you speaking of intelligible being intrinsic to the objects, or of extrinsic intelligible being, which consists in the accidental species? If of the first, you in fact posit identity with the physical reality of the object, which undoubtedly is its intrinsic intelligibility. If of the second, in sum you say that the species is identified with itself, which is far too true, but far too insipid, and entails no true identity of the potency with the object.

16. Fourth argument: it is taken from the universality and indifference of the potency, especially the intellective. Since it can divisively cognize various objects and is indifferent to cognizing now this, now that, it needs something determinative so that it may issue forth into a determinate cognition. But no more suitable determinant appears than the object itself through its species. Yet this argument is considerably weakened by what was said at nn. 2 and 3. To these it can be added that from the office of determining there is no requirement that the species effectively concur toward cognition; yet this is commonly asserted. It is not required, I say, because the office of determining belongs to a mere condition that does not physically influence, as is clear in internal sensation with respect to appetite, in the local approximation of a physical agent, and in the excitation of a memorative species. Indeed, nothing inhering in the potency is required. Fire, while unmoved in itself, is determined to act by application of the patient; and appetite is determined by cognition, which it does not receive in itself if the potencies are adequately distinguished from the soul and from one another. But if appetite is located in the heart and sense in the head, as very many maintain, appetite will be determined through sympathy by a distant cognition that does not act. Why, then, should not a similar

sympathy be posited between the cognitive potency and the object, even though distant and inactive? Add that an angel is commonly granted a species, implanted from the beginning, of the existence of Peter, for example; and nevertheless the angel, in order to cognize that Peter exists, awaits Peter's existence as an extrinsic condition.

17. Fifth: cognition is a representation, or intentional likeness, of the object, whose perfection it expresses in itself and somehow participates; therefore it must arise from a power precontaining a likeness of this kind. But this power cannot be the bare and sole potency, for example the intellective potency; therefore there must be superadded a species which, like a seed of the object, pours its likeness into cognition. The subsumed minor is proved: because, first, the intellect does not formally contain the intentional likeness of cognizable things, since this is proper to cognition alone; nor, secondly, does it contain it eminently, because it would follow that the intellect is eminently like all the things it can cognize, that is, all actual and possible things, and eminently participates all their perfections and expresses them eminently in its own physical being. This seems in no way compatible with the limited perfection of the intellect; nor certainly does the intellect in its physical being have that affinity with the elements and other corporeal objects. Almost the same argument holds in imagination, sight, and the remaining senses when compared with the variety of their objects. Confirmation: because if the bare potency is an adequately active power of cognition, it could now at will extend itself to any object contained within its sphere, even though distant, absent, or non-existent. For what is lacking to the potency for operating if no motion of the object, either by itself or through a species, must be awaited?

18. This proof is more pressing than the preceding ones, but nevertheless does not seem wholly effective. First, it must be answered by those who with Fr. Suárez in *De anima* hold that intelligible species are adequately produced by the agent intellect without the influx of the phantasm in the genus of efficient cause; and similarly that species of the internal sense are effected by the sense itself as the total power. It must likewise be answered by those who deny that a species actively concurs toward cognition. Secondly, it does not prove that species are necessary in the intellect unless it is supposed from elsewhere that the phantasm cannot immediately concur toward intellection by reason of likeness; and that supposition is not easy to prove. Nor does it prove this in the external senses, in which it could be said from n. 2 that the object itself concurs by itself without intervention of a species. Furthermore, it will be denied that it is absurd for the potency to be eminently like its objects, when the

discussion concerns analogical and intentional likeness. For this signifies nothing other than that the potency is fecund of cognition and is more perfect than cognition itself, even insofar as cognition formally has an intentional likeness to the object. This certainly cannot be doubted of the potency, at least insofar as it includes the substance of the soul, especially if the potency is compared not with all cognitions simultaneously but with all taken divisively or distributively, in which way alone it can produce them.

19. Hence neither is it absurd that the intellect eminently participates the perfections of all things naturally cognizable by it, if the discussion is of analogical and purely mediated participation, insofar as, namely, it eminently participates the perfections of all cognitions naturally producible by it, which are analogical imitations of objects. And there is the counterexample of the will, which likewise can be said eminently to participate the perfections of all things insofar as it eminently contains, as an adequate power, the perfections of all natural volitions, which in some way participate the perfections of their objects, since they are specified by them. Finally, if the potency needs species only because of a lack of likeness to objects, the soul of Peter will be able without a species to cognize other human souls; indeed, all animal souls, to which it can be said to be eminently like; and for the same reason an angel will cognize rational souls without a species, and a man his own potencies, habits, and acts. To the confirmation, the consequence will be denied, because although the potency lacks no power, some condition or excitation may be lacking. And the species themselves retained in memory will be urged against the objection, since we cannot always use them at will, although no further motion of the object is to be awaited.

20. Nevertheless, the aforesaid fifth argument must be maintained as highly probable and fitting, because it proceeds chiefly *a priori* and explains, according to the common sense of authors, under what title the necessity of species rests when objects cannot of themselves immediately concur; otherwise the concurrence of a species is not desired. That title is namely the likeness to the object that shines forth in cognition. Indeed, it will always seem harsh and discordant that one and the same created intellect should adequately and eminently contain the likenesses, even though analogical, of infinitely many things differing from one another and precisely insofar as they differ. Nor does the example of the will avail. Both because volitions, although they can be infinitely diversified by their objects, are nevertheless not likenesses of them; and especially because toward the diversity of volitions the object truly concurs with the will in some genus of cause, namely final cause, which is truly and properly a cause, as we saw in Physics.

But toward the diversity of intentional likenesses, if the object does not assist the potency in the genus of efficient cause either by itself or through a species, it assists it in no genus of cause properly so called; hence the intellect alone draws forth from its own treasury diverse likenesses of innumerable objects.

21. And from this the same argument can be strengthened, because vital potencies cannot operate unless, besides their proper power and the general concurrence of God, there comes to them a new co-principle truly assisting in some genus of cause. This is proved 1º, from an incongruity: because if a vital potency had from nature an altogether complete power of operating, it would from the very first instant operate vitally in the highest degree, so that it could never operate better, just as substance, because it has from nature an altogether full power of rooting properties and one in need of no co-principle, immediately from the first instant roots its properties in the highest degree, nor are they ever better. But the consequence is contrary to experience. 2º, by induction through the other vital potencies besides the one in controversy. For the appetitive potency must be assisted by the object in the genus of final cause; the nutritive by the matter of food in the genus of material cause; the locomotive by appetite in the genus of moral cause and by the spirits in the genus of physical co-efficient cause. The same judgment must therefore be made of the cognitive potency, for there is no reason why it should suffice for itself in operating more than the appetitive potency, etc. But no suitable co-principle appears, especially in the intellect, except the object or its species; nor can it concur in any other genus of cause than the efficient; nor under any more evident title than that of representation or likeness of the object itself to be conveyed into cognition. For this reason even the Corpuscularians themselves require, at least in the sensitive potencies, the concurrence of the object through local motion, as we saw in the preceding disputation, c. 2.

22. Nor does it matter that Peter's soul contains within itself a physical likeness with respect to other souls, or an angel with respect to men; for it does not therefore sufficiently contain the intentional likeness without the assistance of the object. Both because the intellect has the same mode of operating about similar objects as about dissimilar ones, and because the need of objective concurrence, since it is founded in the proper condition of a vital potency, must generally extend to all cognitions. The opinions objected at n. 18, about the adequate production of species by the agent intellect or by the internal sense, and about the immediate concurrence of the phantasm toward intellection, will be rejected below. Finally, what has

hitherto been said will receive strength from the arguments we now add to prove the necessity of species in the individual potencies.

Proof of Species in the External Senses Individually.

23. The necessity of species is judged especially evident in sight. For vision manifestly depends upon a present object, not indeed one contiguous to the eyes, but one somewhat removed. This dependence cannot be reduced to mere sympathy with the object acting in no way at all. For sympathy between diverse *supposita* without any action of one upon the other explains nothing and therefore is rightly called the refuge of ignorance; and it could equally serve to deny all activity of one created *suppositum* upon another, for example of fire with respect to wood. For it could easily be said that wood becomes hot by its own power alone in the presence of fire, even though the fire does nothing, because it has, namely, a sympathy with fire whose presence it awaits as a mere condition without which not. Therefore the object acts in some way by which it affects and changes sight; and since it cannot act at a distance except through a medium, it is necessary that it diffuse through the medium some power propagated as far as sight, whose proper effect is vision. And a power of this kind we call a visual species; and we say that it is a quality, whatever the Corpuscularians protest, because it cannot consist in a diffusion or local motion of corpuscles, since it arrives at sight in an instant even from the most distant places, for example from the heavens.

24. Experience confirms this diffusion of objective power through the medium. For often, although the object is not changed in itself, it is viewed in various ways according to the variety of the medium. It is seen obscurely when the medium is turbid or vaporous, clearly when it is limpid; it is seen as though divided or broken when the medium trembles, or when part of the object is seen through media of diverse density; it appears as though multiple when seen through polygonal glass; it appears larger through a microscope; and finally, to omit other things, it is wholly hidden when an opaque body is interposed. But there is nowhere from which this variety can be taken except from the species, which because of the varying disposition of the medium through which they are diffused reach the eyes now remiss, now intense, now continuous, now divided, now more and now less condensed or gathered into one, now through direct lines, now through refracted lines; and when they encounter an opaque body they proceed no farther. Certainly, if nothing is transmitted through the medium from object to sight, you will not easily find what alteration of the medium contributes

toward varying vision, unless perhaps you invent as many sympathies in sight as there can be changes in the medium. I omit recourse to an emission of rays from the eyes toward the object, which is now abandoned by almost everyone as improbable.

25. To this also pertain the common experiments of vision in a mirror, which cannot be explained without reflection of species. For how will anyone behold in a mirror an object situated behind him, indeed his own eyes, countenance, and forehead, unless there are species sent from the object which, striking the mirror and being reflected there, are returned to the eyes along the reflected line and cause the object to appear where the line of reflection begins? Hence the face of one looking in a mirror appears in such a way that its right part seems left, and conversely, because from the right side of the face the species is sent directly into the left side of the mirror placed opposite it, and from the left into the right, and there the line of reflection begins. Hence also an object within the mirror is seen the deeper or more distant the farther it is in its own place from the mirror, because the reflected species represents also the object's distance from the mirror itself. And from the same cause towers or trees situated on the bank of a river are represented beneath the water with their roots inverted, or their tops turned downward, because the upper part is farther from the water and therefore through the reflected species must be represented as more remote from the surface of the water and, as it were, deeper. These and other things commonly observed seem altogether inexplicable unless there flows from the object into the mirror some representative power that flows back thence into sight.

26. You will say that for all these things rays of light sent or reflected from the object into the mirror, and from the mirror reflected into sight, suffice. But I ask whether in these rays there is a power to represent the object, or proximately to determine and complete the potency for vision of it. If you deny it, what do the rays of light contribute to the matter? If you affirm it, the rays themselves, which we presently suppose to belong to the genus of quality, will be the visual species we intend. And so the Scotists with Scotus hold with regard to objects luminous of themselves, as we noted in the preceding disputation, n. 62; for they say that primary light performs the office of a species with respect to light itself, and secondary light with respect to primary light. This opinion would be very probable to me were it not opposed 1º, because a specific diversity between light and illumination, and also between primary and secondary illumination, is gratuitously asserted and contrary to common sense. 2º, because we often see luminous objects although illumination does not reach sight, as when by night or from

a dark recess we discern a very distant fire, and from deep wells stars at midday. Nor does it help to say that some faint illumination always reaches sight. For, even if this is admitted, how does a faint species generate clear and vivid vision, as happens when from a very dark recess one sees a fire outside? 3º, because while we look at fire we simultaneously see the primary illumination existing in the medium; yet there is then no secondary illumination in the eyes. Finally, since the Scotists acknowledge, for secondary illumination and for colors, other species distinct from every illumination, they depart from the other philosophers concerning the species of light at little cost.

27. As regards the remaining external senses, the necessity of species is not so clear, because the objects seem sufficiently applied to concur by themselves immediately toward the act of sensation. For this reason Frs. Hurtado, Arriaga, Quirós, and others, especially the more recent authors, deny species with great probability in touch, taste, and smell; and Frs. Oviedo and Ulloa even in hearing. Nevertheless, the common opinion with the Angelic, Subtle, and Eximious Doctors acknowledges species in every external sense. First, hearing perceives sound as distant, or as existing in the place where it is produced by the sounding body, for example the sound of a bell in a tower, the sound of a voice in the mouth of the speaker, the sound of a lyre in the street or neighboring room. Therefore sound, as distant, concurs toward hearing, certainly through some power or effect diffused through the medium as far as the ears, as the adversaries grant. But it does not concur through another similar sound which it produces and really propagates as far as the ears. Therefore it concurs through a species. The minor premise is proved: because, if such propagation is posited, either only the part of sound that touches the sensory organ concurs toward hearing, or the whole extension of sound concurs in the manner of one agent. If the first is said, only the sound contiguous to the ear will be heard; if the second, the sound of the lyre, for example, will be heard just as if the whole medium were filled with sounding lyres, which plainly conflicts with experience.

28. Hence you will infer that sound is not productive of another sound like itself, just as color is not productive of color. For otherwise the sound of the striking of strings in a distant lyre, whether by itself or through a species it assists hearing, would be perceived as existing throughout the whole medium, just as, if the color of a rose diffused through the air another color like itself as far as sight, the whole intervening air would be seen as though filled with roses. Hence, when Aristotle and others commonly say that sound is diffused through the medium and moves or changes the air as far as the ears, this must be understood of a diffusion and motion not real but

intentional, that is, not by producing another sound but by propagating the intentional species produced by the sounding thing. For I hold, whatever others may philosophize otherwise, that sound is produced by the sounding body alone, for example a bell, and received in the contiguous air, or in flame or water if these are present in place of air, according to some determinate breadth, which will be greater or less according to the variety of the sounding power and of the blow or percussion which it requires as a condition for sounding. Throughout this whole breadth of air the sound really exists; and therefore hearing does not perceive the distance of the sounding thing when it is slight and the sound more vehement, for example when a musket is discharged at two or three paces, because then the sound itself really reaches the ears.

29. But beyond this breadth sound cannot be propagated except through species; that breadth determines the sphere of activity for the sounding agent. Sometimes, however, real sound itself is carried beyond it, not because it is propagated, but because the same individual air which received the sound near the sounding thing is driven farther by some impulse as far as the ears, as happens when one person speaks softly to another through a tube; hence even then distance is not perceived. Whether sound, when it really reaches the sensory organ, produces a species, we shall decide below where we treat touch. Two objections are made here. 1º, that if there were a species of sound, it would be diffused in an instant like the species of color; but experience establishes the opposite, for we see lightning before we hear thunder, although the latter is produced simultaneously or earlier; and one who from afar watches someone cutting wood sees the blow of the axe earlier in time than he hears the sound. 2º, that sound is produced successively and immediately ceases; hence the sound produced near the sounding thing no longer exists when its species reaches distant hearing. Therefore, if it is heard through a species, there will naturally be an external sensation of an object existing nowhere.

30. To 1º: perhaps the solution given in the preceding disputation, n. 80, will suffice. But perhaps it will be better answered that the species of sound by its nature is not produced without an undulation of the air, which is continued beyond the real sphere of the sound and proceeds much farther, sometimes sensibly, sometimes insensibly, according to the force of the percussion. For this reason violent thunder is not heard before the windows tremble; for this reason also, when the wind blows from the direction in which the sound is produced, it is heard better, because the wind advances the undulation of the air arising from the sounding percussion. Nor is it strange if the species depends upon the motion of the air, since sound itself

also depends upon it. Since, therefore, that motion occurs successively, the species of sound is consequently not diffused without some delay of time; but in no great distance this delay is not perceived. Hence the disparity from the species of color is clear. To 2º: the adversaries also are bound to answer; for whatever is the case concerning species, if sound produced near the sounding thing immediately perishes, either it will not be heard from a distant place, or it will be heard when it no longer exists. Sound, therefore, is said to be successively produced, not because what is produced immediately perishes, but because within the sphere of the sounding power it is extended successively and also successively intensified therein; shortly afterward it begins to be diminished, and not long after entirely ceases, namely, in imitation of the vibration of the air on which it depends. Yet once existing, it remains for some time, as does the vibration of the air, and lasts until its species has traversed its whole intentional sphere. See Fr. Suárez, l. 3, *De anima*, c. 21, n. 12.

31. Secondly, in smell it is sufficiently probable that species of odors are found. For odor seems to be diffused in no other way than through the extension of the vapor or smoky substance that exhales from the odorous body and is the vehicle of the odor. For odor is not believed to be active of odor, especially in air, which lacks the temperament of the primary qualities necessary for the production of odor; and for this reason, when the odorous vapor disappears, no odor remains in the air. But the vapor or smoke of the odorous body does not seem able to extend to a distance of fifty or even five hundred miles, at which vultures, as is reported, perceive the odor of dead flesh. Therefore in that case smell does not occur through contact of the odor but through its species. Add that fish beneath the water sense the odor of bait placed in the neighboring air; hence the crocodile emerges from the waters at the odor of flesh placed outside. But an odorous exhalation, since it is of a light and hot nature, cannot be carried downward through cold water unless violently impelled by an extrinsic cause, none of which exists in the experiment of the crocodile. See other proofs in Fr. Suárez, l. cit., c. 24, where he resolves certain arguments to the contrary.

32. Furthermore, in touch the necessity of species can be proved because the hand senses a tangible object through the cuticle, which is a thin and dense skin drawn over the whole skin externally and in itself endowed with no sense; and therefore it can be divided by a sharp razor without the sense of pain. Thus an object not immediately applied to the sensing part is sensed by touch. Therefore it must concur toward touching by operating through a medium and consequently by producing a species. But it makes no difference for preventing immediate application whether the medium is thin

or thick. You will say: the tangible quality is joined to the skin or flesh through another similar quality which it causes univocally in the cuticle. I object: although this is true of the primary qualities, it is not so of the secondary, as hardness, softness, and others; for these do not change the sensory organ or medium by producing like qualities. Therefore they must change it by producing species. Add that by means of a stick we also touch distant objects, whose real action or diffusion through the stick is none. You will say: we touch through an impulse impressed upon the stick. But against this is the fact that through impulse only the heaviness or weight of the impelling thing is sensed; yet by means of a stick we perceive hardness, softness, and other qualities, and distinguish between water, mud, stone, sand, wool, etc.

33. Finally, in taste no similar experiment occurs. Nevertheless the existence of species in it can be rendered persuasive, because if there are species in touch, the most material of all senses, they will more fittingly be found in taste; and therefore no one admits species in touch who denies them in any other external sense. Furthermore, since nature in things of the same genus is accustomed to preserve a uniform mode of operating, if it granted the use of species to the remaining senses, it should not have denied it to taste alone. Likewise, if all other sensible qualities, at least secondary qualities such as color, sound, odor, hardness, etc., have from nature a power of emitting species, it is easy to believe the same of flavor. But it is objected: species were devised only to supply for the absence, distance, or disproportion of the object. But the object of taste is never sensed except as present and immediately applied to the sensory organ, nor does it appear disproportionate under any aspect to concur immediately with the potency toward material sensation. Therefore there is no reason to judge that it produces a species. For the same reason the object of hearing, smell, and touch is sensed without a species when immediately applied to the sensory organ, as often happens.

34. To begin with this last point, I answer: the object of these senses, even when it is sensed as immediately applied to the organ, which I do not deny often happens, truly produces a species of itself. For since it has the power productive of a species and exercises it when it is not immediately applied, as is clear from what has been said, it must likewise exercise it, as a necessary agent, when it is immediately applied to a capable subject, such as the sensory organ itself. And from this it is sufficiently gathered that such an object even then does not influence sensation immediately by itself, and therefore lacks the power of immediately influencing it. For if the object, in order to assist the potency, must always employ another power produced by

itself, and indeed produced not immanently as though a connatural property of itself, but transiently and solely for the purpose of assisting a distinct cause, why would nature have given it a power immediately to influence sensation? Why would it have multiplied powers of diverse genera for a concurrence merely partial and instrumental, such as is the concurrence required on the part of the object toward sensation, especially since no experience can here be alleged? But if the object of hearing, etc., causes sensation only through a species, the same must be believed of the object of taste for the arguments of the preceding number. The same should also be held of the primary qualities with respect to touch, for example heat; although it is not sensed unless it really alters the sensory organ, nevertheless in the order of intentional action it would unfittingly be excepted from the general law of nature that comprehends the other sensible qualities.

35. Now to the objection at n. 33, I admit that species began to be investigated on the basis taken from cognition of a distant or absent object. Nevertheless, once the existence of species has thereby been proved, it is rightly deduced by mediate consequences that no object, at least no sensible object, however present it may be, concurs toward sensation of itself except through a species, and that this species is always necessary to supply the disproportion of the object. For although in the object, compared with sensation, there is found a proportion of perfection, from this there does not follow a proportion of immediate power or fecundity, as is clear in a horse with respect to a mouse, or even in the substance of a stone, which lacks a proportion of immediate power toward downward motion, since it cannot produce it except through gravity, as is commonly said. But the disproportion of power in the object for immediately causing sensation is sufficiently proved from the very power of producing a species, as we just saw. Hence it can be generally inferred that no object productive of species from itself in the manner of a necessary agent can immediately concur toward cognition of itself. Therefore, if the substance of an angel, under the notion of object, concurs immediately with its own intellect, or that of another angel, toward cognition of itself, this will happen because either the angel is not productive of its own species, or is productive only in the manner of a free agent.

36. But when a species is called the vicar of the object, or is said to act in the place of the object, or to concur in the name of the object, or to be substituted in place of the object, do not understand this as though the species does what the object would immediately do if present. Rather, understand it in this way: that the species derives its origin from the object

and concurs not for its own sake but for the sake of the object as representable through cognition; or that the object, disproportionate of itself for concurring, through the species supplies that very thing which other proportionate objects supply without a species, for example the substance of an angel as intuitively cognizable. In this sense also it is truly said that the object must concur either by itself or through a species produced by itself, namely object in general, under which are found some objects apt to concur by themselves, others only through a species. I knowingly omit certain other quasi-*a priori* proofs of species in the external senses, usually brought forward especially by the Thomists, because I find little effectiveness in them.

Likewise in the Internal Sense and in the Intellect.

37. In the internal sense the necessity of species is effectively proved from memory and cognition of absent objects, such as occurs in dreams and whenever the imagination imagines objects no longer perceived by any external sense. For it cannot be doubted that from an object externally sensed there results in the internal sense some novelty or change that afterwards remains; otherwise the imagination would be no differently affected after than before every vision of color, for example. Hence, just as before it was unable to imagine color, as is clear in those blind from birth, so it would be afterwards. But that change cannot occur through emitted corpuscles, both because there are none emitted by color, and because as many corpuscles as phantasms, or seeds of phantasms, are amassed in the memory of some persons cannot be united in the same brain without penetration. Nor can it occur through local motion by which the position or situation of fibers is variously changed; for we abundantly rejected this in the preceding disputation, c. 2. It remains, therefore, that this change occurs through qualities that complete the internal sense and assist it in repeating cognition of the object without a repeated external sensation. Qualities of this kind we call species; and he who retains more of them and for longer is said to have a better memory. Nor certainly can it otherwise be explained why memory is not equal in all, nor how forgetfulness occurs of things someone once learned.

38. This argument demonstrates that the internal sense needs a species for cognition of a past or absent object. But will it also need a species for cognition of a present object actually sensed externally? This is commonly affirmed, because cognition of the present needs the assistance of the object, which cannot be supplied immediately by the object itself since it is distant,

nor merely through the external sensation, since this is distant from the brain, especially when touching occurs in the foot. Fr. Oviedo holds the contrary here, controv. 13, punct. 2, saying that the external sensation is sufficiently applied to concur immediately by itself with the internal sense toward cognition both of itself and of the extrinsic object, because it is immediately united with the immediate principle of internal cognition. For in man the sensation of the foot is united with the soul, which is the same in the foot as in the brain; but in a brute having a divisible soul, it is united with the part of the soul which, although it exists only in the foot, immediately influences the sensation of the brain, because, as the same author teaches elsewhere, all the parts of a divisible soul concur in the manner of one toward every sensation, although elicited in only one part of the body. But this doctrine concerning the concurrence of all the parts of the soul, etc., remains attacked above, disp. 3, n. 77. Hence the application of the external sensation to the internal sense in a brute is not sufficiently preserved in this way unless species are added. But if they are granted to a brute, they must be granted to man, who is subject to the same laws in his mode of sensing.

39. Finally, in the intellect the necessity of species is similarly proved from spiritual memory. For it is certain that not only the internal sense but also the intellect remembers past things and things previously cognized, but not other things that never came into the mind. Hence after its first cognitions the intellect stands differently toward such objects than if it had never cognized them; and this difference cannot be explained unless the intellect acquires and retains species, as we just showed in the similar case. If you say that sensitive memory suffices for the intellect to repeat cognition of what was previously cognized, assisted or determined, namely, by a repeated phantasm, which it always needs, you will be attacked 1º, because the intellect often remembers things not perceived by sensitive memory, namely its own spiritual acts, as when someone remembers and grieves over sins committed through such acts, for example over a rash judgment or a doubt in matters of faith. Then the phantasm assists only perhaps by remembering certain extrinsic circumstances, such as time or place; but the remembrance of these, unless it supposes a species in the intellect, does not suffice for remembering such sins, because the intellect will stand in the same way with that phantasm as it would have stood had it not sinned at all. 2º, because the separated soul remembers what it cognized and did in the body, as is clear from the consensus of all and from various passages of Scripture, especially Luke 16. Yet then it is assisted by no phantasm, nor does it appear by what it can be more fittingly assisted than by species acquired in the body and preserved in spiritual memory.

40. By these arguments the necessity of species in the intellect for remembering is sufficiently shown. But the same necessity does not immediately follow for first cognition, because it could be said that for this the concurrence of a phantasm in place of a species suffices. Nor are there lacking those who so think and acknowledge in the intellect only memorative species concerning acts of understanding and willing, which are reflexive and experiential, produced by previously possessed acts, by whose aid the soul later cognizes that it had cognized or loved such and such objects, which is to remember them. The most common opinion, however, requires species also for first intellections. This can be proved 1º, because generally for understanding there is necessary an adequate power wholly spiritual. Since, therefore, the power of the intellect is not adequate unless some co-principle from the side of the object comes to it, this co-principle must be spiritual and therefore other than the phantasm, namely an incorporeal species. The consequence is legitimate, and the antecedent is clear both from the example of the power for willing, and because intellection, since in its genus it is a primary and characteristic operation of spiritual substance, ought, as far as possible, to be independent of body and corporeal cause, not only subjectively but efficiently. But if you will have the intellect need no assistance from the object beyond determination or application, even so the example of the will presses, for the object must always be applied to it through spiritual cognition, and an act of imagination never suffices.

41. 2º, because intellective memory retains not only reflexive and experiential species of previously possessed acts but also direct and immediate species of the objects themselves. For afterwards it thinks directly and immediately of these, as experience teaches. Thus, for example, an exile, when he remembers his homeland, does not think so much of his cognition of his homeland as of the homeland itself; indeed, he represents it to himself more expressly and distinctly than the cognition. This could not happen if he then cognized the homeland only mediately in the previously possessed cognition as in an image, as is clear from the example of an external image. But those direct species, since they are not produced by the first acts, must be presupposed to them or produced by things presupposed to them.

CHAPTER III.
The Arguments of Chapter I Are Solved, and Various Questions Concerning Species Are Likewise Resolved.

42. We shall now solve the contrary arguments previously proposed in c. 1, and in solving them we shall decide various questions commonly agitated among the patrons of species. We shall also often allege as a reason the very nature of species, known from no other source than its congruence with the effects we experience. For where a hidden matter is treated, it is customary in philosophy to attribute to it such a nature as is not of itself impossible and, if posited, agrees well with effects known by experience. To objection 1 at n. 2, the necessity of species in the external senses and the disproportion of the object for concurring immediately, even when immediately applied to the sensory organ, are clear from what was said from n. 23 onward. It is also clear from nn. 37 and 38 that the internal sense needs a species and cannot be assisted by external sensation alone. But the motion of spirits, unless it carries species with it, is insufficient; otherwise it would equally suffice for imagining color before every vision. Finally, it is clear from n. 39 sqq. that the intellect, if the species is excluded, is not sufficiently determined through the act of imagination.

43. To confirmation 1: the human intellect, at least in this life, cognizes nothing without either a proper or an alien species. A "proper species" of object A is one produced by such an object, or at least primarily instituted for representing it, for example the species of color in sight. An "alien species" is one proper to another object that has at least an analogical or symbolic agreement with object A, and therefore, joined with other alien species, serves the intellect as though secondarily for cognizing object A confusedly and imperfectly. Thus, for the intellect to conceive an angel, it employs experiential species of its own intellective faculty, together with species of beauty, strength, vigor, which are proper to young men, and likewise the species of agility, which belongs to birds by the benefit of wings; and with these species concurring in combination, while the materiality of the objects is simultaneously removed through the act itself, it forms a concept of this kind: "An intelligent, beautiful, strong, vigorous, and agile substance, like a young man in excellent condition and winged, except for materiality." Similarly we conceive God through species drawn from creatures, of power, wisdom, goodness, etc., limitation and imperfection being removed; privations and beings of reason likewise through species of

real being; modes through species of absolute things, etc., always removing what must be removed. And this is to cognize an object through alien species. Although these are seeds only of their own objects, nevertheless, when diverse species are united in concurring, they can generate cognition of a different object, just as from the combined seeds of various animals an animal of a different nature is commonly generated.

44. To confirmation 2: some authors acknowledge in the species only the office of determining the potency without active influx into cognition, namely in the genus of formal cause, or merely by informing the potency, in the way that in the common opinion cognition determines or inclines toward volition. But for precisely this office the necessity of species in the intellect will scarcely be made persuasive, as that confirmation well proves; it will likewise scarcely be made persuasive in the internal sense, which for cognition of an absent object needs another determinant besides the species, and for cognition of a present object can be determined through the external sensation, although distant, namely by reason of sympathy, which for the office of determining is commonly admitted among potencies and acts of the same *suppositum* because of their rootedness in the same soul, or in parts of the same soul. Therefore the common opinion must be held, which with St. Thomas, Scotus, and Suárez attributes to the species an active concurrence toward cognition and asserts it to be necessary by reason of the insufficiency of power in the cognitive potency taken bare. This insufficiency is shown by the argument brought forward at n. 17 and confirmed at nn. 20 and 21. And certainly, since according to these authors the species is necessarily prerequisite to cognition as present and applied; since likewise cognition varies in the same potency according to the variety of the species and becomes intuitive or abstractive, clear or obscure, intense or remiss; since moreover equality of perfection with the effect is not required for partial and instrumental concurrence; and since finally the species is compared to seed, whose role is actively to concur toward generation of the offspring, it seems altogether foreign to the common manner of philosophizing to deny active concurrence of the species toward cognition without any pressing foundation.

45. For the fact that the potency, or soul, is more perfect than cognition and truly productive of it does not prove adequate power. Such a power indeed requires equality or eminence of perfection, but even in a fecund thing it is not sufficiently inferred from this unless another reason or experience is added, as we have often observed elsewhere and as is clearly seen in the generation of animals, where the female cannot generate offspring without the concurrence of the male, although she equals it in

perfection, indeed sometimes surpasses it, as a mare does a mule. But in the present matter experience does not favor but rather resists the contrary, namely the experience of the necessity of species, which the aforesaid authors admit and which sufficiently indicates some defect of power in the potency, since this necessity cannot be founded merely in a need of determination, as we just saw. Nor does the example of the will, which needs no efficient co-principle on the side of the object, stand in the way, for we already gave both the disparity and the retorsion at n. 20. Therefore the adequately active power of cognition is constituted from potency and species as from partial causes, not by partiality of influx or effect, but only by partiality of cause, insofar as each produces the whole effect in such a way that it necessarily needs the partnership of the other, which also produces the whole by the same action. On this see what was said in Physics, tr. 2, d. 6, c. 5, n. 24 sqq.

46. Finally, observe in what way the power of determining the potency belongs generally to a species. It belongs to it, namely, not because every species necessarily determines as to exercise, but because it determines as to specification, or as to sufficiency of power for cognizing such an object. For the potency, of itself indifferent to various cognitions and sufficiencies, through the species of object A is rendered determinately sufficient for its cognition, and indeed in such a way that if it uses this species alone it cannot cognize another diverse object. I omit the opinion of some who, on the contrary, say that the potency does not influence cognition except through the species, and that the latter is the whole ratio of acting, in the way that among Thomists a habit is the whole ratio of producing supernatural cognition. Fr. Suárez, l. 3, *De anima*, c. 4, well refutes this opinion, which today no one seems to embrace. The Thomists likewise attack it; but whatever they object can similarly be urged against them in the case of a supernatural habit and also of the power through which substance acts, especially since St. Thomas, I^{a}, q. 56, a. 1, speaks thus: "As heat is the formal principle of heating in fire, so the species of the thing seen is the formal principle of vision in the eye." Hence, just as heat in fire, according to Thomists alleging St. Thomas for themselves, is the whole ratio of heating and burning, so the species in the eye will be, etc.

On the Excitation and Corruption of Species.

47. To objection 2 at n. 4: Fr. Arriaga with the Nominalists denies that species acquired by the intellect are perpetually conserved. For he says that some entities are by their nature fleeting from the state of existence, which,

with no contrary pressing and no conserving cause failing, as though spontaneously or from their proper imperfection vanish after they have fulfilled a certain period of duration; and he says that the species of both memories, material and spiritual, are of this kind. He proves this assumption by arguments not to be despised, but to me those are more solid by which Fr. Quirós attacks such fleeting entities in the present disp. 92, s. 3, to which I refer the reader, since it is not possible to pursue everything. The common opinion grants that species impressed upon the intellective memory are perpetually retained because they lack a contrary, inhere in an incorruptible subject, and after their first production are conserved by God alone. By God alone, I say, because the power of the intellect is neither adequately active of the species nor could suffice for the simultaneous conservation of innumerable species and, in addition, for cognitions.

48. Therefore the intellect never forgets things it has once learned through defect of species, but it can do so through defect of a condition required for their use. For the connection of intellect and imagination in operating, so long as one lives in the body, also connects the use of the species of both memories, so that no species is excited in the intellect, even by command of the will, unless at the same time some other corresponding species awakens in the material memory. If perhaps this latter has been corrupted, by that very fact it will leave its related intellectual species idle until the soul is separated from the body. Hence it is clear why the intellect is not always in the exercise of cognizing, or of using an acquired species, although the species when it first exists necessarily acts, at least while it is produced through the phantasm, because the species of the imagination is then presupposed as operating. But the disparity from the example of visual species must be sought from their diverse nature. Nor does it seem true that a new direct species in the intellect is required whenever the imagination again repeats a previously cognized object. It will suffice for the previously possessed species to awaken in the intellect, especially if the phantasm does not precede but merely accompanies or follows the act of intellect.

49. As regards the species of imagination or sensitive memory, to which the whole difficulty of forgetfulness, excitation, and corruption is transferred, all admit that here there is a mystery of nature almost inexplicable whether species are admitted or denied. Nor does exclusion of species bring any light, but rather increases the darkness in disclosing the causes of things that commonly occur in memory. Excitation of species in memory is nothing other than a new determination of them toward operating, for which various causes are assigned. The first is the disturbance or abundance of some bodily humor, which by altering the brain either by

itself or through infected spirits, vapors, or fumes, excites species somewhat congruent with the same humor. Hence melancholics frequently meditate on sad things, sanguine persons on joyful things, and choleric persons on dreadful things, and they are accustomed to dream of the same. To the same cause must be reduced excitation coming from an angel or a demon, which naturally cannot occur except through local motion of the humors or spirits.

50. The second cause is the affinity or connection of species among themselves because of the affinity, likeness, or connection of the objects, or because of the mode and order in which they were acquired. Hence from the arrival of a new species other earlier ones long dormant are accustomed to awaken, as when at the sight of a harmful man there returns the memory of evils he formerly inflicted. Hence also is derived that chained recurrence of species by which someone faithfully recites from memory a lengthy speech. For because, when he learned the periods, he reflexively adverted to their order, the species left by the first period represents it not merely in any way, but as prior in order to the second; whence it happens that it immediately excites the species of the second period, and this the species of the third for the same reason, and so of the rest. The third cause is the command of the will, which, with a confused cognition of an object previously cognized shining before it, for example of some history read or heard, applies the intellect and consequently the imagination or material cogitative potency to resuming species of the things and circumstances in particular. Hence arises that effort of mind and imagination by which we sometimes seek species as though lost, or summon them as though remote. For such effort occurs under the command of the will and is nothing other than attention to the confusedly cognized object and cessation from extraneous thoughts; and this cessation and attention contribute greatly to the desired species being restored to use.

51. But concerning these causes, besides the fact that they do not seem to comprehend all events, a particularly obscure question arises: what do they supply with respect to species by which they excite them, or determine them to act? Some answer that certain modes are produced by them in the species. Others say that such causes, and perhaps many others, are merely occasions or conditions which, once posited, species of their nature require to operate. Others say that they are indeed mere conditions, yet not determined by the nature of species, but established by God alone so that He may prepare His concurrence for the species. For since species after their first acts do not require always to operate, nor at any determinate time, and since otherwise it is sometimes in the interest of a man or animal to use memory, God Himself designated occasions on which He would prepare

concurrence now for these, now for those species, according as He judged expedient for the good of the subject, consideration also being given to the common good. In this matter He can conduct Himself as Author of nature, just as within the order of natural providence He freely disposes the causes of winds, rains, and storms. Others say that species are received not in the substance of the brain but in the animal spirits, which after the first acts withdraw to the cerebellum and rest there until by some local motion, which can arise from various causes, they return again to the brain and recall the inhering species to use.

52. These views are not without difficulty, but nothing more expedient occurs. Certainly, whatever the causes that excite memory may be, and however they conduct themselves, they will effect nothing unless species acquired by the internal sense through the external senses are presupposed. For one who has never perceived color by sight, however much he is excited, will never remember color nor form its proper concept. If you ask why species deposited in memory need excitation, since at their first impression they immediately operate, I answer: this is their nature, known by experience and consonant with their end, that they neither perish immediately nor require to operate after the first act unless they are again excited. For they are instituted for the good of the subject, whose interest it is both to have a memory to be renewed as occasion demands and to cease from cognition of past things so that it may cognize new things or restore its strength. It could also be said that an internal species always needs excitation, but that for the first act an external sensation suffices as an excitant. The same must be said of an intellectual species, for which at the first act the phantasm itself, by which it is produced, suffices as an excitant. I speak of a direct species; for a reflexive or experiential species produced by an act in the same potency does not necessarily act even at its first impression. Otherwise, whenever the intellect understands, it would have to cognize the first act by another reflexive act, and this one by a third, and so to infinity. Therefore a species of this kind always needs the command of the will or some other excitant besides that by which it is first produced.

53. But here the difficulty touched upon at n. 5 presses: how does the same species which at its first origin generates intuitive cognition afterwards, in the absence of the object, generate abstractive cognition? The discussion concerns species of the imagination and intellect, for those in the external senses serve only intuitive cognitions, since they are not conserved in the absence of the object. The discussion likewise concerns abstractive cognition that occurs through a proper species but is not connected with the real presence of the object, and in this very point differs from intuitive

cognition, which cannot exist without an object really present, at least naturally. Some deny that anything is intuitively cognized by the internal sense or by the intellect joined to the body. But this seems harsh. For when someone looks at the shining sun, why should he not be said to cognize it intuitively by imagination and intellect just as by sight? The Scotists with Scotus, in Mastrius here, disp. 6, q. 4, a. 2, say that intuitive cognition in the intellect does not need a species, indeed cannot occur through a species, because it always occurs with the object present and is therefore produced immediately by the object. But this also is difficult to understand, especially when an angel, or at least a separated soul, intuits corporeal objects.

54. Certain others admit intuitive species, but such as do not serve for abstractive cognition, because they hold that these immediately perish when the object recedes and intuition ceases, since in being produced and conserved they depend upon the present object mediately influencing the intellect through a phantasm, and the imagination through an external sensation. Fr. Quirós, disp. 92, n. 24, says this opinion is certain, and Fr. Oviedo, controv. 13, p. 3, n. 8, says it must altogether be held by those who admit species in the imagination and intellect for first acts. The Scotist Smising, in Mastrius, l.c., n. 109, expressly holds the same. Nor do these authors therefore deny memory of an object intuitively cognized, but say that it is had through purely abstractive species produced by intuitive acts. This opinion can be maintained without difficulty, provided that in memory, besides species of acts, others are posited directly representing the objects, from n. 41. Although abstractive, such species can be produced by intuitive species no less easily than by the acts themselves.

55. The aforesaid difficulty can further be solved in two ways. 1º, if with Fr. Arriaga an essential distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition, when the latter occurs through a proper species, is denied. For it seems consonant with experience that the intellect or imagination can naturally conserve the same act by which it intuits a present object when the object recedes, although that act loses the denomination "intuitive," which is not altogether intrinsic, since it is constituted through coexistence with the object. 2º, if it is said that cognitions of this kind, although essentially different, can be produced by the same species, because they differ not by reason of principle but by reason of the mode of tending, by virtue of which intuitive cognition has a special connection with the present object, which abstractive cognition lacks. The reason why the species causes intuition when it first exists but not afterwards is that for such an effect it needs the external sensation of the object as a condition without which not, namely because of a certain sympathy, which in things pertaining to the same

suppositum is not absurd. Theologians discuss the species by which an angel intuits existing objects, especially corporeal ones.

56. Now concerning the corruption of species of sensitive memory, it is certain that not only do they all perish at death but many are also entirely abolished in the course of life. Since this does not arise from defect of the conserving cause, for these species are conserved by God, not by the internal sense, for the reason given in the similar case at n. 47, it must be seen whence it comes. First, it can arise from defect of the subject, namely the medulla of the brain, which is gradually dissolved by the action of heat and restored through nutrition like the other parts of the body, indeed more easily than the more solid parts. Hence the species that inhered in dissolved particles, for it is not necessary that each individual species inhere in the whole medulla, consequently perish. Hence dryness or viscosity of the brain contributes to long retention of species, because a drier or more viscous medulla is not so easily dissolved. Hence also we often remember some history as to its substance while the memory of its circumstances has been wholly erased, because perhaps the species of the circumstances inhered in particles of the brain afterwards dissolved, whereas the species of the history as to its substance inhered in other particles. But when in old age the memory of things done in childhood remains while memory of recent things has entirely elapsed, the cause can be a more tenacious viscosity of some portion of the original brain, which long resists dissolution, while other parts newly acquired, because more fluid, easily pass away.

57. Secondly, it can arise from an accidental change of the subject, or from defect of the due disposition in the subject, or from the arrival of a quality contrary to this disposition. Hence it sometimes happens that from some illness almost the whole memory of things previously cognized is altogether lost, so much so that men formerly very learned do not even recognize the letters of the alphabet. This cannot be attributed to a substantial change of the subject, for it is not credible that the whole substance of the brain was changed so suddenly or in so short a time. Humidity is commonly said to dispose toward corruption of species; but I understand this insofar as humidity disposes the subject to be more easily dissolved by the action of heat. For if the subject remains, just as humidity does not prevent reception of species, so neither does it prevent their retention, just as a degree of cold that does not resist introduction of heat does not obstruct its conservation. But the fact that a figure impressed upon a moist body lasts only briefly arises from the fact that the parts of moist matter easily exchange the position in which the figure consists. From this

there is no parity with qualities that do not depend upon position. Therefore recourse must be had to another disposition.

58. And to me it seems it must be said that for the sake of memory some unnamed quality was given to the brain by nature, whose office is to dispose the subject for reception of species in almost the way that transparency disposes for reception of light and opacity for reception of color. This quality has as contrary to it some one of the morbid qualities, by virtue of which it can be diminished or remitted and sometimes destroyed, at the same time bringing about the ruin or remission of species. Afterwards, however, when the cause of illness ceases, it can be recovered or intensified by the unimpeded power of the soul, although the loss of species will not therefore be repaired unless a new external sensation comes to its aid, because the power of the soul does not suffice for their production. But if the illness does not invade the whole brain, but some part only, in that part alone will that quality be endangered together with the species received there. Perhaps also that quality is only generically one but specifically fivefold, according to the five classes of species distinguished by the five external senses, so that there is one disposition in the brain for species drawn through sight, another for those received through hearing, etc. These dispositions, although they inhere in the same subject, are separable and can individually perish or diminish without the others, because the same harmful quality does not oppose all but a different one opposes each.

59. By the benefit of dispositions of this kind many experiments concerning memory can be explained. First, the one concerning the entire memory lost through illness, which must be reduced to corruption of almost the whole dispositive quality. Secondly, why species once vivid are accustomed in the course of time to be diminished in memory and serve only for a faint and diminished recollection: because the disposition of the subject suffers diminution from a contrary quality, which very often is not sensed; and although the disposition is afterwards intensified, the species is not therefore intensified. Likewise, why some species perish without others, and more recent ones sometimes sooner than older ones: because perhaps they are received in some part of the brain which before the others is invaded by a harmful quality, or because perhaps they depend upon a diverse disposition, having been drawn through a different sense. Furthermore, from this can be taken a reason why memory is more or less easy in receiving and tenacious in retaining. For those who have a better temperament receive species more easily, because they possess that disposition of the brain in a more excellent degree; and those who have a more solid or compact brain

resist the harmful quality more strongly and therefore retain both the dispositions and the species more firmly.

60. Finally, by recurring now to a substantial, now to an accidental change of the subject, the other phenomena will somehow be explained. Nor is it necessary with others to recur to the limited capacity of a subject already possessing many species, as though it could not admit new ones without losing some of the previously possessed. Nor again is it necessary with others to assert that species of the brain are received in the spirits alone, whose dissipation would be the loss of species. Both positions suffer various objections. Nevertheless it can be granted to the spirits that they are vehicles of species from the external senses to the internal, and that from their motion and arrival, accidentally varied, there arises the impression of species now in one, now in another part of the medullary substance.

Whether Species Pertaining to Sense Are Sensible and Divisible.

61. To objection 3 at n. 6, it must be said without hesitation that sensible species are material, nor do the contrary proofs stand in the way. The first does not, because species are called forms without matter insofar as they contain a likeness of objects without their real nature; for the species of color is not color, nor is the species of sound sound. Aristotle himself explains this, 2, *De anima*, t. 121, by the example of the mark which wax receives from an iron or golden ring without therefore receiving the very nature of gold or iron. But the spirituality which St. Augustine and St. Thomas attribute to species is improper and means the same as insensibility, in the way the name "spirit" is commonly attributed to air and to those vapors whose subtlety escapes the perception of the senses. The second does not, because not every material entity can be perceived by sight or another sense, since the intellect detects in corporeal things many things hidden from the senses. Nor will this be denied by the Corpuscularians, none of whom has thus far sensed the subtle or ethereal matter they everywhere obtrude, just as neither have they sensed the extension and figure which they attribute to atoms or primitive corpuscles. Among animals scarcely anyone fails to acknowledge vital and animal spirits, certainly corporeal, which nevertheless no one has thus far seen or touched, etc.

62. Therefore species serving the senses are not called "sensible" because they themselves are sensed or terminate sensation, but because they arise from a sensible object and render it proximately sensible, or proximately apt to be sensed. Hence they can be called sensible not "as that

which," but "as that by which." Thus holds the common opinion, and rightly, because species are not of the same nature as objects. Otherwise the species of white and black would be contrary and could not simultaneously be received in the same pupil; and if they were received, they would impede vision. Therefore they do not participate the notion "under which" the sense tends toward its object. The Scotists, however, think otherwise concerning certain species. For according to them primary illumination, which is the species of light, is discerned through secondary illumination, and the latter through another species. Indeed, Mastrius, disp. 5, n. 36, asserts the same of every visual species, namely that it can be seen in itself through another species, as is clear, he says, when a ray passes through red glass; for then redness is discerned on the wall, which is the species of the redness of the glass. He asserts something similar about the species of sound, n. 145. But this doctrine, insofar as it attributes the office of species to illumination, we rejected above at n. 26; and insofar as it makes species of colors visible, it can be attacked from what has just been said, because for such species to be comprehended under the object of sight they must participate the real force and nature of colors; but then they will both impede vision and become contrary among themselves.

63. Here it must be noted that in a mirror neither the species of the object nor some image painted there is discerned, but the object itself is immediately discerned, although situated behind. For if an image or species were discerned, it would appear on the surface of the mirror, or certainly no deeper than the mirror. But now what is seen appears deeper and farther from the surface the farther the object itself really is from the mirror; it is also seen to approach and recede from the crystal, which cannot be verified of a species impressed upon and inhering in the crystal. Add that those weak in sight, who with naked eyes cannot perceive a distant object, do not see it in a mirror, although the mirror is near and clearly seen; but they do see it when spectacles are employed. Therefore what they then see is not something inhering in the mirror but the object in itself, whose species is carried to sight through the reflected line. And because imagination is accustomed to perceive objects opposite the eyes through a direct line, it therefore then conceives the place and distance of the object as though existing beyond the mirror or in the depth of the mirror. See Fr. Suárez here, l. 3, c. 2, where he also teaches that in rays transmitted through colored glass the species is not seen, but only the color inhering in the glass, whose species, mingled with the rays, are reflected from the place where the rays fall. The same must be said when light enters a dark room through a small opening and, received upon paper, seems to depict upon it images of objects

existing outside. For no visible picture is really made there, but only a reflection of species representing the things themselves situated opposite.

64. Finally, the third proof at n. 6 does not stand in the way, because for a sensible species truly to be material it suffices that it be divisible in being, or on the part of the subject whose extension it imitates. But is it also divisible in representing, or insofar as it corresponds to the object? This is a question discussed among the defenders of species from other considerations and turns uniquely or chiefly upon the visual species. For this, according to many, is indeed divisible subjectively, that is, consists of as many parts of extension as does the subject in which it is received, namely the retina, pupil, air, or another transparent medium. Yet it is indivisible representatively or objectively, that is, it does not so imitate the divisibility of the object that individual parts of one correspond to individual parts of the other, but each part of the species represents the whole object, however great, provided that a straight line can be drawn from it as far as the subject of the species through a transparent medium, because each is produced by the whole object and by all its parts through a common action. For example, when someone at one glance sees a man, he does not receive in the pupil distinct parts of a species, one of which is of the head, another of the chest, another of the hand, etc.; but he receives a species extended indeed according to the measure of the pupil, yet of which even the smallest part or point simultaneously and indivisibly on its own side represents head, chest, hands, etc., and is produced by all these through a common action. Thus the Conimbricenses, Toletus, Aversa, and several Thomists, whom the Complutensian College of St. Thomas cites and follows here, l. 2, q. 5, a. 2.

65. The common opinion of our authors, however, with Fr. Suárez here, l. 3, c. 2, to whom Cavellus, Pontius, Mastrius, and others adhere, asserts that the visual species is also objectively divisible, so that each part of the object produces in its entirety its own part of the species, through which that part alone is represented. Therefore, in any point or particle of the pupil, or of the space from which the whole object can be seen, it is necessary that as many parts of species be joined as there are parts of the visible object. The reason is 1º, because this happens when at one glance several contiguous or neighboring but not united objects are seen, for example when someone in a square simultaneously looks at a multitude of men, beasts of burden, carriages, etc. Therefore likewise when several parts of one object are seen simultaneously. The antecedent is supposed by the adversaries and is evident of itself. For who would imagine that men, carriages, and asses concur in the manner of one agent toward a common species? The consequence, however, is rendered persuasive because the foundations of

the contrary opinion either hold in both events or in neither, as will soon be clear.

66. 2º, because frequently there are contrary colors in the object, as when one part is white, another black. But from black and white precisely as such a species common to both cannot be produced, just as from cold and hot precisely as such no effect like both can arise. If you reply that the species of white and black can coalesce into one through identity because, when distinguished, they are not contrary but peacefully coexist in the same subject, I object that these species, although not contrary, nevertheless arise from contrary principles from which they must derive at least a repugnance to identity, just as heat as four and cold as four, although they peacefully coexist in the same subject, nevertheless always exclude identity. Otherwise it would be permissible to imagine that the power of both is sometimes found in one simple quality produced by a common action from hot and cold simultaneously applied to the same patient. This argument especially presses the Thomists, who posit real identity, or at least univocal and specific agreement, between species and object.

67. 3º, because when one part of the object is covered, the species of the other part persists. But if this species is representative of the whole object, how does it no longer represent the whole? They answer that the same species does not persist, but a new one is produced by the uncovered part of the object alone and is representative only of it, while the preceding species wholly perishes through concealment of the part on which it depended as a partial cause. This is indeed said consistently; but from it follows that the whole species of the sea is changed when any drop of water is concealed; that the species of the whole sun, indeed of the whole celestial hemisphere, varies when even one opaque atom is interposed; that from the continuous motion of the heavens, by which new parts incessantly appear above the horizon and others are incessantly hidden, there results a continual production and cessation of total species of the hemisphere, and this in every point of the air, since from each a straight line can be drawn to every point of the hemisphere. These and similar consequences are too harsh to be easily swallowed. 4º, because parts of the object more remote are seen less clearly than those nearer, which would not happen if they were all seen through the same species produced by all through a common action. I omit other arguments added by others.

68. It is objected 1º, from the example of other effects, which are commonly produced by a common action of all parts of one agent. For light in every point of air depends upon the whole sun, just as heat is produced by the whole fire in every point of the patient. 2º, because greater extension and

multitude of parts of the object causes it to be seen more clearly from afar, indeed to be seen simply, when in a smaller bulk it would otherwise not be seen. For a great mountain seen from afar would by no means be seen at the same distance if reduced to the bulk of one palm. Therefore all parts of the object mutually assist one another in emitting a common species. For if each particle emitted its own entire species, it would be discerned in the same way when alone as when joined to others. The objection is pressed: because any particle of the object will have an unlimited sphere of activity and will be able to send a species farther and farther without end, provided that, as it recedes farther from sight, it is joined to more parts with which it constitutes a greater bulk. It is pressed again: because the magnitude of an object appears smaller the more distant it is; but this would not happen in this way if a distinct species were emitted from every point of the object. 3º, because from our opinion it follows that in every point of the pupil or air as many parts of species are amassed and compenetrated as there are points in the hemisphere of heaven, that is, innumerable and almost infinite parts. But this does not cohere with the materiality of species or with their specific likeness, and moreover entails that there would arise from them a vision of nearly infinite clarity. 4º, because the species, as more immaterial than the object, ought not in its mode of representing to imitate its divisibility.

69. All these objections are plainly answered by our first proof. To 1º, the disparity is that there is no part of light or heat which is not indifferently continued in any part of the sun or fire; but the species producible by part A is not contained in part B, although homogeneous, because it is determinately instituted for representing part A rather than the others. And therefore within the individual degree a greater heterogeneity is commonly posited between species producible by two entirely similar objects than between those producible by the same indivisible object, namely because of the intrinsic reference to such an individual cause from which they proceed. Indeed, perhaps they contract some heterogeneity from the diverse line along which they are sent, since from this they have to represent the object in a diverse place. And the argument proves against the adversaries that several objects, although not united, can concur toward a common species, just as several lamps through a common action concur toward the light or heat of the air. It is also for us when parts in the object have contrary colors; for then there will be no common action from them, just as there is none from hot and cold parts of an agent precisely as such.

70. To 2º, the counterexample is clear in an aggregate of several objects, for example in an army seen from afar, whose bulk is constituted by men, horses, carriages, and weapons. For likewise a greater multitude contributes

to its being seen more clearly, indeed to being seen simply from a distance from which a smaller number, or one man, would not in any way be seen. The magnitude of the army also appears smaller the more distant it is; and any one man will likewise have an unlimited sphere of activity in objective being, because however far he recedes from sight he will always send a species provided he is aggregated with several others, whether men, rocks, etc. Therefore it must be said that no visual species determines the potency by itself unless it arises from a proportionate bulk of object, which bulk must be greater the greater the distance. But when the bulk is less than required, then the species, in order to determine the potency, needs the partnership of other species produced by other continuous or contiguous objects and simultaneously determining the potency toward vision of the whole resulting bulk or aggregate. Hence species of this kind are mutually conditions for one another's operating; and the more species are joined in sight, the clearer the vision is, not intensively but extensively.

71. Moreover, any small bulk sends its species, although not everywhere apt for vision without the partnership of others, to a very great distance, but not to an unlimited one, however many other parts may be joined to it. For a bulk however great, or even infinite, would not be seen by an eye infinitely distant. Nor certainly does it appear less absurd that every particle, insofar as it is partially active of a common species, should have an infinite sphere of activity. You will say: an infinite bulk corresponds to an infinite sphere. I distinguish: if all its parts acted in the manner of one, let it pass; if each sent its own species, I deny it. Again you will say: the more the bulk increases, the farther it sends the species; therefore it would send it to an infinite distance if it increased to infinity. I deny the antecedent, because increase of bulk does not cause the species of a small particle to proceed farther, but causes it to become more apt through partnership with others to excite the visual potency. Why, then, does the magnitude of an object appear smaller at a greater distance? It is no more incumbent upon us than upon the adversaries to explain this, since the concurrence of all parts toward one common species has nothing to do with it. Writers on perspective recur to the form of the pyramid according to which species proceed from the object to sight, and which forms an angle the more acute the farther it is projected. But recourse to the condition of species is more philosophical. When they recede too far from the object, they become weaker and represent the bulk of the object so imperfectly that the imagination does not estimate it according to its due measure. See Fr. Suárez, cit. l. 3, c. 17.

72. To 3º: that compenetration of so many species must be admitted by the adversaries in the case in which there were no union among all the

points or particles of the heavens, but mere contiguity or proximity. Nor is it more absurd than the compenetration admitted by all in memory. Materiality prevents only penetrations between things having distinct quantities; otherwise neither substantial form nor corporeal accidents would be penetrated with matter. Nor from the consideration of materiality is there greater difficulty in penetration of two qualities than of a thousand. But that specifically similar accidents do not coexist in the same subject, as Thomists maintain, must be denied at least of those in which some peculiar heterogeneity beyond ordinary individual heterogeneity is found, as in fact is found in species of objects, even entirely similar ones, from n. 69. It must likewise be denied that from that accumulation of so many species there arises an excessively clear vision, as though it participated as many degrees of intensive clarity. For these species do not cause the object to be seen intensively more clearly, but to be seen as more extended, or according to more parts. Therefore, when half of the object of the sheet is covered, the other portion is not seen less clearly, although half of the species is now absent.

73. To 4º: the species under discussion is more immaterial than the object only insofar as it is more insensible. For it is sensible only "as that by which," from what was said at nn. 61 and 62. From this, however, it does not become more indivisible. Indeed, it is divisible under more aspects than the object. For the species of whiteness, for example, is divisible 1º, on the part of the subject, with which it is coextended; 2º, on the part of the object insofar as extended, whose parts it represents through as many of its own parts amassed in every point of the subject from which the whole object can be seen; 3º, on the part of the object insofar as intense, because to the individual degrees of intensity of whiteness there corresponds a distinct part of the species; 4º, on the part of the intensity proper to the species itself, which others maintain is not properly gradual but purely virtual, and which must not be measured from the intensity of the object, since there can be a remiss species of intense whiteness, and conversely, but must be taken from the gradual increase of each part which in the species corresponds to each degree of whiteness. Thus, namely, the part corresponding to the fourth degree of whiteness, for example, becomes more intense for representing that same degree, and so of the rest; 5º, from the conjunction of a reflected species with a direct one, as happens when someone beholds himself in a mirror. For then in the intervening air the direct and reflected species are simultaneously joined, each of which is divisible both from the other and in itself under the four aspects just enumerated.

74. It must be noted here that several species, or parts of a species, which represent several parts of one object, even homogeneous ones, do not constitute intensity although received in the same subject, because they are not ordered so that the same object according to the same respect may be seen as intense, but so that more of its parts may appear. The same must likewise be judged even if the parts of the object are intensive, for example several degrees of intense whiteness. For even then the parts of the species corresponding to these degrees do not constitute intensity, unless each gradually increases with respect to that degree of whiteness from which it arises, since intense whiteness can be represented remissly, as I just said. Hence you will infer that parts of a species thus penetrated, although united to the same subject, are not immediately united to one another, although many suppose the contrary. The reason is that mutual immediate union, since it does not constitute intensity, seems useless. Nor is it required for representing parts of an object as united. For these parts are represented as united insofar as no interval appears between them, and they would be discerned in the same way if continuity of union were removed, provided they remained in the same position. For this reason a chain of mountains, when the intervals are not perceived from a great distance, is seen as though it were a continuation of the same mountain.

75. Therefore that multitude of species existing in the same part of the subject can be called one species only by unity of aggregation and order to one object, or also because of mediate union by reason of the subject. Let the same be said of the direct and reflected species of the same object. If you say that through several species the subject is rendered more changed, not extensively; therefore intensively, you will find the answer in disp. 3, *De generatione*, n. 60, in a not dissimilar matter. I warn, however, that parts of a species coextended with the subject, provided they are from the same part of the object, are continuous with one another according to the continuity of the subject. Finally, observe that whatever has hitherto been said about the divisibility of the species must consequently be said of the divisibility of vision, although some pretend a disparity. Hence that gaze by which a huge mountain is simultaneously discerned consists of many parts united only mediately, just as when an army or a heap of several objects is discerned. I admit that in these matters there is no little obscurity; but so too is the nature of species in most other matters.

On the Diffusion of the Visual Species Through the Medium.

76. To objection 4 at n. 7: the visible object certainly diffuses species through the medium, for this reason the disposition of the medium contributes greatly toward varying vision. Yet it coheres with this that the species received in sight depends not only on those received in the medium but also immediately on the object itself, according to the doctrine given in Physics, tr. 2, d. 3, c. 3, assertion 3. But the objections made against the diffusion of species do not press greatly. To 1º: although a species is a necessary disposition for vision, it is not an "ultimate disposition," if by this name is understood one naturally connected with the form, or such that, once posited, no other disposition is desired. For besides the species, in order to see, a certain temperament of the organ and an influx of spirits through the optic nerves are desired. Therefore, when these are obstructed, although a species is received in the eye, no vision occurs. But a disposition that is not ultimate is often received in a subject otherwise unfit for the form, for example violent heat in steel or gold, which of itself is a disposition toward the form of fire. It could further be said that species produced in the medium are not of the same nature as those produced in sight and do not dispose toward vision except mediately and actively, insofar as they instrumentally concur with the object toward producing other more perfect species in sight. For often from a cause acting through a medium there is produced in a distant patient that is better disposed an effect more perfect and of a different nature, as we saw in the cited place of Physics.

77. Hence to 2º: a species received in the air, if it is of a different nature, has for its formal effect only the denomination "able actively to concur" toward a species to be received in sight; and it indeed supplies this effect to the air. But even if it is of the same nature, its proper formal effect will not therefore be the denomination "completed," or determined, for seeing, since the species by itself is not an ultimate disposition, as we just saw. Therefore its proper effect will only be to denominate the subject "conducive mediately or immediately to vision," of which denomination the air is capable. How a species requires its power to be exercised, see above, disp. 3, n. 54. To 3º, I grant the consequence, namely that the object spherically, or on all sides, diffuses species although no one looks at it, provided it finds a suitable medium, just as the sun and every luminous thing, even when no one looks, spherically diffuses light, whose use and end nevertheless is to

render bodies visible. And just as this outpouring of light is not judged a useless expenditure, so neither is the diffusion of species.

78. Moreover, the natural inclination of things to pour forth a species of themselves can not unfittingly be reduced to a certain natural tribute of service or gratitude owed from the benefit of creation. For from this they innately require to display the perfection and goodness of their Author and to cooperate according to their powers toward His honor and extrinsic glory, which consists in God being cognized and praised by rational creatures. And since cognition of God drawn from visible creatures includes or presupposes cognition of those same creatures, visible things therefore innately desire to cooperate toward cognition of themselves so that from them the Divine Artificer may become known. For this reason, therefore, they unceasingly pour forth their species throughout the world, so that if human sight should happen to occur, wherever it occurs, it may find instruments of seeing prepared and consequently of understanding both visible things and God Himself. To this pertains the saying of the Royal Prophet: "The heavens declare the glory of God, etc."

79. But when activity is denied to color, the discussion concerns univocal activity or activity in the order of purely physical effects that do not belong to the intentional line. In the order of species, however, there is no sensible quality that is not active. Nor is it true that the species is nobler than color; rather it is less noble. And the greater immateriality, or lesser grossness, attributed to it is nothing other than a greater slenderness or tenuity of entity, by virtue of which it cannot be perceived by sense "as that which," as we warned above. The species indeed concurs toward vision, which is more perfect than color, but it concurs instrumentally and does not participate vitality. The Thomists say that a corporeal object is productive of species by participation of celestial power; but Fr. Suárez here, l. 3, c. 9, well shows that this is difficult to understand.

Whether a Species Is a Formal Representation of the Object.

80. To objection 5 at n. 8: species are not likenesses of objects through natural univocal imitation, but only through a certain analogical participation. Hence in their natural being they can lay aside the contrariety of objects, and therefore the species of white and black, and others emitted by contraries, can coexist in the same subject. I suppose with the common opinion that there is no contrariety among species, although Fr. Quirós here, disp. 92, n. 13, thinks otherwise. To the confirmation: it must altogether be denied that a species is a formal likeness of the object in being, or through

specific agreement of entities, as Peter's son is a likeness and image of Peter, or as a painted image is a likeness of the prototype by participating a figure and colors entitatively similar. At most, therefore, the species can be a likeness of the object in representing, or intentionally; in this sense likenesses of contraries coexist in the same subject without contrariety, as is clear in the visions themselves representing white and black.

81. But from this arises a question among the Peripatetics: is a species a formal representation of the object, or a purely virtual or effective representation? The first is held by the Thomists, who maintain that a species, both sensible and intelligible, formally represents the object, that is, manifests it intentionally through itself no less than actual cognition, although less expressly or less clearly. The second is commonly held by our authors with Fr. Suárez, cit. l. 5, c. 2, from n. 20, likewise Aversa, Mastrius, and others. They all maintain that any species is called a representation or intentional likeness of the object for no other reason than because it is an effective power of formal representation, that is, of cognition which by itself manifests the object, just as a ray of the sun, although not properly heat nor formally hot, is nevertheless called virtual heat and absolutely hot because of its power of effecting formal heat.

82. This second opinion, which is truer, is proved 1º, from the analogy of seed, to which neither organization nor the soul of offspring or parent belongs formally, but only virtually. Since, therefore, the species is called the seed of the object, it ought not formally to express its lineaments, but only virtually in the explained sense. 2º, because otherwise the impressed species would be confused with the expressed species, or cognition; or at least cognition would be rendered superfluous. For through the impressed species the cognitive potency would become formally like, or intentionally conformed to, the object, and therefore without a further act it would attain its end, which consists in a likeness or conformity of this kind.

83. They answer that the species differs from cognition 1º, because it is a less expressed likeness; 2º, because it renders the potency like the object not in act but in habit; 3º, because it is not possessed vitally. But these answers do not satisfy. Not 1º, because greater and lesser intentional expression are comprehended within the line of cognition, just as greater and lesser physical clarity are within the line of light. Not 2º, because if "in habit" means the same as "permanently," the species does not sufficiently differ from cognition on this account. For divine cognition is permanent, as is an angel's cognition of itself, and the cognition the damned have of lost beatitude and of present punishment. But if it signifies that the potency by virtue of the species alone is not actually like the object, yet is apt and

inclined to acquire the likeness, as one is called a liar in habit, not in act, who is inclined to lie although he is not actually lying, it plainly follows that the species is not a formal likeness. For otherwise it could not fail in the genus of formal cause to render the potency actually like the object for as long as it existed in it, just as cognition renders it actually like the object for as long as cognition lasts within it, even if it lasts forever.

84. Not 3º, both because if the potency prior to the vital act already possesses the end to be sought through such an act, why will it operate vitally? And because there is no reason why Thomists should deny vitality to the species, at least an intelligible species, since it is produced by a vital potency, namely the agent intellect, and received in a vital potency, namely the possible intellect. This is especially pressed in every memorative species concerning a previously possessed act of understanding. For such a species arises from a proximate vital principle, namely intellection, and is also received in the same potency in which the intellection itself is received. Therefore it must be vitally produced by the same or a stronger right than an act arising from a supernatural habit as from the whole ratio of acting according to the Thomists. What, then, is lacking to it for it to be an intellection if otherwise it is a formal representation of the object?

85. To forestall objections, I note the following. 1º, when a species is called an image, likeness, representation, character, picture, or simulacrum of the object, these names are to be taken in a causal or virtual sense, as when a ray of light is called hot, burning, fiery. And the ancient Doctors must be understood in this way when they use them, unless perhaps they are speaking of an expressed species, as not rarely happens, so that in this way there may be room for the name "seed," which they likewise commonly use. In the same virtual sense the potency is said through the species to be perfected in the representative line, and the object to be united with the potency in representative being. For "representative being" is taken as it exists in seed, in the way the earth is said to be made fruitful in vegetative and fructifying being when it receives seeds, although these possess vegetative and fructifying life only virtually. Therefore the species perfects the potency "formally," that is, in the genus of formal cause, or in the manner of a form informing the potency; nevertheless it does not perfect it as a formal representation, but as a form effective of representation.

86. 2º, the name "species" is not therefore to be attributed to the potency or to every effective principle of representation, because this name peculiarly denotes a power which derives its origin from the object and completes the potency in the being of a power capable of representing this object rather than that. Thus not every cause concurring toward production

of crops is called "seed"; otherwise this name would also be attributed to the power of the sun or moon. 3º, a species can nevertheless be called intentional and belonging to the intentional line, and indeed formally, that is, properly and by reason of itself, because the intentional line comprehends not only cognition or formal representation but also the power which is wholly instituted for cognition and has no other physical effect or office. Finally, to meet at the same time the objection added at n. 8, the species is truly an instrumental sign of the object with respect to the intellect by which it is immediately and quidditatively cognized, namely the angelic intellect, but not the human intellect so long as it is in the body. For in this state we cognize species only mediately, or inferentially, from their effect, because we do not experientially exercise them as we do cognitions, from which it is also gathered that they are not formal representations, nor do we have proper phantasms of them. A species can also be called a formal sign with the qualification "in first act," insofar as it renders the potency fecund of cognition, to which the notion of formal sign properly and without qualification belongs.

On the Causes of Species in the Internal Sense and Intellect.

87. To the final objection at n. 8, which likewise raises the question of the causes of species, it must be supposed from n. 76 that species of the external senses are produced by objects, not through the power diffused in the medium alone, but simultaneously through their own entity, although very distant. Hence it arises that when a hand is interposed, sight does not receive the species of the sun, although its species diffused in the air remain at the sides, because the collateral species cannot act upon sight without the concurrence of the sun; and this concurrence, when the straight line is interrupted by the hand, cannot occur. But a doubt remains about species pertaining to the internal sense. Fr. Suárez, cit. l. 3, c. 9, proposes two ways of thinking. 1º, that these species are produced by external sensations. 2º, that they are effected by the internal sense itself, yet in such a way that the external sensation is prerequisite as a necessary condition. He judges both probable, although he inclines more to the second.

88. Yet consistency of doctrine compels us to abandon this second way, for from it follows that the internal potency eminently, or virtually and adequately, contains the likenesses of all objects that it can attain. But with this cannot cohere that unique or principal *a priori* proof of species discussed above at nn. 17, 20, and 21. Add that a species can in no way be called the seed of an object if it arises from the object neither immediately

nor mediately through true efficiency. Therefore the first way must be held, which our authors and also several Thomists and Scotists commonly approve, adding however the concurrence of species impressed upon the external sensory organs, so that these together with the external sensations constitute the adequate cause of the species of the internal sense. Perhaps there is also added the concurrence of the object through its own entity, which although often distant is sufficiently applied through the power diffused in the medium. The reason for these points is that in all these there is found sufficient proportion and application for influencing, and nothing stands in the way that cannot easily be solved. Yet these causes, since they are distant from the brain, must operate through a medium, namely by propagating species through the sensory nerves by whose intervention the external senses communicate with the brain, or also through the animal spirits which flow to those same nerves.

89. But it must be noted that species destined for the internal sense are of a different nature from external species, both because they are destined for very diverse cognitions; because they do not depend for conservation on the presence of the object or on the cause that first produced them; and because, if they were of the same nature, the species of a painful object which are sent from a wounded foot to the brain would cause pain throughout the whole internal course of the nerves as far as the head, since in that course they find a sense capable of touch and pain. But this is contrary to experience. It must likewise be noted that these same species are also more perfect than the external, because they are destined for a potency and acts nobler in their genus. And hence it arises that internal species cannot be produced by species of the external senses alone, whatever some Thomists may say, for no power can by itself effect a more perfect effect even if it is said to operate in the name of the principal cause, as we showed in Physics. Finally, it must be noted that an internal sensation does not produce a species of itself in the imagination or sensitive memory if the opinion of those who deny to the internal sense the power of reflecting upon its proper acts is true, concerning which see the preceding disputation, n. 149. Nevertheless that sensation does not therefore remain infertile, since it concurs toward an intelligible species, as I shall now say.

90. Concerning the causes of intelligible species there is likewise disagreement among authors, not indeed with regard to reflexive or experiential species, by which the intellect remembers that it cognized, for these clearly are produced by acts of understanding, although they do not depend upon them for conservation, but only with regard to direct species, or species assisting toward first acts concerning external objects. Some deny

species of this kind, as we saw in the preceding chapter. Hence they are not concerned with their causes, nor do they admit an agent intellect in any way distinct from the possible intellect, or the intellect immanently active of intellections. The common opinion throughout the School posits in the intellective part two spiritual faculties, either really or at least numerically distinct. One of them is said to effect species and is called the "agent intellect"; the other receives them and by their aid understands objects and is called the "possible intellect," because of itself it is potentially all things, or capable in some way of being transformed into all things by receiving intentional likenesses of all things, both virtual and formal or expressed. It is also called the "passible" or "passive intellect," because although active of cognitions, nevertheless before it acts it must be acted upon or receive the species, and thereafter it not only effects cognition itself but also undergoes it.

91. In the sensitive part a similar distinction of faculties is not necessary, nor is an "agent sense" commonly posited for effecting species, because for these a sufficient cause is available from elsewhere, from n. 38. But for spiritual species a spiritual cause must be assigned, and none more suitable is found than the agent intellect. Some think that the phantasm can suffice, because it compensates for materiality by intentional vitality, by virtue of which it absolutely surpasses a non-vital species, although the latter is spiritual. But this is altogether displeasing, because it is wholly repugnant to common sense that a spiritual effect can be adequately or principally produced by a material thing. Otherwise the spirituality of the human soul would not be sufficiently gathered from production of spiritual acts; for it would be equally permissible to say that the materiality of the soul is compensated by substantiality, by which it is rendered superior to a spiritual accident.

92. Yet because the agent intellect does not effect a species unless a phantasm, or cognition of the imagination, is present, the question is in what way it is assisted by the phantasm. Fr. Suárez here, l. 4, c. 2, citing some Thomists, judges that the spiritual species is effected by the agent intellect alone and that the phantasm concurs only by purely determining in the manner of a condition, or by supplying, as it were, an exemplar to the intellect. Frs. Téllez, Compton, and a few others subscribe to this. The common opinion among Thomists, Scotists, and our authors, however, teaches that the phantasm concurs efficiently with the agent intellect toward the spiritual species in the manner of a partial and instrumental cause. And this same opinion must be held by us, because if the intellect alone virtually

contained the species, the inconveniences which we objected in the similar case at n. 88 would follow.

93. Add to these 1º, that otherwise species in the intellect would be superfluous. For they are not required as properties, nor for any other end than spiritually to complete the power of the intellect for cognizing. But why would the agent intellect itself not suffice immediately by itself for this, since it virtually and adequately contains the whole power and perfection of the species? Why would that intellectual power, which you say is expended upon species, not immediately be expended upon cognitions in the presence of the phantasm? Add 2º, that in the opposite opinion intellection arises from the object neither immediately nor mediately. For it cannot arise except through the phantasm, and true influx is denied to this. How, then, will that saying be verified, "Knowledge is born from the object and the potency"? Or how will intellection be an image of the object, since the notion of an image imports origin from the prototype, as St. Thomas teaches with St. Augustine, I^{a}, q. 35, a. 1? Add 3º, that it is not apparent how the phantasm can be an exemplar of the species, since the species, not being previously cognized, does not proceed from an intention of imitating it. Add 4º, that the sole or principal foundation of the contrary opinion, namely that a spiritual effect cannot be produced by a corporeal power, proves this indeed of an adequate or principal power, but not of an inadequate and instrumental one. For a power of this kind, just as it belongs to a non-vital species with respect to vital cognition and to an accident with respect to substance, likewise, etc.

94. Certainly the phantasm must be present prior to the intelligible species and have proportion with it in the being of an image and representation of the object. Indeed, in this respect the phantasm is more perfect, since it is a formal representation, whereas the species is only virtual. It is also in some way the measure of the perfection of the species, for the latter is elicited as more perfect the more vivid the act of imagination. Therefore manifest physical indications of active power are present. Nor would I believe this opinion foreign to the mind of our Suárez. For just as concerning the concurrence of accident toward substance, which as a young man in *De anima* he had denied, he held otherwise in disp. 18, *Metaphysicae*, s. 2, so too it should be believed that he then held otherwise concerning the concurrence of the phantasm, which he mentions there at n. 20 without disapproval.

95. From what has been said you will gather that intelligible species, although principally produced by the intellect, are not unfittingly called seeds of the objects rather than of the agent intellect. For two things are

required for the notion of seed, namely both origin from the parent and a power of producing its likeness; and both belong to the species with respect to the object, whereas only the first belongs to it with respect to the intellect. For the denomination "seed," here analogical, a mediate origin suffices, even through a series of many intermediates, such as intervenes between an intelligible species and an external object. For from a visible object, for example, there is immediately produced a visual species; the species causes vision; the vision an internal species; this an act of imagination; and this a spiritual species. It also suffices that the species arise from the object insofar as eminently contained in the First Cause. Hence a species of a created object infused by God alone is the vicar of the object and in some way its seed, because it is produced by God insofar as He eminently contains the object not only physically but intentionally, or in an idea or infinite cognition. But when it is said that a species represents only that by which it is produced, this must be understood of a producer that intends its own likeness, or that does not act precisely in order to supply the defect of another.

96. Finally, a species is said to stand not on the side of the potency but on the side of the object, because although in reality it informs, perfects, and completes the potency in the being of proximately cognitive, it is nevertheless not something belonging to the potency as such, that is, in the being of a property rooted in the soul, but comes from elsewhere as an assistance supplied by the object. Or again, because since potency and object ought to cooperate toward cognition as two agents, the species is not that power which the potency contributes on its own side, but that which is expected on the side of the object. And let these things suffice concerning the doctrine of species, a doctrine indeed commonly treated and everywhere presupposed by almost everyone, but always obscure and exceedingly difficult. Many here dispute whether an impressed species of God is possible for seeing or cognizing Him intuitively as He is in Himself. But this question pertains to the theologians, by whom it is discussed at length. Meanwhile the Eximious Doctor may be seen, disp. 30, *Metaphysicae*, s. 11, from n. 27.

CHAPTER IV.

What an Acquired Habit Is, and to Which Powers It Belongs.

97. The name "habit" has various meanings, concerning which see Fr. Suárez, disp. 42, Met. s. 3. Here it is taken for a certain quality which supervenes upon a vital power and permanently inheres in it so as to assist it in operating. One habit is "infused of itself," another "acquired." An infused

habit of itself is one that of itself is produced by God alone and elevates a power to acts which by the powers of its own nature it cannot attain, e.g. the habits of Faith, Charity, etc. This is said to give "the ability simply," because without it the power is not simply capable of the acts which it produces with it. An acquired habit is one which is acquired by repetition of acts and renders the power prompt and facile in eliciting similar acts. This is said to give only "the ability easily," because it merely enables the power to elicit more readily and with less effort those acts which it can otherwise elicit without the habit. A habit acquired of itself, or of itself apt to be acquired by repetition of acts, can be "infused accidentally," namely if God alone infuses it into the power before the latter labors in acquiring it. The present treatment properly concerns acquired habit, since an infused habit of itself pertains to theologians.

98. Not every facility in operating is a habit, for God possesses the highest facility in operating without a habit; fire likewise very easily burns tow or gunpowder without a habit. Habit, therefore, is a facility not implanted by nature but acquired by use. Nor, again, is it a facility that passes away with the occasion, but one possessed permanently; for a person is not said to operate from habit unless by custom he has become so inclined to operate that he does not easily lose the inclination. Hence Aristotle calls habit "a quality difficult to remove from the subject." Hence also inveterate custom is called "a second nature," namely because of its permanence and because it often permanently changes a natural inclination; thus one who was by nature prone to anger, for example, may through a habit or custom of restraining himself become permanently meek. Experience makes it known that facility of this kind is often acquired by frequent repetition of acts in virtues, vices, arts, etc. Some, however, have thought that it is nothing positive, but consists merely in the removal of impediments, or at least contributes nothing beyond a certain moderation or improvement of the natural temperament.

99. But although this is true in some powers, concerning which below, it is nevertheless false, and commonly rejected, that it applies generally to every habit. For in the will and intellect no permanent removal of impediments distinct from everything positive can be imagined, especially when a habit begins to be acquired immediately after the use of reason. Nor can there be any variation of temperament, since in these powers, being inorganic, there is no temperament. Nor should it be said that their facility depends upon a changed temperament of the imagination and sensitive appetite. For, to omit other points, if there occurs in the brain some improvement of temperament for acts of imagining and desiring, it is not

restricted to a determinate species of acts or objects in the way in which we experience habit to be restricted. Or, if one wishes it to be so restricted, a different proportion of temperament will be necessary for different acts and objects. Hence, just as different proportions of humors or primary qualities do not coexist in the same subject, so neither will different habits coexist; and no one will be able simultaneously to possess habits of Logic, Rhetoric, Justice, Fortitude, etc., which is plainly contrary to experience. Therefore, at least for acts of understanding and willing, a special positive quality distinct from temperament must be admitted, which properly and philosophically is a habit.

100. This quality has a twofold office: one, to render the power facile in first act, that is, more prone and inclined than it otherwise would be to operating; the other, to cause the power to be facile in second act, that is, to operate with less effort and less laboriously than when it lacks the habit. The first is supplied by habit in the genus of formal cause; the second in the genus of efficient cause, whether physical or moral, concerning which below. Both are made known to us by experience, especially in habits of the will. The first, however, appears difficult for some to understand. 1º Because, if a habit as formal cause inclined the power, it would always or unceasingly incline it so long as it informs it; therefore that inclination would always be felt, which is contrary to experience. 2º Because the will, as a rational power, cannot be moved by a purely physical impulse but only by a rational one consisting in cognition of the object. But if habit inclines of itself, there will be a certain purely physical impulse of the will. 3º Because such an inclination of habit toward the object precedes cognition; therefore by such an inclination the will will tend toward what is unknown.

101. Yet this office of habit is everywhere unquestionably acknowledged or presupposed by authors, expressly by Fr. Suárez, disp. 44, Met. s. 5, n. 2; namely because habit is from acts and for acts, toward which it must therefore have an innate inclination. Nor is the effect of custom, which is habit, commonly conceived otherwise than as a certain special propensity, permanently induced, by which we are rendered prone to some determinate mode of operating even when we abstain from it. This propensity is innate, not elicited, that is, it does not consist in a vital affection resulting from the habit, but in the habit itself. It is nevertheless subordinated to the will as regards connection with an efficacious act, because an act can be freely restrained by the will, though not without some violence to the habit. Fr. Oviedo explains this not inaptly by the example of a necessary cause, e.g. fire, whose inclination and connection with operation are subordinated to Divine liberty. Nevertheless, if the habit is more intense, it can determine

the will to some indeliberate complacency as soon as the object is apprehended, even though it is not permitted to proceed to efficacious acts.

102. The difficulties proposed are easily solved. To the first, omitting the answers of others, I grant the antecedent concerning an innate inclination, which is identified with the habit; but I deny the consequence, because an innate inclination is not felt, or known experimentally, unless it causes an elicited inclination. Then, however, it is felt not in itself but in its effect. Sometimes an elicited appetite is called innate, that is, spontaneously proceeding from nature, e.g. the appetite for beatitude. But here we speak of innate inclination insofar as it is distinguished from every elicited appetite. Therefore, the inclination which a habituated will often feels is elicited and consists in that indeliberate complacency just mentioned. And this proceeds from the habit, not, however, as from a formal cause, but as from a cause acting physically or morally, with apprehension of the object being prerequired. Since this apprehension is not always aroused, that inclination is therefore not always felt. It may be said: apprehension sufficiently vivid suffices for that complacency, and no habit is needed. I answer: the force of acquired habit consists precisely in this, that it determines to indeliberate complacency even if the apprehension is not so vivid that without the habit it would determine the will.

103. To the second, there is a parallel in the innate inclination which the will, like every other active power, identifies with itself for operating; for that inclination can similarly be called a purely physical impulse. Therefore the will cannot be moved, that is, exercised by an actual volition, without a previous rational impulse. Yet, that it may obey this impulse more promptly, it can be moved, that is, inclined in first act or rendered prone, by a purely physical impulse. To the third: first, it is not innate but elicited inclination that cannot tend toward what is unknown. Secondly, the inclination of habit does not tend immediately toward the object, but toward the act, which need not be previously known in order to be elicited. Finally, this inclination, insofar as it mediately regards the object, does not regard it as something to be embraced without cognition; it merely inclines the will to will it whenever it knows it. Repeat the parallel of the will's innate inclination, which likewise precedes cognition.

104. The principal question here is whether habit in the intellect and will is distinct from impressed species. As regards the intellect, the negative opinion is highly probable and is held by Fathers Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Compton, John Baptist de Benedictis, John Ulloa, and others, especially the more recent authors. The same opinion is embraced by many Thomists as more consonant with St. Thomas, who certainly greatly favors it in various

places, as may be seen in Capreolus, Prolog. sentent. q. 3, and Cajetan, in 1, 2, q. 54, ar. 4. Of these authors, some, especially ours, identify habit not with just any species but solely with experiential species, which are left in memory by previous acts. They hold that these are intensified by repeated acts and thus induce facility for repeating other similar acts. Others, especially Thomists, place habit in coordinated species, not of acts but of objects belonging to the same Science or Art, although they do not explain in what the coordination of species consists.

105. The foundation of this opinion is that the intellect needs no habit distinct from species in order to be inclined or determined to operate. For it is necessarily determined to evident assent by the species, or by the apprehension arising from it, just as it is also determined to the conclusion by the premises. But to acts of faith and opinions it is altogether determined by the command of the will. Confirmation 1º: once the species is aroused or the application of the will is posited, the intellect operates as a necessary cause no less than sight or hearing; therefore, just as in these there is no need of habit, so neither in the intellect. And certainly it is not apparent how the intellect can be rendered more prompt by habit. For what greater promptitude is there than necessity of acting? Confirmation 2º: from the example of brutes, in which, e.g. dogs and horses, the facility of acting in an orderly manner that they acquire by use is commonly reduced to species left in memory. Confirmation 3º: a positive facility arising from repetition of acts is a habit; but the intensification of experiential species is such a facility; therefore etc.

106. As regards the will, there are likewise some who deny a habit distinct from species and acts. For the whole propensity and facility of the will toward some object can proximately and formally consist in a vivid cognition of the sweetness or advantage previously perceived from that same object, or even in a simple and indeliberate complacency arising from its memory. Remotely, however, or radically, it can consist in experiential species remaining in memory from repeated volitions of that same object. And because formal facility passes away with the acts, whereas radical facility remains in the species, these latter rather than the former deserve the name of habit. Nor will the habits of intellect and will therefore be confused; for although all species belong to the intellect, those that constitute a habit of the will are generated by volitions and incline toward volitions, whereas those that are habits of the intellect are generated by cognitions and incline toward cognitions. Fr. Oviedo vigorously promotes this opinion here, Controv. 15, punct. 14, concluding at n. 34 that he does not judge it improbable. Cardinal de Lugo seems to hold the same according to

Oviedo there, n. 1, and it is affirmatively embraced by Fr. John Baptist de Benedictis, tom. 3, lib. 4, q. 3, cap. 5; likewise Spinula here, disp. 6, sect. 3; and among the ancients Aureolus and John Major according to Quirós, disp. 93, n. 13.

107. The foundation of this opinion is that, apart from any further habit, the whole inclination and facility of the will acquired by repetition of acts can be explained radically and habitually through intense experiential species, and formally through cognition or vivid memory and through the simple complacency resulting therefrom. Confirmation 1º: the will is more facile insofar as it is more attracted by the object; but it is more attracted insofar as cognition of the object is more vivid, and this cognition is more vivid insofar as the species is more intense. Therefore the facility of the will and its increase must be reduced to cognition and species. 2º Sometimes it happens that the will experiences an object as less delightful than it had previously apprehended it; hence it embraces it more easily and eagerly in the first act than in the second. And the more often it experiences it, the more coldly and with greater difficulty it desires it, until at length it positively loathes or abhors it. But this would not happen if repetition of acts generated a habit distinct from species; for more frequent experience ought always to produce a greater inclination. The reason why facility does not then arise from experiential species, but rather difficulty, is that they cause memory not so much of sweetness as of disgust or nausea. Certainly the difficulty then acquired by repetition of acts consists entirely in species and apprehensions. Therefore the same must be thought of the facility acquired in other circumstances.

108. Nevertheless, the opinion common throughout every School, with the Angelic, Subtle, and Excellent Doctors, acknowledges habits in the intellect and will in addition to species. In the will especially it is so ancient and received among philosophers and theologians that, even if no other reason were available, authority alone could render it unshaken. I say, therefore, 1º: in the will there are habits distinct from species. Proof: because species cannot perform the office of habit with respect to the will; for they facilitate the will only by producing a vivid cognition of an appetible object. But they can do this where there is no habit of desiring such an object, indeed where there is a most intense habit of abhorring it, as happens whenever a man outstandingly just and full of virtues suffers a vehement temptation to sin. Then there is certainly a vivid cognition of the forbidden object as appetible, which cognition presupposes an intense species, especially when the temptation is troublesome and frequently recurs; yet there is then no habit of sinning, but rather a most intense contrary habit,

which by resisting the temptation can and commonly does become more intense.

109. It may be said: not every species is a habit, but only an experiential species which renews a vivid memory of sweetness previously perceived. Against this: an intense species of an object not yet willed can incline the will through vivid cognition equally or more than an experiential species. Why, then, does it not equally deserve the name of habit? Again against this: suppose the temptation occurs in a most just old man who has destroyed the vices of youth by contrary virtues; a temptation, I say, arising because experiential species of pleasurable evil acts by which he once sinned are aroused, and hence there proceeds a vivid cognition of the sweetness once perceived. Then everything required on your account for a habit will be present; yet no habit of consenting will be present, but the opposite habit, which will become more intense by resisting. One may reply: species are constituted in the being of habit through the absence of more intense species that produce a more vivid restraining cognition; hence the sinful species of youth do not have the character of habit in an old man who has already acquired more intense species of uprightness, by which he is more strongly restrained from sinning. Against this: for someone to operate from habit, the absence of a cognition that more strongly restrains, or more strongly draws toward the opposite, is not required. Therefore neither is the absence of species producing such cognition required; and consequently in the aforesaid old man nothing will be lacking for the character of a sinful habit. Proof of the antecedent: because one could only absurdly say that a man of upright morals never resists temptation to sin from habit unless the temptation is less vivid than the cognition inviting him to resist; or conversely, that a man of evil morals never operates from habit unless he lacks a cognition more vividly restraining him. If this were true, a good habit would be useless whenever evil delight is proposed more vividly than uprightness; nor could an evil habit effect anything whenever uprightness is apprehended more vividly. Experience plainly shows the contrary.

110. Confirmation 1º: suppose in two men, one habitually sober and the other habitually drunken, direct cognitions wholly equal both in the power of attracting toward immoderate drinking and also in the power of restraining from it. One will undoubtedly feel himself more inclined and facile toward immoderate drinking than the other. But that greater inclination and facility does not arise from cognition, since this is supposed equal in each; nor does it arise from species, since according to the adversaries these facilitate and incline only through the mediation of cognition. Therefore it arises from the habit we maintain. Nor should

recourse be had to indeliberate complacency. For the fact that this is aroused in one rather than the other must be attributed to habit, since it cannot be attributed solely to cognition, which is wholly equal in both. It may be said: in the drunkard, once direct cognition of wine is had, memory of past acts is necessarily aroused, and from this arises the greater inclination. But what if it is not aroused? Then, it will be said, there will be no greater inclination or facility. Yet this is repugnant to common sense and experience, namely that actual memory, habitual memory consisting in species being unable to facilitate without the actual, and an actual reflexion upon past acts are necessary for operating easily from habit. Ask, if one wishes, those who have an evil custom of swearing, cursing, detracting, etc., and all will testify that, when the occasion presents itself, they are swept away by custom without any reflexion or attention whatever to past acts. Moreover, it follows that inveterate custom will scarcely facilitate those whose senses are impaired and others whose memory is weak. Nor will habit effect anything on a sudden occasion that leaves no room for reflexion, however much experience proves the saying of Aristotle, 3 Ethic. c. 8: "Habit is known in sudden circumstances."

111. Confirmation 2º: if a habit of the will consisted in species, intensification of species would be intensification of habit and conversely, as the adversaries concede. Therefore to operate from a more intense habit will be the same as to operate from a more intense species, and consequently from a more intense cognition. Whoever, therefore, operates from a more intense and inveterate habit must have a more intense cognition and therefore a mind more attentive to the object; nor in any other way could he be rendered more facile by such a habit. Yet experience establishes the contrary. For commonly one who operates from excessive habit uses a more remiss cognition, and less attention suffices for him. Hence a slight cognition or moderate temptation, which would scarcely move one who is not habituated, immediately carries away one who is habituated. What happens, for example, in the habit of swearing is almost what happens in the habit of playing the cithara: namely, once it has greatly increased, it is exercised with slight attention and with distraction toward other objects. Furthermore, by repetition of acts of the will the habit is intensified, but experiential species are not. For although each act leaves its own species, no intensification results from these species, since they represent acts at least numerically distinct; just as no more intense species results from someone successively knowing Peter, Paul, John, etc.

112. Confirmation 3º: in truth the confusion of habits of will and intellect is not avoided, for every habit of the will will be an intellectual habit,

although not conversely, and indeed more properly so. For species of volitions facilitate the will only by first facilitating the intellect toward vivid cognitions; hence with respect to the intellect they are an immediate and formal facility, but with respect to the will only a mediate and radical one. Yet this consequence seems altogether to be rejected from the example of infused habits, some of which belong to the will and not the intellect, others conversely, as is certain in Theology. Indeed, otherwise the habit of Divine faith could with the same right as species be called a habit of the will, which it arouses and assists toward willing through the mediation of cognition.

113. Confirmation 4º: habits of the will are mutually contrary, and virtue diminishes or corrupts vice, and conversely; but species neither have a contrary nor are corrupted in the intellect, according to common Philosophy. Nor is it enough to say that species in the being of habit are corrupted or cease through the arrival of other, more intense species concerning a contrary object, through whose absence they are constituted in the character of habit. For it follows from this that in a most holy old man, indeed even in one already blessed, the vicious habits of youth remain intact as regards what is positive. It also follows that after a long-standing habit of vice no one acquires a habit of virtue until he repeats more good acts than the evil ones previously committed; and that neither a habit of virtue nor of vice is present when acts of each kind are equal in number and their species, though most intense, attain equilibrium.

114. I say 2º: there are also habits in the intellect in addition to species. So most of our authors hold with Fr. Suárez, disp. 44, Met. sect. 4; likewise the Scotists and Thomists commonly. Proof: because the facility which the intellect acquires by custom toward certain acts cannot consist in species alone. 1º Because a species does not presuppose but gives the ability simply for cognitions; whereas that facility already presupposes the ability simply for such cognitions, since it is acquired by their repetition, and therefore adds only the ability easily. It may be said: species are intensified by repetition of acts beyond the degree required for the ability simply, and thus an intensified species gives the ability easily and performs the office of habit. But against this: an intense species gives the ability simply for an intense act, as a remiss species gives it for a remiss act; neither superadds the ability easily. To understand this, suppose that by custom the intellect is rendered facile toward cognitions clear as four, for which it is not constituted simply capable except through a species intense as four. Then suppose this species is intensified as six. This intensification does not render the intellect more facile for repeating a cognition as four. For either the species concurs with the intellect through all six degrees or through only four. If through six, it

will undoubtedly produce a cognition clear not as four but as six, and will give the ability simply for it. If through four, after the new intensification it will no more assist or facilitate the intellect than before, as is manifest.

115. 2º Because by the custom of judging concerning object A the intellect is rendered facile toward judging concerning other similar objects when occasion arises. For example, one who has become accustomed rashly to judge Peter in a matter of theft will with equal facility judge any other person in wholly similar circumstances; and one who has become accustomed to believe Peter's testimony will no less easily believe others who are equally trustworthy. But the species of object A does not incline toward cognition of similar things but only of that object, since it is of itself ordered solely to representing it, being its seed. Hence species of two similar objects are held to be more heterogeneous to one another than species of one object; and otherwise, once one had thought of Peter's theft, one could in the same manner know Paul's theft without a new species. Therefore such facility does not consist in species.

116. 3º Because by custom the intellect acquires a facility of judging directly and immediately concerning an external object, e.g. through human faith, or by an opinative or rash judgment. But this facility cannot stand in experiential species left in memory by past judgments. First, because those species do not immediately represent the external object but past acts. Therefore through them the intellect will at most be rendered facile toward knowing that it had judged, not toward immediately judging concerning the external object. Secondly, because species produced by repeated acts do not produce intensification, which the adversaries require in order that species have the character of habit; for they represent acts at least numerically distinct, which suffices to prevent them from coalescing into one intense species, as is evident in the species of many men or stones known simultaneously or successively. If it is said that through experiential species the external object can be represented immediately, or at least that together with them new direct species of the external object are acquired, even so no intensification will result, at least when the species are not of the same individual object but of many similar ones. For example, when someone successively believes a hundred testimonies of Peter or in a hundred similar occasions judges rashly through acts of the same clarity, a habit of believing or of judging rashly is then acquired; yet the species, being drawn from distinct objects, do not produce intensification. Otherwise the last assent would become clear as a hundred. Indeed, intensification of species does not result even from successive repetition of similar acts concerning wholly the same object; otherwise the acts would no longer be similar, contrary to the

hypothesis and experience, but the hundredth would exceed the first by 99 degrees of clarity.

117. 4º Because the more habituated the intellect is, the less attention it employs in inferring conclusions and applying the rules of an art, as is clear in the logician and in the cithara-player, who, with little attention to the cithara and while distracted toward other things, strikes the strings excellently. But if habit were an intensification of species, the attention of the intellect would increase according to the increase of habit, because the more intense the species, the more attentive it renders the intellect, since it causes a more vivid apprehension. If perhaps recourse is made not to intensification but to the coordination of many species, explain what this coordination is. It is not a local coordination, since all species interpenetrate in the indivisible intellect. Nor is it a union of species among themselves, since it neither causes intensification nor is it otherwise apparent how it conduces in any way to facility of operating. Finally, however the species may be coordinated, the proofs adduced remain pressing, especially the first and second.

118. The contrary foundation at n. 105 is not compelling. Habit is required in the intellect by reason of relief in second act, or less labor in operating. It is also required so that in first act it render the intellect more inclined than it is of itself to operating; likewise, so that the intellect may be determined more easily, that is, with fewer or lesser prerequisites distinct from the habit. All these things are established by experience. For the habituated intellect labors less in arranging premises and inferring conclusions, even evident ones. It is also rendered more prone to assent to an object to which it has become accustomed, and therefore is more easily determined by the will, or by apprehension, or by the premises. Before habit, a strong application of the will is often required to determine the intellect; afterward a weaker one suffices, and sometimes perhaps mere permission. Before habit, an evident apprehension does not determine to assent unless it is very vivid, or at least not joined with other distracting apprehensions; afterward one less vivid, or joined with others, suffices. Before habit, keen penetration and attention to the premises is necessary so that they determine to the conclusion; perhaps even an evident judgment or apprehension of the goodness of the inference is required, at least outside the first figure. Afterward, even without this apprehension, lesser attention to the object and order of the premises can suffice. Indeed, the intellect which before habit needed actual discourse in order to assent to a scientific conclusion can afterward, by that habit, repeat assent to the conclusion without the premises, as Fr. Suárez notes, cit. disp. 44, sect. 4.

119. To Confirmation 1º: when the species is aroused, the intellect necessarily effects simple apprehension, but it does not always necessarily proceed to judgment or discourse until it is sufficiently applied by the will. Nor does it always obey the will promptly and easily, especially in obscure matters and when a motive restraining assent is simultaneously proposed. Indeed, sometimes it cannot obey, e.g. if before habit it is commanded to elicit without premises an evident assent to a conclusion. Therefore, that the intellect may be determined either by apprehension or by the will, at least more easily, and also that it may labor less and expend less strength in second act, habit greatly conduces. Hence habit can have a place in a necessary cause when experience teaches that by force of custom such a cause both elicits equal acts with less effort and is more easily applied and constituted in proximate first act. We experience this in the intellect, not in sight and hearing. Nor is it necessary that the intellect be rendered more prompt by habit supposing sufficient application. It suffices that it be rendered more prompt toward this very application and that it feel relief in second act. Indeed, even though sufficient application and proximate necessity of acting are otherwise present, a greater promptitude can be conferred by habit, that is, a new ground impelling it to operate. Thus a horse for which one spur suffices to run with all its strength can be urged by two spurs together and thereby have the necessity of running under a new ground.

120. To Confirmation 2º: Fr. Suárez, cit. disp. 44, sect. 3, denies habits in the internal sense and appetite of brutes, and explains certain facilities acquired by use through memory species. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 50, art. 3, ad 2, admits in brutes "habits in a certain manner," but concludes that in them the character of habit is lacking "as regards the use of the will, because they do not have dominion to use or not to use, which seems to pertain to the character of habit; and therefore," he adds, "properly speaking, habits cannot exist in them." St. Thomas speaks thus because of the authority of the Commentator, whom he had cited at q. 49, art. 3, who says in 3 *De anima*, comm. 18, that habit is what one uses when one wills; whence the saying became proverbial, "We use habits when we will." Yet if the Commentator does not wish to allow habit unless liberty is present, he seems to be rejected. First, because subjection to liberty is extrinsic to habit, and the quiddity of habit can be explained without it. Secondly, because in sudden and indeliberate movements of the will habit manifests itself most of all, according to Aristotle cited above. Thirdly, because in the imagination or cogitative power and in man's material appetite there are habits according to St. Thomas and Fr. Suárez, yet liberty does not always have dominion over

them; for often a passion of appetite strengthened by habit anticipates liberty, and in dreams we usually think again about, and materially desire, those things to which we are accustomed.

121. Therefore the opinion of Scotus, Durandus, and others, both ancient and recent, which acknowledges habits in brutes in addition to species, seems more probable. For several of the arguments proving in man a distinction of habit from species can proportionally be applied to brute animals, at least those that are in some manner capable of training. Moreover, a dog is often induced at first to certain operations by threats and blows; therefore it performs them in such a way as to betray fear by trembling of the body. But after it has become accustomed to them, it performs the same operations promptly and gladly. This is a sign that this promptitude does not arise from memory species of the blows, as the contrary authors maintain; otherwise even after acquiring the custom it would tremble and show fear of pain. The objections commonly raised here from the fact that a brute operates as a necessary cause can be solved from what has just been said concerning the human intellect.

122. To Confirmation 3°: not every positive facility arising from repetition of acts is a habit, but only that which presupposes the ability simply for similar and equal acts and can be exercised indifferently concerning wholly similar objects. Intensification of species does not have these features, as we saw at nn. 114 and 115. Add that intensification of experiential species does not result even from repeated similar acts, from n. 116. It will be objected: through supernatural acts, e.g. of Divine faith, a facility is acquired which does not give the ability simply; yet it does not consist in a habit distinct from species, otherwise there would be a supernatural habit not infused of itself but acquired. I answer: theologians hold different opinions about this matter. Some maintain that supernatural acts not only merit increase of infused habits in a just man, which is beyond doubt, but also physically generate other supernatural habits of a kind distinct from infused habits and supplying only the ability easily. Others indeed concede that a new habit is generated by acts of this kind, but one entitatively natural, which nevertheless, elevated through an infused habit or through another supernatural principle, facilitates toward other supernatural acts of the same character. Which opinion is to be preferred belongs to theological discussion. See Fr. Oviedo, here controv. 14, punct. 7, and Fr. Quirós, here disp. 95, sect. 5.

123. Now to the foundation at n. 107 against special habits of the will, I deny the assumption. For although species truly facilitate the will radically, and cognitions or complacencies formally, nevertheless that facility is not

proper to habit, as we have sufficiently shown at n. 108 and following. For it is separable from habitual facility concerning the same object; often it is intense when habitual facility is remiss, and conversely. Often, too, it is joined in an intense degree with a contrary habitual facility and is overcome by it, as in the example of a most just old man vehemently tempted by a vivid memory of his vicious youth. To Confirmation 1º, I distinguish the major: the will is more facile, etc., with the facility proper to habit, I deny; with a facility common to a will not habituated, I grant the major and minor, but deny the consequence. Facility or attraction which formally consists in cognition and radically in species can be found and commonly is found in a will not yet habituated or one which has already lost the habit. Hence in addition to it another facility proper to a habituated will must necessarily be admitted.

124. To Confirmation 2º: that coldness, disgust, or horror arises from repeated experience because whenever the object is desired and obtained, some sadness, displeasure, or repentance results in the will from its somewhat unpleasant possession; by repetition of this an habit of aversion from that object is generated, and this habit impedes or suffocates the habit of desiring it. The desire or pursuit does indeed begin to generate its own habit even in that event. But because displeasure or repentance commonly lasts longer and is more firmly impressed upon the mind, although afterward desire sometimes returns through levity of mind, it therefore more quickly intensifies and advances its own habit. The contrariety of this habit does not permit the begun habit of desiring to increase; indeed it finally uproots whatever degrees of it it finds. And in this very habit of displeasure consists that difficulty which seems to be acquired by repetition of acts of desiring, but in reality is acquired only by repetition of contrary acts.

125. Now, to satisfy the title of the chapter, it must be seen to which powers habit belongs. It belongs first to the will and intellect, as is clear from what has been said. In the intellect, however, habit is commonly posited for judgments and discourses, not for simple apprehensions, because there seems to be no experience of facility acquired by use for these. Yet for complex apprehensions that require special direction, such as definitions and divisions, a habit can be admitted; indeed also for incomplex apprehensions that require selection, such as those by which logical genera and species are formed. It belongs next to man's internal sense and sensitive appetite, because experience establishes that by custom a facility is acquired in imagining certain objects and in exercising or restraining the passions of appetite. But this facility cannot be reduced to species alone because of the arguments given above for the intellect and will; nor can it be reduced to a

change of temperament, because of what was said at n. 99. It belongs, moreover, to the internal sense and appetite of brutes, as we saw at n. 121.

126. The external senses do not acquire a habit, as the common and true opinion holds, because rather by long use or continual operating they are dulled, as we especially experience in sight. If at times they seem to acquire some facility as they become accustomed to certain objects, this must be reduced to some variation of temperament or removal of impediments. For that it is not properly a habit is sufficiently clear from the fact that it is not intensified but diminished by long use. The same is to be said with equal or greater reason of the nutritive or vegetative power, and with the greatest reason of all of the powers of inanimate things, e.g. the power of a stone to descend, of the sun to illuminate, of fire to heat. For in these no one recognizes a habit, because there is no experience of facility resulting from mere use, or which cannot be attributed to removal of an impediment or to the application or disposition of the patient or medium.

127. Concerning the locomotive power in animals, and especially in man, it is doubtful whether it properly acquires a habit. Some affirm it, chiefly because of experience of facility acquired by use, which nowhere is more manifest or obvious than in the hands of one playing the cithara, in the feet of one dancing rhythmically, etc. The common opinion, however, denies it. For in the cithara-player, for example, the movement of the fingers, insofar as it is artful, or insofar as it strikes the strings in such an order and harmony, manifestly requires cognition, through which it proceeds from the habit of art inhering in the intellect or imagination, which always directs the external movement by some internal act even though the player seems distracted toward something else. But insofar as the movement is performed readily and rapidly, it arises from agility of the fingers, which agility can be explained by something other than habit, namely because by exercise the nerves are loosened and altered and, some thick humor having been expelled, become more flexible. Otherwise, contrary to common sense, a habit would have to be posited in the throat for singing, in the tongue for speaking articulately, or even in mechanical instruments, which likewise commonly become more ready through some exercise.

128. From what has thus far been said a strict definition can be drawn of acquired habit, which we only lightly outlined at n. 97. For this habit is "a permanent quality, left of itself by repetition of acts and of itself instituted merely to facilitate and relieve a power in the production of similar acts." It is called "permanent," not because it cannot perish, but because it is not flowing and transient like acts, from which, though these sometimes facilitate toward other acts, it is sufficiently distinguished by this particle,

but of itself endures in the subject until destroyed by a contrary. It is said "left of itself by repetition of acts," so as to distinguish it from an infused habit and also from a new state of temperament, which only accidentally sometimes results from repetition of acts, for of itself it can proceed from other causes. By the remaining words it is distinguished from impressed species, which do not merely facilitate, the word "merely" presupposing the ability simply, but confer a power simply necessary for acts, namely remiss species for remiss acts and intense species for intense acts. If one wishes multiplied species of the same object to give the ability easily for acts of the same intensity, at least they are not "of themselves instituted" for this, since multiplication in the same subject is accidental to them. Species indeed are often comprehended under the name of habit in St. Thomas and others, when broadly taken for a quality difficult to remove, superadded to a power or nature. But they must be excluded from the notion of habit strictly taken, as it is taken here.

129. It will be objected: a habit sometimes gives the ability simply, e.g. to elicit without premises assent to a scientific conclusion, according to what was said at n. 118. I answer with Fr. Suárez, disp. cit. sect. 6, n. 13, that for habit truly to be said not to give the ability simply, it suffices that the power without the habit can absolutely produce such an act and naturally acquire it with the necessary principles. For habit to be required simply for operating with less preparation and labor, or with fewer prerequisites laboriously sought from elsewhere, is in sum for it to be required simply in order to operate more easily. Thus, if one gives a horse to a robust man for making a journey, one does not give him the ability simply but only easily, although the horse is simply necessary for the journey to be made more quickly, more easily, and with less expenditure of strength and money. Finally observe that the foundation for asserting or denying a habit is not to be taken from whether a power is necessary or free or subject to the dominion of the will, but solely from whether experience establishes that by exercise a facility is acquired which cannot conveniently be reduced to causes other than habit as just defined.

CHAPTER V.
Various Questions Concerning Habit Briefly Decided.

130. It is asked 1º whether habit efficiently and physically concurs toward an act. Fathers Hurtado, Peinado, and a few others deny it; according to them habit facilitates a power only in the genus of formal cause, rendering it prompt and facile toward operating by its information, and hence can be

said to cause the act in the genus of moral efficient cause. But other authors of ours commonly affirm it with Fr. Suárez, cit. disp. 44, sect. 5, where he adduces St. Thomas and Aristotle. The Thomists agree, as does the Scotist Mastrius here, disp. 3, n. 39, who cites Scotus for himself, though Scotus elsewhere inclines toward the negative opinion. The affirmative opinion is proved because habit does not lack proportion for influencing instrumentally, since it is the seed of acts and belongs to the same power; and besides, experience commends its active influx. For with habit we experience facility not only toward operating but also in operating; that is, we have not only a propensity in first act but also feel relief in second act and expend less effort than without habit, other things being equal. But this diminution of effort or relief of labor cannot otherwise be explained than through the active concurrence of habit, by whose aid the power expends less strength in producing acts. Therefore one who operates from habit can attend simultaneously to other things when someone else cannot. Certainly a quality that facilitates in this manner is not repugnant. Why, then, should habit not in fact be judged such, when so clear a testimony of experience favors it?

131. Objection 1º: one who is free from hunger or temptation labors less in fasting and needs less effort than if tempted or hungry. Therefore absence of hunger or temptation is a cause diminishing effort, yet it does not actively influence the volition of fasting, just as neither does a more vivid cognition of the usefulness of fasting, which also diminishes effort. I answer: first, perhaps those acts by which the will wills to fast under pressing temptation and without it are not equal; whereas we are now speaking of diminution of effort in equal acts. Secondly, whatever may be true of this, it is easily understood that effort can be diminished where there is a lesser positively resisting or restraining difficulty to be overcome. But that a habit acquired without a preceding contrary, even when other things are equal both as regards the acts to be elicited and as regards the other positive difficulties to be overcome, should diminish the effort of the power in second act solely through greater inclination in first act, is difficult to understand. For a great inclination on the part of first act does not of itself conduce to diminishing effort in second act, as is evident in one who, from vehement passion, immediately desires some object, or even in the blessed, who are supremely inclined toward loving God, whom they love with supreme effort. Hence it is to be denied that a more vivid cognition of the usefulness of fasting of itself diminishes effort; rather, of itself it conduces to increasing it.

132. Objection 2º: actively to concur with the power is not to facilitate it. Otherwise an infused habit would give not only the ability simply, but also

the ability easily and more easily when intensified beyond the minimum degree required for the ability simply. I answer: it cannot be doubted that active assistance superadded to a cause already simply capable has the character of facility. Thus a man, when assisted by another, more easily lifts a weight which he could lift alone. Thus four horses more easily draw a cart than two. An infused habit never supplies a concurrence that is not simply necessary to the act to be elicited here and now. For while it is intense as four, for example, if it concurs according to its whole intensity, it will elicit a more perfect act which could not be elicited by a habit only as two; but if it concurs within its intensity, it will indeed elicit a lesser act, but such an act as simply requires the measure of concurrence here and now supplied. Therefore a power with an intense infused habit never so tempers its concurrence that it expends less strength than it otherwise would concerning a similar and equal act if it elicited it with a remiss habit. The contrary occurs with acquired habit.

133. Objection 3º: independently of habit, the power possesses adequate power for the act; therefore it ought to exercise that power even when the habit is present, especially if the power is necessary, as is the intellect, for a necessary cause operates as much as it can. Moreover, no special formality in a vital act corresponds to habit. I answer by denying the consequence, for an adequate power often diminishes and proportions its concurrence to another concause applied simultaneously, so that the latter may also influence. This is true even in a necessary cause, as is evident in two horses drawing by a common effort a weight for which one would suffice. A necessary cause is said to operate as much as it can because, although it sometimes diminishes its effort, it does not diminish it freely but necessarily according to the demand of circumstances. So it happens here; for the intellect with a habit cannot, apart from a command of the will, expend as much effort upon such an act as it would expend without the habit. A correspondence or agreement of formalities is not required in equivocal causes beyond a generic one, as I have already more than once observed elsewhere, and as is evident, among many other cases, in the seeds of living things.

134. But hence it is objected 4º: two things cannot be equivocal causes of one another. But an act equivocally causes a habit; therefore habit cannot effect the act as an equivocal cause. I distinguish the major: if both are principal causes, I grant; if one is an instrumental cause, I deny the major. Then, granting the minor concerning principal causality, I deny the consequence concerning instrumental causality, which alone we concede to habit. One has a clear example in the seed of a living thing. It is objected

finally from Fr. Peinado: if God impeded the active concurrence of acquired habit, a will informed by habit would produce an act by itself. But it would then produce it more easily than if it lacked the habit, since the habit by its existence and union excludes the difficulty the will would have from lack of use. Therefore the facility supplied by habit is independent of its active concurrence. I answer: in that case the will would operate more easily, that is, with greater propensity on the part of first act; but not more easily in the sense of having greater relief in second act or expending less strength. Yet this kind of facility also pertains to the office of habit, as experience establishes. Nor is facility in first act to be explained by the mere exclusion of difficulty arising from non-use, for this difficulty is merely negative, or the mere absence of habit, or rather of acts. Hence to exclude this difficulty is nothing other than to exclude the absence of habit or use, which explains nothing. Therefore that facility must be explained, as above at n. 101, through the innate appetite of habit toward operating.

135. From what has been said, other authors can be opposed who say that habit concurs not toward the substance of the act but toward a mode of it. Some wish this mode to be the intensity of the act; but Fr. Vázquez, in 1, 2, disp. 8, cap. 2, distinguishes it from the substance and intensity of the act and places in it the facility proceeding from habit. They can, I say, be opposed because a habituated power experiences relief and diminution of effort in eliciting the very substance of the act. Nor is intensity, if it properly and formally exists in a vital act, distinct from the physical substance or essence of the act, since it consists in the addition of degree to degree. But the mode which Fr. Vázquez superadds to the act does not appear to have any ground by which it relieves the power. Indeed, since it must be produced at least partially by the power, for it is the power that operates easily or in an easy manner, it will not diminish but increase the effort or expenditure of strength by the power.

136. It is asked 2º by what causes habits are produced. The common opinion holds that habits are adequately produced by acts and, once these have passed, are conserved not by the power but by God alone. The first part is clear both from the common sayings, "Habit is the seed of acts," and, "Habit facilitates toward acts similar to those from which it was generated," and because habit is acquired and increased only in the presence and repetition of acts, while no disproportion appears in acts for generating habit. Nor does the power seem to concur immediately, since habit is produced, and indeed better produced, when the power applies its greatest effort to the act and occupies all its strength in it. The other part is likewise clear, because if the power conserved the habit it would feel no relief from it,

since it would expend as much power in conserving the habit as it would save in producing acts.

137. But against the first part it is objected: an act produces a species of itself, and this is called its seed. Therefore either an act does not produce a habit as a seed of itself, or habit and species are the same. I answer: both a habit and a species left by an act are seeds of an act, but in a different sense and in a different line. For each is ordered to producing a likeness of the act. The species, however, is ordered to an intentional likeness, namely to a reflexive cognition of the act from which it arises; whereas the habit is ordered to a physical and univocal likeness, namely to another act concerning the same object and specifically similar to the preceding act. For this reason the name of seed belongs more properly to habit than to species. Nor is it unfitting that there should be two different seeds of the same thing when they refer to different lines and each, or one of them, is metaphorically called a seed.

138. Against the second part it is objected: a vicious habit cannot be conserved by God alone, otherwise it could also be infused. The assumption is denied, because in a vicious habit there is no formal malice. Moreover, its existence and conservation are imputed to the created will which acquired it by its acts, not to God, upon whom as Author of nature and universal Cause it falls to conserve a habit once produced according to its exigency, just as He conserves heat in water after the fire is removed, until a contrary is present by which it is expelled. But if God infused a vicious habit without an exigency of nature, this would then give room for imputation, because He would operate as a special Author or as a particular cause.

139. It is asked 3º whether the first act generates a habit. The reason for doubt is that unless acts are repeated several times we do not experience facility; hence it is commonly said that at least three acts are required for generating a habit. On the other hand, if the first act does not generate a habit, neither will the second or third generate it, since each finds the power equally indisposed as did the first. The common opinion with Fr. Suárez, cit. disp. 44, sect. 9, teaches that some degree of habit is generated by the first act but ordinarily so slight that its facility is not perceived; and for this reason, as also because it is easily removable or corruptible by a contrary, it does not deserve the name of habit until by repetition of acts it grows or is intensified more, although even then it really participates in the essence of habit. Thus a slender sapling, when it first emerges from the ground, does not yet receive the name of tree, though in reality it already possesses the essence. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 51, art. 3, teaches that a habit of science is generated by the first act, whereas a habit of virtue or opinion requires

frequency of acts. The same, however, can be conceded concerning a habit of opinion or virtue when the first act lasts a long time, for then it is equivalent to several. Why the first act does not produce the whole intensity of the habit, though it contains it wholly as an equivocal cause, see Fr. Suárez, disp. cit. sect. 10, n. 13.

140. It is asked 4º through which acts a habit is intensified. It is certain that it cannot be intensified except through acts similar to the earlier ones at least in the formal object. There is doubt, however, concerning acts equally, more, or less intense, both with respect to the habit and with respect to the preceding acts from which the habit itself was generated or increased. St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 52, ar. 3, denies that a habit is intensified except through acts more intense than itself. Scotus, in 1, d. 17, q. 3, grants that a habit is intensified even through equally intense or more remiss acts. Fr. Suárez, cit. sect. 10, teaches 1º that a habit is absolutely intensified through acts more intense than the preceding acts. He teaches 2º that a habit is never intensified in such a way that it can effect acts more intense than all those by which it was generated or increased. He teaches 3º that a habit can be intensified through acts equal to the preceding ones when it has not yet reached a degree equal to those acts themselves. He teaches 4º that once the habit has equaled the act in degree of intensity, so that each is, for example, as four, it cannot be further intensified through equal acts, much less through more remiss ones. All these points are maintained with sufficient probability by our Suárez.

141. But as regards the last point, perhaps the opinion of Scotus is more probable. For those who are tepid in the exercise of virtues commonly acquire through long use a great facility for acting remissly; this facility seems much more intense than the acts by which it is acquired. Moreover, an act produces a habit as an equivocal and eminent cause, and therefore a greater intensity of habit, being less noble, can be contained eminently in a less intense act. Thus one grain of sand superadded to a large heap of sand intensifies its impulse or gravitation, although the gravitation of the heap already has more degrees of intensity than the weight of the single grain. Yet that intensity of habit, e.g. as six, acquired through acts only as four, does not assist the power toward more intense acts, because in operating it cannot exceed the perfection of its cause. Much less does it assist toward acts exceeding the powers of the faculty, because this would be to give the ability simply. Therefore it assists the power only so that it may produce acts as four more easily than if it possessed for those same acts a less intense habit.

142. It also seems uncertain what Fr. Suárez said in the first place, namely that a habit is intensified through acts more intense than preceding acts. For it would follow that one who through acts as four acquired a habit intense as four would afterward through one act as five immediately become intensely facile toward acts as five. But the consequence seems contrary to experience, for one very much accustomed to remiss acts does not immediately acquire great facility toward intense acts through one or another of them. Indeed, it often happens that an intense facility toward remiss acts is joined with a remiss facility toward intense acts. This sufficiently indicates that these facilities are intensified separately and therefore proceed from different habits, though belonging to the same virtue by reason of the motive. Moreover, the intensity of acts of intellect and will does not seem to be properly gradual, but only improperly or virtually so, from what was said in the treatise *De Generatione*, disp. 3, n. 10. If this is true, an intense act differs physically and specifically in its whole being from a remiss one and involves an adequately different difficulty; therefore it must generate an adequately different habit. A habit arising from intense acts can indeed sometimes concur toward remiss acts concerning the same object, though these do not intensify that habit but generate another, because they add no difficulty. But a habit arising from remiss acts, however much intensified, can never concur toward intense acts, since these are more noble and more difficult. Thus the seed of a nobler plant often degenerates and produces another less noble plant, but not conversely.

143. It is asked 5º to which acts a habit extends; or, in other terms, how great the similarity between acts must be in order that they be produced by the same habit. The question proceeds chiefly concerning similarity taken from the object, supposing the acts to belong to the same power. Thomists say that in acts of science similarity derived from the general character of the object under which one total science, e.g. Logic or Metaphysics, tends, suffices; or even that similarity derived from abstraction from matter assigned to each science suffices. Accordingly, they hold Logic and every other total science to be a simple quality or really one habit. But we have abundantly refuted this doctrine in Logic, tract. 1, disp. 1, cc. 5 and 6, where we also explained in what sense the whole of Logic is said to be one science although it consists of many habits, and from what the specification, distinction, and unity of total sciences are taken.

144. Now I say 1º: in order that acts proceed from the same simple habit, they must be similar in the formal object or motive, taken not generically but specifically, when namely it specifies the act precisely as such; or, what comes to the same thing, the acts must not be specifically diverse by reason

of the motive or formal object. The reason is that habit effects only acts similar to those from which it arose, from Aristotle, 2 Ethic. c. 1; and this similarity must be specific, at least on the part of the motive, for if generic similarity sufficed, acts of all virtues or all sciences could arise from one habit. It is objected: experience establishes that a man devoted to one vice or one virtue exercises himself in other vices or virtues more easily than if he had been accustomed to none. Therefore any evil or good habit supplies facility for all vicious or upright acts, though these differ from one another by a specific motive. This objection, which can likewise be made regarding habits of sciences, either attacks all habits or absurdly proves that one habit suffices for all virtues, or all vices, or all sciences. It can also be broken by contrary experience. For many very easily restrain themselves in food but with great difficulty in drink; they are very chaste but very prone to cursing; they have great facility in mathematics and at the same time the greatest difficulty in metaphysics. Therefore, whenever that extension of facility mentioned in the objection occurs, it is always slight and does not arise from a particular habit except mediately and occasionally, namely insofar as on the occasion of acts of one habit the intellect commonly forms for itself certain general maxims as it were, which prepare the way for acts of other virtues, etc.

145. I say 2º: similarity in the material object is not required, provided the formal motive is wholly the same and is uniformly applied. The more common opinion holds this with Fr. Suárez, cit. disp. sect. 11, and experience likewise seems to recommend it, for example in the acquired habit of justice. For one who has become accustomed to preserving another's right from the motive of justice easily preserves it whether in money or in wheat, etc. Nevertheless there are some who probably except from this rule material objects involving a new or special difficulty, and require for these a distinct habit. For one accustomed to fasts from the motive of penance, for example, can and commonly does experience difficulty regarding scourging, or even fasting on bread and water. Many examples of this kind are available in the matter of other virtues.

146. But it can be answered that it often happens that the motive of preceding acts does not wholly prescind from the condition of the material object, and therefore, when applied to new matter, is not wholly the same; for this reason it requires a new habit. Thus in the matter of temperance it commonly happens that the habit of abstaining from food is not a habit of moderation in drink, because that former habit is acquired not from the bare motive of temperance as such, but insofar as contracted to the matter of foods. And if, even with the same adequate motive remaining, a special

difficulty occurs in some material object, this may pertain not to the intellect or will but to the imagination or sensitive appetite. Since these are material powers, they do not regard through their acts the motive in common but contract it to such matter. For this reason they acquire more restricted habits and therefore multiply them for every special novelty of matter, even within the same virtue, as Fr. Suárez well noted, cit. sect. 11, n. 42.

147. It may be said: acts become specifically diverse even from the material object; therefore by reason of the same they require diverse habits. I answer, whatever may be true of the antecedent, by denying the consequence, because not every specific diversity of acts requires a diverse habit, but only that which is derived from a motive or from a mode of tending that brings a new difficulty, as experience seems to establish. Yet if there were two really distinct habits, one restricted to one material object and the other to another, though under the same motive, then they would indeed be specifically diverse, as we have said elsewhere. Certain other points concerning the extension of speculative habit may be seen in Fr. Suárez, sect. 11 cited; especially why simple evident habits must be multiplied more in the intellect than inevident ones, or habits of intellect more in the matter of one science than habits of will in the matter of one virtue, because for individual scientific conclusions revealing diverse truths even concerning the same subject, the motives for assent are in some manner diversified. There also the Excellent Doctor teaches that one habit suffices for love, desire, and joy concerning some good, and for hatred, flight, and sadness concerning the contrary evil; this doctrine is sufficiently probable.

148. I add that although a habit arising from simple complacencies does not suffice for efficacious affections nor is intensified through them, nevertheless a habit generated by those affections can produce simple complacencies concerning the same object. In this matter one must reason as above, n. 142, concerning intense and remiss acts. Finally, I warn that the specification of simple habits of the same power, or their specific diversity, must be taken immediately from the acts and mediately from the formal object or motive; namely in such a way that specific diversity of acts, at least those not mutually connected, taken from the motive, is a sufficient argument for distinction and specific diversity of habits. Sufficient, I say, not the only one, because habits concerning the same object can also become diverse from a diverse mode of tending of the acts, to which are reduced efficacy and inefficacy, as also remission and intensity of acts, at least if they are not formally gradual.

149. It is asked finally whether, and to what extent, a habit is diminished or corrupted. The Excellent Doctor treats this question expressly, cit. disp. 44, sect. 12. From his doctrine, which is common, I briefly say 1º: every habit, we speak only of acquired habit as hitherto, can be diminished and corrupted by a contrary habit, e.g. a habit of vice by the habit of the opposite virtue. This is clear from experience. For we feel that through custom in virtue the habitual propensity toward vice is gradually diminished and finally abolished, and conversely. Hence, although from other grounds the same power can simultaneously be very facile toward opposite acts, nevertheless this cannot be through that kind of facility which of itself arises from repetition of acts. The *a priori* reason perhaps lies hidden, but experience is clear; through it we also know that contrariety exists rather between habits than between impressed species. It is objected: a habit of virtue does not conflict with a habit of vice in the first instant; therefore neither in the others. Proof of the antecedent: because an act of virtue, in the first instant in which it is elicited by one already possessing a habit of vice, produces a habit of virtue; yet the habit of vice truly exists in that same instant, both because it renders the act of virtue difficult and because it could then have concurred toward a vicious act according to the free movement of the will.

150. Fathers Arriaga and Quirós answer that an act of virtue does not produce a habit in the first instant, supposing that free acts necessarily last through several instants, but only in the second, in which the habit of vice is no longer presupposed to exist positively. But it is better answered that what the objection seems to presuppose is false, namely that an acquired habit is wholly expelled by any contrary degree. For contrary habits can coexist simultaneously in remiss degrees, as Fr. Suárez well teaches, cit. sect. 12, n. 23. Therefore a habit of vice is expelled by a habit of virtue only gradually, as heat by cold, so that the first degree of virtue conflicts only with the eighth degree of vice, the second with the seventh, and so on. Therefore the first act of virtue, while elicited by one previously possessing a habit of vice as eight, expels in the first instant the eighth degree of vice by producing the first degree of virtue, while leaving the remaining degrees of vice intact. These therefore then render the act of virtue difficult by inclining toward a vicious act, toward which they would concur unless restrained by the will.

151. I say 2º: habits of the intellect and will cannot perish from defect of the subject, although habits of the imagination and material appetite can; neither kind, however, can perish from defect of the conserving cause. The reason is that spiritual habits are received in an incorruptible subject, but material habits in a bodily organ liable to change, according to what was said in chapter 3 concerning corruption of species; while all are efficiently

conserved by the First Cause alone, from n. 136. I say 3º: habits do not perish through mere idleness or cessation from operating, except accidentally or occasionally. So the common opinion holds with St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 53, ar. 3, against certain older authors. The reason is that no form perishes except either from defect of its cause or from the opposition of a contrary form. Hence the loss or remission of habit which we experience after long idleness proceeds only occasionally from idleness: namely because meanwhile the power is distracted toward other objects, not only disparate but contrary ones, and therefore gradually acquires contrary habits; or because the species which the habit needs in order to operate, not being renewed, become dormant and sometimes perish on the part of the imagination. See Fr. Suárez, cit. sect. 12, nn. 4-12.

DISPUTATION VII.
ON THE SPIRITUAL POWERS OF THE SOUL.

Three spiritual powers are enumerated in the rational soul: Intellect, Memory, and Will. We said in disp. 4 that these powers are really inadequately distinct from the substance of the soul; there too at n. 113 we acknowledged a real distinction between intellect and will, but at n. 114 denied it between intellect and memory taken specifically. Here we shall briefly discuss the objects and offices corresponding to each according to its proper concept, reserving for the following Disputations a special examination of the acts of intellect and will. The inorganic locomotive power, which we attributed to the rational soul in disp. 2, n. 140, can and must also be numbered among the spiritual powers; but concerning this power, beyond what was said there, nothing remains to be added here except perhaps something common to the locomotive power of Angels, concerning which the Excellent Doctor may be consulted, disp. 18, Met. sect. 3, n. 41, and disp. 35, sect. 6, n. 21.

CHAPTER I.
On the Object of the Intellect: Where Various Questions Are Decided.

1. The human intellect can be defined as "a power of the rational soul spiritually cognitive," or "perceptive of an object." If it is asked, of what object? I answer: of every cognoscible thing, or of being in its whole breadth,

even insofar as it comprehends beings of reason and negative beings, that is, privations and absences. For we experience that no object escapes cognition by our intellect, at least confused cognition, e.g. "every being" or every "cognoscible." If one imagines something unknowable to us, one already knows it by this very concept "unknowable." Nor for this reason is our intellect equal to the Divine or Angelic intellect, because although it regards the same adequate object, it differs greatly on the part of the mode, or on the part of the object insofar as attainable in such a mode and perfection. Therefore the aspect under which the human intellect tends, or its objective sphere, is the character of being in common, not indeed as abstracted from inferiors, for thus it is the object of a particular cognition, but as found in all things without exception. The same is meant by the common statement that the intellect tends under the aspect of true; for "true" is taken transcendentally, in which sense it differs from being only as to what is explicit, since it signifies the same as intrinsically cognoscible, or intrinsically capable of being known.

2. But it is asked 1º whether being in common, insofar as extended even to chimeras and negations, is the object of the intellect not only adequately but also specifically. I answer: if by "specificative" is meant the object for the cognition of which a power is primarily ordered, or which can concur toward cognition of itself of itself or through its own species, real being alone deserves that name, because fictitious beings and absences are known only secondarily and through a species of real being. But if by such a name is understood an object sufficient to diversify one power from another, were there another power not perceptive of that same object, this seems to be affirmed. For if one imagines another intellect capable of knowing real beings alone but incapable in any way of knowing absences and chimeras, it would be diverse from ours. Likewise these negative and fictitious beings do not belong to the formal object or motive of our intellect, that is, to an object attainable on its own merits or capable of moving the intellect and concurring toward cognition of itself or through its own species. It is otherwise, however, if by the name "motive" is signified, as is customary, that which, once known, moves one to assent to another object.

3. It is asked 2º whether being in common is not only the adequate object of our intellect but also its proportionate or connatural object. I answer: that object is called "proportionate," "connatural," or also "proper," which can be attained naturally or by the intellect's own powers, not indeed by terminating in any fashion whatever some confused cognition had even through alien species, for in this way the whole adequate object is proportionate, but by concurring toward cognition of itself of itself or

through its own species. In this sense, if the human intellect is considered in itself, or prescinding from its state of conjunction with the body, its proportionate object is finite real being naturally possible. For unlike its adequate object, it does not extend also to God and supernatural beings, since their proper species, or immediate objective concurrence, or quidditative cognition, is not naturally possible to our intellect. But if the intellect is considered as in the state of conjunction, its proportionate object, according to St. Thomas, I, q. 12, art. 4; q. 84, ar. 7; and q. 85, art. 1, is the quiddity of a material thing. According to Scotus, however, in various places cited by Mastrius here, disp. 6, q. 6, ar. 2, it is the quiddity of a thing sensible of itself, that is, the quiddity of sensible accidents; for material substance, which St. Thomas seems to comprehend under the connatural object, is sensible only accidentally.

4. In this matter, which speaks more aptly, Scotus or St. Thomas, depends upon this other question: whether the intellect in the present state acquires a proper adequate species of material substance. In this question the Scotists deny; the Thomists affirm and maintain that from the phantasm of accidents, elevated by the agent intellect, there is produced a proper species of the substance whose accidents they are. Fr. Suárez, l. 4, *De anima*, c. 4, denies that such a species is acquired by the intellect by force of the phantasm, and thinks that the first cognition of substance is had through discourse from an alien species, or from cognition of the accidents. He nevertheless admits that from the first cognition of substance there results a proper species by which substance is thereafter known without discourse or without recourse to the species of accidents.

5. There is no doubt that through species of accidents their substantial subject is immediately represented in a confused and indistinct manner, namely in such a way that it is not distinguished from the accidents. For these are represented not in the abstract but in the concrete, namely this white thing, this savory thing, etc. The question concerns only a species fruitful of a proper and discriminative concept. But it must be noted that the proper concept of some object is said in two ways. 1º Because, although it conceives the thing after the manner of another or through predicates common of themselves, nevertheless by negation or otherwise it is so restricted to such an object that it does not agree with others. A concept of this kind, commonly called "proper from common predicates," is naturally possessed by us concerning substance, not only material but also Angelic and Divine; nor is it elicited from a proper species, but through discourse from alien species. 2º Because it conceives the thing as it is in itself, apart from negation and analogy or without the aid of a symbol or example, as we

conceive light or whiteness which we see, or as an Angel conceives his own substance and other natural objects. A concept of this kind is called "proper from proper predicates," or "strictly proper," and the species from which it arises is "strictly proper."

6. Therefore in this latter and strict sense it must be denied that the intellect in the state of conjunction has a proper concept of material substance, and consequently also that it has a proper species of it. First, because we conceive substance only after the manner of a certain mass. Secondly, because we are led into cognition of it from cognition of accidents with the negation of inherence added; and we conceive matter and form by analogy with artificial things. Thirdly, because if by force of the phantasm of accidents a proper species of substance resulted in the intellect, even an uneducated person would possess it and would therefore distinguish between substance and accident just as he distinguishes between color and taste; yet this does not happen. Fourthly, because Eucharistic accidents affect the intellect in the same manner after consecration as before, yet afterward they do not cause a proper species or proper concept of the substance of bread. Otherwise the intellect would understand that substance there just as it understands the accidents; or, if this species is caused before consecration but not afterward, from its absence the intellect could without revelation infer the absence of the substance.

7. These arguments prove the point not only concerning the first cognition of substance but also concerning the second and the rest. Hence, when Fr. Suárez, cit. cap. 4, n. 4, says that from the first cognition a proper species of substance results, he is not speaking of one strictly proper. For he says that it corresponds to the first cognition, which cognition is not a strictly proper concept, as Fr. Suárez himself proves there, n. 2. Therefore he calls it proper only insofar as it serves for the concept proper from common predicates, first formed by discourse, to be more easily repeated without discourse. Others admit similar species resulting from the first cognition concerning spiritual objects and concerning God Himself; and that they must be admitted concerning any nonsensed object, or one not sensible of itself, is gathered from Fr. Suárez, cit. n. 4. From what has been said one may infer that the proportionate object of the conjoined intellect, as explained above at n. 3, is only the quiddity or thing sensible of itself. Hence it does not comprehend spiritual things, at least with the exception soon to be added, nor corporeal substance, nor those material accidents that are not sensed of themselves, such as qualities called occult and the sensitive powers themselves if they are distinguished from temperament. For none of these is known by the intellect in this state by a proper concept.

8. But it is objected: what is sensible accidentally, such as corporeal substance, is made known to the intellect immediately by force of sensation without investigation, as we said with the common opinion at disp. 5, n. 95. Therefore corporeal substance is first known without discourse and consequently through a proper species. Otherwise God too could be called sensible accidentally, since He is known by discourse from sensible objects. I answer: for that doctrine concerning what is sensible accidentally to be true, it suffices that corporeal substance be immediately known by the intellect through that confused and indistinct concept discussed above at n. 5. This concept certainly is not proper and does not presuppose a proper species.

9. It should be noted here that the rule excluding spiritual things from the proportionate object perhaps admits an exception in acts of intellect and will. For these leave a species of themselves in the intellect, as is commonly asserted and acknowledged by Fr. Suárez, cit. l. 4, c. 5, n. 3. This species must be called proper, not alien, both because it is immediately produced by the very act which it represents and because through it, without symbol or analogy, we know that we have known or willed. Nevertheless it should not be called quidditative, because it does not produce a proper concept of the preceding act as to what it is, but only as to whether it exists or existed; for we know the quiddity of our acts only through discourse.

10. It is asked 3º whether singulars, or material individuals, belong to the object of the conjoined intellect. Many Thomists with Cajetan denied that our intellect knows singulars in corporeal things except confusedly and arguingly. Modern Thomists teach that the intellect indeed knows singulars properly and expressly, but not directly, rather reflexively. This seems to be taught by St. Thomas, I, q. 86, ar. 1, and elsewhere more than once. Therefore, according to them, the intellect does not receive a species directly representative of the singular, but only of the universal; hence first and directly it knows only the universal, and afterward, turning itself toward the phantasm and reflecting upon it, it also distinguishes and expressly knows the singular.

11. Against this, the Scotists with Scotus and our authors with Fr. Suárez here, l. 4, c. 3, hold that in this state the intellect knows corporeal singulars not only expressly and distinctly but also directly. And first, that it knows them expressly and distinctly seems evident. For anyone knows himself and distinguishes himself from others, and likewise his father, brother, friend, etc. The intellect commonly forms propositions with a singular subject and expository syllogisms, and distinguishes between singulars and universals. Divine Faith is often concerned with singulars; and prudence, which is an intellectual virtue, is concerned with singulars. The will also commonly

bears upon singulars, which it therefore presupposes as known by the intellect. Secondly, that it also knows them directly is proved 1º because experience establishes that no reflexion is needed for someone immediately to recognize and greet a friend who approaches; or to conceive mentally the sun which he sees; or, on seeing an image of the Mother of God, immediately to think of the Blessed Virgin herself. Who would believe that the Mother of God cannot come to one's mind unless one first thinks of human nature as such, then turns oneself toward the phantasm, and then by making a reflexion falls upon the thought of the Mother of God?

12. 2º Because the intellect has a proper species of the singular, or one directly representative of it; therefore it knows the singular directly. The consequence is legitimate among the adversaries. The antecedent is excellently proved, and almost demonstrated, by Fr. Suárez in the place cited. For now it is enough to prove it against the man as follows. The intellect forms a proper concept of a singular, at least a reflexive one, as the Thomists concede. But it does not form it through a species of the universal alone. Therefore it does so through a proper species of the singular. Proof of the minor: the intellect cannot form a proper concept of Peter through a species that does not contain that concept, as is certain. But such is the species of man as such, since it represents no individual in particular, otherwise it would no longer be a species of the universal alone, but is adequately commensurate with the concept "man." Just as, therefore, from the concept "man" the concept "Peter" does not follow, so neither etc.

13. They say that the species of the universal is determined by the occurrence of the phantasm to produce a concept of the singular. But against this 1º: this occurrence does not increase the power of the species, since neither does the phantasm immediately concur toward intellection nor does it vary the species of the universal in itself, as the adversaries suppose. Therefore that species remains as inept after such occurrence as it was before. Against this 2º: the occurrence of the phantasm is equally present when the species is first produced, for the species is produced only in the presence and concurrence of the phantasm. Why, then, will the species not immediately without a circuit and reflexion be determined to cognition of the singular? Against this 3º: the separated soul remembers singulars through species acquired in the body, as is evident from the conversation of the rich man with Abraham, Luke 16. Yet there is then no occurrence of a phantasm.

14. Objection 1º: Aristotle distinguishes the intellect from sense by saying that sense is of singulars, but intellect of universals. 2º The agent intellect is posited for the purpose of abstracting the species from

individuating conditions contained in the phantasm. Otherwise the intelligible species cannot be spiritual, since it represents a material object in a material mode, namely as contracted to the individual and not abstracted from the here and now. 3º The intellect, being immaterial, must know the object in a higher and more universal manner than sense, and indeed by the first cognition; otherwise it would not differ from sense as regards what it first and of itself regards, or as regards the limitation of the first species and cognition. These arguments have little force. To the first: Aristotle intends only that the intellect does not know singulars alone, as sense does, but universals in addition. Thus we commonly say that it is proper to a brute to sense and to man to reason, yet we do not deny man the power of sensing.

15. To the second: the office of the agent intellect is to abstract the species from the materiality of the phantasm in being, not in representing; that is, to produce an entitatively spiritual species representing the same object as the phantasm. Hence both the species and the intellect abstract subjectively from "individuating conditions" and from the "here and now," understand by these words sensible circumstances, because they possess an immaterial entity. Yet they do not abstract objectively from these circumstances, since they represent them in the object, in a mode indeed materially objective but subjectively or entitatively immaterial. The parallel is clear in an Angelic species, which directly represents corporeal individuals; likewise in our reflexive cognition, which certainly must abstract from materiality no less than an impressed species. No one doubts that the intellect and its species represent materiality on the part of the object, since it is included in a common nature, e.g. a stony nature. What does it matter if singularity is added to materiality?

16. To the third: compared with sense, the intellect knows in a higher or nobler mode, namely a spiritual mode, which is also more universal in its genus, although in the first cognition it is restricted to the object of sense. The intellect also differs from sense as regards what it regards "of itself," because it regards of itself not only a sensible object but every cognoscible object. But the fact that it does not differ as regards what it regards "first," that is, through the first cognition, proves only what is most true, namely that for the present state the order of understanding must begin from a sensible object. Nor is this unworthy of the intellect, just as it is not unworthy of man that he does not differ from a plant as regards the first vital operation, nor from a brute as regards the first intentional act. Nevertheless, the first intelligible species is less restricted in operating than a sensible

species, because after the first cognition of a singular it also serves for cognition of the universal.

17. But hence it is asked 4º what is first known by the intellect in the present state. This question is celebrated among Thomists, who, wholly excluding the singular from the first cognition, dispute at length concerning what is first known among universals. First, all in one body fight against the Scotists, who say that the most specific species, that is, the atomic species, e.g. human or leonine, is known before generic predicates. Then they dispute at length among themselves about those predicates. Some maintain that what is first known is being abstracted from material and spiritual; others that it is being connoting materiality, so that materiality is not the aspect "which" is known directly but merely a connotate; others that it is the quiddity of a material thing, or formally material being, so that materiality is explicitly and formally known. Each of these modes of speaking has many Thomist patrons, as may be seen in Master Froylán, q. 1, proem. ad Physicam, ar. 2, all of whom adduce St. Thomas and variously interpret him when adduced by the others.

18. But briefly we say with Fr. Suárez, cit. l. 4, c. 3, that the singular is known before the universal. Scotus likewise taught this, according to Mastrius here, disp. 6, n. 239, and the Scotists commonly follow him. Proof 1º: because it is prior to know the foundation of abstraction, namely the agreement of several singulars, than to abstract the common nature. For an uneducated man to whose mind it has never occurred that several individuals agreeing in the nature of the Sun are possible, from what will he be moved to conceive the nature of the Sun in common? Or on what foundation will he conceive the Sun as such before the individual Sun which he sees? 2º Because the intellect receives a proper species directly representative of the singular perceived by sense, as we showed above; and there is no reason why it should not immediately use such a species. It may be said: it does indeed use it, but for conceiving the common nature contained in that individual. Against this: that species has power to represent not only the nature of such an individual but also its singularity. Since, therefore, it is a necessary cause and impeded by nothing when first impressed, why does it not immediately exercise its whole power? It should be noted that the intellect does not receive through the mediation of the phantasm a species of the universal distinct from the species of the singular; rather, for the first cognition of the universal it uses species of several singulars agreeing with one another. After the first cognition, however, it is probable that a species representative of the universal alone is left. See Fr. Suárez, cit. c. 3, n. 12 sqq.

19. Now, if comparison is made among universals, the opinion of Scotus seems more probable, namely that what is less universal, or the atomic species, is known first; e.g. the character of whiteness before the character of color as such, or quality as such, or being as such. Suppose the first object presented to a child for understanding is whiteness. It appears utterly incredible that the child cannot mentally conceive whiteness unless he first conceives being as such or material being, and afterward by distinct concepts all intermediate predicates, through all of which he must descend gradually, according to Froylán, q. cit. ar. 1, § ult., namely accident as such, corporeal quality, sensible quality, secondary quality, color as such. What does the child know about these predicates, which philosophers themselves scarcely know how to distinguish? Or why is it necessary to traverse the predicamental tree from summit to root in order to conceive whiteness exposed to the eyes? Is it not more congruous that in this tree the intellect first ascend rather than descend? Moreover, the first species impressed upon the intellect represents the specific degree of the object, as the Thomists concede. Therefore the intellect with such a species has adequate power to elicit a specific concept. Therefore it will immediately elicit it, since it is a necessary and complete cause and in the first concept does not depend on the command of the will.

20. The foundation of the Thomists is that in the first cognition the intellect proceeds from potency to act, and therefore must first elicit a more imperfect act, such as the more universal cognition, because it is more confused. For every agent, while proceeding in this manner, reaches an imperfect act before a perfect one, because between potency and a perfect act there intervenes an imperfect act. Thus an animal first generates an embryo before introducing the soul. Thus also an artisan first fashions rough works before perfect ones. I answer: when an agent proceeds to act from a complete and unimpeded active potency, retarded by no obstacle or contrariety, it immediately produces the most perfect act which it contains; as is evident in the sun illuminating, in a substance rooting its properties, and in a stone beginning for the first time to fall, which certainly does not begin to move less swiftly than if it had fallen a hundred times before. That in the generation of an animal and in many other cases the power of the agent proceeds gradually arises from resistance of the matter or patient. Since, therefore, the intellect to which whiteness is first proposed possesses complete power for cognition of the specific degree, since it receives its species, and since on the other hand there is no impediment on the part of the power nor any resistance in the object, there is no reason why that cognition should be deferred.

21. It may be said: why, then, do we know a thing confusedly before distinctly and by parts; e.g. the thing defined before its definition, or a house indistinctly before its individual parts? I answer: because commonly at first sight we do not receive a species distinctly representative of the parts, but acquire it gradually, either by examining the thing more attentively or by reasoning from effects. Yet if the first species were of itself representative of the parts according to their proper objective concepts, it could immediately concur, as it does in an Angel, toward a definitive cognition of the thing, or one distinctly exhibiting its physical or metaphysical parts. When Aristotle says that our cognition must begin from more universal things, he is speaking of the order of teaching in handing down the Sciences, in which common matters should be prefaced lest they afterward be ineptly repeated. Otherwise Aristotle himself, 1 Poster. c. 2, teaches that those things are better known to us which are nearer the senses.

22. It is asked 5º whether our intellect can understand several things simultaneously as several, or in the manner of several. St. Thomas denies this, I, q. 85, ar. 4, where he takes knowing several things in the manner of several as equivalent to knowing through several species. But this seems difficult. For one who distinguishes white from black, or man from horse, knows several things through different species, which even the Thomists do not deny. Hence all seem to admit that several objects are known simultaneously through diverse species, provided they are in some way united either under the same predicate, or as parts of the same Whole, or as extremes of one relation or comparison, namely similarity, diversity, inequality, etc. But St. Thomas, when he absolutely excludes simultaneous use of several species, and when in I, q. 12, ar. 10, he denies that the parts of some Whole are understood simultaneously if understood through proper species, must be interpreted as speaking of species each of which demands great attention and draws the whole present strength of the intellect toward its object. Certainly what the Holy Doctor asserts in the places cited requires interpretation, namely that the intellect cannot simultaneously be informed by diverse species, just as one body cannot simultaneously be shaped by diverse figures. For among the defenders of species it is taken as certain that many and diverse species are simultaneously conserved in the same intellect.

23. The difficulty is whether the intellect can simultaneously understand several wholly disparate objects apart from any union, comparison, or order among them which it itself considers. The Scotists and our authors with Fr. Suárez here, l. 3, c. 7, affirm it, at least through several acts simultaneously elicited. This seems known by experience, not only regarding the intellect

but also sight and hearing. For we often simultaneously see in a marketplace several men performing different actions, and at the same time beasts, carts, etc. We likewise often distinctly hear several entirely different and unconnected sounds at once, and indeed apart from comparing them with one another; this comparison can neither be made by the senses nor is it made by the intellect at first sight. The intellect also commonly attends simultaneously to external actions wholly unconnected, as when an artisan attends to his work while simultaneously speaking or joking about various things with bystanders. The *a priori* reason is that it is not necessary that every object occupy the whole strength of the intellect or seize its whole attention, although this sometimes happens.

24. But can the intellect also perceive disparate objects by one act? Our authors commonly affirm it, because there is no repugnance in one concept identifying with itself tendencies toward diverse objects which are distinguished in other concepts, provided those tendencies are not opposed to one another, as these are not, for example: "a man speaks, a dog sleeps." Thus, according to the common opinion, the same species in a superior Angel represents many objects which in an inferior Angel are represented by many species. Moreover, it does not seem alien to the power of an intellective faculty, even one operating naturally, that it can use diverse and unconnected species for the same effect when these are received together or aroused together. It may be said 1º: it is repugnant for the same thing to be similar to two things diverse from one another. I answer: it is indeed repugnant when the question concerns physical and specific similarity, but not intentional similarity, which precisely consists in manifesting or making known another thing. For what prevents two different things from becoming known through the same manifestation?

25. It may be said 2º: therefore the same concept can be true concerning one object and false concerning another. Some concede the consequence when the objects are wholly disparate. Others say that if one of the objects is lacking, the act will be true in a qualified sense but simply false, because falsity, being in the genus of evil, results from any defect whatever. It may be said 3º: an act must take unity from the object since it is specified by it; but in disparate objects there is no unity. I answer: an act does not take real unity from the object, otherwise this act, "every animal," could not be really one. It does, however, take specific unity, not because it must presuppose this in the object, as is clear in the example just given, but insofar as by reason of the object it becomes of the same species as other acts regarding the same object and differs specifically from all those that do not regard the

same object. For this it is immaterial whether the object is regarded by the act as one or as multiple.

26. It is asked 6º whether an intellect is possible that is so restricted to some species of being that it can understand nothing else. The common opinion denies this against some. Omitting other arguments, it is briefly proved because an intellect incapable of knowing a spiritual object is repugnant. For if it were restricted to a corporeal object, it would already be a material power and therefore not intellective, since spirituality belongs to the concept of intellect according to all. But an intellect capable of knowing some spiritual object must be capable of knowing God, for God is not excluded from its sphere by reason of spirituality; nor by reason of infinity either, because, as I argued elsewhere, this title equally applies with respect to our intellect and yet does not render God unknowable to it. If, however, that intellect can know God, it will also be able to know all beings, at least in common; both because cognition of creatures in general is more imperfect and easier than cognition of God, and because God cannot be known unless infinite and omnipotent being is known, and therefore a being capable of producing infinitely many beings, or finite beings without end. Hence one may gather that every possible intellect tends under the aspect of being in common and consequently, with a proper species or supernatural light added, can know clearly and distinctly any beings whatever under every particular aspect, as is evident in our intellect.

27. Finally, it is commonly asked here whether the intellective essentially implies the volitive; or whether an intellective substance that is not volitive is repugnant. This question is treated at length by theologians and therefore need only be touched upon briefly here. There are some who deny it, but the common opinion throughout every School affirms it. It is commonly proved by an argument drawn from St. Thomas, I, q. 19, art. 1. Namely, elicited appetite, proper to the will, bears to apprehended or known good the same relation as innate appetite bears to physical and connatural good. But every substance naturally perfectible by some form good for it has an innate appetite either of desire, to attain it when absent, or of joy, to enjoy it when present. Therefore every substance knowing an object good for itself must be capable of a similar elicited appetite concerning it. But every intellective substance can know some object good for itself, since at least it can know its own existence, which it cannot fail to apprehend as fitting to itself. Therefore it must be capable of elicited appetite, or volition, concerning such a good.

28. Confirmation 1º: as we saw in the preceding question, a substance that understands but cannot know any being whatever under every aspect

under which it is cognoscible is repugnant. Therefore if an understanding substance is elevated, for example, to hypostatic union, it will be able to know that union as good for itself and consequently as appetible to itself, since good and appetible are convertible just as true and cognoscible. But it cannot know it as innately appetible to itself, since hypostatic union, being supremely supernatural and not due, cannot be naturally desired. Therefore it will know it as appetible to itself by elicitation, and consequently will be able so to desire it at least with an appetite of joy. Confirmation 2º: every understanding substance can know God as its Creator and therefore as beneficent to it, and can apprehend its own existence as a benefit of God. But such cognition of itself inclines to thanksgiving or an affection of gratitude, as is evident from the terms. Therefore it presupposes in its proper subject the capacity for an affection of this kind. Confirmation 3º: a substance capable of the vision of God but incapable of love for such goodness is repugnant, just as a subject capable of the ultimate disposition to a form but incapable of the form; or capable of gravity but incapable of downward motion; or capable of intention of an end but incapable of election of means. Since, therefore, no intellective substance is possible which is not capable of the vision of God, none can be incapable of loving Him. For the vision of God inclines to love much more than an ultimate disposition, etc.

29. It is commonly objected 1º that the external senses are cognitive and yet not appetitive. 2º That the intellective is rationally distinguished from the appetitive and is conceived as prior and therefore as independent. 3º That a cognition incapable of arousing an affection of the will is not repugnant; such are various speculative cognitions, e.g. "twice three is six," or "anything whatever either is or is not." At least such would be the assent of supernatural faith by which Peter believed God revealing a decree not to concur toward any act of the human will; for such an assent would be essentially connected with that decree and therefore with the absence of every act of Peter's will. But to the first it is answered that external senses have corresponding appetites, from what was said in disp. 5, n. 132 sqq.; or at least such senses are appetitive radically and mediately and cannot exist except in an appetitive *suppositum*. To the second, two things can be rationally distinguished and yet be essentially connected, as is evident in God's omnipotence, eternity, and immensity. Nor is the intellective conceived as independent or unconnected, although it is conceived as prior, because it does not possess priority in the consequence of subsisting, but only a certain connotative priority from order to a prior operation, namely intellection, which is prior to volition.

30. To the third: a cognition arousing no affection can indeed be given, provided it does not represent an object as good for the knower. Yet the possibility of an intellective thing that is not volitive does not follow from this, because nothing intellective can be intrinsically restricted to sterile cognitions of that sort or incapable of knowing its own goods under the aspect of such, as is clear from the proofs adduced. Others deny that a cognition is possible which cannot arouse some complacency or displeasure either concerning its object or at least concerning itself; or at least one which from its proper mode of representing does not presuppose in its subject a capacity for willing. Thus Peter's assent in fact presupposes such capacity by the very fact that it represents a Divine decree not to concur with Peter's will toward any act. The possibility of that revelation or of an essentially true assent can also be denied. For such an assent would by its nature be a motion and inclination toward love of the Divine decree and, on the other hand, would essentially demand absence of love. It would therefore simultaneously demand two contradictories, which is chimerical. Hence that decree would be unrevealable, at least in order to supernatural assent, just like a decree to reveal nothing, or not to concur toward any cognition.

CHAPTER II.

On the Agent and Possible Intellect; on the Dependence of the Intellect upon the Imagination; and on Intellective Memory.

31. From what was said in disp. 6, n. 90 sqq., it is clear that the "agent intellect" is that which together with the phantasm produces spiritual species; while that which receives these species and with them produces intellections and is acted upon by them is called the "possible," "passible," or "passive" intellect. It is also clear that an agent intellect is commonly asserted because otherwise no sufficient cause can be assigned for production of spiritual species. Three offices commonly attributed to the agent intellect must now be explained, namely "to illuminate phantasms, to abstract the species from phantasms, and to make things actually intelligible." Concerning the first, Thomists disagree among themselves according to the College of St. Thomas of Alcalá here, q. 40, n. 14 sqq. But their more common opinion according to the same College there, nn. 40 and 48, teaches that the intellect illuminates phantasms insofar as these receive from it a certain spiritual power by virtue of which they are rendered apt to concur instrumentally toward the intelligible species; nor is it unfitting, they say, that an incomplete spiritual power, where "incomplete" means the same

as "after the manner of a form," should be received in a corporeal subject, as is evident from the example of our soul, which, because incompletely spiritual, informs a material subject.

32. But this opinion must altogether be rejected. For that power would be thoroughly accidental and therefore, if received in a phantasm, would be educed from a corporeal subject and dependent upon it in being produced and conserved. Yet nothing is more alien to the concept of a spiritual form. Otherwise why is the soul of a brute not called spiritual? Or why is the rational soul held to inform the body in such a way that it nevertheless does not depend upon it in conservation nor is educed from it? Therefore it must be said with Fr. Suárez here, lib. 4, c. 2, that by those offices of the agent intellect nothing else is signified than the action by which the intellect itself produces the intelligible species with the concurrence of the phantasm. For by this action the intellect is said to illuminate phantasms insofar as it effects that a spiritual species be partially produced by them, almost in the manner in which light joined to color effects that a visual species be emitted by the color; or also insofar as it endows the objects of phantasms with a certain spiritual light, that is, an intelligible species. It is likewise said to abstract the species from phantasms insofar as it produces an immaterial species of their object; this species is called abstracted, that is, purified, entitatively, not objectively, from the materiality of phantasms. Finally, it is said to make things actually intelligible because material things, until their incorporeal species are produced, are not actually, that is, proximately, knowable by the intellect, but only remotely or potentially.

33. Two other offices sometimes mentioned by St. Thomas are to be explained similarly, namely "to strengthen the possible intellect and to cause the evidence of principles." For the agent intellect strengthens the possible intellect insofar as through the mediation of the species it completes its power for understanding; and through the species it likewise causes evidence of principles, because first principles do not require discourse but, once the species is posited, are immediately apprehended evidently. Hence one may gather that all the offices of the agent intellect consist in reality in efficiently producing the intelligible species in the presence of the phantasm after the manner of a principal cause. It may be said: the agent intellect elevates the phantasm as an instrument toward production of the spiritual species; therefore it must premove it, or previously act something into it. I deny the consequence, because although premotion is required in instruments of art, it is not generally required in natural instruments, as is evident in a species and an acquired habit, which instrumentally concur toward intellection and are elevated by the power or soul toward a nobler

effect through union alone and simultaneous concurrence. Indeed, even without union the assistance or presence of the principal cause suffices, as is seen in the seeds of living things when they are elevated by the universal cause to produce offspring.

34. It is asked whether the agent intellect is really distinguished from the possible intellect. Thomists affirm it according to the cited College of Alcalá, q. 10, n. 13. But our authors commonly deny it with Fr. Suárez, cit. lib. 4, c. 8, recognizing only a distinction of reason or according to offices or connotates. The Scotists likewise deny it with Scotus, according to Mastrius here, disp. 6, q. 5, ar. 2. Their opinion is briefly proved because there is no compelling foundation for a real distinction. For actions subordinated of themselves as means and end, such as production of a species and production of intellection, need not proceed from distinct powers when nothing else prevents them from proceeding from the same power. Thus, according to the Thomists, production of the ultimate disposition and generation of the form proceed in physics from the same power. Add that powers, according to the Thomists, take a real distinction from objects; but the agent and possible intellect regard the same object, and indeed the agent intellect most properly regards an object if species is a formal representation, as Thomists maintain.

35. Nor perhaps does St. Thomas, whom they confidently adduce, intend more than a perfect distinction of reason, such as he does not acknowledge between intellect and memory, between practical and speculative intellect, etc.; or he merely intends that the agent intellect, insofar as proximately active of a species, is really inadequately distinguished from the possible intellect, because thus taken it includes partnership with the phantasm. Hence the Holy Doctor, I, q. 79, artt. 7 and 10, proves that the agent intellect is distinguished from the possible because one is active of a species and the other passive; "and in all things," he says, "one power is active and another passive." Unless this argument is understood of a distinction of reason or of a real inadequate distinction as now explained, it will prove, against everyone, that the possible intellect must be really divided into two, of which one is active of intellection and the other passive. Therefore, just as Thomists, in order to preserve the distinction between active and passive power with respect to intellection, take the active power as conjoined with the impressed species, by reason of which it is really inadequately distinguished from the passive power, so a similar distinction of powers with respect to the species can be preserved if the agent intellect is taken as conjoined with the phantasm.

36. It is objected: the possible intellect is a purely passive power with respect to species; therefore another power active of species must be asserted. Proof of the antecedent 1º: because that intellect is called pure potency in the order of intelligibles. 2º Because every sensitive power is rightly passive with respect to the species which it uses; therefore likewise etc. 3º Because every power is purely passive with respect to that form without which it is simply incapable of operating; for it cannot prepare its own first act for itself or produce its own coprinciple. But a cognitive power, such as the possible intellect, is simply incapable of operating without a species. Therefore etc. Confirmation: because species and intellection do not agree in vitality nor are they produced under the same common aspect. Therefore they do not proceed from the same power.

37. To the objection, I deny the antecedent in a real sense. To proof 1º: the possible intellect, taken really, is called pure potency, etc., because it has no connatural species but must acquire all through the ministry of the senses, in such a way nevertheless that it itself actively concurs toward their production. Therefore it is not a purely passive power but at once active, although called "pure," that is, of itself lacking every species. To the second: we already said, disp. 6, n. 91, why an agent intellect of species is posited rather than an agent sense. But once an agent intellect is admitted, there is no reason why it should be distinguished from the possible intellect; the same would have to be said of an agent sense if one were admitted. To the third, I grant the major concerning a form, and understand the same of a first act or coprinciple, simply necessary for the first operation of a power; but I deny it concerning one simply necessary for an operation which already presupposes another operation of the same power. For the intellect is incapable of judging without apprehension, and the will of choosing without a preceding intention; yet the intellect is not a merely passive power with respect to apprehension, nor the will with respect to intention. Then I distinguish the minor: it is simply incapable of operating without a species in producing cognition, I grant; in producing the species itself, I deny the minor and consequence. Therefore a species is indeed prerequisite for cognition, but not for every operation of the possible intellect, because production of the species itself is truly an operation of that power taken really.

38. It may be said: from a cognitive power as such there proceeds only cognition, just as from a volitive power as such there proceeds only volition. But species is not cognition; therefore. I press the point: from a judicative power as such there proceeds only judgment; but apprehension is not judgment. Therefore apprehension does not proceed from a judicative

power. One will deny the consequence in a real sense, although the major is true in a formal and reduplicative sense, which is produced by the phrase "as such." Therefore take the same answer for oneself. It may further be said: no cognitive power prepares its own object for itself but presupposes it as prepared from elsewhere. But through a species the object of the possible intellect is prepared, because it is rendered proximately intelligible. This also proves that apprehension is not elicited by the judicative power, because through apprehension the object is rendered proximately judicable. Therefore, although a cognitive power presupposes its object taken specifically, it can nevertheless through one operation render it proximately apt to terminate another operation.

39. To the confirmation: whatever may be true concerning vitality, to which a species has a right in Thomistic doctrine, a common aspect can easily be assigned to intellection and species if species is a formal representation, as Thomists maintain. For each will agree in the character of formal representation or intentional assimilation to the object, and under this aspect each will proceed from the same power. This same aspect of likeness to the object suffices on our principles. For although it belongs to species only analogically, since species is only a virtual likeness, nevertheless the defect of univocal agreement is compensated in the species by the concept of a means ordered and instituted of itself for understanding and having no other office in the nature of things. And ask the Thomists what common aspect there is between generation and the preceding alteration, that both may proceed from the same power. Nor is it necessary that every operation of a vital power be formally vital; it suffices that it be vital either formally, vitally, or dispositively.

40. Now concerning the dependence of the intellect upon the imagination, it is certain 1º that the intellect is a spiritual and inorganic power and therefore does not depend in being upon the imagination, nor upon its organ, nor upon any other corporeal thing, as is clear from what was said in disp. 2, cap. 1. Hence the intellect, even insofar as it imports an accidental power, is not bound to one part of the body but accompanies the soul throughout the whole body as a property belonging to it in its being as a spiritual substance. It is nevertheless said to understand not in every part of the body but in the head, either because there it receives species through the ministry of imagination, or also because intellections exist only in the head, not as in a subject but as in a place. Hence it is certain 2º that the intellect does not depend in operating upon imagination for every state, since it can be separated from imagination together with the soul, which certainly understands in the state of separation. It is certain 3º that the intellect in the

state of conjunction with the body depends in operating upon imagination as upon one ministering the first species of objects, almost in the same manner as imagination itself depends upon the external senses. For since the human intellect does not have connatural species or species implanted by nature, as St. Thomas proves against the Platonists, I, q. 84, ar. 3, and Fr. Suárez here, l. 4, c. 2, it must receive them through the ministry of the senses, and proximately indeed through the ministry of internal sense or imagination, which receives them from the external senses. Hence arose the saying, "Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in sense," namely as regards the first intellections of objects. For afterward the intellect proceeds by discourse from objects perceived by sense to knowledge of many things perceived by no sense.

41. It is doubtful, however, 1º whether the intellect depends on the operation of imagination not only in first cognitions but also in the others, so that once species are acquired it can never use them unless imagination simultaneously imagines the same object or something analogous. There are some who deny this, both from the parallel of imagination, which once it possesses species uses them even when no external sense operates; and from the experience of those who suffer rapture or ecstasy; and because the intellect, once endowed with a species, has complete power for understanding. The common opinion, however, with Aristotle, 3 *De anima*, t. 30, St. Thomas, I, q. 84, ar. 7, and Fr. Suárez here, l. 4, c. 7, which Scotus also holds in several places according to Mastrius, disp. 6, n. 6, although somewhere he seems to suggest the opposite, is wholly affirmative. It is proved by two experiences. 1º When the organ of imagination is damaged or its operation impeded, the intellect does not use previously possessed species or habits of sciences previously acquired, as is seen in the delirious, lethargic, or deeply sleeping, and in those who lose the use of intellectual memory through a disease of the brain destroying sensitive memory. This would not so occur unless operation of imagination were always required for the use of intellectual species, for intellection by reason of itself does not depend upon an organ. 2º The intellect conceives no object, even an incorporeal one, without something corporeal being simultaneously presented to imagination, at least as a symbol or example after whose likeness, for example, God or an Angel is understood.

42. This second experience is not very compelling, because it could be said that something corporeal indeed confronts the mind whenever we understand, but that this same thing is presented to the intellect as an example of an incorporeal or nonsensed object, and need not always be presented to imagination. The first experience, however, is efficacious and

plainly proves that the intellect is more closely connected with imagination in operating than imagination itself is with external sense. For although the organ of sight is impeded or lost, imagination still uses species previously received through sight. Therefore the intellect in the state of conjunction, even when it operates supernatural cognitions, e.g. of Faith, according to the ordinary law always prerequires or draws along with itself an operation of imagination. Several affirm this even in rapture or ecstasy, although there is no doubt that God can miraculously dispose otherwise. This is precisely what is commonly meant by saying that the intellect does not operate "without conversion to the phantasm," or "without contemplating phantasms." For this conversion or contemplation does not signify a reflexion of the act of intellect upon the act of imagination, but only concomitance of the two acts. Or perhaps in this expression "phantasm" is taken not for the act but for the object of imagination, and the intellect is said to turn to it because it understands nothing unless by directly or indirectly contemplating an object simultaneously perceived by imagination. Others say that not so much the intellect as the soul turns to phantasms, that is, is applied to simultaneously eliciting acts of imagination.

43. It is doubtful 2º whence this dependence or connection of intellect with imagination in operating arises. Scotus, in lib. *De anima*, q. 18, thinks that this subjection, as it were, of the mind to sense is not connatural to man but penal, imposed by God as punishment for original sin. This, however, is commonly rejected as asserted gratuitously and without foundation. Indeed, with equal right it could be imagined that it is not connatural to man to need species drawn through sense in order to understand, and that in the state of union, original sin apart, the soul could naturally intuit itself, Angels, etc., just as in the state of separation. Others have recourse to sympathy of the powers arising from their rootedness in the same soul. But this reason is broken by the example of the external senses. Others say that intellectual species either are not conserved when the act of imagination ceases, or are aroused only by it. But that species are conserved in the intellect was shown in the preceding disputation. And that they are aroused only by an act of imagination, even if admitted, does not prove that the intellect needs the presence of this act after the species has once been aroused. For it could continue the begun use of the species by contemplating or discoursing even if sleep or lethargy supervened. Yet this is plainly repugnant to experience.

44. Therefore the reason for the aforesaid connection must be taken from the office of form which the soul exercises in the state of union. For it is a general law of nature that no form immanently elicits any operation which does not in some way depend upon the subject of that form, as is

evident by induction through all other substantial forms and even all accidental forms. Since, therefore, an intellection of the united soul, being spiritual, cannot depend upon the subject of the soul, or the body, as sustaining it or otherwise influencing it, it must depend upon some corporeal operation as a preceding, concomitant, or subsequent condition. Indeed, the rational soul ought to depend upon the body in operating no less than in existing. But in existing it so depends upon the body as upon a condition that it can neither be created outside it nor exist anywhere without the companionship of the body so long as the state of union lasts. Likewise, therefore, in operating it must depend upon an operation of some corporeal faculty. Hence this dependence in the intellect in question does not proceed from a defect of power but from the condition of the state. The separated soul, however, just as it in no way depends upon the body in existing, so neither in operating, for then it no longer exercises the office of form but the office of spirit. Thus the inorganic locomotive power belonging to the soul cannot be exercised in the state of union without simultaneous exercise of the organic locomotive power; but otherwise in the state of separation. See above, disp. 2, n. 140. It should be noted here that the aforesaid dependence does not belong to a soul reunited with a glorified body, because that supernatural state is free from the imperfections of mortal life.

45. It remains for us to say something about intellective memory. Memory is taken in two ways. 1º For the faculty of retaining species of things previously known and using them for repeated cognition of the same things. 2º For the faculty of remembering, or recognizing again what was previously known, not in any manner whatever but as previously known and as past. In the first sense intellective memory cannot be denied unless either intellectual species are denied or they are said to perish with the first acts. But both positions can be refuted from what was said in the preceding disputation, n. 39 sqq. There also, nn. 47-60, we showed that forgetfulness in intellective memory occurs not from defect of spiritual species but from defect of sensitive memory, and that the species of this memory can perish from various causes; and we gave several other points concerning memory. In the second sense St. Thomas, I, q. 79, ar. 6, "in corp.," seems to deny intellectual memory, and proves this because to know the past as past is to know a thing under determinate time, but this belongs only to sensitive memory, which is apprehensive of particulars. Yet there, in "resp. ad 2," St. Thomas restricts this to the object of preceding acts and does not extend it to the act itself; for he grants that the intellect understands that it has understood and remembers its intellection as past.

46. But since the intellect knows singulars, even external or sensible ones, by a proper concept, at least indirectly or reflexively, as the Thomists admit to be the mind of St. Thomas, see above n. 10, there is no reason to deny intellective memory of singulars, which at least indirectly or reflexively remembers them under determinate circumstances and therefore under determinate, or past, time. Moreover, there is most manifest experience. For we commonly remember, certainly as men or as using reason, our acts, even external ones, likewise our parents, friends, etc., together with circumstances of time and place. Hence the College of St. Thomas of Alcalá, q. 10, n. 120, interprets the Holy Doctor as intending not that the intellect lacks remembrance of the past as such, but that it does not possess it "of itself first," as internal sense does. I agree, provided "of itself first" does not exclude from the intellect direct cognition of singulars, but signifies only the dependence of intellectual memory upon sensitive memory as regards use of species in the present state. For this reason Aristotle said, lib. *De memoria et reminiscentia*, c. 1, that memory belongs of itself to the first sensitive part, but accidentally to the intellective part, namely because intellective memory depends upon sensitive memory, not conversely.

47. It is asked here whether an act of memory must have past cognition as its object; or whether it must regard the object as previously known. It seems certain that a species conserved in memory can be aroused concerning an object without representing the past cognition. For we often think from a previously possessed species about God, death, or an absent friend without reflecting upon the past cognition. Whether, however, a thought of this sort is to be called an act of memory is a verbal question. It seems to be denied if memory is taken in the strict sense, for thus it is a faculty remembering the past as past, not indeed in the being of a thing, since the same object can and commonly does still actually exist, but in the being of known, insofar as it must be presented to the mind as known through a past cognition. It is to be affirmed, however, if memory is taken in a broader sense, though not improperly. For thus it is a faculty of again knowing an object through a species once acquired and now again aroused. Hence one is commonly said to remember God or to remember one's last things who directly thinks of these objects from previously possessed species, although he does not consider them as once known by himself. It may be said: a species conserved in memory, if aroused, cannot fail to represent the past cognition, since it was produced by it. But it will easily be denied that every species remaining in memory was produced by a past cognition, or that it was produced for the sake of the cognition itself rather than for the sake of the object or in its name. Yet if someone maintains that

whenever a species in memory is aroused the past cognition is always represented at least faintly, he will not easily be refuted.

48. Finally it should be observed that the intellective power, although really one, receives various names according to the variety of its offices or acts. For besides the names "agent and possible intellect," and also "memory," concerning which we have already spoken, the intellect is commonly divided into "apprehensive, judicative, and discursive"; likewise into "scientific and opinative"; likewise into "practical and speculative," the force of which names I suppose to be known from what was said in Logic. Moreover, it is called mind because of the eminence by which it measures the perfections of things. It is especially called "intellect" insofar as it apprehends and without discourse judges objects known of themselves; in this sense it is also sometimes called "intelligence," although this name signifies an act rather than a power. It is likewise especially called "reason" insofar as it understands by discoursing; "higher reason" insofar as it is concerned with Divine and eternal things; "lower reason" insofar as it thinks concerning human and transitory things.

49. Likewise, as prior to the species it is properly called "possible intellect"; as possessing a species without an act, "intellect in habit"; as actually knowing, "intellect in act, or acquired." Or, as others maintain, it is called "acquired" when it already possesses whatever it can possess, which occurs only in the state of beatitude. Finally, it is sometimes called "synderesis" insofar as by natural light it dictates what we ought to do; and in the same sense it is sometimes called "conscience." The name "synderesis," however, is properly taken for the habit of knowing first practical principles, especially those concerning morals; and the name "conscience" for cognition dictating what here and now we are bound to do, or also for cognition of our preceding operations in their moral being. When it discovers them to be good it generates joy; when evil, it causes sadness, which is called the "worm or remorse of conscience."

CHAPTER III.

On the Object of the Will, Where Several Doubts Are Resolved.

50. The will is "a spiritually appetitive potency of the good through acts elicited under the direction of reason." Its object, as is evident from the definition itself, is the good in common, or that which is found in every particular good without exception. Good is divided into "honorable, useful, and pleasurable." The honorable is that which can be loved according to the dictate of right reason; the useful, that which conduces to obtaining

something else; the pleasurable, that which is apt to delight the one desiring it. These members are not really distinct in every object, but in many they are distinct only by reason. The Excellent Doctor, disp. 10, Metaph., explains their proper notions, as also the notion of good in common, broadly and wisely. For now it is enough to observe, 1º, that good in common, or transcendental good, differs from being only in the mode of signifying. For good is the same as perfect, or as having some perfection; but perfection and entity are formally the same. Good, however, is signified after the manner of what is suitable to something, that is, both to itself and to another: to itself, insofar as its own quiddity and existence are suitable to every entity; to another, insofar as it also has suitability with respect to something really distinct. In both ways it is convertible with being, as the Excellent Doctor proves, disp. cit. s. 3; but in the former way it is called absolute good, or good in itself; in the latter, relative good, or the good of another. In either way, however, good is the same as intrinsically appetible, at least prescinding from innate and elicited appetite.

51. 2º, that this division is not adequate if honorable good is taken strictly for moral good, or good in the order of right conduct; for besides this there is a good of nature which, prescinding from the notion of virtue and from pleasurableness or usefulness for something else, is appetible in itself, for example, health, integrity, and life itself. The division will nevertheless be adequate if honorable good is taken in a broader sense; for thus, as Fr. Suárez explains, d. cit. s. 2, it comprises both moral good, that is, what is in itself becoming and consonant with right reason, and the good of nature, or natural good, that is, what is in itself advantageous to nature, prescinding from pleasure. 3º, that useful good does not mean the same as what is in itself advantageous to the one desiring it, for then it would be confused with the good of nature; rather, it is taken for a means conducive to attaining another good, precisely as such. For this reason it is not contained under the formal object of the will, but only under its material object, since it cannot be loved except for the sake of another. Indeed, it is not good by a goodness intrinsic to itself, but only by an extrinsic goodness borrowed from the end, as Fr. Suárez subtly explains, cit. s. 2, n. 22, et sqq. Finally observe that good of whatever kind is either real or apprehended, that is, apparent or falsely apprehended; and the latter can also be loved by the will, as experience shows.

52. The will is divided into concupiscible and irascible; this division, which is certainly not real but one of reason or according to functions, together with the acts corresponding to each part, is to be explained as above, disp. 5, n. 126, concerning the sensitive appetite. It is likewise divided,

also according to functions, into prosecutive and aversive. It is called prosecutive insofar as it tends toward an object through acts of love, desire, joy, etc.; aversive insofar as it recoils from an object through acts of hatred, abhorrence, sadness, etc. If perhaps from this one infers that good is not the adequate object of the will, since the will as aversive regards not good but evil, the consequence will be denied concerning the will taken according to its primary concept, which imports only the power of willing or pursuing. For the aversive power is secondary in the will, since aversion is of itself rooted in prosecution; for we hate evil precisely because we love the opposite good. Hence it can be said that good is the formal object, or motive, with respect to all affections of the will: the intrinsic motive of prosecutions, and at least the extrinsic motive of aversions, insofar as it is the motive of the preceding acts from which aversions arise.

53. Now concerning the object of the will it is asked, 1º, whether the formal object of the will is the same as the end? I answer: It is not the same if the end is taken for the object moving one to execute the means, for we often simply love an object while thinking nothing about attaining it through means. It is, however, the same if the end is taken for the motive, or the object appetible for its own sake. It is asked, 2º, whether the will can love evil as evil, or under the notion of evil, with no goodness proposed to it for the sake of which it is moved? All deny this except the Nominalists. First, because the will must be enticed, attracted, or moved by the object in order to love; indeed, it needs prior cognition of the object for no other reason. But evil as such does not attract, but repels; nor does the will find in it a motive of love. Again, because a means known to be useless for an end cannot be loved for the sake of the end, precisely because in relation to the end it is not good; therefore an object known as not good in itself cannot be loved for its own sake. The *a priori* reason is that good is the object of the will as prosecutive, just as color is the object of the visual potency. Hence, just as a vision that represented neither true nor apparent color is repugnant, so too is a love or prosecution that does not tend toward at least an apparent good. From this one may gather that love of an altogether indifferent object, in which neither badness nor goodness is proposed, is likewise repugnant.

54. It is objected, 1º: if the will cannot love evil, neither will it be able to hate good; therefore its liberty is destroyed. For either the object is proposed as good, and thus it cannot be hated, or as evil, and thus it cannot be loved. 2º: someone can will an object in which no good at all appears merely for the sake of exercising liberty, for example, to kill himself. 3º: the damned hate God, who is purely good; therefore they will also be able to love what is

purely evil. And they seem in fact to do so when they desire their own annihilation, which removes the foundation of every good proper to them. 4º: someone often wills evil to an enemy precisely because it is evil to him. 5º: impossible things, known as such and therefore lacking all goodness, are often loved. These are easily answered. To 1º: liberty of contrariety remains if the good is proposed as mixed with evil, as most often happens. Thus theft is proposed as a useful or pleasurable good and at the same time as a dishonorable evil, or one dissonant with reason; and conversely fasting as an honorable good and at the same time as an inconvenient or unpleasant evil. But if an object is sometimes proposed as purely good or purely evil, at least liberty of contradiction will remain.

55. To 2º: the very manifestation of liberty or dominion over one's own life is apprehended as good, and the killing or evil of death is loved only for its sake. To 3º: when the damned hate God, they know Him as avenger and author of the punishment they suffer; and therefore in Him they apprehend some notion of an evil inconvenient or unpleasant to themselves. They desire their annihilation, however, not for its own sake, but as a means, or as a useful good, toward the cessation of torments, which they apprehend as good. To 4º: no one wills evil to an enemy unless he apprehends in the enemy's suffering a notion of vengeance useful or pleasurable to himself. Yet when someone wills evil to another out of enmity, he is said to will the other's evil as such, not because the volition rests in it as in its motive or formal object, but because in the very notion of the other's evil, as such, there stands the usefulness for the end of vengeance. This does not occur in the same way when someone for the sake of his own good wills evil to another, not from enmity but from avarice or concupiscence; for example, if a son desires his father's death so that he may enter upon the inheritance as soon as possible. For then he wills the other's evil only as useful to his own good, with a usefulness that would likewise be desirable even if it were not founded upon the notion of evil.

56. To 5º: an impossible thing, known as such, cannot be loved except perhaps under the condition of possibility, under which it is already apprehended as good. But more on this immediately. It must now be observed that the common opinion holds even with respect to the absolute power of God; for not even God can invert the essence of love, which by its concept is a tendency toward good. Some, however, maintain that a love supernaturally determined by God is possible which regards an object that is transcendentally good in itself but appears in cognition as purely evil, because such a love would in reality be a tendency toward good, nor would the formal object of love, which is real good, be lacking to it; only the prior

condition, namely cognition of the good as such, would be absent. Yet this opinion does not admit love of evil as such, that is, love moved by the notion of evil; it merely posits love of an unknown real good, to which the cognition then existing, which proposes that object as evil, would stand materially. That love of an unknown object is repugnant even by divine power will be evident from the following chapter.

57. It is asked, 3º, whether, or to what extent, the will can love an impossible thing known as such? I answer, 1º: the will cannot with an efficacious absolute affection desire a good known as impossible. Proof: because such an affection seriously intends the absolute attainment of the end and efficaciously moves toward seeking and executing the means. But this intention and motion are impossible regarding an end known as absolutely unattainable, both from the terms themselves and from experience, and because no means can be known as useful. I answer, 2º: there can be an inefficacious love, or simple complacency, concerning a good known as absolutely impossible, under the condition that it were possible. Proof: because for simple complacency any species or appearance of goodness is sufficient, even under an impossible condition. Thus someone can take delight in imagining himself to be an Angel or omnipotent. The reason is that such an affection is, as it were, speculative and does not move one seriously to procure the attainment of the end.

58. I answer, 3º: a good known as impossible can also be loved by an efficacious affection that is objectively conditioned, that is, by now loving the goodness of the object as suitable under the condition that it were possible. Proof: because such conditioned goodness can truly be loved at least by simple complacency. Therefore, if the will applies a greater effort, it will be able to love that goodness so strongly that it excludes from itself efficacious hatred of the same object under the same condition. But a love incompossible with efficacious hatred of its object is not simple complacency, but efficacious love. And thus experience teaches that a contrite sinner efficaciously wills never to have sinned, if that could be done, although it is impossible for the sin not to have occurred on the supposition that it did occur, which supposition the very affection of repentance of itself presupposes. So too a man unable to bear misery, especially one damned, vehemently desires never to have been born or drawn forth from nothing, although this affection presupposes the existence of the one desiring, which once posited makes the object altogether impossible. To this also pertains the fact that holy men often ardently desire to love God with an infinite love proportioned to His goodness, if that could be done, although they know well that it cannot be done.

59. It is objected: a volition under an impossible condition is usually expressed by "I would will"; but that verb does not signify a volition which exists, but one which would exist were the condition posited, just as "I would see" does not signify a vision now existing, but one which would exist, or signifies an act of intellect by which the vision is known to be going to exist under some condition. I answer: such a volition is indeed usually expressed in that way, whence it is commonly called a "velleity," especially when it is inefficacious. But then the expression "I would will" is not taken merely conditionally, like "I would see," "I would hear," and the like. Rather, according to the common intention of speakers it signifies an affection subjectively absolute and objectively conditioned. For who would doubt that this is the intention, for example, of a hungry man when he says, "I would eat, if I had food"? Hence that expression in such circumstances has the same force as "would that." And certainly one who says, "Would that I had not sinned! Would that I had never been born! Would that I could love God infinitely!" signifies some present affection, and indeed an efficacious one if conceived with great ardor of mind. It must be noted, however, that love under an impossible condition is not efficacious in such a way that of itself it is truly capable of entailing the absolute positing of the object or the execution of means for obtaining it, on the hypothesis that it were possible; for a true conditional capacity to effect something under an impossible condition is repugnant. Therefore the efficacy of such an affection must be explained, as above, through its present incompossibility with hatred concerning the same object.

60. It is asked, 4º, whether hatred of evil must formally be love of the opposite good? Formally, I say, or expressly, for virtually or interpretatively it is always love of the opposite goodness. It is commonly answered that hatred of a purely privative evil, such as death or lack of light, is formally love of the opposite good, because an evil of this sort has in itself no ground or motive for hatred except insofar as it is the formal exclusion of good. Therefore there is no reason why it should be hated except because the opposite good is loved. But hatred of a positive evil, that is, one opposed to good not merely contradictorily but contrarily, such as adultery, theft, or a headache, need not formally be love of the contrary good. First, because such an evil has in itself a ground of hatred. Again, because hatred stands to evil as love stands to good; but love of good need not formally be hatred of the contrary evil, for someone can love virtue while thinking nothing about the contrary vices.

61. It is asked, 5º, whether the will, as prosecutive, must always regard in the object a good suitable to itself, or in some way its own? The common

opinion affirms this, and Fr. Suárez holds it here, lib. 5, c. 2, n. 7. Proof 1º, from Aristotle, 5, Ethic. c. 8, saying: "The lovable is indeed good, but for each one his own good." 2º: because innate appetite cannot tend except toward a physical good suitable to nature; therefore neither can elicited appetite tend except toward a good known as in some way proper to the one desiring it. For each appetite is given by nature for pursuing goods suitable to its own *suppositum*. 3º: because love is a kind of weight and inclination toward the object as toward a center in which the lover rests; but the lover cannot rest in a good in which there is no suitability or proportion with respect to himself. 4º: because, as St. Augustine says, 8, *De Trinitate* c. 10, love is a certain union or bond; but "union," says St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 28, ar. 2, ad 2, "belongs to the notion of love insofar as, through the complacency of appetite, the lover stands toward that which he loves as toward himself or toward something of his own."

62. It must nevertheless be noted that a good can be called suitable to the one desiring it not only when it is advantageous or pleasurable to him, but also when it is becoming, consonant with, and proportioned to him as rational, as God is in reality insofar as He is good in Himself; likewise when the object is in some way one with the one desiring it, or in some way pertains to him by reason of friendship, kinship, or similarity, whether univocally or analogically. St. Thomas explains this at 1, 2, q. 27, ar. 3, while proving that similarity is a cause of love. Hence one may gather that in this opinion love of benevolence or friendship is not confused with love of concupiscence. For although each love tends toward a good suitable to the one desiring, love of concupiscence wills the advantage of the desiring subject as physically distinct from others; whereas love of benevolence or friendship wills the good of another who is only morally something belonging to the desiring subject, namely by reason of proportion, friendship, similarity, etc.

63. But one may still object: someone can have complacency in some object, for example something beautiful, that in no way pertains to him, as experience seems to teach. I answer: that complacency is not in the object, but in the sight or contemplation of the object, which is known in exercise as one's own good. 2º: the beautiful is then known as pleasurable to the one desiring it. 3º: that object pertains to the one desiring by reason of a certain proportion or similarity, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, loc. cit. Nor perhaps is it necessary that the suitability with respect to the one desiring be expressly known or loved; it is enough that, after the manner of an objective condition, it actually be found in the object known as absolutely good.

CHAPTER IV.
Whether, and to What Extent, the Will Depends on Prior Cognition in Operating.

64. A twofold question must be treated here. First: whether the will can love an object proposed to it with no prior cognition? That naturally it cannot is certain to all, for the Mystics whom some allege to the contrary speak only of supernatural rapture or ecstasy. Hence as a first principle this maxim has prevailed among all: "Nothing is willed unless first known," which experience confirms to be true at least from the nature of the thing. See Fr. Suárez, d. 23, Met. s. 7. It is usually objected that the will sometimes commands the intellect to cease from every cognition. But it must be denied that this can occur unless the very cessation which is commanded is first known. Hence that command must except the cognition by which it is directed, nor can it be conserved once that cognition ceases. Similarly, whenever someone desires to know things unknown, he first knows in a confused way the knowledge which he desires, and indeed the very objects themselves, which are called unknown only relative to clear and scientific knowledge. And generally, whenever the will commands some cognition or applies the intellect to it, the commanded cognition must in some way be known beforehand. Nor does the intellect depend upon the command or application of the will for every cognition; for at least as regards the first, it is determined by God or by the object.

65. It is nevertheless doubtful whether, at least by the absolute power of God, it can happen that the will loves what is unknown. Some Scotists, such as Vulpes and Cavellus, and also some of our authors, especially Fathers Oviedo and Peinado, affirm this after Ockham, Palludanus, and some other ancients. But the Thomists commonly deny it with St. Thomas, the Scotists with Scotus, and our authors with Fr. Suárez, cit. disp. 23, s. 7. Their opinion is proved thus: the will cannot even by divine power love without a motive or reason for loving; but it would love without a motive if it loved what is unknown; therefore, etc. The premises must be proved separately. First, the major premise is proved: the will cannot even by divine power love without an object which becomes loved, as all admit; therefore neither without an object which is either formal or material, since object as such is adequately divided into these members, just as animal into rational and irrational. But to be a formal object is to be loved for its own sake, and to be a material object is to be loved for the sake of another. Therefore the will can in no way

love without an object loved either for itself or for another; therefore neither can it love without a motive or reason for loving, which the particle "for the sake of" imports by its very terms. Add that the will cannot even by divine power love pure evil either in the being of the thing or in the being of the known, for no other reason than that it finds in it no motive of love.

66. Now the minor premise of the first syllogism is proved: the will is moved only by a good previously known; therefore, if it loved what is unknown, it would love without a motive, for that by which the will is not moved is not an actual motive; and although it may be a motive in aptitude, if it does not move, it stands just as though it did not exist. The antecedent is proved: the motion of the will by good does not consist in some physical influx of good, for the will is commonly moved by a good which does not physically exist, and sometimes cannot even exist. Therefore that motion consists in intentional influx, namely in this, that the will is enticed and invited by an object proposed through cognition; for there is nothing else in which it can consist. Therefore, cognition failing, the will can in no way be moved by good. The same point is explained and pressed. The created will is moved by the object in the genus of final cause; nor can it fail to be so moved if it loves, since under every hypothesis it must love the object either for itself or for another. But a final cause cannot cause except as known; therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved, first because a physical cause, for example an efficient cause, cannot cause even by divine power unless physically existing; therefore neither can a final cause unless existing intentionally, or as known. For as physical existence stands to a physical cause, so intentional existence stands to a final cause, since the latter, as distinguished from physical causes, claims such existence for itself from its proper concept. Again, because true causality, such as final causation is, as we saw in Physics, presupposes some actual being in the cause. But in a final cause it does not presuppose physical being, as is certain; therefore it presupposes intentional being.

67. Confirmation: the formal notion under which the will tends is not good in itself independently of cognition; therefore it is good as known. And since the will cannot be withdrawn from its formal notion, as the adversaries do not doubt, it can in no way tend toward an unknown good. The antecedent is proved: although the will loves an object which on the part of the thing is purely evil or purely chimerical, and therefore lacks all real goodness, it is not withdrawn from its formal notion, provided the object appears good in cognition. But it would be withdrawn if, as its formal notion, it regarded the object as good in itself independently of cognition; for the object which has only apparent goodness is not such a good. If one says that

the object of the will in common prescinds from real and apparent good, because through some acts the will tends toward real good, while through others it tends toward apparent good, I reply, 1º: at least love of a purely apparent good essentially presupposes cognition; otherwise it could be elicited without an object, namely without either apparent or real good. Therefore the same must be said of love of real good. The consequence is evident because this love, being more perfect and more similar to divine love, cannot be less rational than love of a purely apparent good; yet it would be less rational if it were less connected with cognition.

68. I reply, 2º: if volition generically does not essentially tend toward known good, it will not differ in the genus of appetite from innate appetite; for the latter also tends toward real good and, moreover, can sometimes be an elicited act, or one produced by the appetitive subject, as is, for example, the gravity of a stone, which is both immanently produced by the substance and is its inclination or weight toward the good of possessing the center. Nor let it be said that the difference lies in the fact that volition naturally presupposes cognition. For the local motion of a separated soul or of an Angel is a certain act elicited by the substance; it is also an appetite for its terminus, namely location, since it is an inclination toward the terminus, and so efficacious that it essentially entails its existence. Moreover, it naturally presupposes cognition, since an Angel cannot naturally move by his own power unless knowing and willing. And yet that motion is not volition, but a certain innate appetite for its terminus. Why? Because it does not essentially presuppose cognition, since it can be elicited by an ignorant Angel through God's determination.

69. Therefore the essential connection of love with cognition is founded upon the fact that the will cannot be withdrawn from the formal notion under which it tends; and that notion is constituted through cognition, since it consists in good as apprehended or known. The same comes to this: good is not objectible to the will except as apt to move it toward love of itself; but it is not sufficiently apt to move, or to be a motive, except as proposed through cognition. It must be noted, however, that good is constituted in the being of a motive through cognition, not as through a motive power or reason of moving or finalizing, as is clear from what was said in Physics concerning final cause, but as through an extrinsic form formally constituting it in the state of being simply able to move. Thus the apprehension "man" constitutes human nature in the being of what is predicable of many, not as the reason which is predicated or can be predicated of many, but as an extrinsic form formally constituting the nature in the state of being simply able to be predicated. So too in physics, the

existence of a cause, if it is distinguished from essence, as the Thomists think, is not the reason for acting or an active power, not even partially; nevertheless it constitutes the essence in the state of being simply able to act. Therefore cognition of a lovable object is to be called a motive or reason for moving, not "as that which," but "as that by which," or "constitutively."

70. It is objected, 1º: cognition of the good is a mere condition for the production of love; but a mere condition for an effect can be supplied by divine power, as is evident in the application of fire to burning and in the disposition of matter for receiving a form; therefore. I deny the minor premise if it speaks indiscriminately of every condition. For the duration of an efficient cause and its existence, if distinguished from its essence, cannot be supplied by divine power. The premises also, according to a probable opinion, are essentially prerequired for the act of the conclusion, although they are mere conditions. And the applicative decree of absolute Omnipotence is essentially prerequired for every effect, although of itself formally as such, or insofar as virtually distinguished from Omnipotence, it is not an active power but only a condition, according to the common doctrine. I grant that a mere condition should not be asserted to be essentially necessary without proof. But it is not so asserted in the present case.

71. It is objected, 2º: innate appetite tends toward real good in the same way as elicited appetite tends toward apprehended good; but innate appetite can tend toward a good which is real not actually but possibly, as when matter appetites a possible form. Therefore elicited appetite will likewise be able to tend toward a good which is known not actually but potentially. Confirmation: by divine power the visual potency can see a nonexistent color; therefore the will can also love an object not known. For cognition of good is no more required for love than existence of color for vision. The objection absurdly proves that elicited appetite could naturally tend toward what is unknown, just as innate appetite often naturally tends toward a possible good. Therefore it must be denied that innate appetite generally presupposes, even naturally, the real existence of its object or terminus; for this existence is prerequired under no title, since this appetite is not physically caused by its terminus. It belongs only to the common notion of such appetite to regard a good that is of itself naturally possible, or connaturally attainable; and this in such a way that not even by divine power could it regard another. In this sense its comparison with elicited appetite as regarding apprehended good must be made.

72. To the confirmation I deny the consequence together with the attached proof. For the exercised existence or presence of color is required

for vision under no other title than because a species is required which depends upon the color for its production and conservation; for color causes vision in no other way than by efficiently producing the species. Since, therefore, God can by Himself produce and conserve the species, or even supply its causality, which is generally true of the influx of any created efficient cause, at least one not vital, it follows that the exercised presence of color is only naturally necessary. See above, disp. 5, n. 166, et sqq. But cognition is required for love as a form constituting the object as simply lovable or simply proportioned to moving and terminating love. And since God cannot by Himself supply the intrinsic constitutives of things, He cannot bring it about that an object without cognition becomes proportioned to love. Cognition is likewise required as the proper existence of the final cause in its genus. And since God cannot bring it about that love proceeds from the will without a final cause, nor that this cause finalizes without intentional existence, He therefore cannot bring it about that without cognition there are all the co-principles sufficient for love.

73. It is objected, 3º: at least if love consists in an absolute quality, God will be able by Himself to produce love and infuse it into the will without any prior cognition. In that event the will would become loving, since all the constitutives of this denomination would exist. To the objection some deny that in that event the will would be denominated loving, because it is not a subject capable of this denomination except as previously having cognition, which constitutes, "as that by which," its capacity for loving. Thus, in the opinion distinguishing essence from existence, the essence of the will is not a subject capable of the denomination "loving" except insofar as actually existing, although existence is not loving "as that which." But it is better to answer by denying the hypothesis, either because love identifies with itself its production by the will, or because, although it is produced by a distinct action and in this sense is called an absolute quality, nevertheless by reason of vitality it essentially requires that it proceed from the will. More on this in the following disputations. And there is a confirming case in love of an object not truly but apparently good: such love cannot be produced by God alone outside a knowing will; otherwise it would either change its object or regard no object.

74. It is objected, 4º: the Mystics testify that often in ecstasy, or in the highest degree of prayer, divine love is aroused, or at least conserved, without actual cognition. St. Bonaventure, the Seraphic Mother Teresa, St. Francis de Sales, and others are usually cited for this. But Fr. Arriaga asks the Mystics how they knew or remembered that they had loved, or had had love of God rather than of a stone, if they loved without any cognition of the

object. For memory is only of what has previously been known. Yet this question, although received and repeated by many with approval, does not press very strongly. For love, as is commonly supposed, leaves an experiential species of itself, which at least mediately also represents the object of love; and through this species someone will later be able to remember that he loved and what he loved. Nor is memory only of what was previously known, but also of what was previously willed. Setting aside this objection, therefore, it must be denied for the reasons given above that love can ever be aroused or conserved without any cognition whatsoever. The holy Doctors, however, must be interpreted as speaking only of reflexive cognition, insofar as the soul raised to the highest degree of prayer is so rapt and occupied by love of divine things that it does not reflexively advert that it knows; or also of discursive cognition, which they call "meditation," and which the soul does not always need in order to love God most fervently.

75. The second question: whether cognition efficiently influences an act of the will? Durandus, Cajetan, and some Scotists, with the Nominalists, affirm this, as cited by Mastrius, disp. 7, n. 164, and also some of our authors, as cited by Fr. Quirós, disp. 87, n. 31. But the common opinion in every School denies it, with St. Thomas, Scotus, and Suárez, as cited by the same Quirós, n. 32. This opinion is more probable. For first, cognition is admitted to be necessary for willing under no other title than that of direction, illumination, and existence of the final cause; but these functions do not of themselves require active influx. Furthermore, if cognition actively concurred in volition, various absurdities would follow. 1º, that for supernatural love of God an infused habit of charity, or another supernatural active co-principle besides supernatural cognition, which must necessarily precede, would not be necessary. This has greatest force in the love of the Blessed: for if the beatific vision actively concurs in it, and the vision is certainly not less perfect than love, what need would there be for another supernatural principle? Hence the assumed habit of charity would give facility in being able, but not the simple power of being able, which is more than absurd.

76. It would follow, 2º, that if someone through a supernatural act of infused knowledge knows a forbidden object and nevertheless wills it, which certainly can happen since that cognition does not remove liberty, the sinful action of the will would actively proceed from a supernatural principle, with which it would therefore be essentially connected, and would be a supernatural action; which again is undoubtedly absurd. 3º, that one and the same cognition would be an active power of various and contrary affections. For under the same cognition, for example concerning an object honorable

yet at the same time inconvenient, or pleasurable yet at the same time base, volition and nolition, or love and hatred, can be elicited, as can an efficacious and inefficacious affection, absolute and conditioned. But although this amplitude of power belongs to a potency as a universal cause, it would only absurdly be granted to a particular cognition, especially since the latter is often very imperfect in its own genus. Add that, if active power belonged to cognition, a more perfect cognition would be active of a more perfect affection, just as, because such power belongs to cognition with respect to a habit, a more perfect cognition produces a more perfect habit. But the falsity of the consequence is evident in speculative cognition, which is usually more perfect than practical cognition and yet arouses no affection beyond simple complacency at most.

77. It is objected, 1º: the species actively influences cognition; therefore cognition also influences love. The consequence is proved, 1º, because perfection, proportion, and necessity are no less in cognition than in the species. 2º, because just as knowledge is produced by object and potency, so is love; for love ought to depend no less upon the object than knowledge does. Therefore, just as the object influences knowledge through the species, so it influences love through cognition, especially since it often cannot influence through itself, being absent or nonexistent. I answer by denying the consequence, because the species performs no function other than that of a co-efficient principle, nor under any other title is it necessary in the intellect, as we saw, disp. 6, n. 44; nor does any inconvenience follow from its active concurrence. But cognition, although it does not actively influence, is necessary for loving under the title of direction and of the existence of the final cause, or of a form constituting the object in the being of a motive; and, moreover, from its influx the absurdities just indicated would follow.

78. To 1º of the proof: although cognition is not less perfect or less necessary than the species, that it is less or not at all proportioned to influencing is sufficiently gathered *a posteriori* from the absurdities that would follow from its influx. To 2º, it can be granted that not only cognition but also love is produced, that is, caused, by object and potency, but in a different genus. For cognition is caused by the object in the genus of efficient cause, since it cannot be caused in any other; love, however, is caused in the genus of final cause. This genus of cause does not efficiently influence or physically move the will, but intentionally and metaphorically, although it causes properly, as was explained in Physics. Hence, even if cognition actively influenced love, this influx would not be under the title of object nor proper to final cause. It can also be said that the object exercises the function of motive through cognition, not as the proximate reason of

moving, but as an application or existence required for such a genus of cause. Why the intellect rather than the will needs an active co-principle for its natural acts was stated in disp. 6, n. 17, 20, and 21.

79. It is objected, 2º: love is specified by cognition, since it varies according to the diversity of cognition; therefore it is caused by cognition, certainly in the genus of efficient cause, since it does not depend upon it as upon an end or object. I answer: cognition can be called a specifying principle of love, not "as that which," but "as that by which," or after the manner of an application, condition, or form constituting the object in the being of what is proximately able to specify in this or that way. This suffices for love often to vary according to the variation of cognition, although cognition neither actively influences nor finalizes. See what was said, tr. 2, Physic. d. 2, c. 3, n. 17. Nevertheless, the function of a moral efficient cause must be granted to cognition, because of itself it inclines the will toward love. But a moral cause does not require active physical influx, of which we are speaking. See loc. cit. Physic. cap. 5, n. 17 and 18. It is objected, 3º: the Divine Word is a principle physically influencing the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through the will; therefore likewise the word of the created mind, or intellection, ought to influence an act of the will. I deny the consequence, because the Divine Word is an intelligent and loving substance, really identifying with Himself the divine will. It is therefore not surprising that He has spirative power, or power productive of the Holy Spirit. But a created word is adequately distinct from the will, nor is there any reason why it should participate in the power productive of love.

CHAPTER V.

What Kind of Cognition Is Necessary for Willing? Where It Is Asked Whether the Will Is More Perfect Than the Intellect.

80. Having established that cognition is altogether required for an act of the will, it is now asked, 1º, whether simple apprehension suffices, or whether judgment is required. The Thomists require judgment for every act of the will. The Scotists with Scotus, as cited by Mastrius here, disp. 7, n. 153, think apprehension sufficient for inefficacious acts or simple complacencies, but require judgment for efficacious affections. Most of our authors hold the same with Fr. Suárez, disp. 23, Met. sect. 7, n. 9 and 10. Some, however, with Fr. Oviedo, require judgment for an efficacious affection to be elicited prudently, but not for one elicited imprudently and after the manner of brutes. Indeed, Fr. Quirós here, disp. 87, n. 30, seems to think that judgment is not always necessary for a prudent, free, and efficacious election. He

alleges the example of a physician who not imprudently applies a doubtful remedy to a sick man concerning whose health he despairs by means of known medicines, although he has neither a judgment concerning the possibility of the end which he intends nor concerning the usefulness of the means which he chooses.

81. It must be presupposed that some apprehensions are conceived without foundation and propose no motive or reason for judging; for example, if someone, hearing another rashly say that the stars are even in number, or that a Turk is now dancing, or that beatitude is evil, immediately simply apprehends these objects. Other apprehensions either evidently propose the object or vividly represent motives or compelling reasons for judging; as when someone, hearing from a trustworthy witness of the death of a friend, simply apprehends it as reported by such a witness but does not yet judge. Apprehensions of this kind, which are called "suasive" and which Fr. Suárez recognizes, cit. n. 10, although they are not formal judgments because formally they affirm or deny nothing, can nevertheless be called virtual or radical judgments, because they strongly incline toward judging and in some way are equivalent to judgment in the force of certifying the intellect and removing doubt.

82. I say, therefore, 1º: an apprehension of the first kind concerning the suitability of an object does not suffice for any act of the will. First, because according to Aristotle, St. John Damascene, and St. Thomas, in the places cited by Fr. Suárez, ubi supra n. 9, the will is not moved without some judgment; but an apprehension of this sort in no sense deserves the name of judgment. Again, because such an apprehension is compatible with a certain judgment denying the suitability which is apprehended, nor does it render the object properly known. For if someone is asked whether the stars are even in number, he will answer that this is altogether unknown to him, although by that very fact he apprehends such an object. But the will cannot appetite a good properly unknown. One may object: someone often takes delight in apprehending himself to be a King, Pope, Angel, or omniscient like God. I answer: that delight proceeds from a conditioned judgment concerning the suitability of the object under the condition that it were obtained or could be obtained, or at least from a suasive apprehension concerning this same conditioned suitability.

83. I say, 2º: an apprehension of the second kind, which is called suasive, suffices even for an efficacious affection, at least an imprudent one. First, by parity with the appetite of brutes, which is moved to efficacious acts by internal sensation, although this is not a formal judgment but only a virtual one, after the manner of a suasive apprehension. Again, because such an

apprehension suffices for an act of the will to be said to proceed from judgment; which is again evident from the same example. For, as St. Thomas says, 1, p. q. 59, ar. 3, "A sheep flees a wolf from a certain judgment by which it estimates him harmful to itself." Hence the authority of the ancients recently alleged is satisfied, for they can be understood of either formal or virtual judgment. Again, because an apprehension of this kind renders the object properly known, and therefore in it the definition is properly verified, from what was said tr. 5, Logic. d. 1, c. 2, n. 12. Finally, because experience seems to attest this. For often one who is accustomed vehemently to love or hate some object, at the simple apprehension of it immediately bursts forth into an affection of efficacious love or hatred; and if some obvious means is present which he apprehends as useful, he immediately chooses it. A formal judgment does not seem to be awaited for affections of this sort. Hence one may gather that sometimes under apprehension alone a free affection imputable as a fault can be elicited, namely if the suasive apprehension proposes the object as pleasurable and at the same time dishonorable. One may say: whenever a suasive apprehension is present, judgment is also present, because the former necessitates judgment. I answer: a suasive apprehension indeed inclines, but does not necessitate judgment unless it is altogether evident. Indeed, it is not certain that evident apprehension necessitates as regards exercise; and although natural necessity were certain, judgment could at least by divine power be impeded, in which event apprehension would suffice for an act of the will.

84. I say, 3º: for a prudent effect, especially one which is an election of means for the sake of an end or which determines to election, a formal judgment is required. All or nearly all think thus, and rightly, because no one prudently intends or chooses from the first appearance of good; rather, according to the rules of prudence he must first not merely look at but look around the matter and weigh in the balance of judgment the suitability of the end and usefulness of the means. Nor is judgment lacking in the example of the physician adduced in n. 80, for the sick man's health is then judged attainable under the condition that the doubtful remedy is in fact useful, and it is intended only under this condition. The remedy, moreover, is applied from a judgment concerning the nonappearance of uselessness or concerning doubtful usefulness, which suffices in those circumstances.

85. It is asked, 2º, whether, or to what extent, the judgment, whether formal or virtual, prerequired for volition must be practical. For the present purpose, that judgment is called practical which proposes the object in a manner proximately apt for the will to be able to will it without awaiting any further persuasion of the intellect. It is called speculative, however, if it is

not proximately apt to arouse an affection of the will, because it represents the good abstractly and without relation to the one judging, or not as lovable by him here and now. This being posited, all agree that a practical judgment is necessary for willing. It likewise seems certain that a judgment would not be practical in the said sense unless it proposed the good as suitable to the knower, namely with the suitability of pleasure, advantage, or moral rectitude, and indeed unless it judged that it is suitable here and now to will it. For, as Fr. Suárez observes, ubi supra n. 12, when the will is moved, it not only wills the object but in exercise also wills its own act. Hence it is necessary that judgment also be made concerning the suitability of having the volition here and now.

86. It is nevertheless questioned whether anything more is required in order for a judgment to be sufficiently practical. The Thomists mentioned by Fr. Suárez, disp. 19, Met. sect. 6, require for all affections, even free ones, a judgment or dictate of reason that is not merely practical in any way whatsoever, but irresistibly determines the will and declares that, all things considered, the object is to be embraced here and now. They usually call this dictate "the command of the intellect," although by this name the Thomists commonly designate a certain intellectual impulse corresponding to the words "do this," which is neither apprehension, judgment, nor discourse, and which, moreover, is prerequired for every act of the will and has the force of determining efficaciously, or indefectibly. But this Thomistic doctrine is extensively and efficaciously attacked by Fr. Suárez, cit. disp. 19, s. 6 and 7, and in Theology is likewise extensively opposed by our authors and the Scotists. For now it can be briefly opposed from the standpoint of liberty.

87. For either of those acts, or either intellectual command, if it is necessarily prerequired for willing and is indefectibly connected with a determinate operation of the will, overthrows its liberty, since it removes sufficiency and indifference toward omission or toward the opposite operation, as is easily gathered from what was said in Physics against the physical premotion asserted by the Thomists. Indeed, the overthrow of liberty is clearer here. For physical premotion, according to the Thomists, is compatible with liberty because it is neither placed on the side of the first act of liberty nor required so much on the side of the secondary cause as on the side of the first cause. But that intellectual command, if it exists, undoubtedly stands on the side of the first act for willing and is required on the side of man. Nor let it be said that this command is conceived by the intellect from the free application of the will and therefore induces only consequent necessity. For I ask whether another command of the intellect

preceded the free application of the will. If this is denied, then such a command is not prerequired for every free act of the will, and the doctrine of the Thomists collapses. If it is affirmed, that other command will overthrow liberty, for it cannot be asserted to depend upon another free application unless one proceeds to infinity.

88. They have recourse to mutual priority, by virtue of which that very volition which is determined by the command of reason applies the intellect to eliciting this very command. But besides what was said in Physics against mutual priority, this is now easily attacked because it would have to be a mutual priority in the same genus of cause, which even displeases the Thomists. Proof: if volition is the application and determination of the intellect to efficiently producing the command, the command likewise is the application and determination of the will to efficiently producing the volition. Therefore, if volition is for that reason prior in the genus of efficient cause, by the same right the command will be prior in that same genus. Add that this recourse is openly alien to St. Thomas, who at 1, 2, q. 17, ar. 1 denies that the command of reason has the power of moving except from a presupposed act of the will; and at ar. 5, ad 3, to avoid a process to infinity, he has recourse to the first act of the will, which he denies to be from the command of reason. What the Holy Doctor indicates there, however, namely that this act is necessary as arising from an instinct of nature or of a superior cause, must be understood of necessity not as regards exercise but only as regards specification. Otherwise the liberty of the other acts would be destroyed, since all of them, if the doctrine of a prerequired intellectual command predetermining the will were maintained, would arise by inevitable consequences from an altogether necessary act not determined by the will itself. This would also overthrow the constant doctrine of St. Thomas, alleged in Physics against the Predeterminists, namely that the will is determined to neither extreme of liberty except by itself.

89. Moreover, that practical dictate discussed in n. 86 is usually rejected especially because, if it is necessary, it follows that no one sins without having a heretical judgment. Proof of the consequence: no one will freely commit adultery, for example, unless he first has this judgment: "Adultery, all things considered, is to be embraced now." But this judgment is heretical, since it is directly contrary to this judgment of Faith: "Adultery, all things considered, is never to be embraced." Nor does it matter that the former is practical and limited to individual circumstances. First, because it does not thereby cease to be contrary to the universal judgment of Faith. Again, because Faith also practically dictates the contradictory, namely that adultery in these circumstances is not to be embraced but avoided. If one

says that adultery is not judged to be embraced or preferred to the absolute good of chastity, but only in relation to the end of sensible pleasure, then first this seems contrary to the intention of the adversaries, who require that judgment precisely because they think the will can will nothing unless it judges it to be a greater or more desirable good here and now, and thence infer that no sin is committed without an error of intellect. This certainly is not preserved if adultery is judged merely more desirable than chastity, that is, more apt for sensible pleasure, for this is known without error. Next, with that judgment thus restricted it is quite compatible that one simultaneously judge it absolutely better here and now to avoid adultery and preserve chastity. This being posited, there is no reason why the former judgment should be given the power of efficaciously determining the will, since another preponderating judgment is simultaneously present to restrain the will.

90. Finally, against the command "do this," it is usually argued that, if it exists, it is not an act of the intellect but of the will. First, because there is no act of the intellect which does not represent an object. Therefore either it represents simply, and it will be an apprehension, or by affirming or denying, and it will be a judgment, or by inferring one thing from another, and it will be discourse. Again, because this command has whatever belongs to the notion of an act of the will. For it presupposes cognition of the object which it commands, since nothing unknown is commanded; and thereafter it is a weight and efficacious inclination toward the commanded terminus, certainly as good. Again, because St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 17, ar. 1, attributes to the will the power of moving which belongs to the command "do this." Hence, if such command is considered not as representing but precisely as moving or impelling, as the Thomists seem to consider it, it is only an act of the will according to the mind of St. Thomas and does not pertain to the intellect except insofar as it adds an intimation or declaration of the presupposed decree of the will. But this declaration is certainly an affirmative representation of that decree, corresponding to this vocal affirmation: "I will that you do this," to which "do this" is equivalent in sense.

91. Here it must be noted that St. Thomas does not require this command with the power of moving or determining for every free act of the will, but only for use, which follows election, as is evident from cit. q. 17, ar. 3; nor does he then admit it except as dependent upon the free application of the will and therefore as not hostile to liberty. When, however, at the same ar. 3, ad 3, and ar. 5 he seems to imply that every free act arises from the command of reason, he is not speaking of a determining command but of another command lacking the power to determine, which at ar. 4 he

distinguishes from the command "do this" and says is expressed by a verb in the indicative mode, as when it is said, "This is to be done by you." Yet this command is nothing other than the practical judgment which we said above, n. 85, to be necessary and which always proposes the object as suitable and therefore as to be done or embraced, not absolutely and all things considered, unless it is honorable, but under the aspect of advantage or pleasure; yet the will can reject this in the composite sense of that judgment. Hence one may infer that, speaking of itself, the will can will and freely will without any command or act of reason irresistibly determining it to will such an object; and if such a command sometimes intervenes, it has no power of determining except from another presupposed act of the will.

92. But one may object for the necessity of a command of reason or determining practical judgment. 1º: the will, since it is a blind potency, follows the guidance of reason; therefore it tends determinately where reason leads through the final practical judgment. 2º: judgment is required for willing; therefore for willing something determinately a determinate judgment is required. Hence anyone asked why he determinately wills this answers, "because I judge that it is to be willed." 3º: sin is said to proceed from a practical error of the intellect because no one wills a forbidden object unless he determinately judges that this is better for him here and now and altogether to be willed. These are easily solved. To 1º: the will is called blind because it cannot will without reason showing the goodness of the object; nevertheless it is not bound to will this goodness, just as a blind man is not bound to follow his guide. If the will elicits a positive affection, it is indeed bound to follow the final practical judgment, but not as regards everything which it proposes, but only as regards something. For it is falsely supposed that through this judgment two opposite objects cannot be proposed, for example chastity and adultery, or one object as to be willed and not willed, that is, as suitable and unsuitable under different aspects, for example adultery as pleasurable and at the same time unjust and base. Nor is there any particular good which cannot be proposed "as eligible or avoidable," according to St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 13, ar. 6. One will deny that this can occur through the final practical judgment. But that it can occur at least through a twofold judgment is persuaded upon us by the concept of liberty.

93. To 2º: a determinate judgment is indeed required, but not one determining the will: determinate, I say, both subjectively, insofar as it must be an individually existing act, and objectively, insofar as it must propose in the object a determinate goodness, for example of rectitude. With this, however, it is compatible that it simultaneously propose the object as determinately evil in another genus, namely in the genus of inconvenience

or unpleasantness. Hence it is called an "indifferent judgment," because by proposing a good mixed with evil it leaves the will indifferent to willing or not willing. The reply, "because I judge so," etc., is not always given, but sometimes this other one: "because I will so." And when the former is given, it signifies a reason inviting, not determining. To 3º: even if that practical error were necessary for sinning, it would not thereby determine the will, at least as regards exercise; for the will could abstain from love of that object, although perhaps while that error remains it could not hate it or will the contrary. But on occasion of this argument,

94. it is asked, 3º, whether the will can love an object which is not proposed to it by the intellect as better or a greater good? This is also usually disputed under these terms: whether the will can love a lesser good in the presence of a greater, or either of two equals, where the discussion concerns goods as proposed by cognition. Those who think that the practical dictate discussed above, n. 86, is required for willing answer negatively, or seem to do so here, and therefore judge that no one sins without a prior error of judgment by which he prejudges an object, although forbidden, to be better for him or a greater good here and now. This, however, must be rejected altogether. First, from what was said n. 89. Again, because it overthrows liberty, at least liberty of contrariety. For of two contrary objects, for example playing and hearing Mass when a precept binds, no one will be able to choose either one, since both cannot simultaneously be proposed as better; and if one is proposed as better, the other can no longer then be chosen. Indeed, it also destroys liberty of contradiction. For if omission of Mass appears better, hearing it cannot be chosen, nor conversely; and if each appears equal, the will will remain like a stone. Again, because it follows that no one sins against conscience or against the rule of reason dictating that it is better here and now to observe the law of God. Hence no one will sin from malice, but only from error. Indeed, not even thus will he sin, since that error must be inculpable; otherwise it would already presuppose another sin in the will. Concerning this sin I shall similarly ask whether it proceeds from another error, culpable or inculpable, and so on until a sin is assigned which is committed without error or proceeds from inculpable error.

95. Fr. Vázquez, in 1, 2, d. 43, c. 2, and d. 128, c. 5, judges that of two means useful for a previously intended end, only that which appears more useful can be chosen; but of two ends, the one which appears less good in itself can be loved or intended, provided cognition of it is more vehement or vivid. More generally, he holds that only a good proposed more vividly can be loved. This opinion too must be rejected. First, as to the first part, because at least among means altogether equal, or none of which appears

more useful than the other, someone will be able to choose either. Otherwise, if one showed a traveler two roads equally suitable for reaching his destination, he would be unable to continue; nor could a thirsty man drink if he found two altogether equal cups. Nor, likewise, could one efficaciously intend an end if he foresaw that two equally useful means were available to him, since by that very fact he would know that he would be unable to choose. As to the second part, liberty is destroyed if the honorable cannot be loved when a depraved pleasurable good is proposed more vividly, nor conversely. One may say: at least love of the more vividly known object can be omitted. But against this, 1º, at least liberty of contrariety is destroyed, and indeed liberty of contradiction as well, because omission of love will not be willable, at least positively, unless proposed more vividly. 2º, no one will be free to will to hear Mass on a feast day when play or hunting is more vehemently proposed to him. Nor let it be said that the intellect can then be applied by the will to consider the commanded good more attentively. For if this application or attention is more vehemently foreknown, play can no longer be preferred; if it is not so foreknown, the attention itself can no longer be preferred.

96. For these reasons the most recent doctrine among our authors and the Scotists is that the will can freely love a lesser good in the presence of a greater, and either of equals, even if it is not known more vividly. Some, however, except goods of the same genus and altogether similar, and deny, for example, that an avaricious man, given the option, can choose one gold coin while leaving a hundred, or that a hungry man can choose an ounce of bread while leaving a pound. They also think that between two homogeneous and altogether equal goods neither can be chosen. They prove this because the will, being a rational potency, cannot prefer one to another without a reason for preferring; but among goods of the same species there is no reason for preferring one to another equal good, much less to another greater good, because in the former there is no force of attracting or inviting which is not found in the latter. If it is said that no other reason is needed than "because I will so," they press the point because then some reason of preponderance is apprehended in the lesser good, namely that its election is more apt for displaying the dominion of liberty.

97. But first, this preponderance or greater aptitude for displaying liberty cannot be apprehended in the case of equality. Hence a hungry man, if he has only equal loaves, will necessarily suffer hunger just as if he had none; which is plainly false and contrary to experience. Next, if for preferring either the lesser among unequal goods or either among equal goods no other reason is needed than that someone wills to use his liberty, there is no

reason to attack this opinion. For it does not differ from the common opinion, which asserts only that among goods both equal and unequal, even though of the same species, the will can choose whichever it pleases from mere good pleasure, or for no other reason than because it wills. This, I say, the common opinion asserts, and rightly, because good A, in the presence of another greater or equal good, is not withdrawn from the sphere of the will, nor does it lose the goodness by which, when alone, it can move and terminate love. Therefore by such presence it is not rendered unlovable.

98. One may say, 1º: the lesser good in the presence of the greater, supposing that both cannot simultaneously be obtained, appears as excluding the greater good; therefore it appears as evil. I answer: it does not appear as purely evil or as a pure privation of the greater good, but at the same time as truly good; and under this aspect it can be loved by a will neglecting the aspect of evil which appears at the same time. One may say, 2º: good is lovable only as known; therefore it is not lovable in preference to another unless it is known as preferable to the other. I distinguish the consequence: unless as preferable, that is, worthy to be preferred, I deny it; unless as preferable, that is, capable of being preferred according to the good pleasure of the will, I grant the consequence. But for this it is enough that it be known as truly good. Nor is the will bound to render or possess any other reason of preference besides its own good pleasure. One may say, 3º: why, then, is deliberation employed before election, or a comparison of the means, if any one is eligible? I answer: deliberation usually presupposes an efficacious intention of obtaining the end through the means which appears more advantageous and useful; and then I grant that such a means cannot fail to be chosen unless the will departs from the preexisting intention. This, however, does not arise from the mere superiority of the means, but solely or chiefly from the preexisting intention. We are now speaking of the necessity of willing imposed by the superiority of the object alone. Hence it must be granted that an avaricious man and a hungry man, of whom n. 96 spoke, if they efficaciously intend to become rich or to be satiated in the best way they can, by that very fact remove from themselves the faculty of choosing from the offered means the less useful one. But if either no intention is presupposed, or one not altogether efficacious, or one regarding the end as to be obtained through sufficient means without concern for the best, then, although deliberation is employed so that the objects or eligible means are well examined, the will can neglect the better and choose any one, provided it appears good or sufficient. See Fr. Suárez, cit. disp. 19, s. 6.

99. The chief objection here is taken from the well-known saying, "Every sinner is ignorant," taken from Aristotle, 3, Ethic. c. 1. Prov. 14 is consonant

with this: "They err who work evil," and so are other texts of Scripture in which the falls of sinners are attributed to ignorance, blindness, or lack of thought and knowledge. Hence it follows that no one embraces a depraved object without a positive error by which he judges it to be a greater good here and now; or at least without a defect of consideration and advertence to its depravity; or at minimum, as Fr. Vázquez maintains, without a defect of more vehement cognition, which is necessary for love of the honorable, and this defect can be called a negative error. But that someone can sin without being ignorant or erring concerning what is absolutely better for him and to be preferred according to the rule of reason and obligation of the law seems altogether indubitable. First, from what was said n. 94. Again, because this is plainly gathered from Luke 12, v. 47: "The servant who knew the will of his lord and did not do it, etc.," and from Jas. 4, v. 17: "To one who knows to do good and does it not, to him it is sin." Again, because experience strongly confirms it in sinners who act with actual remorse of conscience, to whom Ovid's saying aptly applies: "I see and approve the better things; I follow the worse." Finally, by an evident reason: cognition of the good as better and commanded by God does not necessitate the will, at least as regards exercise; otherwise no one would freely observe the commandments. Therefore omission of love, and hence sin, can be joined with that cognition. This reason also proves that a defect of more vivid cognition is not required; for even if cognition concerning the due object is more vivid, it does not thereby necessitate as regards exercise, as Fr. Vázquez admits.

100. As regards a defect of consideration or advertence, the Scotists and Nominalists deny that it is simply necessary for sinning, because whatever the intellect considers, created liberty can turn aside from moral good. Hence they think that Lucifer and Adam sinned without any inconsideration. Fr. Suárez, cit. disp. 19, sect. 7, and lib. 1, *De gratia* cap. 12, in reality approves this doctrine, but judges that, morally or ordinarily speaking, the will never falls unless some defect first exists in the intellect, at least inconsideration of several reasons or motives which can restrain the will from sinning and would with a certain moral certitude hold it back if they were considered. To this pertains Ecclus. 7: "Remember your last things, and you will never sin." Add that always, or very often, when an express and immediate volition of an external depraved object is to be elicited, the will turns the eyes of the mind away both from the contrary rectitude and from the prohibition and depravity of the object, and therefore proposes it to itself only as advantageous or pleasurable to sense. But the proposal of a depraved object in this inconsiderate or unreflective manner can be called a certain practical error, at least a negative one; and when often repeated it generates a certain

blindness of mind, that is, a habit of proposing pleasurable things without consideration.

101. I speak of the faithful, or of those who have not yet lost Faith, for unbelievers frequently sin with a positive error and blindness of mind concerning the object to be chosen here and now. Yet this error, as also that inconsideration of the faithful, is culpable, since it presupposes in the will the fault of turning away from or neglecting due consideration. But this fault need not presuppose in the intellect another culpable defect, otherwise one would proceed to infinity. It is enough that it presuppose a defect, even though involuntary according to the prior sign, of cognition of several restraining motives. If such cognition were present, although it would not simply remove liberty of sinning, just as its defect does not necessitate one to sin, it would nevertheless morally keep the will within its duty. Thus, partly through culpable inconsideration and partly through involuntary cognition which precedes the fault of not considering, it can in fact be verified that every sinner is ignorant or errs, at least by a negative error. Although the passage Prov. 14 and other similar ones can not incongruously be explained of an error of conduct or of operations of the will from the straight path of salvation, even though that path is not unknown. But theologians treat these matters more fully in 1, 2, of St. Thomas. See Fr. Suárez in the places cited.

102. We said at n. 90 that the command "do this," insofar as it has the force of impelling or determining, is not an act of the intellect but of the will. On this occasion it is asked here, 4º, whether commanding pertains to the will or to the intellect, or whether command consists in an act of the will or in an act of reason. The latter is taught by St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 17, ar. 1, whom the Thomists follow, and among our authors Fathers Vázquez, Salas, and others. The former is taught by St. Bonaventure and Scotus in the places cited by Mastrius here, disp. 7, n. 185, whom the Scotists and several of our authors, especially the more recent, follow. The question seems in great part verbal. If "to command" means the same as to intimate, declare, prescribe, or dictate what is to be done, it undoubtedly belongs to the intellect. Hence prudence, which is an intellectual virtue, is called preceptive; hence also the rules of art are called precepts. But if the word signifies to move, apply, determine, decree, and establish from dominion what ought to be done, it undoubtedly pertains to the will. For this reason St. Augustine, 8, Confess. c. 9, St. Anselm, *De conceptu Virg.* c. 4, and St. Thomas himself, 1, 2, q. 71, ar. 6, ad 2, likewise 2, 2, q. 10, ar. 2, and q. 58, ar. 8, ad 1, and often elsewhere, attribute the function of commanding to the will. Nor is anything more frequent in the Schools than the statement that the will commands the other

faculties of the soul, even the intellect, and sometimes itself; hence acts of the will are commonly divided into commanding and commanded acts.

103. Since, therefore, command is attributed to each potency under a different notion, there remains only the doubt to which it properly or more properly belongs. And it seems one should stand for the will. First, from usage, at least today far more common, even among authors of the first opinion. Again, because, as all agree, dominion in the kingdom of the soul and the power of binding or efficaciously moving to execution belong to the will alone, both with respect to the intellect and to the other faculties. But to command is an act of dominion and power. Again, because it is proper to command to be able to compel or impose necessity, according to St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 83, ar. 1. But no acts of the intellect, independently of an act of the will or prescinding from prior volition, have the power of imposing this necessity of execution, as is plainly gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 17, ar. 1. Therefore no act of intellect has the proper force of command except as joined with an act of the will, and this in such a way that the act of the will is the formal constitutive of command, while the act of intellect is its material constitutive, as Cajetan notes there. Hence at most it follows that command is constituted from both acts, but chiefly from the act of the will.

104. Indeed, although command insofar as intimated or declared imports an act of the intellect, nevertheless, taken according to the power of binding and therefore properly, it seems according to the doctrine of St. Thomas to consist in the act of the will alone. Nor does declaration pertain to the substance of command, otherwise a herald declaring the command of a Prince would properly command. Rather, declaration presupposes the command and is only an application or condition for the command proximately to bind another person. But if the command is immanent, or concerns the commander's own potencies, no intimation of reason is required, at least in order for the will to command the intellect. St. Thomas seems to require it through the act "do this" for other executive potencies; but very many contradict him on this point. I know that Fr. Vázquez and a few others deny that one can properly command oneself or one's own potencies. Yet Fr. Salas, in 1, 2, tr. 6, d. 2, s. 2, shows that this is contrary to St. Thomas and to the common sense of the Schools, where he freely grants the consequences which Vázquez objects to as absurd.

105. But for the opinion which properly ascribes command to the intellect, it is objected, 1º: to command is to say, according to Gen. 1: "God said, Let there be light"; but saying is proper to the intellect. 2º: Wisdom, which pertains to the intellect, explicitly says, Prov. 8: "Through me

lawmakers decree just things; through me princes command." 3º: Aristotle more than once asserts that appetite obeys reason. 4º: to command is to order and govern or direct, which belongs to the intellect alone. 5º: command and prayer pertain to the same potency; but prayer is an act of the intellect. 6º: if command were an act of the will, it would be a desire; but often someone under compulsion commands without a desire to bind, and often a superior desires but does not command. All these press little.

106. To 1º: "to say" sometimes means the same as "to decree," and so it is taken in Gen. loc. cit.; but in this sense it pertains to the will. To 2º: Wisdom decrees and commands not elicitively but directively, insofar as it directs the will and shows how one should command. Or, if preferred, "to decree" and "to command" are there taken less properly, namely for dictating or handing down rules of acting well, in which sense prudence also is called preceptive. Add that wisdom in Sacred Scripture often comprises rectitude of will, and one lacking this is called foolish, while one possessing it is called wise. Hence Wisdom in the same c. 8 attributes fortitude and justice to itself and says, "I walk in the ways of justice," which certainly is a function of the will. To 3º: Aristotle speaks of the sensitive appetite, which obeys reason, that is, rational appetite. To 4º: if "to order" means to establish from dominion or to preelect the right order of acting, it pertains to the will; if it means to direct or regulate, it pertains to the intellect. But when it signifies referring one thing to another, it belongs to each potency and is more than once attributed to the will by St. Thomas, for example, 1, p. q. 107, ar. 1.

107. To 5º: prayer, insofar as it signifies petition through signs or internal words, in which sense it is taken by St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 83, ar. 1, indeed imports an act of the intellect. Yet in relation to God, who needs no sign, true prayer can be preserved in an act of the will alone. See Fr. Suárez, tom. 2, *De religione* lib. 1, *De oratione* cap. 3, et sqq. To 6º: internal command is a desire, not just any desire, but one of a special character, namely one which efficaciously wills to bind the subject. Hence every command is a desire, but not conversely: a desire, I say, of obligation, though not always of execution, because someone can seriously command something which he does not in fact will to be put into execution, provided he wills the subject to be bound and of himself prepared to execute it. Hence one who under compulsion commands externally without a desire to bind in reality has no internal command; nor will a subject who knows of the absence of this desire be bound to obey, however much he perceives the intimation of reason or hears the words "do this."

108. Now some things must incidentally be noted concerning the command or dominion of the will over the other potencies. 1º: the intellect is subject to the will in judging concerning nonevident matters, such as things opinable and things credible by faith; but, according to the common opinion, not so in judging concerning objects evidently proposed, although some dissent on this point. Yet that evident judgments usually depend upon the application of the will as regards a disposition apt for reasoning should not be denied. It is also subject as regards the conservation of any particular act, because by command of the will it can be distracted to another. It is likewise often subject as regards the excitation of simple apprehensions, though not always, because species can be acquired or excited without intervention of the will. 2º: the imagination too is subject to the will in nearly the same way as the apprehensive intellect. 3º: the sensitive appetite also falls in many things under the dominion of the will, whereby it is often free to us to restrain movements of anger, sadness, etc. This dominion, however, is not despotic but political, as Aristotle says, because the appetite often resists or anticipates the command. 4º: the will commands the locomotor potencies despotically with respect to movements called spontaneous, if the members are properly disposed; but not with respect to natural movements, such as the movement of the heart, circulation of blood, etc. 5º: the will dominates the external senses through local motion, insofar as it can, for example, open or close the eyes. In the same way it exercises dominion over the nutritive potency, namely by applying or withdrawing food. Hence these potencies are only mediately subject to the dominion of the will; the others immediately.

109. Several Thomists, whom John of St. Thomas reports and follows here, l. 3, q. 12, ar. 6, deny that the will can by its command move or apply potencies immediately subject to it unless it impresses some physical quality upon them. Some others require at least a physical concurrence of the will, either through itself or through an act of command, toward the acts of the subordinate faculties. But the common opinion holds that a subordinate faculty obeys the command of the will through sympathy, that is, through an innate exigency by which it makes the concurrence of the first Cause due to itself under the condition that the will command its act. Such sympathy among the potencies of the same *suppositum*, or those rooted in the same soul, involves no difficulty, especially if the soul itself immediately concurs in the acts of all the potencies, as in fact it does according to our principles.

Whether the Will Is a Nobler Potency Than the Intellect.

110. Finally, since we have ascribed command in the kingdom of the soul to the will, it is asked, 5º, whether the will simply surpasses the intellect in nobility or perfection. Simply, I say, or all things considered; for relatively each potency exceeds and is exceeded. The Scotists affirm this with Scotus. 1º: because the will dominates the intellect and alone possesses liberty, which is a principal perfection of man. It is also the first mover among the powers of the soul. 2º: because the most perfect act of the will, namely love of God above all things, is more perfect than any act of the intellect, according to the Apostle, 1 Cor. 13: "The greater of these, however, is charity." This is also true with respect to the beatific vision, first because charity unites the soul to God more than vision does, and again because its opposite, namely hatred of God, is far worse than lack of vision, or even than error and ignorance concerning God. 3º: because the Seraphim, who excel in love, are more perfect than the Cherubim, who excel in knowledge or cognition.

111. On the other hand, St. Thomas asserts the superiority of the intellect, 1, p. q. 82, ar. 3; the Thomists follow him, and our authors commonly with Fr. Suárez here, lib. 5, c. 9. Proof 1º: because from the faculty of understanding is taken the principal perfection and dignity of man, who is therefore defined by rationality. From the same source is taken the difference of perfection among Angels, both among themselves and in comparison with men. 2º: because the will, being blind or seeing nothing of itself, needs the light and direction of reason for all its acts, even for those by which it commands the intellect. By contrast, the intellect enjoys a native light and uses, as it were, its own eyes; nor does it depend upon the will for all its acts. Hence the superiority of the intellect is sufficiently gathered. First, because the will depends more upon the intellect than conversely. It depends upon it for all acts, and indeed essentially, whereas the intellect in return depends only for some acts and no more than naturally. Again, because perpetually to be under another's direction and always to need a tutor greatly lowers the condition of a prince and the esteem of his dominion. Hence if there were a prince altogether unable at any time to command anything without the counsel and direction of a certain counselor, the condition of the counselor would be held better and more excellent than that of the prince in the judgment of prudent men. Add that the intellect is

the rule of conduct, for the will acts well or badly insofar as it obeys or resists right reason.

112. Hence the contrary arguments are easily answered. To 1º: the will indeed dominates the intellect insofar as it can apply it to many acts; but since for this very application it needs the prior light of reason and stands like a prince who can command nothing, even to the counselor himself, without the counselor's direction, it cannot from such dominion be judged more excellent than the intellect except relatively. Nor is liberty the principal perfection of man, but rationality. Nor is the will called the first mover except as regards exercise; for as regards specification the intellect is the first mover, insofar as no object can be loved by the will except one proposed by the intellect. Hence in the function of moving there seems to be a certain compensation. To 2º: if the discussion concerns natural acts, it can be denied that love of God is nobler than the highest cognition of God possible by the powers of nature. But if we speak of supernatural acts, an act of charity is indeed more perfect than an act of faith and the other acts had by the intellect in the state of the way, and in this sense the Apostle speaks, as is evident from the context; but it is less perfect than the beatific vision, which can be elicited by the elevated intellect. Nor does it matter that love is said to unite; for it is not a physical union but an intentional one, and in this sense vision approaches God more closely, since it is called an intentional identity of the potency with the object.

113. Nor does what is added concerning hatred of God present an obstacle. For many grant that it is worse in moral being, but deny that it is worse in physical being, because the punishment of loss, which is the greatest of all, consists in privation of the vision. Or it can be granted that hatred of God is a greater evil than error or lack of vision, not because it excludes a good greater in itself, but because it is opposed to a good more due and is in itself supremely undue. Thus cold or privation of heat is a greater evil for man than lack of light; yet heat is not nobler than light. So too for our soul the privation of habitual grace is a greater evil than lack of the hypostatic union, although that union is a nobler grace. Similarly, mortal sin, which alone is opposed to grace, is far worse than venial sin, which is sufficient to exclude the hypostatic union.

114. To 3º: the Seraphim exceed the Cherubim both in cognition of God and in love, since more perfect love in the Blessed presupposes a more perfect vision, as is certain. Love is therefore attributed to the Seraphim and cognition to the Cherubim because the function of the latter is to illuminate the minds of men, while that of the former is to inflame their wills with love of God. But this function is more perfect because an act of charity in the

state of the way is the most perfect of all. See Fr. Suárez, cit. c. 9. The things said thus far seem to render the second opinion more probable. Nevertheless, its arguments can also be solved probably; and therefore some number this matter among the problems, while others with Aversa affirm an equality of the two potencies, all things considered.

DISPUTATION VIII.
ON THE ACTS OF THE INTELLECT.

CHAPTER I.
In What Intellection Consists.

1. The proposed question is common to every sensation and elicited appetition; hence whatever we say in it concerning intellection can also, with due proportion, be applied to sensations and appetitions. We suppose, however, that vital acts add to the soul something of true reality or newly produced entity; this we sufficiently demonstrated against certain Atomists in *Dissertatio praeliminaris ad Physicam*, n. 33. We likewise suppose that intellection does not consist in the impressed species or in its reception, whatever certain Ancients may have said, whose opinion is now antiquated and may be seen refuted in P. Suar. here, l. 3, c. 3.

2. Concerning the essence of intellection, therefore, the first opinion holds that it consists in an action or operation which physically proceeds of itself from the intellect. Thus all, or nearly all, Thomists. Some of them, cited by Colleg. S. Th. here, q. 10, n. 235, assert that every intellection, even in the Blessed, is the production of a quality representing the object, which is called the "expressed species and mental word," and which is not the intellection but the term of the intellection. The Coimbra Fathers and Peynado likewise hold this. Most Thomists, however, deny that a word is produced through every intellection; some except only the beatific vision, while several others except every intuitive intellection of a spiritual object,

and hold that a word is produced only through abstractive cognition, that is, cognition regarding an absent or even a corporeal object. They philosophize similarly concerning cognition of the imagination, or internal sense, through which, when it regards an absent object, they hold that an expressed species is produced, which is called not a "word" but an "image." Yet to the external sensations, since all of them are intuitive, they concede no term distinct from the action. As for elicited appetitions, some deny and others concede a distinct term, namely a certain quality after the manner of a weight or impulse inclining the potency toward the object.

3. Further, when intellection is the production of an expressed species, some Thomists say that it is a mere action and belongs to the category of Action; this is also held by the Coimbra Fathers, Peynado, and Alphonsus, who places intellection here in the action by which the union of the expressed species with the intellect is produced. Most, however, judge that it belongs to the category of Quality and call it a virtual action, because, although it is the immediate production of the expressed species, it has this from its secondary, not its primary, concept. Moreover, according to the Thomists, the word alone, or expressed species, is the concept, representation, image, and likeness of the object; cognition or intellection, however, is the contemplation, consideration, and perception of the object in the word. Alphonsus and Peynado, however, do not seem to assign to intellection any office beyond physically producing or uniting the expressed species. I have set these matters out at greater length so that the Authors, especially the Thomists, may be understood. P. Lynce differs little from their opinion, for he distinguishes two intellections, active and passive, identifying the latter with the expressed species and the former with the production of that species.

4. The second opinion places intellection in a quality produced by the intellect through a distinct action, such that this quality alone is truly and properly the intellection as completed, and at the same time the expressed species and mental word; its production, however, is not intellection except with the addition "in becoming" or "in process." Thus the Scotists with Scotus, cited by Mastr. here, disp. 6, q. 3, and several of Ours with P. Vazquez, to whom P. Suar. also inclines, both here, l. 3, c. 5, and disp. 48, *Metaph.*, sect. 2. The third opinion identifies intellection, or at least understanding concretely taken, with a composite of the expressed species, which is a quality, and the action by which this species proceeds from the intellect. Thus P. Hurtado, whom several Recent authors follow. Finally, the fourth opinion, omitting others of less importance, places the essence of created intellection in a quality or accidental entity which is formally the

representation or manifestation of the object, and at the same time its own production from the intellect and its union with the same, without any intervening action or union and without another term of which it is the production. Thus Cardinal de Lugo and PP. Ripalda and Aldrete, cited by Quiros here, disp. 94, n. 22, who in large part agrees at n. 41 sqq. Thus also expressly P. Oviedo here, controv. 6, punct. 1, § 3 sqq.; likewise Aversa, Trinitar., and several others, especially Recent authors distinguished for ability, in M. S. This is also the opinion of the Thomists as regards those intellections through which they deny that a word is produced. Indeed, in general the Thomists differ from this opinion only insofar as they hold that intellection is sometimes the production of a distinct word and deny that it is a representation of the object.

5. This same fourth opinion is to be embraced by us as more probable and more consonant with our principles, and as not displeasing to the Eximious Doctor, who at disp. 48, *Metaph*., s. 2, commends its probability. It is proved thus: Created intellection is formally the representation or manifestation of the object; moreover, it is also formally its own production from and union with the intellect, and is not the production of another term. Therefore it consists in an entity to which all these formally belong, as the fourth opinion maintained. The premises must be proved separately. The major, which no one opposes except perhaps one or another who assigns to intellection only the office of physical production, as noted at n. 3, will appear beyond doubt if the common notion of the terms is retained. For intellection is cognition; and cognition is formally a disclosure or declaration, and therefore a manifestation, of the object: both from the force of the word, and from the example of ocular vision, the beatific vision, and Divine cognition, and because for an object to be known to us means the same as for it to be open, disclosed, and manifest to us; conversely, to be unknown means the same as to be covered and hidden from the eyes of the mind. Certainly "knowledge" and "cognition" do not differ in signification, nor do the verbs "to know" and "to cognize." But who could doubt that knowledge is formally a manifestation, or that to be known means the same as to be manifest?

6. Nor can the Thomists disagree, since they say that intellection is formally a consideration or contemplation of the object; for contemplation is undoubtedly a manifestation, otherwise contemplation of God, or the beatific vision, would manifest nothing. They indeed refuse to concede that cognition is a representation, reserving this name for the mental word distinct from cognition. Yet since intentional representation is neither the real placing of the object in the intellect nor a univocal imitation of the

object's reality, such as exists in a painted image with respect to the color and figure of its prototype, notions which we rejected in a similar matter above, disp. 6, n. 15, it can be nothing other than a manifestation by virtue of which what was hidden is disclosed to, appears to, and lies open before the intellect. In this sense we take representation here, and Scholastics commonly do so. But if anyone wishes to take it otherwise, we do not dispute about that for the present. It is enough for us that cognition is formally a showing, manifestation, and disclosure.

7. Formally, I say, that is, by reason of itself, immediately of itself, and from its proper concept; not merely actively, virtually, or mediately, as though cognition were only the production of a manifestation as a distinct term. For our proof establishes that for something formally to be cognized is the same as for it to be disclosed to the mind, or made known, and therefore manifest, unless the common dictionaries deceive us. And who could doubt that by the beatific vision the Divine essence is immediately disclosed and laid open, or that by ocular vision color is immediately manifested? Add that cognition is a representation or manifestation in the same sense in which volition is an elicited inclination; for these operations are distinguished in this, that one is after the manner of representation, the other after the manner of inclination. But volition immediately and by reason of itself is an elicited inclination, as no one is ignorant. Therefore, etc. Hence cognition is compared in vain with heating, which is not heat but the production of heat, or with illumination, which is not light but the production of light. For no one calls heating the form of what is hot, nor illumination the form of what is luminous; but cognition is called by everyone the form of what is cognized, which means the same as known, disclosed, or laid open to the intellect. Heating, indeed, and think the same of illumination, is the form of what is "heated," but this denomination is not properly the same as the denomination "hot": for the latter expresses heat as the form, while the former expresses the production or reception of heat, which it does not include formally but only by connection. But the denomination "cognized" is altogether the same as the denomination "manifested," as we have sufficiently shown.

8. Now the minor of the first syllogism, which, except for its last part, of which later, is chiefly opposed by the second opinion, is proved thus: Intellection is formally intentional life in second act; but life of this kind is formally an immanent physical action or operation. Therefore intellection is formally its own production from the intellect and its own union with the intellect. The consequence is legitimate, for no one denies that an immanent physical action proceeds of itself from its principle and is united to the

same. The major also seems certain: for intellection is second act, or the actual exercise of the intellective as such, just as heating is the exercise of what is calefactive and illumination of what is illuminative. But since what is intellective is formally an intentional living thing in first act, its exercise cannot fail to be intentional life in second act. The minor is therefore proved: Life in second act must in some true sense be an immanent operation, or, what is the same, a motion from within and into what is within, by which the vital principle actualizes itself; this all, or nearly all, acknowledge when treating the concept of life in common. Since, therefore, intentional life is truly life, as no one doubts, it must be a motion or operation truly from within, and indeed formally, because it must formally include what belongs to the concept of life in common.

9. But if it is not a physical action of the intellect, in no true sense is it an operation of the intellect from within. This is proved because, if it is not a physical action, it does not proceed physically from the intellect after the manner of a motion or operation. Nor, moreover, does it proceed or become produced from it intentionally; for to be produced in this way is to receive intentional being, that is, to be cognized, just as to be physically produced is to receive physical being. Yet it does not belong to the formal concept of intellection to be reflexively cognized by the intellect. Confirmation: Intellection is formally the exercise of the intellective as such; but the intellective as such in created things is physically active. Therefore intellection is formally the exercise of a physically active principle, and hence is formally a physical action. The minor is proved 1º because the intellective as such is formally living; therefore it is formally capable of actualizing itself from within, since this belongs to the formal concept of the living; and therefore it is formally capable of procuring for itself the actuality of intellection, so that this does not merely accrue to it from without. But in created things this power cannot be conceived while prescinding from physical activity, as anyone can see.

10. 2º Because, if the intellective, and consequently the volitive, in created things does not formally imply physical activity, an intellective and volitive creature will be possible which is not physically active with respect to its own acts and cannot understand or will except through acts infused purely from within. But this consequence seems exceedingly absurd. For that creature would be truly living, and yet from another standpoint would not be so, since it would be merely passive toward its acts, and consequently like something inanimate or devoid of life. Indeed, the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 4, when it condemns those asserting that "the free will of man…cooperates in no way by assenting to God who excites and calls…but,

like something inanimate, does absolutely nothing and behaves merely passively," plainly supposes that "to do nothing and behave merely passively" is proper to a thing wholly inanimate or nonliving, and that the human will would conduct itself like "something inanimate" if it received the act of willing produced purely from without or by God alone. Nor is it speaking only of "acting" intentionally, which among the Adversaries is nothing other than understanding or willing; for the heretics did not deny that man wills through an act of willing produced by God alone. Therefore the Council condemns only those who deny that the will "cooperates" and "acts" physically; and it condemns them for this reason, that the will would behave just like an inanimate thing if it were merely passive toward volition in the physical sense.

11. Add that, if there is no repugnance in a creature cognizing through a cognition which it cannot physically produce, there will be no reason why prime matter, which naturally receives sensations, should not thereby become seeing, hearing, etc., and properly living in second act no less than the soul. Nor will there be any reason why the humanity of Christ the Lord could not be rendered formally understanding by the Divine intellection, just as it is rendered formally holy by uncreated holiness. For the humanity would not thereby become equally understanding with God Himself, because intellection, just as holiness can, could temper its formal effect according to the limitation of the subject. Add further that, contrary to the judgment of all, a volitive substance that is not intellective will be possible. For one that was volitive only through acts not produced by itself would certainly have no need of cognition, since cognition is necessary only so that the will may be moved or invited to elicit an act of volition.

12. You will say: Created intellection must indeed, at least from the nature of the thing, arise physically from the intellect, but only through a distinct action; just as every creature must be from God, yet through a distinct action. But this is easily rejected from what has been said. For intellection is formally actual life, or life in second act. Therefore formally and by reason of itself it has what belongs to the concept of actual life in common, namely, to be an operation immanent in its principle. But if it were produced through a distinct action, it would not have the concept of an operation, but only of a work or produced term. The objection is pressed: Intellection, as we have shown, is the exercise of a physically active principle as such. Therefore it cannot fail to be a physical action, which certainly does not require a distinct action. The example of creatures is turned against the objection: for those things which have the concept of an operation or exercise of Omnipotence do not depend upon God through a distinct action.

The same, therefore, must be thought of intellection with respect to the intellective potency.

13. But, say the Adversaries, intellection is indeed an intentional operation, yet it is not an action except grammatically and analogically, that is, improperly. For it is called an action both because it is signified by words sounding of action, such as "cognition," "conception," etc., while "to understand" is grammatically an active verb; and because intellection is always in becoming after the manner of an action, since it naturally depends upon the actual influx of the potency for as long as it endures; and because, after the manner of an action, it also passes into a distinct term, namely the object, not so as to confer physical being upon it, which a properly so-called action does, but so as to confer intentional being, or being cognized. Hence intellection is the exercise of understanding and of operating intentionally, but it is not the exercise of producing or physically acting. And if the intellect received cognition from within, it would live and operate from within through it, not physically but intentionally, and would be called grammatically acting. What would it effect? The object according to intentional being. Yet it would not effect or operate, either physically or intentionally, the cognition itself.

14. But this doctrine, by which the contrary opinion protects itself, is strongly rejected 1º because it plainly abuses the name "operation" and the verb "to operate" when it asserts that these can be attributed to a subject which properly effects nothing but behaves merely passively. Indeed the Council of Trent, in the place cited above, takes "not to cooperate" and "to behave merely passively" as equivalent. Why is matter not said to operate the form when it receives it, or form to operate the subject when it informs it? Surely both act grammatically, for "receiving" and "informing" are grammatically active participles, and "to receive" and "to inform" are active verbs. Reception and information also pass after the manner of action into a distinct term to which they confer some being, namely being received or being informed. Yet because reception is not physically produced by matter nor information by form, neither is thereby denominated as operating. 2º Because, as is clear from n. 9 sqq., an intellective principle in created things is formally physically active; consequently it cannot be exercised as intellective without being exercised as active. Therefore an exercise of understanding without an exercise of physically acting is repugnant.

15. 3º Because, in order that the intellect intentionally effect the object, it must produce it according to intentional being, namely by producing its intentional existence, just as, for a cause physically to effect an effect, it must produce its physical existence. Therefore, in order that the intellect be

said intentionally to effect the object, it must produce cognition, which is the intentional existence of the object. But it must not produce cognition intentionally, as the Adversaries admit and is evident of itself; otherwise it would necessarily have to precognize it. Therefore it must physically produce cognition. 4º Because intentional life must be no less from within than into what is within, as is evident from the concept of immanent operation. But it must be into what is within physically, or through physical union, in order to render the potency intentionally living. Therefore, etc. Finally, if there can be a vital operation which neither physically nor intentionally, neither positively nor negatively, is from the subject that lives through it, but which accrues to it purely from without, it does not appear how the common doctrine concerning the concept of the living and of life can stand.

16. Nor are certain men to be heard who have dared to say that to be moved or operate from within does not belong to the concept of every living thing, but only of one living by physical life, and that there is no concept of life truly common to intentional and physical life, but that the equivocal name "life" is applied to each. They are not, I say, to be heard. First, because all the Ancients protest against this, notably St. Thomas, I, q. 18, a. 1 sqq.; and almost all the Moderns likewise protest. Second, because, in order to verify that understanding in God is living, all have recourse to aseity, by virtue of which God has intellection from within, at least negatively, that is, not from another but from Himself. Third, because vegetative things would in no way participate in the life of God, nor in any way imitate the life of cognizers; hence there would be no reason why they should be said to be generically more perfect than inanimate things; nor would "living" be a higher genus than "animal," nor could it except ineptly be divided into vegetative and cognitive, because under an equivocal name there lies no one concept which can be divided into subject species. Fourth, because, if the name "life" and "living" is equivocal and generates no determinate concept, it could at pleasure be applied to any things whatever; just as the name "cock," which equivocally applies to a bird and to a man, could without inconvenience also be applied to a fish or a stone if one wished. Hence if someone asks why the name "life" is common to cognition and nutrition, but not also to heating, no reason could be given from the nature of things, but only from the pleasure of speakers.

17. From what has been said thus far the third opinion, reported at n. 4, will be refuted without difficulty. For if action truly belongs to the essence of created intellection, it must belong to it not as a physical part, or as really distinct from another copart, but as the whole physical essence of

intellection; and therefore it must identify with itself the expressed species or manifestation of the object, which likewise belongs to the essence of intellection in that opinion. The assumption is proved because action is predicated of intellection absolutely and directly; for, according to the Authors of that opinion, intellection is truly called a motion from within, an immanent operation, and the exercise of an active principle as such, which names belong to physical action. But no physical part is thus predicated of the whole, as is evident of the soul or prime matter with respect to man. Therefore, etc. Or otherwise: according to that opinion, the notion of motion or immanent action in created things is the generic predicate of life, and the notion of expressed species or intentional manifestation is the specific or differential predicate; but the generic and differential predicates are really identified. Therefore, etc.

18. As for what some say, namely, that action belongs not to intellection taken abstractly and after the manner of a form, but only to understanding taken concretely, or to the formal effect of one understanding, it remains refuted by what was said above, where we showed that created intellection under this abstract name, as signifying a vital operation, is necessarily a motion from within and the exercise of an active principle as such. Add that, prior to the action, the intellect is supposed to be proximately capable of understanding. Therefore, if the adequate form of understanding is united to it, the formal effect of one understanding will necessarily result, because generally a formal effect is constituted only from the form, union, and capable subject, as induction makes clear. Hence, if action is not the form of understanding and yet otherwise belongs to the formal effect, it will belong to it not insofar as it is action, but at most insofar as it is union, if it has this office.

19. Moreover, the Authors both of the third and second opinions can be pressed quite effectively by this argument. The intellect, at least in fact and connaturally, does not understand unless it elicits a physical action, as all admit. But this action is formally intellection. Therefore in fact no quality distinct from the action is necessary to preserve the essence of intellection, whatever may be the necessity of such a quality from another source, or the possibility of an intellection distinct from the action. The minor is proved by the example of the will, which no one rejects here: The physical action which the will in fact elicits while it wills is of itself and formally volition. Therefore similarly, etc. The antecedent is proved: that action of itself and formally is a spiritual inclination elicited from prior cognition; but such an inclination is volition, as will be clear to anyone examining all the predicates of volition. Therefore. The major is proved because such an action is first of

all an inclination, at least toward the distinct term of which, according to the Adversaries, it is the production; for it essentially requires and entails the existence of that term. And otherwise it is without doubt spiritual and elicited from the prior light of cognition. Nor does it matter that it is the physical production of a term. From this it follows only that the term is simultaneously produced and willed by such an action, just as an Angel is by the Divine decree according to the probable opinion which formally identifies creation with the decree; and no one attacks that opinion on this ground.

20. Add 1º that this action is formally voluntary, since the definition of the voluntary belongs to it, namely: "That which is from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end." But an operation formally voluntary is volition, for no one operates voluntarily except by willing. Add 2º that this same action formally and by reason of itself is the exercise of liberty; for it is the immediate determination upon which no indifference any longer remains in the will. Therefore formally and by reason of itself it is volition. The consequence is clear, both because the will does not exercise liberty nor freely determine itself except as willing; and because it could happen that the will freely determined itself toward good or evil, and therefore merited reward or punishment, and yet was not willing, namely if God prevented the union with the will of the absolute quality or impulse which the Adversaries superadd. This certainly is not repugnant, since that quality requires a union distinct from itself and not identified with the action, as most of the Adversaries hold. Finally, because, if the concept of freely determining oneself is not formally the concept of one willing, but of one merely physically acting, a free cause that is not volitive will be possible, which no one would say.

21. The arguments which prove cognition to be a physical action prove with the same force that it is its own union, or is united through itself with the intellect; for they prove it to be not just any action but an immanent action, and no one doubts that an immanent action is united through itself with its principle. But this same point is further confirmed against most Authors of the second opinion, who alone resist it. Intellection by reason of itself and without a superadded union renders the object cognized; for to do this it requires no physical union, but only an intentional one, consisting in a tendency and relation to the object, which tendency and relation intellection without doubt really identifies with itself, whatever may be said of formal identity from the nature of the thing, which some Scotists deny. Therefore similarly, intellection by reason of itself and without a distinct union renders

the intellect cognizing, which certainly it does not do without physical union.

22. The consequence is proved 1º by parity with other forms which confer correlative denominations. For a form which by reason of itself denominates one extreme united also denominates the other; and one which without a distinct union confers the denomination of produced, received, or informed likewise without another union confers the denomination of producer, recipient, or informer. 2º Because for the object to be rendered cognized is for it to be rendered intentionally present, and indeed present to some intellect, just as nothing is physically present except to some place. But for the object to become intentionally present to the intellect and for the intellect to become cognizing are formally the same. Therefore whatever suffices for the object to be cognized also suffices for the intellect to be cognizing. 3º Because otherwise intellection could exist by Divine power without union to an intellect; in that event there would be something cognized without a cognizer. But this is no less repugnant than a cognizer without something cognized, something produced without a producer, or something received or informed without a recipient or informer.

23. Finally, that intellection is not the production of another term, which was the last part of the minor at n. 5, is denied only by the Authors of the first opinion, and not by all of them, nor with respect to all intellections, as noted at n. 2. But since those Authors deny this part because they think a mental word distinct from the whole intellection is necessary, they can be refuted from what will be said in ch. 3, where we shall discuss the mental word. For now it is enough to show that our opinion, especially in this part, is most clearly taught by Aristotle, IX *Metaph.*, c. 9, t. 16, where he teaches that through a transitive action a work distinct from the action is made and is the end of the agent, while through an immanent or vital action nothing is made beyond the action itself. He says that this action is the end of the agent and remains in the agent, finally concluding thus: "But in those things in which there is no other work beyond the action, the action is in the agents themselves, as vision in the one seeing and contemplation in the one contemplating." The Philosopher teaches the same in III *Ethic.*, c. 4 and 5, and I *Magn. Mor.*, c. 35, and often elsewhere. St. Thomas agrees, I *Contra Gentiles*, c. 100, saying that an immanent operation is one "through which nothing other than the operation itself is made, as seeing and hearing; for perfections of this kind belong to those whose operations they are and can be ultimate." And III *Contra Gentiles*, c. 2, n. 1: "An action," he says, "is sometimes terminated at something made, as building at a house and healing at health; sometimes, however, it is not, as understanding and

sensing. And if it is terminated at something made, the impulse of the agent tends through the action toward that thing made; but if it is not terminated at something made, the impulse of the agent tends toward the action itself."

CHAPTER II.

The Contrary Arguments Are Answered.

24. It is objected 1º: Intellection, as maintained by us, is a physical action without a term. But such an action is plainly no less repugnant than a union without extremes. Therefore, etc. Nor does it help to say that it is not an action without a term absolutely, but only without a distinct term. For against this stands 1º that action from its proper concept is a way, tendency, and relation toward a term, offices which it cannot have with respect to itself. It therefore requires a distinct term, and indeed one physically produced, since we are speaking of physical action. 2º That an intentional operation without a distinct object is repugnant, just as is a union without a distinct extreme. Therefore similarly, etc. I answer by denying the major absolutely. For, as P. Suar. observes, disp. 48, *Metaph.*, s. 2, n. 41, intellection as maintained by us should rather be called a term without an action than an action without a term. For it does not consist in a physical production which is pure action, having no other perfection, office, or predicate than that of ultimate determination whereby the cause is purely physically acting. Rather it consists in a certain term which, among other predicates proper to cognition, has of itself the property of flowing or proceeding from the power of the cause without an intervening action; just as, according to the probable opinion of many, an Angel without a distinct mode of creation depends upon and proceeds through itself from Omnipotence, and yet is not for that reason called pure action or an action without a term.

25. I concede, however, that intellection is an action or physical production, to speak with Aristotle and St. Thomas above, n. 23, not indeed without a term, but one which is simultaneously the action and the physically produced term, namely the representation of the object, identifying with itself its own physical procession from the intellect; or, as the Angelic Doctor said, an action toward which the impulse of the agent tends in such a way that it stops there and does not proceed farther or terminate in another thing made. There is no reason why this kind of action should be repugnant. First, because it belongs only to the concept of action that it ultimately determine an effect so that it actually depend in a determinate manner upon such an efficient cause. But what repugnance is there in some effect being thus determined through itself, so that it cannot

exist without depending in such a manner upon such a cause? Second, because every action identifies with itself its own production; therefore a term too will be able to identify its production with itself. Third, because, just as action without a term is repugnant, so also is union without two extremes; and yet an extreme not distinct from its own union is not repugnant, for every modal form, for example location or subsistence as commonly posited, is united through itself to its subject. It must nevertheless be noted that the action we posit is more properly a term of the active power than of itself, although it can also be called a term of itself insofar as it stops in itself or does not proceed farther; for "term" is not always said correlatively to "way."

26. The additional objections in n. 24 do not press. Not the first, because those offices do not belong to the concept of action as such, which concept we explained in the preceding number, but only to an action which is otherwise proved distinct from the term, or through which the impulse of the agent, not stopping in the action itself, tends toward another thing made, as St. Thomas said. An instance is found in every action which, although it is not a relation to itself, is nevertheless the production of itself; likewise in union, which need be a relation to two extremes only when it is proved distinct from both. One may also say with the common doctrine of the Thomists, indeed with St. Thomas, Opusc. 48, tract. *De actione*, c. 7, that a strictly immanent action, namely that by which intentionally living beings operate, is not a predicamental action, or does not belong to the category of Action, because it is intended for its own sake, or as perfecting the potency by reason of itself; whereas only that action through which the impulse of the agent tends toward another thing made belongs to that category. But only a predicamental action need be a way, tendency, and relation toward a term. Not the second, because a created cognition or volition which has itself and nothing else for its object is quite commonly acknowledged to be possible. And certainly, even if God cognized or willed nothing besides Himself, He would not for that intrinsic reason cease to be cognizing and willing. Yet if you contend that cognition without a distinct object is repugnant, prove the repugnance from grounds other than those you brought against the indistinction of physical action from its term, for those are of no weight. Union must be distinguished from at least one extreme, since by its concept it is a bond of two; nevertheless it can be identified with the other, as we have already noted. Hence the example is turned against the objection.

27. It is replied: If a twofold intentional tendency is found in some act, for example love and hatred, as is found in the act of perfect contrition, a

distinct term must be assigned to each. Therefore, if a twofold tendency, namely physical and intentional, is found in intellection, a distinct term must correspond to each. I answer: It is falsely supposed that intellection is a physical tendency; for this implies a relation toward a produced or physically attained term, a relation which does not belong to intellection. Add that, even if intellection were a physical tendency, the consequence would have to be denied, because there does not appear to be an equal opposition between physical and intentional tendencies as between love and hatred with respect to the same term. The example indicated above, n. 19, supports this. One may object: Cognition is formally a physical production, as we hold. Therefore, if it tends toward an object, it tends as a physical production; therefore it renders that object physically produced. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it is formally the physical production of itself, I grant; of the object, I deny. Then I distinguish the first consequence: it tends as the physical production of itself, which is at the same time purely intentional with respect to the object, I grant; otherwise, I deny both the first and second consequences. Here is a similar sophism: Contrition is formally hatred. Therefore, if it tends toward God, it tends as hatred; therefore it denominates God as hated. See what was said in Logic, where virtual distinction was treated.

28. It is objected 2º: If intellection is the production of itself, it will be a mode or modal entity, since it is essentially affixed to the intellect. But that acts of the intellect and will are not modes but qualities is clear 1º because through them we are rendered "such"; hence, if it is asked what sort of persons we are, one answers "good" or "bad," "wise" or "foolish," denominations conferred by acts of intellect and will. 2º Because vital acts have a perfection foreign to the weakness of modes; for they greatly perfect the soul of themselves and render it blessed, and they also produce habits and species. 3º Because they are capable of intension and remission, which is proper to qualities. I answer: Several patrons of our opinion concede the consequence because they think that nothing is lacking for an entity essentially bound to an absolute thing, whose indifference it determines through itself, truly to be a mode. Others deny the consequence because they require for the concept of mode, in addition to essential attachment, that it be distinguished from the absolute thing by no title other than determination to some office toward which the thing is presupposed to be indifferent of itself. And since intellection is not distinguished from the intellect by this title alone, for even if a created intellect were not indifferent to understanding, it would still require an intellection distinct from itself

and produced by itself in order actually to understand, they therefore say that intellection cannot be numbered among modes.

29. The dispute appears verbal. For, if you consider the thing, all Defenders of this opinion agree that intellection is essentially bound to the potency, although it possesses greater perfection than is usually attributed to pure actions, locations, or durations. Whether this suffices for it to be called a mode depends upon the concept of modality, which different authors describe differently. As far as I am concerned, I admit the consequence. But when it is objected that a vital act is a quality, I first set against it the authority of Aristotle, X *Ethic.*, c. 3, expressly declaring that "neither the operations of virtue are qualities, nor is happiness itself." Certainly the operations of virtue are acts of the will, while happiness consists in an act of the intellect according to the same Aristotle, ibid., c. 7 and 8. Next, I freely concede that an act of intellect and will is a quality, not indeed an absolute quality, in which sense Aristotle speaks, but a modal quality. For there is no reason why the concept of quality should conflict with the concept of mode. Even the Adversaries suppose this when they call intellection an "absolute quality"; for why add "absolute" if there is no quality except an absolute one? Nor does it matter that intellection is a physical action, because for that reason it does not belong to the category of Action, according to n. 26.

30. Not every mode, however, is a quality, but only one which is both accidental and, in addition to the office of determining, also has other predicates by which it notably perfects the subject by reason of itself. Hence, although intellection is a mode, it can render the subject such; it can also be capable of intension and remission, not in the office of determining, if the representation remains unchanged, but in the office of representing. Finally, it can produce habits and species, although these are absolute qualities, because it is not foreign to the concept of a mode that it be perfectly sufficient for effects, even absolute effects, which are of an inferior order, as habits and species in fact are through their lack of vitality. Thus, in the plausible opinion of grave Theologians, the hypostatic union, although a mode, has the perfection of a sanctifying form and of rooting supernatural gifts. From this you will infer that not all modes are of weak or tenuous entity, but only those which are mere modes, or which have no other office than merely to determine the indifference of a thing. Here I note incidentally that we deny only that intellection is the production of another term, not that it is a productive power; for after the manner of a power it certainly produces species and habits.

31. It is objected 3º: Although intellection by its nature demands to arise from a vital potency, it is nevertheless indifferent as to whether it arises from the potency without a habit or with a habit, and likewise with this or with another species or assistance. Therefore this indifference must be determined through a distinct action. Confirmation 1º: Otherwise a habit will not facilitate acts similar to those by which it was generated. For an act proceeding from the potency and habit, since it is identified with its own production, will necessarily be different from prior acts not arising from the habit, since physical action is varied by variation of the principle, even a partial one. Hence the acquired habit will be necessary for the ability simply to act; for without the habit the potency simply will not be able to produce the same acts which it can produce with the habit. Confirmation 2º: Nor will the same supernatural act be able to be produced by the potency with extrinsic assistance as with intrinsic assistance. Hence what is commonly asserted will be false, namely that a supernatural act is more connaturally produced with intrinsic assistance; for the act which is produced with extrinsic assistance will depend upon it altogether connaturally, indeed essentially. Confirmation 3º: Because, if what we say is true, God alone will not be able to produce a created intellection. What then of that censure of St. Thomas, I, q. 105, a. 2: "It is erroneous to say that God cannot by Himself produce all determinate effects which are produced through any created cause"?

32. To the objection I distinguish the antecedent. Intellection is indifferent in the stated way taken specifically insofar as it is specified by the object, I grant; taken individually, or even insofar as it is specified by the active principle, if it is so specified, I deny the antecedent and consequence. It is most true that within the same species of intellection, insofar as it is specified by the object, which is its principal and, according to several, sole specifying principle, or even insofar as it is specified by the mode of tending, there are many individuals, some of which can arise from the potency alone and others from the potency together with a habit. In this sense intellection according to species is truly said to be indifferent as to being produced by the potency with or without a habit. But taken individually, or even insofar as it derives from the active principle a diversity greater than individual, if it truly derives such a diversity, which several generally deny of every action, it by no means has the indifference intended by the objection, either with respect to a habit or with respect to another coprinciple. But it plainly follows from our opinion that intellection is identified with physical action; no absurdity will be proved from this. Hence it is clear that no distinct action is required, because indifference according to species is determined

through individuation, and in the individual there is no further indifference as to arising from various principles.

33. To confirmation 1º: A habit concurs only toward acts similar to prior acts in object, mode of tending, and degree of intension, not toward acts similar in relation to the active power from which they arise. The Adversaries must admit this in the physical actions by which acts of intellect and will are in fact produced, whatever may be said of the distinction of those actions from their terms. For a habit principally facilitates actions of this sort, since in these the relief of the potency, or diminution of labor, is especially manifest. Nor is it said to facilitate except toward actions similar to preceding ones; and yet those which arise from the habit cannot be similar to those arising from the potency alone except in relation to the term. Hence it must be admitted that an acquired habit gives simply the power to perform those individual acts toward which it concurs, just as according to the contrary opinion it gives the power to perform the actions by which those acts are produced. Yet it does not give simply the power to perform such a species of acts insofar as they are similar in object, degree, and mode of tending; for without the habit the potency can be exercised through other acts similar in this respect, although it is exercised more easily and with less expenditure of strength through those which depend upon the habit. For this reason the habit is said to give an easy power, namely with respect to the species of acts. Let the same answer be given to confirmation 2º. The numerically same act cannot proceed from either kind of assistance, but the specifically same act can, in the sense explained. What is said of greater connaturality must be applied not to the acts but to the potency, for which it is more connatural to be exercised through acts depending upon intrinsic rather than extrinsic assistance. The Adversaries must say the same of actions.

34. To confirmation 3º: That censure presses the Thomists sufficiently, since, although they place the mental word in an absolute quality produced through a distinct action, they nevertheless deny that it can be produced by God without the concurrence of the created intellect, as may be seen in Colleg. S. Th. Complut. here, q. 10, n. 26¼ sqq. It also presses several Authors of the second opinion who, although they hold acts of intellect and will distinct from their production, nevertheless acknowledge, either in fact or at least as possible, acts of the will essentially free, which certainly cannot be produced without the concurrence of the created will. But it does not touch us, precisely because we identify vital acts with physical action. For no one doubts that the actions of created causes must be excepted from that rule of St. Thomas; for if they were produced by God alone, they would

simultaneously be and not be exercises of created power, which is a manifest contradiction. But "it does not belong to the Omnipotence of God that He should be able to make two contradictories exist simultaneously," as St. Thomas says, q. 5 *De potentia*, a. 2, with whom all agree.

35. You will say: Actions are excepted for this reason, that they are not effects but effectings or causalities. Since, therefore, intellection truly is an effect, it must be comprehended under the aforesaid rule of St. Thomas and consequently distinguished from the action. I answer: Since it is certain that St. Thomas is not speaking of actions, and since otherwise the Holy Doctor himself acknowledges that some actions are simultaneously effects, that is, terms in which the impulse of the agent stops, as is clear from what was said at n. 23, it must consequently be certain that he is not speaking of absolutely all effects, but only of those of which it is not positively proved that from their concept they are essentially exercises of created power. For these are what are properly and absolutely called "effects," while in the others the name "action" prevails in common usage, for example in acts of intellect and will, which are called not so much "works" as "operations." Likewise, the rule is general that God can produce or destroy any creature independently of another; and yet He can neither produce a mode without the thing nor destroy the thing while conserving the mode, because that rule speaks of a creature whose concept does not include an essential attachment to another.

36. It is replied: An action wholly indistinct from a created cause is repugnant; therefore so too is an action wholly indistinct from an effect. I deny the consequence. For the antecedent is true because such a cause could not exist without operating, and therefore would not be subject to God's dominion in operating. But every created cause must be subject to God's dominion not only in being but also in operating, at least with respect to every determinate individual effect. Moreover, it seems to belong to the concept of a created cause that it have indifference toward several effects, at least of the same species, an indifference repugnant to action. Furthermore, that cause would truly act or produce an effect, as is supposed, and otherwise would not act, because that alone acts from which the action is; and then the action would not be from such a cause because that cause would not be from itself. But these inconveniences do not obtain in an action wholly identified with the effect, as will be clear to one who considers the matter.

37. It is objected 4º: Intentional life, which is proper to intellection, can be rationally distinguished from physical life, or from motion or action from within. Therefore this action does not belong to the formal concept of intellection, and consequently intellection can be preserved without physical

action. The antecedent is proved 1º by the authority of St. Thomas, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3, saying: "Understanding implies only the relation of the one understanding to the thing understood, in which no notion of origin is implied, but only a certain information in our intellect, insofar as our intellect is made actual through the form of the thing understood." 2º Because the Divine intellection is truly intentional life and is not physical life, or an action physically from within. 3º Because a created substance identifying intellection with itself is possible; through this it would certainly live intentionally and yet would not move itself from within. 4º Because life in common is usually divided into physical and intentional life, while members of a division must at least be rationally distinct. 5º Because the concept of intentional life or cognition includes only representatively tending toward an object, or being a representation of it; but this is well conceived while prescinding from physical action. Certainly, whatever may be said of this action, if an object is conceived as immediately represented to a potency, that potency is by this very fact conceived as cognizing and therefore as intentionally living. Suppose a representation distinct from the action: surely if the potency possessed it in itself, however produced, it would possess the object as intentionally present; therefore it would cognize it.

38. To the objection I distinguish the antecedent. Created intentional life can be rationally distinguished in this way, I deny. Intentional life prescinding from created and uncreated life can be so distinguished, I subdistinguish: it can be rationally distinguished from motion from within if "from within" is taken positively, in which sense physical life is so called, I grant; if it is taken only negatively for "not entirely from without," I deny the antecedent, and under the same distinction the consequence. What this subdistinction means is clear from what was said in disp. 1, ch. 1, where we explained in what sense Divine intellection is called motion or operation and showed that it is included under the common concept of life, although it is not positively from within, that is, through real production, which physical life implies as it is commonly taken. Now we absolutely deny that created intentional life can be rationally distinguished from real production from within any more or otherwise than man from animal, and universally a species from its genus. Here there is certainly no place for a mutual distinction properly so called, although there is that improper distinction which they call "according to what is explicit," and which does not remove formal inclusion, as no one is ignorant. We say the same of production as the Adversaries say of producibility from within, or at least by God: this producibility belongs to the concept of created intentional life in such a way

that the latter cannot be rationally distinguished from it except at most according to what is explicit.

39. To proof 1º: St. Thomas must be interpreted either as wishing only that the notion of origin is not implied explicitly in intellection, or as understanding by the name "origin" an intervening action distinct from intellection itself. Otherwise nothing is more frequent in St. Thomas than that understanding is an action and motion from within, or proceeding from the living being itself, and indeed from the proper concept of vital operation. See, for example, I, q. 18, a. 1, 2, and 3; likewise q. 54, a. 1 and 2; III *Contra Gentiles*, c. 2; likewise XII *Metaph*., lect. 8, where he says it is necessary "that the intellect, insofar as it attains the intelligible, become acting and operating." Hence with St. Thomas there is no doubt that understanding is acting and that the intellect, insofar as it understands, truly acts, not indeed upon the object, to remove this scruple of some, but upon the operation itself, because the impulse of the agent stops in it, according to the Angelic Doctor cited at n. 23. The intellect is indeed said to effect the object according to intentional being; but this in sum is to effect intellection, since intellection itself is the intentional being of the object.

40. To proof 2º: By the same example it could be proved against the Adversaries that created intellection does not of itself require connaturally to arise from within through a distinct action, or that one may prescind from real producibility, or that of itself it is apt to render the potency understanding without physical union or information. Therefore the Divine intellection does not imply physical action because it implies aseity, by which it has being from within in a more eminent manner, namely negatively from within, or in no way from without. But created intellection, since it can be from within only positively, or through a physical and real action, must necessarily include this action in order to have the concept of a "vital operation." You will say: Even if God were not from Himself or wholly uncaused, provided that He were understanding through an intellection identified with Himself as now, He would truly live intentionally. But I ask you whether God, if He were not from Himself nor wholly uncaused and yet were infinitely wise as He now is, would truly be God? You will deny the hypothesis as involving contradiction, because God cannot be conceived without contradiction as infinitely wise as He now is unless He is conceived with complete aseity. Think the same answer given to you here: for likewise an intellection truly such cannot without contradiction be conceived unless it is conceived as truly living, and consequently unless it is conceived, at least implicitly, as truly possessed from within, either through physical production or through aseity.

41. One may object: Therefore God will live formally through all His attributes; and, if uncreated prime matter or an unproduced chaos such as the ancient Pagans imagined were granted, it would be living. I answer: The consequence can be conceded without inconvenience, although it is not necessary by reason of form. For although aseity belongs to the concept of unproduced life, it does not immediately follow that whatever is from itself is living, just as it does not follow that every animal is a man, although animal belongs to the concept of man. We already touched on this in disp. 1, n. 11. There also, n. 23, you have the solution to proof 3º of the argument which we are now rejecting. Nothing need now be added except that the possibility of that substance is denied even by most of the Adversaries, and plainly by St. Thomas, I, q. 54, a. 2, teaching and proving that no creature, but God alone, can be its own understanding.

42. To proof 4º: That division can 1º be understood of life or vital operation in common, insofar as it is abstracted from created and uncreated life; and thus it presents really distinct members. For there is purely intentional life in God, and purely physical life in a plant, as also in a brute and a man insofar as they nourish themselves in second act. Yet the division is not adequate unless it adds a third member, namely physico-intentional life, such as every created cognition is. 2º It can be understood of created life alone; and thus it gives really distinct members if a note of exclusion is expressed or understood in the members, namely if the division is made into life "purely or only" physical and life which is "at the same time" physical and intentional. But if the note or excluding difference on the part of the members is prescinded from, it will be a division of life not as a genus into species, but as of metaphysical grades of life into a higher and lower in the order of predication. These grades admit only a nonmutual distinction of reason, such as exists between animal and living; or, if you prefer, it will be a division of the difference of vitality into two differences subordinated to one another, which can be mutually rationally distinguished if the lower difference is not transcended by the higher. The reason for this doctrine is that physical life as such is a higher grade, that is, extends more widely than created intentional life; nevertheless it is contracted to the latter and formally included in it. And if each is taken precisely according to its differences, one is constitutive of the genus of created life as such, while the other contracts this genus and constitutes the species of created intentional life. An example is the division of soul into vegetative, sensitive, and rational, prescinding from the excluding differences repeated in brute and plant; the Eximious Doctor explains the sense of this division in the same way, l. 1 *De anima*, c. 6, from n. 7, and c. 8, from n. 15.

43. To proof 5º: Representation, or a representative tendency toward an object, can be taken either as a species of life or precisely as a difference of vital operation. In the first way it is the whole essence of cognition, and in created things it cannot be conceived without physical action, just as in Divine things it cannot be conceived without aseity, because it cannot be conceived without motion from within unless it is conceived without the generic notion of life. Nor is its relation to that notion otherwise than that of animal to living or man to animal. In the second way it is not formally the whole essence of cognition, if the genus does not formally transcend the differences, as the common opinion holds, and it can be rationally distinguished from physical action and prescinded from it, not indeed by a precision of indifference or lack of connection, but only by a precision of nonformal inclusion. From this it follows only that cognition has some predicate rationally distinguishable from physical action; nevertheless cognition itself formally includes this action and is no more distinct from it than a species from its genus. An example will make the matter clear. "Rational" taken specifically is the whole essence of man and thus formally includes animal and formally is animal. But taken purely differentially, it can be rationally distinguished and prescinded from animal, though only by a precision of nonformal inclusion. From this you would ineptly infer that man can be conceived without animal.

44. You will say: If representation is identified with action, it should rather be compared to action as genus to species or difference, because it extends more widely. I distinguish: representation prescinding from vital and lifeless representation, or even from created and uncreated representation, let it pass; created and vital representation, or representation belonging to the line of vitality in second act, I deny. And I again press the recent example. For although "rational," insofar as it prescinds from human and Angelic, extends more widely than animal and can be compared to it as genus, nevertheless human rationality is undoubtedly a difference of animal. It commonly happens that of two predicates of the same thing each is a difference of the other under a different comparison. Thus in intellection, if it is compared with volition, spirituality is the notion of agreement and representation the notion of difference; but if it is compared with sensation, representation is the notion of agreement and spirituality of difference. So in six hundred other cases. Indeed, in the subject matter itself, vitality, insofar as it prescinds from representative and effective vitality, is contracted to cognition through representation; and representation, insofar as it prescinds from vital and lifeless representation, such as exists in a statue, is contracted through vitality to cognition itself.

45. Now, if we are speaking of the representation proper to a cognitive potency, it must be denied that an object can be conceived as immediately represented to the potency while no account is taken of action. For such representation either formally includes action or physical life, or, conceived after the manner of a difference, formally contracts it. Hence it is related to it as risible or human rationality to animal. If a representation really distinct from action and from aseity is imagined, it is thereby imagined as lifeless or as not belonging to the genus of life; hence it cannot render the object intentionally present to the potency, at least with the intentionality proper to cognition, whatever else that word may signify. In the same way, if a weight not belonging to the genus of life were placed in the will, it would not render the will intentionally inclined toward the object with the intentionality proper to volition; otherwise the acquired habit which inclines the will would formally be volition or love. See what we say below concerning habit, n. 50.

46. It is objected 5º with PP. Alphonsus and Peynado: For the intellect to cognize is to make the object intentionally present to itself, or to express and as it were paint it within itself. But for this there suffices an action which produces an expression or representation of the object distinct from itself, or its union with the intellect. Therefore intellection consists in such an action. The argument is confirmed by the example of nutrition, which is an action producing an increase of the living thing distinct from the action itself; likewise by parity with heating and the action of painting, which regard terms distinct from themselves, namely heat and a picture. To the objection I distinguish the major: it is to do this through a vital presence, expression, and picture, or one indistinct from cognition, I grant; otherwise, I deny the major. Then I distinguish the minor: if such an action is formally and by reason of itself a representation or manifestation of the object, let it pass; if it is not, I deny the minor, and under the same distinction the consequence. In order that the intellect cognize, it must produce within itself an intentional presence or representation of the object, not just any representation but a vital one. Since this is not vital after the manner of a principle or first act, it must be vital after the manner of second act, and therefore after the manner of an operation from within; hence it cannot be distinct from cognition, especially since otherwise cognition must formally be a representation, as we showed in the preceding chapter. That cognition produces or unites a further representation is false from what will be said in the following chapter; but for now we allow it to pass, because the present objection is sufficiently answered otherwise.

47. To the confirmation: Nutrition or nutritive action, concerning which see disp. 1 *De generatione*, n. 44 sqq., from its concept is not increase but the production of increase. The same is to be said of heating and the action of painting with respect to heat and an image. But cognition from its concept is representation or manifestation, as we have sufficiently shown. Consequently, whatever may be said as to whether it has a distinct term, at least it does not need one in order to render the object intentionally present to the intellect. Here, however, occasion being given, the difference between the nutritive and intentional vital operations must be noted. The nutritive operation is vital only on the part of the action, namely because of the specific immanence which it derives from its principle, as we explained, disp. 1, n. 27, not on the part of the term, as though the latter of itself required to be produced vitally or immanently, for by its nature it can be produced transitively by the generator. Hence the term of nutrition must be distinguished from the action, since it is indifferent as to being produced by either an immanent or a transitive action. But an intentional operation, that is, cognition and appetition, is vital also on the part of the physically produced term, namely the representation or elicited inclination. For this term of itself is the second act of a vitally operative principle as such and is not indifferent as to being produced by a transitive action, something which all at least admit concerning natural indifference. Hence it is not necessary to distinguish such a term from the action, especially since from its proper concept it includes immanent action.

Some Inferences, and Further Confirmation of the True Opinion from an Act of the Will.

48. From what was said in this and the preceding chapter it is inferred 1º that it is altogether repugnant for a creature to understand through an intellection purely introduced from without, just as it is repugnant for a cause truly to act through an action which is not its own. For to understand is to act immanently, and intellection is the action of the one understanding. Therefore, when the Fathers and Theologians say that certain illuminations or cognitions of the intellect, and pious affections of the will, are "produced in us by God without us," they do not exclude physical action on our part, but only free application or prior merit. The meaning is that these acts are produced without our freely cooperating or meriting. You will say: Peter's intellection can by Divine power be united to Paul's intellect; in that event it would render Paul understanding, since it would be a form of understanding communicated to a capable subject. But I ask in turn whether Peter's

physical and immanent action, if by Divine power united to Paul, would render Paul truly acting. You will deny this, I think, because a determinate action is not a form of acting for every subject capable of acting, but only for that from which it physically arises. Think the same answer given concerning intellection, although perhaps it is not repugnant for one intellection by Divine power to be united to two intellects, at least if they interpenetrate, to one through itself and to the other through a reflex union.

49. It is inferred 2º that whatever we have said of intellection must likewise be understood of every sensation, internal and external, for the proofs adduced proceed generally concerning cognition as such, under which every sensation is included. It is inferred 3º that the same must also be judged concerning love and every act of the will and sensitive appetite. For just as cognition is a physical action identifying with itself the representation of the object, so too love or volition must be an action identifying with itself a weight or inclination toward the object. This, besides parity of reason, is sufficiently established by the particular argument treated above, n. 19 sqq. I now add another, by which our opinion is further confirmed.

50. If love consists in an absolute quality which is like a weight inclining toward the object, it follows absurdly that an acquired or infused habit received in the will will formally be love of its acts and objects; for it is an absolute quality after the manner of a weight inclining the will toward acts and objects. Nor does it matter that the habit is not immediately produced by the will. First, because according to most Adversaries love can be infused into the will purely from without. Second, because an acquired habit at least mediately arises from the will, and in addition is immediately conserved by it according to a probable opinion pleasing to several even among the Adversaries. In that opinion the will by virtue of its own action through which it conserves the habit truly has within itself a spiritual weight toward the object. What, then, is lacking for it to have love? Third, because, if intentional life prescinds from physical life and is of a different genus, as the Adversaries hold, there is no reason why love should require immediate production by the will. For the formal effect it confers, it will be enough that it require informing the will, just as a habit, even an infused one, requires. The words of St. Thomas cited at n. 37, as understood by the contrary side, support this.

51. Nor does it matter that a habit does not presuppose in the soul cognition of the object toward which it inclines. For neither does love presuppose it if love is produced by God alone, as is possible according to the contrary opinion. They do not require cognition in order that love exist

absolutely, at least by Divine power, but at most in order that it confer its formal effect upon the will or be naturally produced by it. Indeed, cognition will not even be naturally necessary from the concept of love, because it is necessary only on the part of the will in order to act; and on the principles of the Adversaries it is not repugnant for love by its nature not to require arising from the will which it denominates, as I was just saying. This may indeed be established by applying the proofs objected against us at n. 37. Finally, it does not matter that the inclination of the habit toward the object is innate. For it is indeed innate to the habit, but not to the will which the habit renders inclined. And precisely this happens in the absolute quality in which the contrary side places love. Hence it is concluded that nothing is lacking in a habit for it truly to be love, although it does not render the will loving unless cognition is present. It is otherwise on our principles, which constitute love in a physical action of the will immediately and essentially presupposing cognition.

CHAPTER III.
On the Mental Word.

52. Although "to say," "to speak," or "to form a word," considering the imposition of these names, belongs to spoken sounds, nevertheless by the application and usage of the Wise it first and principally pertains to the intellect and denotes those acts or concepts of the mind by which we speak internally to ourselves, that is, manifest something to our own intellect, as the great St. Augustine testifies, XV *De Trinitate*, c. 10, and often elsewhere. Hence the Fathers, Theologians, and Philosophers, besides the spoken or external word, also acknowledge an "internal word" or "mental word," and by its example they in some measure explain the production of the Divine Word. They call "internal word" not only that by which, before uttering the spoken word or sounds to be pronounced, we preconceive them in the mind or imagination, but also any concept manifesting any object, even without order to spoken sounds, and especially that which has the force of an interior judgment affirming or denying. Such a word is called a "conception, concept, and offspring of the mind," because it must really be generated or produced by the intellect. It is likewise commonly called by all an "expressed species, likeness, and image of the object," names signifying the office of representing the object to the intellect. In particular it is called an "expressed species" either because it represents more expressly or formally than the impressed species, or because it is expressed, that is, elicited by the intellective power as such. What is this word, or in what does it consist? This

is a question customarily discussed at length in Theology, which we shall resolve here insofar as it concerns us.

53. The Thomists whom we mentioned above, n. 2, place the word in a quality representing the object which is adequately distinguished from intellection and is the term produced through intellection as through a physical action; not in such a way that intellection is a pure action or predicamental action wholly for the sake of the term, but in such a way that it too is a quality desirable for its own sake and nobler than the word, while only through a secondary office is it the production of the word. Most of them, however, hold that a word is not produced through intuitive cognition, but only through abstractive cognition, although they do not all agree on this, as we noted at n. 2. They require a word distinct from cognition in order immediately to terminate cognition not only under the office of physical production, under which office it is called "saying," but also under the office of contemplation of the object. For they hold that cognition immediately contemplates the object in the word as in an image, likeness, or mirror by which the thing cognized is represented or rendered intentionally present and is formed in the being of an object or in objective being.

54. Hence they say that the word is a medium of cognizing, not a formal medium or a medium "by which" the object is manifested as by the form of cognizing, but a medium "in which," and an image "in which," the object is beheld; consequently it is a medium previously cognized, or at least cognized simultaneously with the object. Yet not all agree even on this. For John of St. Thomas, here, q. 11, a. 2, teaches us that the word "is a formal image, which is not the object cognized, but is itself the reason and form terminating cognition; and this need not itself be cognized objectively, but only render cognition formally terminated with respect to the object." And Collegium S. Th. Complut., here, q. 10, n. 236 and 248, says that by direct cognition the word is not cognized "signately and as that which," but only "exercisedly and as that by which." Yet afterward, n. 259, it says that the word is cognized "exercisedly and as a medium in which," but not "signately and as a medium through which"; and in the same place it simultaneously concedes that the object, although cognized by means of the word, is denominated immediately cognized from the cognition. Let these points be noted for what will be said below concerning the authority of St. Thomas.

55. On the contrary, the Scotists with Scotus, and Ours most commonly with PP. Suárez and Vazquez, assert much more probably that the mental word is indistinct from intellection. This is proved 1º by the authority of the Fathers. For St. Augustine, IX *De Trinitate*, c. 11, says: "When the mind knows itself, the knowledge is its word"; and XV, c. 10: "Thought formed from the

thing which we know is a word." He speaks similarly in XII *De Civitate*, c. 7, and often elsewhere, but especially tom. 10, serm. 20 *De Sanctis*, saying: "The Holy Scriptures define the word as thought itself." St. John Damascene, I *De fide*, c. 18, otherwise 17, says: "Our word is a natural motion of our soul, according to which it is moved, understands, or thinks." And St. Anselm, *Monologion*, c. 31, whose words I shall soon report, expressly teaches that thought itself is the word. It is proved 2º by reason: two things belong to the notion of a word, namely manifestation and real origin from the intellect, as is clear from common consent and expressly taught by St. Thomas, q. 4 *De veritate*, a. 2. From this he infers that in God absolute and essential intellection, since it does not really proceed from the intellect, although it truly is a manifestation, cannot properly be called a word except by reason of the identity of essence with the Person of the Son, because, as he says in the body of the article, "If something belonging to the notion of a thing is taken away, it will no longer be a proper acceptation." But both properly belong to intellection, since intellection really arises from the intellect, as no one doubts, and otherwise is truly and properly a manifestation, as we showed above, n. 5 sqq.; nor do the Thomists dare deny this, as may be seen in John of St. Thomas, cit. q. 11, a. 1, toward the end. Therefore intellection truly and properly is a word, or is indistinct from the word.

56. Confirmation: The names or attributes of the word reported in n. 52 belong to intellection. For intellection truly is a concept and conception, or offspring of the mind, since it is really generated by the mind. It is also a likeness of the object, whatever the Thomists may protest. This is clear first from St. Augustine, IX *De Trinitate*, c. 11, where, after saying that knowledge is the word of the mind, he added that "knowledge has a likeness to the thing which it knows." And lest it be thought that by "knowledge" he signifies something other than cognition, afterward, XIV, c. 17, he says: "Then there will be a perfect likeness of God in the mind when there is perfect cognition of God." Second, from St. Anselm, cit. c. 31 *Monologion*, arguing thus: "It cannot in any way be denied that, when the rational mind understands itself by thinking, an image of itself is born in its thought; indeed, its thought itself is an image in its likeness, as though formed from its impression." For "whatever thing the mind desires truly to think, it certainly endeavors, so far as it can, to express its likeness in its thought." He concludes that such a likeness and image, consisting in thought, "is the word."

57. Third, because the likeness of the cognizer to the thing cognized is not "according to conformity" or "agreement in nature," but only "according to representation," as St. Thomas says, q. 2 *De veritate*, a. 3, ad 9, and a. 13, ad 1. For this reason he acknowledges this likeness in Divine knowledge with

respect to creatures, ibid., and attributes no other likeness to the mental word afterward, q. 4, a. 4, ad 2. But likeness according to representation, not implying conformity in nature, under which name conformity in external figure, such as exists in a statue, also falls, is nothing other than the intentional manifestation and disclosure of those things which are in the object; nor is it ever attributed by St. Thomas to the mental word under any title other than manifestation. Since, therefore, intellection truly is a manifestation of the object, it cannot fail to be a likeness of the same in representing, which is proper to the word. Hence created intellection also has the notion of image, as St. Anselm just said, because image beyond likeness adds only origin, as St. Thomas teaches with St. Augustine, I, q. 35, a. 1. But intellection arises from the object through the impressed species, and indeed more properly than the Thomistic word. Consequently it is also an expressed species, because by this name no one understands anything other than a likeness and image elicited by the intellect fecundated by the impressed species.

58. Hence it follows that in a created intellect another word distinct from intellection is superfluous, and consequently that intellection is by no means the production of another term besides itself. For such a word is not required in order that our mind display its fecundity or have an offspring, since intellection suffices for this; nor in order that the object be represented to the intellect, since this is done through intellection itself. Nor is it required in order that intellection have a term, because insofar as intellection is a physical action it does not require a term distinct from itself, as we saw in the preceding chapter; and insofar as it is an intentional tendency it terminates at the object, because to be thus terminated is nothing other than to be a manifestation of the object, or to regard it through the relation of what manifests to what is manifested, which relation intellection implies just as the Thomistic word does. Nor does it matter that the object is corporeal, absent, nonexistent, impossible, or representable in various ways. For just as the object can nevertheless be the term of the spiritual and intentional manifestation which the Thomists attribute to their word, so too, with this word removed, can it be the term of intellection. No difficulty can certainly be objected here which does not equally apply to the Thomistic word.

59. Add that this word will be cognized prior to and more immediately than another object, since it is the medium "in which" and the image "in which" the intellect contemplates the object. But the consequence is both against experience, since no one experiences within himself such an image distinct from cognition, and plainly contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas,

who, I, q. 85, a. 2, on the occasion of the intelligible species, proves very well that by direct cognitions the things themselves are understood "first," not certain likenesses of them existing in the soul. Earlier, q. 14, a. 6, ad 1, he expressly teaches that a cognizer, unless he uses reflex cognition, "does not cognize the thing cognized according to that being which it has in being cognized." In the same place he manifestly teaches that the being which the object has in the cognizer is not distinct from cognition. This is especially to be noted against the Thomists, who posit their word in order that the object may exist within the intellect "in objective being," "in the being of an object," or "in being cognized," as though to be an actual object or to be cognized were something other than an extrinsic denomination formally proceeding from cognition. Certainly it is nothing other in the object of ocular vision and of any intuitive cognition according to the opinion sufficiently common among Thomists; likewise in the object of volition, which need not terminate in a quality distinct from itself and produced in the will after the manner of a weight. Otherwise by no act could anyone love God alone, since he would always have to love first or simultaneously a created quality.

60. From what has been said you will infer 1º that there is no word "in which" in a created intellect, if by this name is understood, as is usual, some medium distinct from the object and cognition in which the intellect beholds the object. Therefore there is only a word "by which," or a medium "by which," that is, cognition itself, which mediates between the intellect and the object after the manner of a form "by which" the intellect is rendered cognizing and the object cognized. Nor does it matter that the Divine Word is called by Theologians a word "in which" and an image "in which." For the Word in God is not produced from need but from infinite fecundity, nor so that the Father may understand, but because He understands most perfectly; and therefore, since it presupposes in its principle a most complete intellection, it is not produced as a form of understanding but as an image "in which." The contrary occurs in a created word, which is both produced from the indigence of the intellect and does not presuppose the intellect as understanding, but is the form by which the intellect is rendered understanding. For, as St. Thomas says, I *Sent.*, dist. 27, q. 2, a. 2: "It is impossible for anyone to understand except by a word of his intellect." Therefore the Divine Word partly agrees with the internal created word and partly with the external word. It agrees with the internal word insofar as it really arises through intellect from the Father; it agrees with the external word insofar as it presupposes its principle, prior in origin, as most perfectly understanding. No one doubts that in this matter the parity from

Divine to created things does not hold in every respect. Otherwise, just as "every understanding in us, properly speaking, is saying," as St. Thomas says, q. 4 *De veritate*, a. 2, ad 5, so in God absolute understanding, insofar as common to the three Persons, would properly be saying. Yet this is known to be false, since the Son and Holy Spirit properly understand and do not properly say, because they do not produce a word. See St. Thomas, loc. cit. Hence God's understanding only insofar as terminated and as it were contracted through the subsistence of the Father, in which sense it is called "notional understanding," is properly saying. But of these matters the Theologians treat.

61. You will infer 2º that a created intellect can never understand without a word, because it cannot understand without intellection, which is a manifestation of the object and an offspring of the mind. This is the express opinion of St. Thomas both in the two places just cited and in I, q. 27, a. 1, c. Hence no intellection is to be excepted, however intuitive, not even the beatific vision, which is also properly a mental word. The Thomists object that a created image and likeness of the Divine essence as it is in itself is repugnant; likewise that God is seen immediately by the Blessed, not through some intervening image. But it is answered that the beatific vision is not an image and likeness in the being of a being, but only in the being of formal representation. St. Augustine acknowledges this likeness in the vision of God, XIV *De Trinitate*, c. 17, whose words we gave at n. 56; indeed, the Apostle John indicates it clearly enough, 1 John 3, when he says: "When He appears, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Nor will God for this reason cease to be seen immediately, because the likeness of the vision is not a medium "in which" but purely "by which," or the formal reason of immediately seeing God as He is in Himself. Nor would one be blessed who reflexively saw another's beatific vision, for the direct vision in relation to the reflex would be a medium "in which," and consequently the reflex vision would not be immediate with respect to God.

62. You will infer 3º that, since to say is the same as to produce a word, in created things it is the same as to produce an intellection. Hence the production of intellection is saying, and conversely. And if intellection is produced through a distinct action, as the second opinion reported at n. 4 holds, saying is modally distinguished from intellection as a predicamental action from its term. In this sense Scotus said that saying and intellection are distinct actions, because saying is the physical production of the absolute quality in which intellection and the word consist, and which in that opinion is also an analogical or grammatical action. But in our opinion saying is not distinguished from intellection or the word except by the mode of signifying,

or according to what is explicit, insofar as saying expresses the office of physical production of the word, while intellection or the word explicitly expresses the office of a produced term manifesting the object. Hence St. Thomas very well said, as cited above, that "every understanding in us, properly speaking, is saying," not only insofar as "to say" signifies manifesting something by a word, but also insofar as it is the same as producing a word, because in us the word itself is its own production, or is a term indistinct from its own production.

63. You will infer 4º that it must likewise be denied that sensation is the production of a further image or quality representing the object. This must be denied not only of every external sensation but also of internal sensation and of the act of imagination imagining an absent object. For a superadded image is superfluous, since cognition of the imagination itself is of itself a representation, likeness, image, and expressed species of the object, as will be clear to anyone applying the proofs of n. 56 and 57. You will say: When we conceive an Angel after the likeness of a youth, or the soul after the likeness of a thin breeze or flame, we form in imagination a certain image or phantasm of a youth or of a thin breeze. I answer: We indeed form one, but subjectively taken, or on the side of the imagination, it is not distinct from the representation identified with the cognition of the imagination itself; objectively, or on the side of the object, it is nothing other than the real youth or breeze whose impressed species is preserved in the memory. The same must be said of the idea of a work which an artisan preconceives, for example when about to build a house. This idea is not some specter formed by cognition; objectively taken, it is the work itself to be constructed; subjectively, it is the cognition of that work. Nor is it an image of the work "in which" except insofar as it is reflexively cognized.

64. It remains for us to say something concerning the authority of St. Thomas, whom the Thomists cite for themselves because in various places he says three things contrary to our doctrine. 1º That the mental word is something "understood, and an intention understood." 2º That it is not a medium "by which," but "in which." The first he teaches in many places, but the second, indeed both together, most expressly in Opusc. 13, where he says: "The interior word is compared to the intellect not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which it understands." He adds in Opusc. 14 that the word "is the principal thing understood, because the thing is not understood except in it; for it is like a mirror in which the thing is seen." Similarly, q. 9 *De potentia*, a. 5, he teaches that not the thing but the interior word "is first and of itself understood." 3º That the word differs from intellection and is the term of intellection. Thus q. 4 *De veritate*, a. 2; q.

8 *De potentia*, a. 1; IV *Contra Gentiles*, c. 53. He also indicates this in I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2, and more than once elsewhere. Nevertheless, we say that these texts do not prove the mind of St. Thomas to be opposed to us. As regards the first, those Thomists among the Moderns who are distinguished and whose words we gave at n. 54 must first answer it. If they say that the word is something understood "exercisedly and as that by which," we freely subscribe; but this very thing is verified of intellection, which no one denies to be in this manner a cognition of itself. Likewise it is commonly said that the will exercisedly wills itself to will, and sight exercisedly senses itself seeing, and so of the remaining senses.

65. Next, all the Adversaries must answer the other passages in which the Angelic Doctor expressly warns that the word is not understood except through reflex cognition, in which manner intellection itself is also understood beyond doubt. One of these is I, q. 14, a. 6, ad 1, concerning which see above, n. 59. Another and more explicit passage is IV *Contra Gentiles*, c. 11, where, after premising that the mental word is the intention understood, the Holy Doctor adds: "It is one thing to understand a thing, and another to understand the intention itself that is understood; this the intellect does when it reflects upon its own work." See how far he is here from asserting that the word is "the principal thing understood" or "first and of itself understood" when the thing is understood. These testimonies are taken from his more distinguished writings and therefore must prevail, if those opposed to us are interpreted of something understood "exercisedly," or of "understood" in the sense of "produced by intellection." Otherwise, likewise, that quality which several Thomists say is produced in the will beyond volition would be the principal thing willed, even through an act of charity, which is plainly absurd. Hence the solution to the second point is also clear; for if the word is cognized by direct cognition no more than exercisedly, it can be a medium "in which" only in relation to reflex cognition. Certainly what is said in the cited Opusc. 13, namely that the word is compared to the intellect "not as that by which," is rejected by St. Thomas, q. 4 *De veritate*, a. 2, ad 3, saying that the word is "that by which the thing is understood."

66. The third point is also easily answered, because on our principles the word is in some manner a term of intellection, since intellection through itself arises from the intellect and can be called its own term, as we explained in the preceding chapter. St. Thomas indeed seems to speak of a term distinct from the action, yet not by a real or modal distinction, but only according to what is explicit or according to the mode of signifying which we noted at n. 62. The interpretation is clear both because, according to St.

Thomas cited at n. 23, intellection is not the production of a further term but is the action in which the impulse of the agent stops, and because St. Thomas often uses a diminishing qualification, as when he says, I *Contra Gentiles*, c. 53, and IV, c. 11, that the word is "as it were the term of intellectual operation"; and q. 8 *De potentia*, a. 1, that the conception in which the word consists "differs from the action of the intellect because the aforesaid conception is considered as the term of the action and as something constituted through it." Note the "as it were" and the "is considered," which sufficiently allude to an improper distinction or one arising from the mode of signifying. Otherwise St. Thomas wishes only that the word really arise from habitual cognition, not from actual cognition, except when it is a conclusion inferred from premises. "The word," he says, q. 4 *De veritate*, a. 4, "is expressed in us through actual consideration as though arising from some consideration of principles, or at least from habitual cognition." He teaches the same more explicitly in the same place, a. 2.

CHAPTER IV.
On the Threefold Operation of the Intellect.

67. The operation of the intellect is generally divided into apprehension, judgment, and discourse. Apprehension, although sometimes taken broadly for any cognition, is strictly taken for an intellection which so represents an object that it affirms or denies nothing of it. Judgment is the act by which the intellect affirms or denies something, or pronounces a sentence concerning the object. Discourse is the act by which the intellect from an object already judged infers another. We gave many things concerning these in Logic; now we shall add certain others more pertinent to the present matter. But first you will ask whether this division is adequate, or whether there remains another operation of the intellect which is neither apprehension, judgment, nor discourse. The latter is held by the Thomists and some of Ours, whom P. Quiros cites and follows here, disp. 96, n. 17. As a principal example they adduce the command, "Do this," which according to St. Thomas is an act of intellect, yet is not comprehended by this division. They also commonly adduce acts of intellect corresponding to interrogative, vocative, deprecative, optative, and, add, admirative spoken expressions, which are not judgments since they enunciate nothing, nor mere apprehensions since they are complete expressions. To these may be added suspicion, doubt, and fear of the intellect.

68. The contrary is asserted by the Scotists and commonly by Ours. For every act of the intellect is cognition, just as every act of the will is volition and every act of the visual potency is vision. But every cognition is a representation or manifestation of an object, as is clear. Therefore it either represents without affirmation and negation, or with one or the other, for there is no middle between these. If in the former way, it will be apprehension, whatever formula expresses it; if in the latter, it will be judgment, and this either not inferred or inferred from another or others, by which second operation is distinguished from third. Nor should one say that acts of the practical intellect are not cognitions but motions toward work. For this is both openly against St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 11, ad 2, and abolishes the practical sciences, and absurdly removes acts of synderesis, conscience, and prudence from the number of cognitions. The command itself, "Do this," according to St. Thomas, I-II, q. 17, a. 1, is a declaration and intimation. But an intimation signifying nothing is repugnant. Therefore such a command signifies, and consequently represents, since in acts of intellect to signify and to represent are the same. Otherwise it would not differ from an act of will, as we argued in the preceding disputation, n. 90. There we also said that this command, insofar as it implies declaration, is a judgment, and in what sense. Now, however, we do not care whether it is a judgment, nor whether of itself it has the force of moving or determining. We contend only that it is representative; consequently, if it is not a judgment, it is an apprehension.

69. We say the same concerning the other acts objected by the contrary side. For a vocal interrogation or admiration, and think the same of the rest, undoubtedly signifies something. Therefore, if some act of intellect corresponds to it, that act must signify something, since the spoken expression outwardly sounds what the concept corresponding to it signifies inwardly. Therefore it is not now necessary to investigate the meaning of expressions of this sort, nor whether they signify rather an act of will than of intellect, or of both. Whatever act of intellect corresponds to them certainly signifies; consequently, if not after the manner of judgment, then after the manner of apprehension, since under this name falls mental signification in general which is not judicative. Yet various species can be given under this genus, some of which can be called complete expressions because they are not considered as potential parts of a judgment. For not every apprehension need be ordered toward judgment, just as not every judgment toward discourse.

70. But you will object concerning intellectual fear, which is commonly explained by this act: "Perhaps I am mistaken." This act is not an

apprehension, as is clear from its mode of tending; otherwise it is not a judgment, because fear can be joined with any probable judgment, and therefore with this merely opinative judgment, "A supernatural substance is impossible." But that act, "Perhaps I am mistaken," could not be joined with this if it were a judgment, for it would yield the opposite sense, namely: "It is possible that a supernatural substance is not impossible." I answer 1º: Intellectual fear, although expressed by a judicative verb, can consist in a persuasive apprehension of the opposite object which inclines, though does not determine, one to omit the probable judgment or cease from it, and this apprehension is not incompatible with that judgment. I answer 2º: Even if it is a judgment, it need not yield the sense intended by the objection. For it can signify in the mind that the arguments upon which the opinative judgment rests are not evident nor certain from Divine testimony.

On Apprehension.

71. Apprehension, although always called simple insofar as it lacks the composition proper to judgment, is nevertheless in its own order called either complex or incomplex according as it contains or does not contain expressions really or formally multiple. Likewise, one is absolute and another comparative. I suppose these divisions known from Logic. There are also some apprehensions which are persuasive and others which persuade nothing, according to the preceding disputation, n. 81. It is now asked 1º whether apprehension can attain the objective copula, or the agreement and identity of the extremes asserted through judgment. Some deny this, but the common opinion rightly affirms it. First, because the intellect often, before judging, doubts and deliberates whether it should assent to the identity of the extremes, for example to the identity of the soul with the intellective potency. But this cannot occur unless such identity is apprehended. Second, because when someone hears this spoken proposition, "The intellect is really the will," he immediately apprehends its whole object, yet does not immediately assent to it, especially if he is a Thomist. You will say: There is then a nonultimate concept, that is, an apprehension terminated at the words, not at the object. But against this stands the fact that one who understands Latin then conceives otherwise and more than one ignorant of it; but the latter conceives only the words. Therefore the former also conceives the object. Hence you will infer that apprehension can represent the whole objective proposition and need not always differ from judgment in object, but in the mode of tending.

72. It is asked 2º whether apprehension necessarily precedes judgment. The most common opinion, which few oppose, affirms it. As regards a nonevident judgment, the reason is effective, because a judgment of this kind depends upon the command of the will, while the will cannot command an unknown assent concerning an altogether unknown object. It must therefore precognize both, certainly through apprehension, since another judgment should not be presupposed. I admit that sometimes there is presupposed a judgment concerning the sufficiency of the motive for judging, but not always nor for the most part in an opinative assent; and when such a judgment is presupposed, it too depends upon the application of the will, at least while the sufficiency is not altogether evident. The necessity of prior apprehension for an evident judgment is more difficult to prove, since according to the common doctrine such a judgment does not depend upon the application of the will, although not all agree. It is commonly proved from the imperfection of the human intellect, which, unlike the Angelic intellect, must begin from a more imperfect genus of cognitions in order to rise to another and more perfect one. This seems to be established by experience: for before we pronounce judgment concerning objects, we propose them to ourselves in a simple manner and, as it were, place them before the tribunal of reason to be judged. Hence, when it is commonly said that the intellect cannot fail to assent to an evidently proposed object, a prior apprehension is already presupposed, for through this the object is proposed, that is, appears to the intellect. Add that, when the species of an object is posited and excited, even concerning something known of itself, for example the greater magnitude of the whole than the part, the intellect still remains indifferent to various assents which are indeed equivalent but diverse in their mode of tending. For it can assent either under these terms, "The whole is greater than its part," or under these, "The part is less than the whole," or under these others, "It is impossible that the whole should not be greater," etc. Therefore it must be determined to one mode of assenting rather than another either by the prior apprehension or by the will with that apprehension illuminating beforehand.

73. These arguments, however, do not prove an essential dependence of human judgment upon apprehension. Hence it is commonly asserted that by Divine power a man can judge with no preceding apprehension, just as an Angel naturally judges. And at least it is very widely received among Theologians that the beatific vision, although judging most perfectly, does not need a distinct apprehension. Nevertheless, there are some who attribute an essential dependence upon apprehension at least to judgments humanly possible, either because these judgments reflect in some manner

upon prior apprehensions, concerning which later, or because they tend toward the true as apprehended, just as volitions tend toward the good and cognized. For this reason the intellect often assents to the false when it apprehends it as true and dissents from the true when it apprehends it as false. Otherwise false judgments could exist without an object, namely without anything true either really or apparently. This reason, however, presses little, because it can be said that every judgment identifies with itself an appearance or representation of objective truth. What is to be held in this question will be clear below, n. 84.

74. It is asked 3º whether prior apprehension efficiently influences judgment. I answer: If apprehension performs the office of a species with respect to judgment, as some not improbably hold, it will influence efficiently, as is clear from what was said in disp. 6 concerning the influx of the impressed species. But even if it does not perform this office, an active influx of apprehension can still be defended quite probably; yet it can also probably be denied because of what was said, disp. 4, n. 75. Hence apprehension is commonly said to precede judgment after the manner of a condition or application. It is asked 4º whether apprehension is capable of truth and falsity. We said enough concerning this in tract. 5, Logic, disp. 2, where you will also find treated the questions commonly disputed concerning the truth of judgment.

On Judgment.

75. Judgment can be divided into as many species as enunciation is commonly divided into in the *Summulae*. It is called "assent" when it is an affirmative judgment and "dissent" when negative. It must now be discussed whether judgment is a simple quality, that is, a concept really indivisible into essential parts, and really uncompounded from such parts, or whether it coalesces from several apprehensions or concepts really distinct. The question concerns human judgment, for that Angelic judgment is a simple quality is beyond doubt. The first opinion asserts that judgment is composed of apprehensions. Many Thomists and several of Ours with PP. Suar. and Vazq. stand for this opinion. Aristotle is cited for it by P. Suar. here, l. 3, c. 6, and St. Thomas by P. Alamann. I, p. *Summ. Philos.*, q. 19, a. 1. In truth, both seem perpetually to presuppose this opinion. The second opinion, which is very probable and prevails among Modern authors of every School, argues for the simplicity of judgment. Its principal foundation is that in order to judge, for example, that man is an animal, some concept is required distinct from every apprehension and consequently essentially judicative. For a

judgment is not constituted from mere apprehensions, just as efficacious love is not constituted from mere inefficacious complacencies. Otherwise there would be a judgment whenever the extremes and their identity or distinction are apprehended, which we nevertheless saw to be false at n. 71. Indeed, assent and dissent concerning the same object would then simultaneously occur whenever someone doubts whether such a predicate belongs or does not belong to such a subject; for then the identity and distinction of the extremes are simultaneously apprehended, often indeed through vivid and persuasive apprehensions founded upon weighty grounds on both sides.

76. But that concept distinct from every apprehension and essentially judicative, which, if granted, is simple, as the Adversaries do not doubt, must be an integral judgment. This is proved because such a concept is truly a cognition, since in it the intellect displays the judicative power as such, which power is formally cognitive as proper to the intellective precisely as such and insofar as it has the excellence of cognizing above the sensitive power. Therefore such a concept represents something, and nothing more than the identity of man with animal, for this is that concerning which judgment is passed. But cognition representing the identity of man with animal in an assertive or judicative manner thereby assertively represents that man is an animal, as is clear from the terms; and to judge concerning such an object is nothing other than this, as is likewise clear from the terms. Therefore through itself alone, with everything else prescinded from, it is an integral judgment. Indeed, this concept represents identity not in common but a determinate identity and one of such extremes; for concerning this alone a doubt or controversy is raised by prior apprehensions for judgment by the tribunal of reason. Consequently this same concept represents the extremes of such identity, since the identity consists in the extremes themselves if it is wholly indistinct from them; therefore it represents the objective subject, copula, and predicate. If, then, otherwise it has an essentially judicative mode of tending, what can be lacking to it for the perfect notion of judgment? Hence it follows that a judgment which is not a simple quality is repugnant, because judging by its proper and essential notion requires a concept such as we have discussed.

77. Nor do the objections commonly made seem of great weight. Namely 1º that, even if a concept distinct from apprehension is granted, it could attain the objective copula while leaving the extremes unattained, just as physical action can produce a union without producing the extremes. Otherwise the apprehensions of the extremes preceding and accompanying judgment would be superfluous, since judgment represents the same

extremes. For what purpose would the intellect represent to itself the same object once and again at the same time without new clarity? 2º That a negative judgment, for example "man is not a lion," cannot be a simple concept, both because an impressed species of lion cannot concur toward cognition of man, and because one image cannot simultaneously be a likeness of lion and man, as is clear in an external picture. 3º That the human intellect, unlike the Angelic and Divine, judges only by composing and dividing, as Philosophers commonly teach with Aristotle and St. Thomas. And indeed the composition belonging to affirmative judgment, since it is not given on the part of the object, must be given on the part of the concept. Nor can a distinction between subject and predicate, or an affirmation of one concerning another, be understood if there is not one and another either in the object or in the act.

78. To 1º it is answered: Since the objective copula is nothing other than identity wholly indistinct from the extremes, it cannot be attained, at least in particular and as the identity of such extremes, while the extremes themselves remain unattained, as is clear of itself. Thus, if physical union were wholly indistinct from the extremes, it could not be produced without the extremes being produced by the same action. Understand the same of nonidentity or distinction attained by a negative judgment, which likewise is indistinct from the extremes. Apprehensions subsequent to or merely accompanying judgment concerning the same object would indeed be superfluous; but not those which precede in the order of nature, though not of time, because these prepare the intellect for judging and confer the utility discussed above, n. 72. But the representation added through judgment, although not clearer, is not homogeneous, since it asserts a new mode of tending and affects the intellect differently.

79. To 2º, the assumption is denied with its proofs. For although the species of a lion cannot by itself concur toward cognition of a man, it can nevertheless, when joined with the species of man, influence a simple cognition of both. For this is a power of the intellect, that it can simultaneously use diverse species in order to compare diverse objects with one another and judge concerning their diversity or distinction. An intentional image, since it is not univocal but analogical, and is a likeness not in being but in representing, can as one and the same be a likeness of diverse things. For there is no inconvenience in one act manifesting man and lion, as is evidently clear in an Angelic judgment concerning the diversity of both. It is otherwise in an external image, where one figure obliterates another and one color another. If that example held, then just as the same extension of a panel cannot simultaneously receive images of man and lion, so the same

intellect could not simultaneously have apprehensions of both and consequently could not have a negative judgment.

80. To 3º: First, the division proper to a negative judgment cannot consist in the separation of parts of the judgment itself, as is manifest; otherwise those parts would not constitute one judgment. Next, when a denying judgment is passed, division entitatively is in the object and only representatively in the judgment, insofar as the latter represents the extremes as divided, that is, as distinct. Similarly, the composition proper to affirmative judgment can be considered on the part of the object if composition is taken broadly for identity, or insofar as opposed to distinction. For just as a negative judgment is called divisive because it representatively divides, that is, distinguishes, so an affirmative judgment can be called compositive because it representatively composes, that is, identifies. In this sense even Angelic and Divine judgment undoubtedly compose and divide. Yet another composition is proper to human judgment, namely one taken not for the union of parts of a single act but for the simultaneous positing of several acts in the same intellect with a certain order of dependence. For a human judgment must be posited or joined simultaneously in time with apprehensions on which it depends as prior conditions in the order of nature. This kind of composition is repugnant to Divine judgment and is at least usually absent from Angelic judgment. But a division which is subjectively in the intellect cannot be explained in any opinion, unless perhaps the human intellect is said to divide when it does not join judgment to apprehensions, just as when it joins judgment it is said to compose. Moreover, the distinction of reason between the subject and predicate of an affirmative judgment, which become one and another, is contained through the judgment not formally but both presuppositively and equivalently: namely insofar as the judgment affirming that man is an animal presupposes from the nature of the thing apprehensions by which man and animal are formally distinguished, and equivalently contains the representation of those apprehensions and also of the words corresponding to them.

81. Nevertheless, in order that the first opinion, which is ancient and more consonant with the Philosopher and St. Thomas, may be defended, I submit a manner of explaining it which I touched upon more than once in the *Summulae* and Logic. A human judgment indeed requires an act essentially judicative and distinct from every apprehension; nevertheless it does not consist in this act alone, but in it together with the apprehensions formally distinguishing the extremes which are assumed as subject and predicate. For if it were adequately distinguished from the apprehensions, it

could by Divine power exist without them; in that event it would not be an enunciation of one concerning another and would not properly have a subject and predicate, since these cannot be understood without some distinction either on the part of the object or on the part of the act. But the consequence seems to overthrow the proper notion of human judgment acknowledged by all in Logic. Therefore, just as in the common doctrine discourse or reasoning indeed requires an act essentially discursive, yet does not consist in that act alone but is constituted simultaneously from premises which are mere judgments, so too here. Therefore the essentially judicative act expressly represents the identity of the extremes, for example of man with animal; nevertheless it does not represent the extremes themselves under their proper expressions, indeed not even confusedly after the manner of extremes, but presupposes them as represented through the apprehensions "man" and "animal," which it connotes as coexisting with itself and in some manner connects, constituting with them an integral mental proposition.

82. An example is the verb "is" uttered in a spoken enunciation. For it signifies the identity of the extremes expressly in an assertive manner, and yet does not contain their expressions in itself but presupposes and connotes them in adjoining or preceding words, at least uttered by another, without which it is never an integral enunciation. Nor does it signify the extremes confusedly after the manner of extremes, as though it meant the same as "something is something"; this I call signifying after the manner of extremes. Otherwise, if one were asked whether man is an animal and answered "is," the answer would yield this sense, "something is something," and would therefore be no answer or an inept one. The same should consequently be judged of the peculiar judicative concept after whose exemplar conventional signification was instituted in the verb "is." There is, however, this difference: the spoken verb can be uttered outside an enunciation with some signification because it can change its signification; for it does not signify the same thing in the same manner outside an enunciation as within it, as we said with Aristotle and St. Thomas in *Summulae*, disp. 2, c. 3, and disp. 6, c. 3, n. 11 sqq. But the judicative concept, since it cannot change its mode of representing, cannot be elicited or exist without apprehensions with which it constitutes an actual judgment. Therefore its natural representation is to be compared only with the conventional signification belonging to the verb "is" or "is not" in a spoken enunciation of a third adjacent term, for this signification too is essentially inseparable from the association or consignification of other words.

83. To forestall objections, note 1º: Identity, although reflexively it is commonly explained after the manner of a relation or bond of two, is nevertheless in reality neither a relation nor a union or bond; therefore it need not be conceived signately through the simple judicative act as though regarding extremes. Note 2º: The extremes, for example man and animal, must indeed be represented through that act, since identity is nothing other than the extremes themselves, yet not under their proper expressions but only under the assertive expression of identity corresponding to the verb "is" enunciatively uttered. Whatever the Adversaries object can be repelled by this point, for conventional signification is no more precisive than the natural representation of concepts. You will say: That act does not represent identity as such, but a determinate identity, namely of man with animal; therefore it cannot fail formally to express man and animal. I answer: It signifies a determinate identity, not by signate but by exercised determination, insofar as by its mode of tending it exercisedly attributes that identity to man and animal, whose expressions, although it does not formally contain them in itself, it contains in some manner virtually because it essentially presupposes and connotes them in the accompanying apprehensions. And consider what you would say concerning the signification of the verb "is," where the same difficulty occurs. If you ask in what this connotation consists, I answer: in a certain implicit or exercised reflection upon the apprehensive concepts, namely such as every cognition has with respect to itself when it so assures the intellect of its own existence that, if asked whether it cognizes, it unhesitatingly affirms that it does. The judicative concept has this power from its mode of tending not only with respect to itself but also with respect to the apprehensions which it connotes.

84. Note 3º: No immediate physical union between the concepts composing a judgment is required. An intentional and as it were artificial union consisting in the aforesaid connotation suffices for the judgment to be called an act one of itself or definable by a single definition, as is clear from the example of a spoken enunciation or mental syllogism. Note 4º: The essentially judicative act, by reason of this connotation, is the formal copula and the "composition" proper to human judgment, both affirmative and negative. For it composes or connects two apprehensions, one of which it denominates the formal subject and the other the formal predicate, namely the one whose object it attributes to the object of the other; and this distribution of denomination must, in the opinion of all, be referred to a peculiar mode of tending. See what was said in Logic, tract. 1, disp. 2, c. 5, n. 33, 43 sqq. Note 5º: Formal composition does not belong to the notion of

judgment as such. For an Angel, and much more God, judges most perfectly without the artifice of subject and predicate and without any distinction of extremes which are really identified. The same is to be said of the beatific vision, for it is elicited by the rational soul in a quasi-Divine manner and no otherwise than by an Angel. Therefore only a judgment elicited in the human manner will be composite, even if it is elicited through the habit of supernatural Faith. Hence you will infer that such a judgment cannot by Divine power exist integrally without apprehensions, because it cannot exist without its constituents; and the essentially judicative act neither by itself alone is a complete judgment nor can it be separated from the apprehensions with which it has a quasi-modal connection. Finally note: in a hypothetical or complex judgment, namely conditional, disjunctive, or copulative, one simple concept seems sufficient for both verbal copulas and also for the principal copula denoted by one of these particles, "if," "or," and "and"; for these merely indicate a peculiar mode of tending of that concept.

On the Opposition of Assent and Dissent in the Same Intellect Concerning the Same Object.

85. Here it is also asked whether assent and dissent, that is, affirmative and negative judgment, can coexist in the same intellect while concerning the same object. There is no doubt concerning logical incompatibility, that is, in truth and falsity; for it is certain that both cannot simultaneously be true nor simultaneously false, even in diverse subjects. Therefore the doubt concerns only subjective coexistence, or simultaneous existence in the same intellect, which would be deceived through one or the other. Nor is there any doubt concerning opposed judgments about an object really the same but conceived under diverse expressions, so that the identity is not adverted to; for judgments of this kind are commonly joined, and nothing is more frequent than to assert one predicate of an object while simultaneously denying another which perhaps is really the same, for example when God is asserted to be omnipotent and at the same time denied to be connected with possibles. Therefore the question concerns only assent and dissent under the same expression, for example these: "Peter exists," "Peter does not exist." And indeed the question concerns essential incompatibility, or one unconquerable even by Divine power; for experience demonstrates, and all admit, that these acts cannot be joined by the nature of the thing. PP. Oviedo, Alphonsus, Lynce, Quiros, and Peynado deny the essential incompatibility or incompossibility of these acts. But the common opinion

rightly affirms it, and is held by the Eximious Doctor, disp. 45, *Metaph.*, sect. 4, and tom. 1, in III, p. d. 38, s. 3.

86. This is proved, omitting other arguments, by the following reason. If the same intellect could simultaneously assent to and dissent from the existence of Peter, for example, it could also by one and the same act judge that Peter both is and is not. But it is essentially incapable of this. Therefore it is also incapable of the former. The major is expressly conceded by P. Peynado here, l. 2, disp. 4, n. 45, and seems altogether undeniable, both because the intellect judges nothing other through this one act, "Peter is and is not," than through these two, "Peter is," "Peter is not"; and because from these two, as from premises, the former one is legitimately inferred, just as from these, "Peter writes," "Peter sits," it is legitimately concluded, "therefore Peter writes and sits." But an intellect capable of assenting to the premises and intrinsically incapable of eliciting assent to the conclusion is repugnant. The minor is therefore proved 1º because the intellect is essentially incapable of assenting to the false as false, that is, to an object so proposed through the assent itself that it appears altogether alien from truth. I speak of objective truth, by virtue of which the object is in reality as it is enunciated through the assent. For the intellect, insofar as it assents, tends under the notion of the true, or of the persuasible, as sight under the notion of color. Hence, just as it is repugnant to see an object which through the vision itself appears noncolored, so too here. But an intellect judging by one act that Peter is and is not would assent to the false as false in the sense explained. This is clear because that Peter "simultaneously is and is not," under these very terms and from them, appears evidently altogether false to every intellect, especially if it is already furnished with knowledge of that principle most known of itself: "It is impossible that the same thing simultaneously be and not be," which knowledge, as P. Peynado warns, must be presupposed in the intellect for the present question.

87. The same minor is proved 2º because such a judgment, according to the Adversaries, is of itself incapable of being elicited from the determination of the will, as also from the determination of the intellect or object, and cannot exist except from the determination of God against and above every exigency of nature. Therefore such a judgment would be intrinsically supernatural; and since otherwise it would be essentially false, as repugnant to truth from its very mode of tending, it would absurdly follow that a judgment essentially erroneous can be intrinsically supernatural and proceed from God as special Author. From what has been said you will infer that acts of efficacious love and hatred, or volition and nolition, concerning the same object cognized under the same expression

cannot be joined even by Divine power in the same will. For the present question is common to these acts also, and the reason is the same. If the will could efficaciously will and not will walking simultaneously, for example, it could also by one and the same act efficaciously will that walking both be and not be. It would therefore efficaciously and absolutely will an object which evidently appears impossible, and consequently purely evil or participating in no goodness. Hence the will too would be drawn outside its formal notion; and that act, although essentially futile, irrational, and foolish, would nevertheless be intrinsically supernatural and proceed from God as special Author, which is plainly absurd.

88. It is objected 1º: Positive qualities or forms, such as assent and dissent, are not opposed as the being and nonbeing of the same thing; and therefore they are not contradictorily opposed in the same subject, but contrarily in the physical line. But this opposition can be overcome by Divine power, as is clear from the example of heat and cold or whiteness and blackness. I answer: This rule is not general for all positive forms, for some can be virtually contradictory in physical being insofar as one essentially requires the absence of the other. Thus an act of Faith by which Peter believes himself to be a mere man is essentially incompossible with the hypostatic union of Peter's nature to the Word. Likewise, if duration is a mode, as most Adversaries hold, today's duration essentially excludes yesterday's. Here it must be noted that the opposition of assent and dissent in the same subject is in a certain way intentional, or arises from the objects; namely insofar as one act destroys the object of the other in the being of something judicable by this intellect, because an object is constituted in the being of such a thing through the absence of the opposite judgment.

89. It is objected 2º: Sadness and joy can coexist in the same will. For the soul of Christ the Lord, even when it was "sorrowful unto death," was affected with supreme joy from the beatific vision. Therefore similarly, etc. I answer: Joy and sadness concerning the same object cannot in any way exist simultaneously, as St. Thomas proves, III, q. 84, a. 9, ad 2. Therefore neither did the soul of Christ the Lord have sadness and joy simultaneously concerning the same object, as St. Thomas also teaches, III, q. 46, a. 8, ad 1. It had sadness concerning the sins of men and simultaneously joy concerning the Divine perfections and its own beatitude. The Theologians discuss this expressly. See P. Suar., loc. cit. Moreover, sadness and joy concerning diverse objects are indeed opposed in an intense degree, but only by a certain physical contrariety after the manner of cold and heat, which can be overcome by Divine power.

90. It is objected 3º: The intellect can simultaneously apprehend two contradictories and even judge that there are weighty and probable motives for each side of the contradiction. Therefore it will then be able simultaneously to elicit opinative assent and dissent. Confirmation: After an opinative assent, at a posterior sign, an evident apprehension of falsity can supervene which compels the intellect to dissent. First, the objection proves against everyone that assent and dissent can naturally be joined. Then I deny the consequence, because a natural nonevident apprehension does not decide whether the object is or is not. Hence not only two apprehensions but a single apprehension can simultaneously propose its being and nonbeing, since it can serve for a judgment concerning the repugnance of their simultaneity. Hence the disparity from our case is clear. Motives for each side of a contradiction can indeed be apprehended simultaneously, or even reflexively judged simultaneously probable; yet not by a probability of simultaneity, as though it were probable that both sides are simultaneously true, but by simultaneity of probability, insofar as motives not lightly persuasive are simultaneously proposed to the intellect that either side is true in a sense divided from the other, or is true in such a way that the other is false. Therefore there are never motives persuading the intellect to adhere by direct judgment simultaneously to both sides. Evident apprehensions of the existence and absence of a thing, however, can in no way be joined, because they are virtually and connexively judgments. Nor can an evident apprehension of falsity coexist in the same instant with an opinative judgment, because such a judgment presupposes the absence of this apprehension; for it presupposes its motive precisely as a motive constituted in the being of sufficient motive for opining through the absence of evidence to the contrary. Hence that judgment cannot be a cause or condition for such an apprehension to be excited at a posterior sign, unless you wish the apprehension to be present and absent in the same instant, which involves contradiction.

On Discourse.

91. Discourse is a motion or progression of the mind from one or more judgments to another: a progression, I say, not of just any kind, but implying an order of causality between the antecedent and consequent judgment. We discussed many things concerning this mental progression under the name "syllogism" and "argumentation," both in the *Summulae* and in the last tract of Logic. It remains now to discuss whether discourse implies some essentially discursive act, or one which essentially distinguishes the third

operation from the second. Some deny this, but very few. The common judgment everywhere either affirms it or presupposes that it must be affirmed. For the formal conclusion implied in discourse is not just any judgment but a judgment essentially inferred and of itself presupposing the second operation of the intellect once or twice exercised. Therefore, just as the second operation is essentially distinguished from the first because it presupposes it of itself and adds an essentially judicative act, so too, etc. Yet if you contend that every judgment belongs to the second operation, and that from the difference between inferred and noninferred judgment the classes of operations are not diversified but only species of judgments, just as from the difference of hypothetical from categorical judgment, you will be disputing about the name. You could similarly dispute concerning the difference of judicative from nonjudicative representation, as though it merely varied species of apprehensions just as the difference of simple apprehension from complex apprehension does. The common doctrine means only this: that in what is called the third operation of the intellect there is implied an act inferred of itself, or depending of itself upon another or other presupposed judgments.

92. But the question is in what this dependence is placed, or in what consists the fact that the conclusion of discourse is essentially a conclusion, or inferred of itself. This question is connected with the one which we left undecided in Logic, last tract, disp. 1, at the end, namely whether the conclusion formally attains the object of the premises. There we set out various opinions on this matter and their Authors. Now, in order to decide both questions simultaneously, I shall briefly examine three sufficiently common manners of speaking. 1º According to several, therefore, the conclusion depends upon the premises because, although it does not intrinsically attain their object, it is nevertheless produced by an action essentially tied to the premises, for they suppose cognition to be an absolute quality. It is not that the conclusion of itself requires to be produced by such an action, but that in fact it is so produced from the command of the will or from the peculiar disposition of the premises. Hence taken formally or reduplicatively as a conclusion, it essentially depends upon the premises because it thus reduplicates that action; yet specifically taken it could have existed without the premises, namely produced by the intellect alone with the species. Indeed, it could never have been a premise inferring either of the premises now such, for example in this syllogism: "This man is the Pope; Clement is this man; therefore Clement is the Pope." For if the conclusion becomes the minor premise, it will infer with the same major, in the second figure, the preceding minor; and if it becomes the major, it will infer with the

same minor, in the third figure, the major of the first syllogism. Therefore, just as fire B depends of itself upon fire A while it is produced by it, and yet it could have happened conversely that A was produced by B, so too here.

93. But this opinion seems false because it posits nothing intrinsically belonging to the third operation of the intellect except a certain physical action which, in this opinion, is not formally cognition or representation. Hence the intellect, insofar as discursive, will not be properly cognitive, since it claims no peculiar act for itself which is properly cognition. But this seems absurd, since the discursive power as such is human rationality itself. Moreover, that a conclusion specifically taken can be elicited as the same without premises cannot be true, at least universally, if the object of the premises is merely extrinsic to the conclusion, as this opinion holds. For, this being posited, there will often be a conclusion without an intrinsic motive, for example in this syllogism: "What the Angel says is true; but the Angel says that the stars are even in number," suppose he did say so; "therefore the stars are even in number." Here the conclusion will have no motive except an extrinsic one proposed by the premises. Hence, if that motive is absent, as in reality it is absent when the premises are absent, this conclusion elicited separately will be a judgment without any motive for judging, either intrinsic or extrinsic, which is plainly repugnant.

94. 2º According to others, the conclusion is essentially an inferred judgment because it does not have a motive intrinsically attained, but only one extrinsically proposed in the premises; and since it is incapable of existing without a motive, it therefore essentially presupposes the premises and cannot be produced or conserved without them. But neither does this opinion satisfy. First, because it falsely supposes that no conclusion is moved in any way by the intrinsic truth of the inferred object. For although this is so when the medium of proof is altogether extrinsic to the inferred object, as happens in the syllogism just adduced concerning the parity of the stars, nevertheless it is otherwise in scientific conclusions, where the middle term is really intrinsic to such an object, as when one property of an essence is demonstrated from another. For then, as the Eximious Doctor observes, disp. 44, *Metaph.*, sect. 11, n. 46 and 47, the reason for assenting, or formal object of the conclusion, is not the middle term taken in just any way, nor only the truth of the principles, but the very truth of the objective conclusion insofar as it is shown in itself from the connection of the extremes with such a middle term. Otherwise the objects of the sciences would not properly be known scientifically but as it were believed on the faith of the principles.

95. Second, because an assent attaining no motive intrinsically, or no persuasive reason for assenting, is repugnant. For assent tends under the notion of the persuasible true, as these Authors admit, and for this reason deny that a conclusion can be elicited without a persuasive reason at least extrinsically proposed in the premises. Hence, just as vision expressing no color and hearing perceiving no sound are repugnant, precisely because otherwise they would be drawn outside that notion under which they tend, so an assent perceiving absolutely no reason by which the object is rendered persuasible must be repugnant. Nor does it help to say that the conclusion is not an integral act but a part of one act composed of itself and the premises, and that the intellect need not perceive the motive of assenting through every part of its act, as is clear in this causal judgment, "Because the Angel said it, the stars are even in number," where the motive is not perceived through the second part. This does not help, I say, because if a part of an act as distinguished from the others is truly an assent, as the conclusion undoubtedly is, it must by reason of itself perceive the object as persuasible, or as furnished or connected with a motive for assenting, just as every part of an act of hearing which is truly hearing cannot fail by reason of itself to perceive the object as sounding. But that causal judgment is either an altogether simple act, or, if it is composed of apprehensions, certainly not of judgments or judicative acts really distinct, as we warned above concerning other hypothetical judgments, n. 84, at the end.

96. 3º Therefore, according to several others, and this is the common opinion of the Thomists and several of Ours, which St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 8, a. 3, and q. 12, a. 4, and which P. Suar. quite clearly presupposes, loc. cit., the conclusion is a conclusion of itself and essentially inferred because it reflects upon the object of the premises, so that in this syllogism, for example, "Every man is an animal; Peter is a man; therefore Peter is an animal," the mental conclusion intrinsically proposes to itself as the reason for assenting the already judged identity of the extremes with the middle, and yields in the mind this sense: "Peter is an animal because he is a man and every man is an animal." This sense, or quasi-causal tendency, is denoted by the particle "therefore" in a spoken syllogism. But this opinion also suffers difficulties. It is commonly objected against it 1º that, if it were true, a categorical conclusion would not be inferred from categorical premises but a hypothetical, namely causal, one. 2º That the middle term would necessarily have to be repeated in the conclusion, contrary to the rules of the *Summulae*. 3º That, contrary to the same rules, the true could never follow from the false. For in this syllogism, "Every stone is an animal; every man is a stone; therefore every man is an animal," the conclusion will

be false if it yields this sense: "Every man is an animal because he is a stone and a stone is an animal." 4º That the conclusion will not need the premises, since it itself proposes to itself the motive of assenting; for a proposition known of itself or immediate because of this does not need prior propositions. Therefore far from the conclusion becoming a conclusion of itself through attaining the object of the premises, the opposite rather follows.

97. Nevertheless it seems that the conclusion must be said intrinsically to attain the object of the premises as a motive or reason for assenting to its own object. For when the object of the conclusion is not persuasible except through a middle term extrinsic to it, as in the syllogism concerning the parity of the stars at n. 93 and similar ones, if the conclusion does not intrinsically attain such a middle term, it will be an assent without any reason for assenting proposed to or attained by itself. But this, besides what was said at n. 95, is convicted of falsity from the fact that the conclusion is the proper and characteristic act of the discursive power as such, in which human rationality principally consists. Therefore it must be a maximally rational act. But how will it be maximally rational if, seeing no reason for judging, it nevertheless pronounces sentence concerning the object? It is therefore necessary that conclusions of this kind attain the object of the premises of themselves. The same must be thought of the rest in whatever matter. First, because we experience that they have a similar mode of tending. Second, because the contrary arguments apply either to both or to neither. Third, because every conclusion assents because of the object of the premises as connected with the truth of the objective conclusion, so that without it there is not a sufficient and adequate reason for assenting for such an act. Otherwise, if the truth of the inferred object alone sufficed, the conclusion would no longer be a mediate but an immediate proposition. But every conclusion, in order to be a properly rational act, must perceive not just any reason for assenting but a sufficient one.

98. It is not necessary, however, that the conclusion be formally hypothetical or causal, nor that it explicitly have this tendency: "Peter is an animal because he is a man and every man is an animal." First, because we do not regularly experience this tendency, although it is not repugnant and can sometimes be had from the command of the will. Second, because the reason for affirming need not be explicitly affirmed through the assent which it objectively determines, although it is attained by it. This is clear in assent to an immediate proposition known of itself, for example, "The whole is greater than its part." This assent has as its reason for affirming the immediate agreement of the extremes clear from the terms, and

undoubtedly regards it intrinsically; yet it does not explicitly affirm that agreement as such, nor does it have this tendency, "The whole is greater than its part because this is immediately clear from the terms." Otherwise every immediate proposition would be hypothetical and none categorical. The same therefore must be judged concerning assent to a mediate proposition, for there is no reason why one rather than the other should explicitly affirm its motive. Yet each implicitly or virtually affirms the motive, or presupposes it as true, insofar as it so affects the intellect that, if asked why it assents, the intellect immediately gives the reason through a causal reflection. The same is meant by what others say, namely that the motive of affirming is not always affirmed "as that which," but "as that by which."

99. Indeed, I do not even think it necessary for the conclusion expressly and distinctly to repeat the object of the premises without affirmation, for we generally do not experience such repetition. We do experience, however, a mode of tending which presupposes or alludes to the premises. We express this allusion by the word "therefore," which is equivalent to "hence," "for that reason," "therefore," or "this being so," and to which on the part of the intellect corresponds a perception of objective inference as founded upon the object now already judged, while at the same time representing this object by a certain simple and confused intuition, yet not vague or indefinite but contracted to such an object as here and now already judged, just as occurs in that intuition by which sight confusedly perceives a present object under weak light. But since this intuition is of the object as now already judged, from its mode of tending it also presupposes the formal premises as present and therefore reflects upon them. For the objective inference of object B from A does not suffice for an absolute assent concerning B unless that assent either affirms, or presupposes as affirmed and proposes, object A, or at least perceives it as known of itself. Hence arises the fact that the conclusion is essentially a conclusion, or an inferred judgment and a mediate proposition, because it essentially has a mode of tending which presupposes premises; and it is moved not from the terms alone of the object which it affirms, but solely or simultaneously from a motive asserted in the premises and at least rationally distinct or proposed under another expression. Hence also the conclusion is rendered essentially inseparable from the premises, at least if it arises efficiently from them, which is very probable; for it identifies with itself its own production, as does every other cognition on our principles.

100. But when afterward the assent of the conclusion is repeated without the premises, as often happens, that assent is then not properly but

analogically a conclusion, insofar as it imitates the previously possessed conclusion both in the object affirmed and in the motive for assenting. For it is always moved by the object already judged in the premises, whose memory, at least confused, it necessarily presupposes. Therefore, if someone is asked the motive of such an assent, he immediately repeats the premises formerly possessed. This imitation suffices for an assent of this sort to proceed from the habit and species of the conclusion and commonly to be called a conclusion. Yet it differs from a conclusion properly and strictly so called, because it does not presuppose actual premises nor reflect upon them as present, but only as past. But if it in no way proceeds from their memory, but proposes another motive to itself, or that same motive not as already judged, it can in no way be called a conclusion, nor will it arise from the habit of the conclusion, although it affirms the same object.

101. From what has been said the objections of n. 96 are easily solved. To 1º: Although the conclusion intrinsically attains the object of the premises, it need not tend in a hypothetical or causal manner, but can be formally categorical, as we have shown. To 2º: The rule of the *Summulae* is satisfied if the middle term does not enter the conclusion "as that which," that is, as the object affirmed or as the subject or predicate of explicit affirmation; nor is it forbidden to enter "as that by which," that is, as the reason for affirming, in which way it is denoted by the word "therefore." To 3º: A mental conclusion deduced from false premises is always absolutely false because of the false supposition, or because of the implicit and virtual affirmation of the false motive; likewise a spoken conclusion insofar as it contains the particle "therefore." Yet each can explicitly affirm an object true in itself; and therefore, if it is considered as affirming the material object while prescinding from the motive, it can be called true. In this sense the true is said to follow from the false, namely because it is true from another source, not by virtue of the consequence or inference. The reason a consequence is not called by Summulists true or false, but good or bad, is that it contains no explicit affirmation of the motive.

102. To 4º: In order that a proposition be called immediate, it is not enough that it intrinsically attain the motive of assenting unless that motive consists in the immediate agreement of the terms, or of the predicate with the subject. Otherwise this proposition would be immediate: "Pompey was defeated by Caesar because historians report it so." But the motive of a syllogistic conclusion is either extrinsic to the inferred object, or at least rationally so distinct that it can be called a "middle term." Nor will the conclusion cease to need the premises because it attains the motive, since it attains it not in just any way but as already judged, with a reflection upon the

formal premises as present. Finally, note that it is not to be denied generally that there can be a purely extrinsic motive, or one not terminating the act which it moves by means of another preceding act; for this often occurs in acts commanded by the will and in external human actions. It must nevertheless be denied that this can occur with respect to an act which attains no other motive or formal object sufficient for itself, and especially with respect to discursive assent, which by a peculiar title must be intrinsically and by reason of itself rational. Therefore the object of the premises with respect to the conclusion is both an intrinsic or terminating formal object and at the same time an extrinsic motive, though not a purely extrinsic one, insofar as through the premises it determines the intellect to elicit the conclusion.

CHAPTER V.

On the Various Species or Properties of Intellection.

103. It remains to examine the variety of species or properties of intellection that commonly occurs under these names: "abstractive, intuitive, quidditative, comprehensive, reflexive, immediate, mediate, certain, evident, and probable cognition." Authors disagree considerably concerning the distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition. Many hold that intuitive cognition is any cognition effected through a proper species and containing a strictly proper concept of the object (as to what is called a "proper species," what an "alien species," and what a "strictly proper concept," see above disp. 6, n. 4, and disp. 7, n. 5), whereas abstractive cognition is effected through an alien species and therefore is not a strictly proper but a symbolic or enigmatic concept. These authors are obliged to concede that every cognition of an absent object, provided it is had through a proper species, is intuitive, for example, our memorial cognition of a sensible object that has already perished; and similarly that cognition of color as such, or of whiteness as such, is intuitive. This plainly conflicts with the received usage of the Schools. Others give other explanations. Omitting these,

104. I assert, in accordance with the common judgment of the Doctors, that at least two things are required for intuitive cognition: 1º that it be effected through a proper species (the same holds if it occurs through the immediate influx of the object, or if God by Himself supplies the concurrence of the object or species); 2º that it tend toward the object as really present. The reason is that these two things are necessary in ocular intuition, from whose likeness the name "intuition" was transferred to an

act of the intellect. Hence intuitive intellection is called "vision." To this also alludes the Apostle in 1 Cor. 13: "We now see through a mirror in an enigma; but then face to face." Guided by this text, the Fathers and Theologians call beatific intellection "intuitive and the vision of God," because through it the Divine essence is discerned openly and manifestly, just as a human face exposed to the eyes; whereas they call the cognition of God that we now possess "enigmatic," as also any other cognition acquired through alien species. Through lack of the first requisite, no cognition that does not arise from a proper species is intuitive, even if it represents the object as existing and present, and even evidently (every intuitive cognition is evident, but not conversely), as is clear in the cognition by which the Philosopher evidently demonstrates that God exists and is everywhere. Through lack of the second, cognition cannot properly be called intuitive which, although had through a proper species, nevertheless either expresses the object as past or future, abstracts from existence, or represents it universally, that is, in common.

105. It is objected: Divine cognition of creatures existing at some time is intuitive, and therefore is called "knowledge of vision"; yet it represents objects even as past and future, precisely as such. I answer: it does indeed represent them as past or future with respect to us, but as present with respect to God, because the eminence of the Divine mind simultaneously regards the whole extension of time, as our sight regards the extension of a place placed before it; or, as St. Thomas says, I^{a} p., q. 14, a. 9, because God's understanding is measured by eternity, which, existing without succession, comprehends all time, and therefore "God's present intuition extends to all time and to all things that are in any time, as to things present to Him." But the explanation of this presence belongs to the Theologians.

106. It may be asked whether, besides the two things stated above, anything else is required for intuitive cognition. The reason for doubt is that an absent or nonexistent object is often represented as present, as though it were seen by the eyes, especially in dreams and insanity; and yet such a representation, although had through a proper species preserved in memory, does not seem to be intuitive. I answer: many concede that such cognition is intuitive. But because it is common doctrine that intuitive cognition cannot naturally be elicited or preserved without the present object, although it can be so preserved by Divine power, it seems that, beyond the two conditions stated above, there is required a special mode of clarity that so certifies the intellect concerning the actual existence of the object that, however attentive, sane, and awake it may be, it cannot doubt that existence. This arises not so much from the intensity of the clarity as from a peculiar mode

or character. This requisite, however, is absent when an insane or dreaming imagination proposes an absent object as present.

107. Hence you will gather that, for the present state, no object is intuitively known by our intellect through direct cognition (excepting our acts as reflexively known), unless it is actually perceived by some external sense; for in direct cognition we have a proper species only of a sensible and actually sensed object. And this species, in order to produce cognition endowed with that special clarity, naturally depends upon present external sensation as upon a condition without which it is either not preserved or at least is not proximately able to produce such an effect. Hence, with respect to our intellect as intuitive, no external object is called present unless it is actually sensed; although with respect to an Angel or a separated soul, whatever naturally exists in any place is said to be present for intuition. Thus, if after looking at the sun at midday we close our eyes, intuitive cognition of the light immediately ceases in the intellect, and we no longer experience in the mind that special clarity whereby we are certified of the present light, although we continue to think about it through a proper species. Suppose that the light you see is not that of the sun but of a candle which, as soon as you close your eyes, is extinguished without your knowledge. Will you still intuit in your mind the light that has now been extinguished? Nor does it matter that, when our eyes are closed at midday, we do not doubt the existence of light. For this arises from certainty previously possessed from another source concerning the necessary permanence of the sun, and not from the cognition that then proceeds from the recent sight and species of the light; for such cognition of itself no more excludes doubt concerning the sudden extinction of the sun than of the candle.

108. Finally, it must be known from common doctrine that supernatural intuitive cognition is essentially connected with the presence of the object, because, if it existed apart from it, it would be false and would make God the author of error. Natural intuitive cognition, however, naturally requires the presence of the object, and indeed immediately by reason of its own character and tendency, as many hold; or, as others judge, perhaps more probably, mediately, that is, by reason of the power from which it arises. For in us it arises from a species that needs the present object either in order to be preserved or at least in order to operate intuitively, according to what was said in disp. 6, nn. 54 and 55. In Angels, however, it is effected either through the immediate concurrence of the object or through a species that depends upon the existence of the object in order to produce intuition. The Theologians will give the reason for this dependence.

109. Now "abstractive" cognition will be any cognition that lacks one of the conditions stated above (the name "abstractive" is not taken here, as in Logic, from the abstraction of a common nature from its inferiors, but from the abstraction of the object from the state of actual existence or presence). Most especially, however, and almost by antonomasia, that cognition is called "abstractive" which is had through alien species; for cognition through proper species, whether preserved in memory or infused by God, approaches intuition very closely. This is especially true of cognition that manifests the quiddity of the object without any shadow of impropriety or confusion, such as the Divine knowledge of simple intelligence and the cognition by which the Blessed know purely possible things in God. Such cognition, I say, although it is not intuitive, will not properly be called abstractive, and perhaps would better be said to belong to a third kind, or to be purely quidditative. Moreover, among properly abstractive cognitions, some are evident and others inevident; and among the latter, some are certain, such as an act of Faith, while others are uncertain, such as an act of opinion. As regards clarity, not every abstractive cognition is surpassed by every intuitive cognition; for we know this principle, "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be," more clearly than a sensible object perceived by sight at a great distance or under poor illumination.

110. "Quidditative" cognition, considered according to the force of the name, can generally be called any cognition of the quiddity of an object whereby one answers a person asking, What is the thing? Hence every mental definition, even if formed through alien species and negative concepts, is customarily called quidditative cognition. According to the common usage of the Doctors, however, cognition is not called strictly quidditative unless it arises from a proper species of the object (proper, I say, either formally, equivalently, or eminently), and moreover, by a clear, proper, and positive concept, distinctly penetrates the essential predicates of the thing down to its ultimate difference. If it simultaneously expresses the thing as present, it will also be intuitive; if it abstracts from the state of existence, it will be abstractive or purely quidditative, according to the preceding number. Hence you will infer 1º that the Thomists and our authors rightly reject the opinion of Scotus, namely, that there can be a proper species and quidditative cognition of God which is not intuitive. For God cannot be known quidditatively without being known indubitably as existing and present; and cognition that thus expresses God through a proper species can lack nothing required for intuition. See Fr. Suárez, disp. 30, Met., s. 11, n. 22. It is otherwise with creatures, whose essence, since it

does not exist necessarily, can be known quidditatively without intuition; for in this way purely possible things are known by God.

111. You will infer 2º that in the present state we cannot know quidditatively those objects of which we do not have a proper species, that is, a strictly proper concept. Which objects these are, see above disp. 7, nn. 5-9. You will infer 3º that not every proper species suffices for quidditative cognition, because not every species is fruitful of cognition that distinctly penetrates the constitutive or essential predicates of the thing by a clear, proper, and positive concept. This is clear in every species of an object sensible in itself; for we know color, sound, etc., through a proper and intuitive species, and yet this species does not produce strictly quidditative cognition, since the quiddity of these things is not thereby distinctly penetrated in the manner stated. Otherwise there would not be so much dispute about what color, sound, odor, etc., consist in, nor would Aristotle have defined heat and cold through very remote effects and signs. Hence a proper species and intuitive cognition often coexist with an inability to know the same object quidditatively. Certainly a brute knows sensible objects through a proper species and intuition and distinguishes one from another, although it cannot know them quidditatively. Hence you will gather that no object, except perhaps the aforesaid most simple and transcendental objects, is known by us quidditatively in the strict sense in the present state, since not even those objects of which we have proper species are known by us in this way. So dark is the state of mortal life.

112. "Comprehensive" cognition, or intellectual comprehension, is sometimes taken for the beatific vision insofar as the latter, as it were, grasps and holds the ultimate end toward which we tend, according to the Apostle in 1 Cor. 9: "So run that you may comprehend," and Phil. 3: "I pursue, if in any way I may comprehend." Comprehension is here taken as opposed to pursuit, or to the way; hence the Blessed, because they cease to be wayfarers upon having attained the terminus, are called "comprehensors." In the present discussion, however, it is not taken in this sense, but insofar as it signifies cognition adequate to the object, or entirely commensurate with it in representing, namely, cognition by which the whole object is known wholly, according to the saying of the great Augustine, epist. 112, c. 8: "It is one thing to see and another to comprehend the whole by seeing; but the whole is comprehended by seeing when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing, or when its boundaries can be surveyed." This usage is derived from an analogy with bodily comprehension, for one body is said to be comprehended by another when it is surrounded or encompassed on every side by it. The Theologians treat expressly of

comprehension taken in this sense. All agree that God is incomprehensible to a created intellect, while comprehending Himself and all other knowable things; they also agree that the concept of comprehension requires a cognition that is clear, certain, evident, and quidditative, because it is the most perfect of all cognitions corresponding to the object. But they disagree at length in explaining what is additionally required for comprehension properly so called, or in what its commensuration and adequation with the object consists.

113. For very many, especially among the Thomists and our authors, require for comprehension a cognition of everything contained in the object, not only formally but also virtually or eminently (in the present context those predicates are said to be contained "formally" which really belong to the object under their proper concepts; but all effects producible by such an object are contained "virtually" or "eminently"), so that by virtue of penetrating the object whatever can arise from its power necessarily becomes known. Others, especially the Scotists, think that comprehension can stand even if what is virtually contained in the object is not known. Others say that it suffices for comprehension to attain all the possible effects of the object in common, or according to the formal aspect under which the power of the object tends. Others require cognition of all effects in particular, at least as regards species, but except effects producible through obediential potency. Furthermore, there is disagreement whether, for comprehension, it suffices distinctly to know whatever is in the object formally and virtually or eminently, with expression of all the termini of its connections and of all effects down to the individual. Many affirm this, and therefore judge that from cognition of all possible things in Omnipotence there necessarily follows comprehension of Omnipotence. Many others deny it, because they judge that such cognition might fail to equal the intensive knowability of the object, and therefore that another more perfect cognition is possible, one not exceeding the deserts of the object, which, although it discovers nothing new in the object, nevertheless knows more clearly and in a more perfect manner the very same thing discovered by the other cognition.

114. For the present purpose, I think it should be said that one comprehension is strictly such, that is, wholly exact and complete in every respect, while another is ordinary, less exact, or broadly so called. Comprehension of the first kind must distinctly know not only whatever is formally in the object, as all admit, but also in particular and down to the individual all effects contained in its power and all termini with which it is intrinsically connected. The reason is 1º because Divine cognition knows in

this manner whatever is in God and yet does not super-comprehend God, but only comprehends Him exactly; therefore such cognition belongs to entirely exact comprehension. 2º Because a thing cannot be exactly comprehended unless all its intrinsic connections and relations are known expressly as such; for the concept of comprehension demands that all things really identified with the object be known under their proper expressions, since implicitly or indistinctly they are attained through any cognition of the object. But connections and relations as such cannot be known while their termini remain unknown, as is manifest. Therefore the termini must be known at the same time, and indeed down to the individual if the object is connected with them individually, as the power of every cause, even one active through obediential potency, is connected with its effects as possible, according to what was said in *Physica*, tract. 2, disp. 7.

115. This same point is confirmed because, in order that the sun, for example, be comprehended, all its intrinsic predicates must be known formally as such; otherwise Augustine's statement, "so that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing," will not be verified. For a predicate that is not known as such is said to be hidden or unknown, as is clear in an animal seen at a distance, concerning which we do not know whether it is rational or irrational. But the connection with the possibility of each individual light producible by itself is an intrinsic predicate of the sun. Therefore this connection must be known formally as such, which cannot be done unless that individual light itself is known. Furthermore, comprehension of the sun must exhaust all its knowability; but the sun is knowable by a concept expressly comparing it with each and every effect that it contains; therefore, etc. Indeed, that is comprehended whose boundaries are surveyed, as Augustine taught us above; and "the boundaries of a thing are then surveyed when one arrives at the end in the mode of knowing that thing," as St. Thomas explains, I^{a} p., q. 12, a. 7, ad 2. But one has not arrived at the end in the mode of knowing when the thing can still be known in a new mode, namely, under an express comparison with each and every one of its effects or termini of connection.

116. If you infer from this that the sun, for example, cannot be wholly and exactly comprehended by any created intellect, since the individual effects that it can successively or divisively produce are infinite; indeed, since the sun and every other creature is immediately connected with all or almost all possibles, as we said in *Physica*: I grant the consequence with Fr. Hurtado and others, at least concerning a created intellect operating naturally, whatever may be the case with one supernaturally elevated, which many with sufficient probability think capable of distinctly knowing infinite

objects. Whether, however, the aforesaid cognition of all the connections of the object is not only required but also sufficient for comprehension strictly so called, the Theologians will dispute. The negative opinion explained at the end of n. 113 seems to me very probable, supposing, as must be supposed in this question, that a created intellect can through supernatural light distinctly know all possible things simultaneously. If you ask why God is said not merely to comprehend creatures but to super-comprehend them, I answer: because He comprehends them with clarity absolutely infinite, which surpasses every created comprehension; or because He knows not only whatever necessarily belongs to each creature, but also whatever contingently belongs to it, namely, without identity or connection.

117. Now comprehension of the second kind, namely, ordinary and broadly so called, which alone can naturally belong to one creature with respect to another, is cognition that intensively equals the whole motive or specifying knowability of the object, that is, the whole power possessed by the object to cause cognition of itself within its own order, either by itself immediately or through a proper species, or at least to specify that cognition extrinsically as the measure of its perfection. Such cognition suffices for the object truly to be said to be known wholly and as a whole; because, although it does not contain every expression under which the object can be known, it is nevertheless the highest and most perfect of all those cognitions that the object can cause or specify by its own deserts. Thus, when the intellect attends to an object as much as it can, that is, with all its powers, it is said wholly and totally to attend, although it does not elicit every act by which it could divisively regard the same or another object. By this same example it is clear in what sense comprehensive cognition is said to exhaust the whole knowability of the object. Nor is adequation or commensuration required in the being of entity, since a substantial object can be comprehended by accidental cognition; it suffices that there be adequation in the being of an effect objectively causable in an intellect suited to cooperate according to the deserts of the object, namely, in an intellect that is either superior to the object or at least equal to it. Hence, according to common doctrine, an Angel comprehends the rational soul, and a higher Angel a lower one, but not conversely.

118. This very cognition, by reason of that adequation, is a full and exact estimation, or a just judgment, concerning the worth and perfection of the thing known; for every thing has a desert or power of specifying a cognition whereby it is estimated at what it is worth. Hence, among the effects or termini of connection of the object, the comprehensor need know only those whose cognition is necessary for a full estimation of the object, and only in

the mode in which it is necessary. Therefore he need not distinctly know effects producible by the object through obediential potency, because obediential potency does not add a peculiar perfection above natural power; nor is the perfection of supernatural effects attributed to the elevated power, but to the cause elevating it. It will therefore suffice if the comprehensor knows that such an object can be elevated by God to all things that do not imply contradiction, whatever they may be. Nor again need he distinctly know each and every natural effect that the object can successively or divisively produce; rather, it suffices that he clearly know what kind and degree of perfection, and under what aspect, can be communicated by this object to its effects in one, as it were, adequate production. For in this way the other effects divisively producible are equivalently known, and a fixed judgment is made concerning the quantity and character of the perfection of the object.

119. Indeed, in order to comprehend the human intellect, for example, it is not necessary distinctly to know all the species of acts naturally producible by it insofar as they are derived from the object. It will suffice to know the specific variety of acts taken from their mode of tending, which does not proceed to infinity; likewise, how much perfection the power can communicate as though from its own store when it operates naturally with its greatest effort; and finally, that its objective sphere is the aspect of being in common, under which the species of acts can consequently vary according to the infinite variety of objects. The reason is that no other cognition is necessary in order for the perfection of the human intellect to be estimated according to its deserts; for once it is known that any being whatsoever can be known by this intellect in such a manner and with such perfection or perspicacity, the estimation increases little or not at all from knowing in particular that being A, being B, etc., can be known by it. For the same reason it is clear that all possibles need not be distinctly known, even if the human intellect is connected with them either because of the order of the cognitive to the knowable or because of the general title of elevability to anything whatsoever.

120. Moreover, of comprehension thus explained it is not improperly verified that it sees the thing in such a way "that nothing of it is hidden from the one seeing," namely, nothing whose expression is necessary for a just estimation of the thing. It is likewise verified that it "surveys the boundaries" of the thing, namely, the boundaries of its estimability. If perhaps you infer that by ordinary comprehension as explained by us God is comprehended even by the Blessed, I deny the consequence, because although the beatific vision discloses all that we said must be disclosed on

the part of the object, nevertheless on its own part it lacks that intensive and specific perfection which we required for comprehension in n. 117, namely, that by which it perfectly corresponds to the object according to its whole motive or specifying power; for God is an object naturally specifying cognition that is absolutely infinite. But enough now concerning comprehension.

121. "Reflexive" cognition in the present context is called cognition that has itself for its object, that is, which reflects upon itself signately. Concerning this cognition it is asked whether it exists or can exist. The Nominalists judged it impossible. On the contrary, some with Spinula think that every cognition necessarily reflects signately and expressly upon itself. The common opinion holds that not every cognition reflects upon itself, yet that cognition having itself for its object is not impossible. The former part is clear from experience, because we often think about various things without reflexively noticing that we are thinking. Moreover, no reason proves such reflection necessary, as will soon be clear. The latter part also is easily established. For first, that cognition can confusedly attain itself together with other things is clear in these concepts, "every cognition, every act of intellect," and the like. Next, that it can also clearly reflect upon itself is established by the example of Divine cognition, which is the clearest cognition of itself; likewise by parity with confused reflection of the kind just described, against which the contrary arguments are equally applicable. If you ask whether cognition can so reflect upon itself that it has no other object really distinct from itself, I think this should be affirmed, provided it is not pure cognition but really identifies with itself other perfections of which it is a manifestation, as Divine cognition identifies with itself the perfections and attributes of God.

122. It is objected against the first part: 1º it is manifest to everyone who knows that he is knowing; hence anyone, when asked whether he knows, immediately affirms that he does, which is a sign that every cognition is a manifestation of itself. 2º The action, union, or location of any thing is necessarily the production, union, or location of itself; therefore likewise, etc. To 1º I answer: every cognition manifests itself, not signately but exercitively, insofar as it excludes from the intellect every doubt concerning its own existence, and at the same time produces and preserves an experiential species of itself, which, if aroused by a question or otherwise, without delay causes reflexive cognition of the existence of the direct cognition. To 2º I deny the consequence, for the antecedent is true because every action must be produced, every union must be united, and every location must be somewhere; and, moreover, if there were an action of an

action, etc., an infinite regress would follow. But whence do you prove that it is necessary for every cognition to be reflexively known? Add that, if the example from action, etc., is valid, a negative judgment will be a negation of itself, and hatred will be hatred of itself.

123. Against the second part it is objected: cognition is referred to the object and caused by it, and is a tendency toward it as toward a terminus; but it cannot be referred to itself, be caused by itself, or tend toward itself. I answer: this relation and causality, or tendency, has place in cognition which is otherwise established to be really distinct from its object, but not generally in every possible cognition, as though it belonged to the concept of cognition as such. For Divine cognition, prior in origin to the Word, does not attain an object really distinct from itself according to the probable opinion denying that the Word proceeds from cognition of possibles; and no one attacks that opinion on the ground that true cognition is not preserved without a distinct object. Therefore, just as not every physical action is a tendency or relation toward a terminus, but only that action which is established to be distinct from the terminus, so too here. Likewise, the knower and the known are said to be mutually related, and yet the same intellect can be known by itself. It should be noted, however, that a species from which cognition arises without an object really distinct from it would have to be produced by God alone and could not be caused by the object. Nor is this novel, since, according to a very common doctrine, the species through which an Angel knows a stone is producible by God alone.

124. Concerning "immediate, mediate, certain, evident," and "probable" cognition, what we said in Logic, last tract, disp. 2, chs. 1 and 3, should be recalled. For understanding the terms, it should now be noted 1º that evidence and intuition are not mutually convertible, although each name is derived from the clarity of external vision. Every intuitive cognition is indeed certain and evident, but not conversely; for we know certainly and evidently that God exists, though we do not intuit Him. It should be noted 2º that mediate cognition is not so called because it does not terminate immediately at the object, but because it needs some means or motive in order to attain it, or because it is determined to know it by another object or by penetration of that object. If the determining or moving object must be previously known by another distinct act, it will be called a "means from which," and there will be cognition "of one thing from another," as occurs in discourse. But if it is known by the same act, which presupposes no other, it will be called a "means in which," and then without discourse there will be cognition "of one thing in another," as occurs when an Angel knows effects

in their causes, or when a Blessed person sees certain future or possible things in the Word.

125. It should be noted 3º that abstractive cognition effected through alien species, although it sometimes assents to the object from the terms themselves, is nevertheless called mediate by reason of the species from which it arises and which is not immediately instituted to represent that object. For the contrary reason, cognition had through a proper species is called immediate. This same cognition, especially if quidditative, is said to know the object "as it is," or "as it is in itself," that is, not "after the likeness of another," as does cognition had through an alien species. Yet to know an object "in itself" does not signify the same as to know it "as it is in itself." For a Blessed person knows in the Word, through a species eminently proper, creature A "as it is in itself," and yet does not know it "in itself," but "in another," according to what was said in Note 2º. Accordingly, that is said to be known "in itself" whose cognition is not specified by an extrinsic means but rests solely upon the intrinsic knowability of the object itself. Hence you will understand the sense in which Theologians dispute whether possibles are known by God not only in Omnipotence but also in themselves.

CHAPTER VI.

Whether Knowledge, Faith, and Opinion Can Be Conjoined in the Same Intellect Concerning the Same Object.

126. This question is customarily disputed here after the evidence, certainty, and probability of cognition have been explained. It concerns the same material object affirmable from diverse motives, for example the immortality of the soul or the existence of God. For we can know and affirm this object, at least divisively, by three acts from diverse motives: one an act of supernatural faith, because resting upon the revelation of God; another evident or scientific, because resting upon an evident or demonstrative argument; another probable or opinative, because resting upon an argument that is indeed weighty but not compelling. It is therefore asked whether these three acts can simultaneously coexist in one intellect. The Thomists deny this, even by the absolute power of God. Their principal foundation is that faith imports obscurity, whereas knowledge or evidence imports clarity; therefore they conflict with one another as light and darkness. Likewise, opinion imports uncertainty and fear of falsity, whereas faith and evidence import certainty; but certainty and uncertainty concerning the same thing cannot in any way be joined.

127. Nevertheless, following Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, Durandus, and other older authors, our authors commonly and rightly affirm it. For if a pagan philosopher, after acquiring by natural discourse evident cognition of the existence and attributes of God, is converted to the Faith, he can and must believe by Divine faith the existence and attributes of God, according to the Apostle, Heb. 11: "He who approaches God must believe that He exists, etc." But then he will conjoin faith with evidence. If you say that such a wise man cannot believe by faith that God exists, the contrary is shown 1º because the Apostle speaks without limitation of one approaching God, and the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 6, understands his words of faith properly so called; 2º because that wise man can love the existence of God with a supernatural and meritorious love, which must certainly be regulated by faith; 3º because otherwise he would be in a worse condition than an unlearned man who knows this truth with a greater and nobler certainty, nor could he say in the Creed, "I believe in one God, maker of Heaven and Earth"; 4º because it would follow that the Mother of God could not have believed by faith that she had conceived without a man, given birth without pain, stood by the cross, and many other things which she knew by natural evidence. Hence we would be more certain concerning such objects than the Mother of God herself, since the certainty of faith is greater than that of natural evidence.

128. Nor again should you say that such a wise man can indeed believe by faith, but only by ceasing from scientific assent. For this too will be attacked: 1º because when the existence of God is proposed to such a wise man for belief, the evident species of that same object already otherwise scientifically known are necessarily aroused, or at least can be aroused; and when they are aroused, evident assent cannot be restrained. 2º Because a scientific habit should not cease or be diminished by the arrival of faith; otherwise, in like manner, the habit of faith would cease or be diminished by the arrival of a scientific act or habit, and Christians would lose the whole habitual faith while acquiring knowledge of the existence and attributes of God through philosophical arguments. They would lose the whole of it, I say, because habitual faith is the same for all the articles of faith and cannot diminish without being wholly lost, as is known to Theologians. But who would accept the consequence? Therefore the act of knowledge should not cease because of the act of faith. The consequence is clear: where habits are in no way opposed, and neither exclude, diminish, nor remit one another however much they increase, there is no incompatibility or opposition between their acts, as is clear from constant induction. And indeed, if acts of knowledge and faith were opposed, an exceptionally learned Christian would

experience great difficulty in eliciting an act of faith, because through a strong scientific habit he would experience a strong inclination toward the opposite act. Yet experience plainly contradicts this. By the same argument the coexistence of opinion with knowledge and faith is proved; for the assent of faith or knowledge does not weaken the force of a probable argument for the same object, nor destroy or diminish the habit of opining. Nothing is more frequent than that we should be habitually disposed, because of probable reasons, to assent to an object of which we otherwise possess knowledge or faith.

129. Furthermore, omitting for brevity several other sufficiently ingenious arguments offered by Fr. Quirós, *Philosophia*, disp. 36, sects. 2 and 3, this opinion is established by destroying the foundation of the contrary one. For faith is called obscure, not because it is a formal lack or privation of intellectual light in the subject; for it is "as a lamp shining in a dark place" (2 Pet. 1), and the light by which the true Light, Christ, "enlightens every man" (John 1). Rather, it is called obscure because it is a positive manifestation that does not identify with itself the clarity proper to knowledge, or does not participate in it from the motive of revelation. At most, therefore, it can be called a negation or exclusion of scientific clarity from itself or from identity with itself, but not from the intellect; just as whiteness is an exclusion of sweetness from identity with itself, but not from the subject in which it exists. Similarly, opinion taken according to the substance of probable assent, in which sense it is now taken, is not privative but positive uncertainty, that is, a positive act excluding certainty from itself, or not deriving it from the probable motive, without thereby excluding from the intellect certainty coming from elsewhere. Nor of itself does it import fear except aptitudinally or permissively, insofar as by its own desert or by virtue of the probable motive it does not remove but permits in the intellect formal or actual fear, that is, an apprehension, fear, or reflexive judgment concerning the danger of falsity, without thereby preventing that fear from being excluded by another act. Thus sweetness of itself permits blackness in its subject, yet it coexists with another form excluding blackness, namely, whiteness.

130. Therefore, if acts of faith, knowledge, and opinion concerning the same object were simultaneously given, the intellect would know it clearly and obscurely, certainly and uncertainly, although without formal fear, but with this addition: "through diverse acts and diverse motives." Nor does this seem any more repugnant from the force of the terms than that the will, by adding efficacious love to simple complacency, should love the same object efficaciously and inefficaciously at once; or that the intellect, by adding

judgment to apprehension, should know the same thing suspensively and assertively at once; or that, seeing a thing in itself and in another, as a Blessed person who sees himself both in himself and in the Word, it should know it immediately and mediately at once; or even that the soul of Christ our Lord should abstractively have known through acquired knowledge many objects which it simultaneously knew intuitively through infused knowledge and the beatific vision. Nevertheless, of an intellect furnished with those three acts it will not be verified absolutely and without qualification that it knows clearly and does not know clearly, or that it knows certainly and not certainly, but only that it absolutely knows certainly and clearly, while at the same time it knows unclearly and uncertainly in a qualified respect, namely, according to the force of a certain act or motive. The reason is that a positive denomination is truly affirmed absolutely provided that it belongs to the subject from one form, even if not from all the forms existing in the subject; conversely, for it to be denied absolutely, it must proceed from no form, because negation is of a malignant nature, as they say. Thus fire, although not luminous through heat and dryness, is truly called luminous absolutely; but it is falsely called absolutely non-luminous. Likewise, you would falsely say absolutely that an intellect simultaneously apprehending and judging, or knowing abstractively and intuitively at once, judges and does not judge, or intuits and does not intuit the object; and so in the other cases.

131. From what has been said you will infer 1º that faith can be conjoined with an evident act not only abstractive but also intuitive concerning the same object, as is clear from the faith of the Virgin Mother of God concerning certain objects, from n. 127. That Faith is not found in the Blessed is because the end for which this virtue is destined by Divine ordination has ceased; for it is destined to direct the state of wayfarers tending through merits toward beatitude. Or again, because the beatific vision most clearly discloses the motives upon which supernatural faith rests and therefore removes the obscurity that faith requires on the part of the motive. This reason has place if faith cannot coexist with evidence in the one attesting, as the common opinion holds. But against the inference it will be objected: one who sees the object would foolishly believe it because of another's testimony. I distinguish: if the testimony is human, let it pass; if Divine, I deny it, because he will prudently believe both in order to render obedience to the authority of God and in order to acquire greater certainty, since faith given to God is more certain than ocular evidence. It is further objected: faith, insofar as it is abstractive cognition, tends toward the object as absent; intuition, toward the object as present; but it is repugnant for the

same object to be known simultaneously as present and absent. I answer: abstractive cognition is said to tend toward an absent object insofar as, from its kind, it does not require the presence of the object. Otherwise there is no doubt that through faith we know God as immense and therefore as most present to us.

132. You will infer 2º that the saying of Paul in Heb. 11, "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the argument of things not appearing," and many testimonies of the Fathers saying that faith must concern things not appearing or not seen, are to be understood of things not clearly appearing or seen through the very act of believing, or by virtue of the motive of revelation; nor do they prevent the same objects from simultaneously appearing through other acts or other motives. Thus abstractive cognition must concern things not intuitively appearing, and immediate cognition things not appearing in another; and yet an object known abstractively or immediately can through other acts simultaneously appear intuitively or in another, according to what was said in n. 130. Add that even if Paul were speaking of things absolutely not appearing, he would not therefore have to be understood as speaking of faith according to its essential concept or according to all its acts. For he similarly says that faith concerns things to be hoped for, and yet by many acts of faith we believe things not to be hoped for, for example the fire of Hell, the creation of the world, Noah's flood, and the sin of Adam and Lucifer. Therefore, just as for the truth of that text in its first part it suffices that faith in fact truly concern things to be hoped for, although not only such things nor things necessary to its essential concept; so, for the same text to be true in its second part, it is enough that faith in fact truly concern things not appearing, although not only such things, etc. For in fact it proposes to us things not appearing, that is, not seen, such as all Divine things; and also many things not appearing, that is, not abstractively known or evident, such as the Trinity, Incarnation, Eucharist, and the other supernatural mysteries.

133. But it will be objected: the act of faith must be free and meritorious; therefore it cannot be conjoined with evidence, especially intuitive evidence, which necessitates the intellect to assent. This is confirmed from the words of Christ the Lord, John 20: "Because you have seen Me, Thomas, you have believed; blessed are they who have not seen and have believed," where it is openly supposed that faith conjoined with vision lacks merit. To this also pertains the saying of the great Gregory, hom. 26 in Evang.: "Faith has no merit where human reason supplies experience." To the objection I deny the consequence, because although evidence necessitates assent from an evident motive, it does not necessitate assent from the motive of faith,

namely, "because God has revealed it." For one who assents to the immortality of the soul, for example, because of a demonstrative argument can refuse to assent to this truth because of the revelation of God. Indeed, even if one simple assent were conceived from both motives, it could still be free and meritorious; for although the evident motive necessitates some assent, it does not necessitate such an assent as simultaneously rests upon the motive of faith, which would therefore be freely conceived even in the presence of the evident motive.

134. To the confirmation: the Apostle Thomas had faith concerning the object that he saw, as Fr. Suárez shows, disp. 3, *De fide*, sect. 9, and as the word "you have believed" presupposes. But because evidence or vision diminishes the difficulty of believing and therefore the merit, although it does not wholly remove it, the Lord commends the faith of Thomas less than that of those who did not see. When the Fathers say that Thomas saw one thing and believed another, they do not deny that he believed the truth of Christ's body which he saw, but they point out that with greater merit he further believed the Divinity which he did not see. St. Gregory's statement has place when faith does not rest upon Divine testimony as upon a motive sufficient of itself, but for the sake of security calls human reason or experience to its aid, in the absence of which the intellect would not acquiesce. This is St. Bonaventure's interpretation. It should be noted here that although faith in fact is free and meritorious, freedom and merit do not belong to the common and essential concept of faith, just as they do not belong to the common concept of charity, since charity in the Blessed is not meritorious. Likewise, obscurity or inevidence of its proper motive will not belong to the common concept of faith if an act of faith can exist with evidence in the one attesting, as many probably hold. To have evidence in the one attesting is evidently to know not only that God is infallible and supremely truthful, but also that He has revealed this object. But we leave this question to be discussed by the Theologians.

135. You will infer 3º that faith, through conjunction with probable assent taken specifically, is not rendered fearful or capable of conjunction with formal or actual fear of falsity. For although probable assent of itself does not exclude fear, neither does it necessarily entail it; for a probable judgment, and indeed an erroneous one, is commonly had without any actual fear. I said "taken specifically," that is, according to the substance of direct assent, because if this assent is taken reduplicatively as conjoined with fear, as it often is, especially under the name "opinion," it cannot coexist with another certain assent, whether of knowledge or of supernatural faith. And in this sense it is taken by Aristotle, l. I, *Posterior*

Analytics, at the end, and by St. Thomas, 2, 2, q. 1, a. 5, ad 4, where they deny that opinion can be conjoined with knowledge concerning the same object. Therefore St. Thomas himself, 3, p., q. 9, a. 3, ad 2, expressly teaches that opinative cognition had through probable signs can coexist with demonstrative knowledge of the same object. Hence it follows that such cognition can be separated from all doubt or fear, and consequently does not conflict with the certainty of faith. St. Thomas will be more difficult to explain where, 2, 2, q. 1, aa. 4 and 5, he denies that faith can concern an object seen or known. But first, he is not treating of the absolute power of God. Next, perhaps he speaks of an object believed and known from the same motive, or of an act of faith which is simultaneously vision or knowledge; or he takes faith reduplicatively as conjoined with lack of evidence in the intellect, which conjunction, although not necessary, regularly occurs. You have an example in St. Thomas's use of "opinion," just discussed.

Whether the Same Doctrine Can Be Extended to a Simple Act.

136. A doubt remains whether a simple or indivisible assent is repugnant which is simultaneously one of faith, knowledge, and opinion because it assents to the same material object on account of three motives, each of itself and in first act sufficient, namely, because of the testimony of God, because of an evident argument, and because of a probable reason. That this is repugnant seems sufficiently to be gathered from St. Thomas in the place just cited, and Fr. Suárez expressly holds it, d. 3, *De fide*, s. 9. That it is not repugnant is a very common opinion among others of our authors and is not slightly probable; and since the discussion concerns the absolute power of God, this opinion seems preferable. First, because it is not repugnant for the same assent to be conceived from several motives, each of which is here and now proposed as sufficient for assent. Experience establishes that we often assent to philosophical opinions both because of several direct reasons and because of the authority of the wise. The will also often loves food both because it is sweet, because it is healthful, and because it is offered by a friend. Next, the motives of faith, knowledge, and opinion can simultaneously be proposed to the same intellect and simultaneously attained by distinct acts, as we have shown. And, although they are attained by the same act, there is no reason why opposed predicates should therefore redound into that act.

137. For although the motive of faith does not communicate to the act concerning the material object the clarity proper to knowledge, nor the probable motive certainty, it does not thereby prevent that same act from participating in them from another motive. By that very fact the act will be absolutely and positively clear and certain concerning its material object, and will be obscure or uncertain only precisively, insofar as, considered formally as arising from the motive of faith, it abstracts from clarity, and formally as arising from the probable motive, from certainty; or insofar as it abstracts from either according to the common concept in which it agrees with acts of pure faith or pure opinion. Examples will make the matter clear. Although the intellect or will does not communicate supernaturalness to an act, it does not prevent supernaturalness from being communicated by another principle; nor must it communicate positive naturalness, but merely precisive naturalness, insofar as the act, as proceeding from the power, abstracts from supernaturalness, which it neither excludes nor requires. Similarly, a material phantasm does not communicate to an intelligible species any materiality beyond precisive materiality. And so in other cases.

138. Therefore, when an act is not one of pure faith but simultaneously of knowledge and opinion, it will indeed still be obscure concerning the motive of Divine revelation, which is supposed inevident, since we are not now treating of evidence in the one attesting; and it will simultaneously be clear concerning the scientific motive. Likewise it will be uncertain concerning the probable motive or concerning its connection with the material object, and at the same time certain concerning the motives of faith and knowledge. There is no difficulty in this, because clarity and obscurity, that is, evidence and inevidence, as likewise certainty and uncertainty, are not repugnant in the same act with respect to diverse things. But with respect to the material object, for example the immortality of the soul, it will not be obscure or uncertain, but absolutely clear and certain. For this it is enough that it receive sufficient clarity for such an object through one, as it were, window, even if it does not receive it through all; likewise, that it have certainty through one or two foundations, although not through another superabundant one. Pure faith simply is obscure, and pure opinion simply uncertain; but not an act which, beyond the concept of faith or opinion, identifies with itself another concept. Thus a purely vegetative soul is material, and a purely sensitive soul mortal; but one that is vegetative and sensitive in such a way as further to identify rationality with itself is neither material nor mortal.

139. Some deny that the act of which we speak would properly be faith. But without reason, because the concept of faith as such consists only in

assenting to the object because of the authority of God revealing, as because of a motive sufficient to render the revealed object believable without fear. Such an act would assent in this way, although it possessed additional concepts besides. Therefore, just as the human soul, because it is truly a principle of nutrition, in which the concept of vegetative soul as such consists, is properly vegetative although it possesses additional perfections; so too here. Nor would that act cease to be supernatural, since it would truly depend upon a supernatural principle, although a partial one. Here note in what sense Divine authority would then be a partial or inadequate motive: namely, insofar as that assent of mixed species would not be specified by that motive alone, or would not attain that motive alone; but by no means because Divine authority would be taken through such assent as insufficient to render the object firmly believable, or as though it were not sufficiently persuasive of itself without the aid of another motive. For such an assent, as now defended, would not take the motives of faith and knowledge as integrating one motive, but as disparate and not needing mutual assistance to render the material object here and now judgeable. It would therefore take each as apt to persuade even if the other were absent, or each as by itself worthy of its entire assent unless the will preferred to embrace both by a single assent. Thus one to whom walking is proposed as pleasant, as healthful, and as commanded by a Superior can say within himself: I see that each of these motives is sufficient, and because they are such, for all these reasons I will to walk.

140. Hence you will easily resolve what others object, namely, that the assent conceived from the threefold motive of which we speak would be neither clear nor certain with respect to the material object; for just as a conclusion deduced from one clear and another obscure premise, or from one certain and another probable premise, follows the weaker part and becomes absolutely obscure or probable, so too here. The parity must be denied, because in a syllogism neither of the premises, whether objective or formal, is taken as a motive sufficient by itself for inferring the object of the conclusion; rather, both are taken together as integrating or constituting one motive, namely, the identity of each extreme with the middle. But this identity is not connected with the object of the conclusion except insofar as it belongs to both. Hence it is no wonder that the conclusion does not become evident or certain when either premise is inevident or uncertain; for from the fact that A and B are identical with one third thing, it cannot certainly and evidently be inferred that they are identical with each other unless it is certainly and evidently established that both together are identified with that third thing. But the opposite occurs in our case; for the

evident motive appears through the assent and is taken as of itself evidently connected with the immortality of the soul, and similarly the motives of faith and opinion each appear and are taken as sufficiently persuasive of themselves concerning the same object. Therefore the assent truly has a source from which it takes the evidence and certainty of the immortality of the soul, although it does not take either from every motive that it attains.

141. But it will still be objected: the same cognition cannot simultaneously be abstractive and intuitive concerning the same object; but the cognition of faith must be abstractive; therefore it cannot be identified with evident and intuitive cognition concerning the same object. I answer: we readily admit the whole argument, because for the present it suffices for us that faith be identifiable with merely abstractive evidence, such as is customarily found in human knowledge. Hence we do not contend that one and the same act can be faith and intuition of the same object, for example, the Divine essence. This would be contrary to all the Doctors, according to Fr. Oviedo here, controv. 5, punct. 3, n. 20. The reason may be either because faith, according to the doctrine of the Fathers, must concern an object not seen, which must be verified at least of an object not seen through the same act; or because the cognition of faith, as had through a revelation extrinsic to the object, is rigidly abstractive cognition of that object, that is, conceived through a species that is not proper, and therefore must be distinguished from intuition, which is conceived only through a proper species. If you ask why the same act cannot be conceived through a proper and a non-proper, or alien, species, I answer: it must be judged impossible, at least because of the authority of the Wise, that the same object be known by the same act "through a mirror in an enigma" and simultaneously be seen "face to face," according to the Apostle's expression.

142. It is further objected: an act that were simultaneously knowledge, faith, and opinion would be constituted in a threefold species; but this is no less repugnant than for the same entity simultaneously to be a man, a horse, and a lion; therefore, etc. First, the objection is pressed by the impressed species or cognition of an Angel, especially a higher Angel, which can simultaneously represent a man, a lion, and a horse; by the act of contrition, which is simultaneously love of God and hatred of sin; by the volition of fasting, which is often simultaneously obedience and temperance; by a sin which is simultaneously theft and sacrilege, or against justice and a vow, as often occurs. Furthermore, it is no less difficult for the same thing to pertain to diverse genera than to diverse species; and yet the same entity is action and passion; the same good can simultaneously be honorable, useful, and delightful; the same man belongs to the genera of intellective and sensitive

living things, through one of which he agrees with Angels and through the other with brutes; the same beatific vision agrees with Grace according to the genus of supernatural form, with natural knowledge according to the genus of intellection, and with bodily vision according to the genus of intuitive cognition; and so in other cases.

143. Therefore it cannot be denied that there are some definitively diverse concepts, arranged in diverse classes, which nevertheless in themselves, that is, in genus or subalternate species, although unconnected, are not opposed, but rather indifferent to being found in reality either identified or distinct, according to the ultimate difference by which they are contracted to the lowest species. There are others, however, which imply or involve mutual opposition, such as substance and accident, material and immaterial, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, whiteness and blackness, since one concentrates sight and the other disperses it, and many others, either opposed from the terms themselves or contracted with the exclusion "purely," or "only," such as is given or understood in the concepts of lion and horse. We say that the concepts of faith, knowledge, and opinion belong to the first kind, because nothing compelling proves the contrary. Consequently we deny that the concept of faith as such, and similarly of knowledge and opinion, is a lowest species or atom. It is a genus or subalternate species, indifferent to being contracted either to an act that is "purely" of faith or to an act that is "simultaneously" of knowledge, so that the latter act differs specifically from the former through a difference contracting two or three genera. Whether this difference is one unnamed difference, or, as some hold, multiple, was treated in Logic where Difference was discussed.

144. Hence, in form, I distinguish the major premise: the act, etc., would be constituted in a threefold lowest species, I deny; in a threefold subalternate species, I subdistinguish: in three species whose concepts are opposed, I deny; in those whose concepts are not opposed, I grant the major premise. But in this sense I deny the minor premise, because the concepts of man, lion, and horse possess opposition according to what has been said. It is further objected: an act conceived from a threefold motive would have three specifying principles; therefore it would derive three species. I answer: it would indeed derive three subalternate species, distinct in reason, but only one lowest species, because in relation to the latter those motives would not be total but partial specifying principles. Thus an action is specified both by its principle and by its terminus, and yet is not in two atomic species.

DISPUTATION IX.
ON ACTS OF THE WILL.

We have already said many things in the preceding discussions concerning acts of the will: namely, that their physical quiddity consists in a certain vital, spiritual, and elicited weight, as it were, whereby the will is either inclined toward good or drawn back from evil; that such a weight is a quality identifying with itself its own production and union by the soul and with the soul; that it essentially depends upon cognition of the object; and several other things that need not now be repeated. Some matters nevertheless remain that require discussion, especially the freedom of acts of the will, their best-known prerogative. We shall say something about it here, referring other questions concerning it to Theology, where they are discussed at leisure.

CHAPTER I.
What Is the Proper Freedom of the Will?

1. Freedom, insofar as the noun is derived from the verb "to free," is said in as many ways as there are releases, liberations, or immunities from some bond, obligation, or subjection; hence there is freedom from servitude, captivity, misery, obligation of law, etc. For the present purpose, one freedom is "from coercion," another "from necessity." Freedom from coercion is found in acts possessed by the will spontaneously or without violence, even if they are possessed necessarily. Thus beatific love is

necessary and yet spontaneous, for the Blessed person does not love God under coercion or unwillingly. In Divine things, the production of the Holy Spirit and the essential love by which God loves Himself also enjoy this freedom, with supreme necessity indeed, but far removed from all violence and coercion. Freedom from necessity, which is also called "freedom of indifference," belongs to acts which the will has under its power not to have. This freedom, considered on the part of the will, is called "free choice," and is defined as "a power," or "faculty, which, when all prerequisites for operating have been posited, can operate and not operate." This does not mean that it can conjoin the act with its omission, but that, after it has been fully furnished with everything necessary for operating, it still lies within its choice either to operate or to abstain from operating. Hence it is called a dominative power, or one having dominion over the operation. This same power, when indifferent to contrary acts, such as love and hatred of the same object, is called "freedom of contrariety," or "of specification," or "as to specification." But when it is or is considered only as indifferent to the act and its omission, it is called "freedom of contradiction," or "of exercise," or "as to exercise."

2. Freedom of indifference, or from necessity, alone is what properly and absolutely comes under the name "freedom" in the present discussion. It suffices, and is altogether required, for imputation, whether for the merit or demerit of human acts, as all Catholics hold, especially since Innocent X condemned as heretical the third proposition of Jansenius formulated in these terms: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, freedom from necessity is not required in man, but freedom from coercion suffices." That such freedom exists in men is too certain and evident to deserve controversy, whatever the heretics of this age may rave against their own conscience and experience. You will find them abundantly refuted by Cardinal Bellarmine, lib. 3, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, and by other polemical writers. The Excellent Doctor also demonstrates the same truth philosophically, disp. 19, Met., sect. 2. There too he shows that a created free faculty must be active. In sect. 3 he wisely discusses, in a threefold sense, the question customarily debated between Thomists and Scotists: whether created freedom could stand if God acted without freedom, that is, from necessity of nature. He also shows in sect. 5 that the will alone, not the intellect or any other power, possesses freedom. And in sect. 9 he effectively proves against the Nominalists that the will acts freely in the very instant in which it operates, that is, with an actual power of omitting the act. All these points are commonly received.

3. It should be noted, however, that freedom of indifference presupposes freedom from coercion and adds the exclusion of necessity from whatever source. I mean physical coercion, that is, coercion importing violence in the physical sense, according to Aristotle's definition of the "violent": "that which is from an extrinsic principle, the patient contributing no force," that is, neither cooperating nor requiring it, but rather resisting, as we explained elsewhere. For ordinary or moral coercion or violence, which is inflicted through threats, blows, or fear of some other danger or loss, leaves the will simply free as regards its acts. Hence one who denies the Faith through fear of death certainly sins, because he freely wills to deny it, although in some manner coerced and not without some repugnance or resistance of his own will. A sailor also freely wills to cast his merchandise into the sea through fear of shipwreck, although unwillingly; and so in other cases. The reason is that the consent of the will is not then violent in the physical sense, since it truly proceeds from within and the patient, that is, the will, truly contributes force, nor is it necessitated from another source, as I suppose. Indeed, speaking of physical coercion or violence, although this can occur with respect to acts of faculties inferior to the will and subject to its command, such as walking, speaking, etc., which acts are called voluntary and free only mediately and by command, nevertheless it is wholly impossible with respect to the proper acts of the will, which alone are called voluntary and free "elicitively" or "immediately." For since, on our principles, these acts identify with themselves their production by the will, they cannot simultaneously "be from within, while the patient contributes no force." Hence you will know why it is commonly and truly said that not even by Divine power can the will be coerced, that is, driven by physical violence to will. St. Thomas expressly teaches this, 1, 2, q. 6, a. 4; and even those who distinguish love from action hold it, although they do not as easily give the reason.

4. It should also be noted that for an act of the will to be free from coercion is nearly the same as for it to be voluntary. The "voluntary" is defined according to Aristotle, 3 *Ethics*, c. 1, and from the doctrine of St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 6, aa. 1 and 2, as "that which is from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end." The Theologians explain this definition in their extensive treatment of the voluntary. For us it now suffices to observe 1º that by the name "end" is understood the object known as appetible, namely, by a cognition from which a reason can be given why it is desired. Since such cognition belongs only to the intellect, the voluntary of itself and immediately belongs only to acts of the will, as those alone that of themselves and immediately presuppose intellectual cognition. It belongs to

the acts of brutes, which are called spontaneous, only analogically or imperfectly, as St. Thomas explains in the cited a. 2, although freedom from coercion properly belongs to brute appetitions and generally to all acts of intentional life. I said "of itself and immediately," because mediately and by command it also belongs to acts of other human powers determined by the will; likewise objectively to willed objects, even if they are not produced by the one willing and even if they are mere passions from without. For in a broad sense whatever happens to one who wills or is conformed to an affection of the will is generally called voluntary.

5. 2º Voluntariness is essential to acts of the will, since it is essential to them to arise from an intrinsic principle and to presuppose cognition of the end. Hence not even by Divine power can it happen that an act of the will is simply involuntary, nor that it happen to a man except when he wills it, at least by the act itself; although it can be denominated involuntary in a qualified respect from some reflexive displeasure, just as it can be denominated coerced in the ordinary sense. 3º The voluntary, taken strictly according to the definition given, is not convertible with freedom from necessity, although, insofar as it pertains to the will, it is convertible with freedom from coercion. The reason is that everything required by the definition of the voluntary can stand with necessity, as is clear from the example of beatific love and the others in n. 1. Nevertheless, "voluntary" is often taken broadly, even by learned authors, for what is free from necessity; and often also for what is spontaneous, insofar as it excludes every violence or coercion, even ordinary coercion, and indeed even the obligation of a law or precept. These usages must be noted for understanding the Doctors.

6. Therefore freedom of indifference, or from necessity, of which we shall henceforth speak, adds beyond freedom from coercion and voluntariness an indifference of the will to eliciting or omitting the act. The indifference proper to the will, however, is not mere combinability with an act or its omission while being determinable by another, such as belongs to an indifferent judgment and to a habit. Rather, it is elective or dominative indifference, which, when fully constituted, is determinable by the will itself and not by another. "The power of the will itself," says St. Thomas, in 2, d. 39, q. 1, a. 1, "insofar as it is of itself, is indifferent to many things; but that it determinately proceeds into this act or that is not from another determining it, but from the will itself." Hence, among all the things constituting proximate freedom, the will alone has "dominion over its act," that is, the immediate power of determining whether it exists or not. For "this dominion," says the Angelic Doctor, loc. cit., a. 2, "is in man according to

that power which is disposed toward many things and is not determined to any of them except from itself; all of which belongs to the will."

7. Nor again does the indifference of freedom signify equilibrium, as though the will were not free unless in first act it inclined no more toward one side of contradiction or contrariety than toward the other. For from this it would most absurdly follow that the human will almost always operates without freedom and therefore without merit or demerit. The indifference proper to freedom therefore signifies exclusion of necessity and requires only that nothing positive or negative be present by which either operation or its omission is rendered inevitable or antecedently necessary to the will. I say "antecedently," because antecedent necessity alone is opposed to freedom. What is called antecedent necessity and what consequent necessity, see *Physica*, tr. 2, disp. 8, ch. 5, where many points relevant to the present discussion can be observed. Therefore the will must actually have, or have within its power, all requisites for operating, because if anything is lacking, omission will be necessary. Likewise it must lack anything infallibly connected with operation which it can in no way avoid or impede; for if anything such is present, operation will be necessary. Indeed, the free power differs especially from a necessary power in this: that it can conjoin all prerequisites, or the whole first act of freedom and complete sufficiency for operating, with omission of the operation. But to explain this more distinctly, I suppose that proximate and unimpeded freedom, which alone is simply freedom of indifference, is not adequately intrinsic to the will, that is, does not consist in the will alone; otherwise infants or lethargic persons would have proximate freedom. Hence only remote, radical, or aptitudinal freedom is wholly identified with the will, insofar as the will of itself is apt, upon the addition of certain co-principles or conditions, to become proximately free.

8. Therefore, for the proximate first act of created freedom to be constituted, there is required 1º the addition of an active power if the will of itself does not sufficiently contain the perfection of the act. Hence for a supernatural act there is need of a supernaturally active co-principle. There is required 2º on the part of the intellect an indifferent judgment, at least virtually so, that is, judicative cognition which so proposes the object that, although it persuades, it does not irresistibly impel toward love of it, and similarly as regards hatred, but can indifferently be joined with love or omission of love according to the choice of the will. From this combinability it is called "indifferent," even if it inclines more toward one extreme than toward the other. In order to constitute freedom of specification or contrariety, this judgment must represent the object as simultaneously good

and evil in diverse genera, for example, as honorable but inconvenient, or delightful but shameful or harmful to health. It is not, however, necessary that this mixture of good and evil be proposed by one and the same judgment; it suffices if there are two judgments, one attracting and the other repelling, by one of which the aspect of good appears and by the other the aspect of evil.

9. But in order to constitute freedom of pure contradiction or exercise, the judgment must propose the goodness of the object without admixture of evil and, according to many, also some difficulty or trouble in the act of love concerning such an object. According to many others, however, this latter condition is not necessary; it suffices for freedom of exercise if the judgment proposes pure finite goodness, or infinite goodness obscurely. For no finite goodness, nor infinite goodness obscurely proposed, necessarily carries away the love of the will as regards exercise; this is sufficiently consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 10, a. 2. If you object that freedom requires cognition that both attracts and repels, they grant this concerning freedom of specification, but deny it concerning freedom of exercise, unless one speaks of something negatively repelling, that is, not insuperably attracting. If you say that first-first movements are not free because the object is proposed without admixture of evil, they deny the causal connection and think freedom fails in those movements because a confused agitation of the animal spirits disturbs the head and causes a man for a time to operate like a drunkard.

10. There is required 3º the First Cause or Omnipotence prepared to concur with the human will, and therefore applied through a decree of the Divine will. For until such application is understood, the human will cannot be understood as simply free or absolutely able at its choice to act or imputably not to act, as we sufficiently showed in the cited place of *Physica*, and as is clear of itself. For how will it be imputed to a man that he does not effect a commanded act if God refuses to concur? Omnipotence must, however, be applied through an indifferent decree, whose character or tendency you have explained in the cited *Physica*, disp. 8, ch. 3; for if the decree is connected with a determinate extreme of freedom, it will destroy freedom. Hence there is required 4º absence of all impediments irremovable by second act, and therefore of all impedible and infallible connections with a determinate extreme of freedom, because every such connection is an impediment to the opposite extreme. The necessity of this requisite is clear, because a free power must be unimpeded toward both extremes, namely, toward acting and not acting, or toward contrary acts. But it cannot be thus unimpeded if it is impeded toward either by an impediment that cannot be

removed by itself. The same is expressed when others say that there is required absence of all antecedent necessity or of every determination unavoidable by the will; for any such necessity or determination toward one extreme is undoubtedly an impediment to the opposite extreme which the will cannot freely remove. And how will "freedom from necessity" stand with antecedent necessity, or "freedom of indifference" with unavoidable determination?

11. An impediment irremovable by second act is one that exists wholly independently of the exercise of freedom, even as conditionally foreseen, and, once existing, cannot be removed at the choice of the will. Such is physical predetermination asserted by the Thomists. An impediment removable by second act, however, is one whose existence the will can destroy by operating, that is, remove it or prevent it from being; or one which, although prior in time and indeed existing from eternity, nevertheless exists only with accommodation to the exercise of freedom, or upon supposition of it as future or foreseen, at least conditionally; and therefore can be so impeded by the will through the opposite exercise that it never existed. Thus voluntary sitting is an impediment to walking, as also is the air occupying the space through which one must pass; love freely posited is likewise an impediment to hatred and to its own omission. But these are impediments removable by second act, because the will can by walking destroy sitting and displace the air; it can also prevent the positing of love from occurring by omitting it or by eliciting hatred. Thus also the Divine knowledge of vision, or middle knowledge as conjoined with the absolute bestowal of freedom, and likewise efficacious predefinition regulated through middle knowledge, are infallibly connected with a determinate extreme of freedom and therefore are impediments to the opposite extreme. But they are objectively impedible by the created will constituted in the absolute state, not in such a way that the will can destroy or frustrate their connection, but in such a way that by removing the object and positing the opposite it can cause them never to have existed from eternity. The Theologians treat this more extensively. Therefore absence of impediments of this sort should not be understood as belonging to the first act of freedom, but only precision from their absence and existence. There must, however, be understood an absence of irremovable impediments, and indeed as a constituent of the proximate first act of freedom, unless perhaps among the other constituents you find something essentially connected with this absence, such as an indifferent decree seems to be.

12. Concerning freedom thus explained it should be noted that it is not so proper to the human will that the latter cannot have some necessary acts.

Concerning acts necessary as regards specification, that is, not free with freedom of contrariety, the matter is clear. For the object often appears good without admixture of evil, or evil without admixture of good, in which event the will is not indifferent to love and hatred. Hence concerning good in common, or happiness in common, the will is not free as regards specification, as is commonly asserted with St. Thomas. Concerning acts necessary even as regards exercise, that is, elicited without freedom of contradiction, there is an example not only in beatific love, which is necessary as regards exercise according to the most received opinion, but also in certain acts elicited by the will in the state of the way under an imperfect or disturbed use of reason, as occurs in children not yet using reason, and likewise in the insane, demented, drunk, and dreaming. Some, however, seem to suppose that in all these there is no act of intellect and consequently none of will, but only acts of imagination and material appetitions elicited in the manner of brutes. St. Thomas seems to favor this opinion, 1, 2, q. 10, a. 3. But experience plainly contradicts it, especially in certain insane persons and dreamers, who often think about God, Angels, and other spiritual objects, sometimes form syllogisms, aptly compose verses, and make various reflections foreign to the materiality of imagination. And St. Thomas acknowledges that an operation of intellect sometimes occurs during sleep, I^{a} p., q. 84, a. 8, ad 2, and 2, 2, q. 154, a. 5, ad 2 and 3.

13. Others, cited by Fr. Quirós, disp. 88, sect. 2, acknowledge in children and the insane a certain physical freedom, that is, concerning sensible objects and goods of the body or animal nature, but not moral freedom, that is, freedom sufficient for good or evil morals, or for merit and demerit, which freedom no one admits without the use of reason, because the aspect of honorable good or of evil forbidden by God is not perceived by them. Fr. Suárez favors this opinion, disp. 23, Met., sect. 7, n. 13. This physical freedom does not seem to be extended by its authors to the drunk and dreamers, although the same reason seems to apply to them. Other authors, whom the same Quirós cites and follows, acknowledge no freedom in any of the aforesaid persons deprived of the use of reason. This seems to be the common and truer opinion. For if physical freedom is given in them, it follows absurdly that moral freedom is also given. For it is false that they do not perceive honorable good or its opposite evil, since insane persons not rarely discourse about vices and virtues and exhort others to live honorably or deter them from sinning by proposing the fear of God, etc. Dreamers also not rarely propose to themselves objects as morally good and commanded, or as prohibited and sinful; sometimes they resist appetite from a motive of

honesty, while at other times they consent to a shameful passion not without some remorse of conscience from an apprehension of sin. Hence habits of virtues or vices acquired while awake commonly reveal themselves during sleep.

14. Yet I do not approve what some say, that the defect of freedom in sleep and insanity arises not from a defect of cognition but from the vehemence of sensitive appetite, which necessitates the will. For when the judgment of reason remains intact and undisturbed, the will is never carried away necessarily by appetite, at least as regards efficacious acts, but can always dominate or resist it, as is gathered from Gen. 4:7. Freedom therefore fails in sleep, etc., because from the physical disposition of the head the imagination is disturbed and consequently the "use of reason" is impeded. By this name is signified not any act of intellect whatsoever, even a judicative one, but a judgment vivid and firm "in a special mode." This mode belongs to the indifferent judgment as constitutive of freedom, and although it is not easy to explain, it is sufficiently recognized by experience; for everyone experiences that, when waking from sleep and the clouds, as it were, have been dispersed from the intellect, he now perceives, discerns, and judges the objects that had occurred to him while sleeping in a far different manner.

15. But when the judgment of the intellect is sufficiently vivid and firm, such as is required for the use of reason properly so called, the will in the state of the way has freedom of exercise or contradiction regarding every act, at least every efficacious act. The Excellent Doctor proves this well, disp. 19, Met., sect. 8, and shows that it accords with the mind of St. Thomas. He specifically teaches that even concerning good as such or happiness in common there is freedom as regards exercise. There too he effectively refutes the opinion of those who say that the will is not free in the intention of the end, but only in the choice of means. And there, from n. 11, he proves against Cajetan and other Thomists that the first act of a man using reason need not be necessary as regards exercise, indeed not always even as regards specification. When the will is said naturally to desire certain objects, "naturally" does not exclude freedom of elicited appetite, but signifies only that it is elicited according to an innate propensity, which propensity nevertheless does not entail a necessity of willing.

16. It is asked here whether necessity can be imposed upon the human will while an indifferent judgment remains. That it cannot be imposed by any created agent is taught by all with St. Thomas, q. 22, *De veritate*, a. 9. That it cannot even be imposed by God is held by several Thomists cited and followed by John of St. Thomas here, q. 12, a. 2. But this opinion is rightly rejected by the Scotists, our authors, and also other Thomists, and was

sufficiently refuted by us, although incidentally, in *Physica*, tr. 2, d. 8, c. 5, n. 25. Certainly St. Thomas, cited q. 22, a. 8, where he expressly proves that the will can be necessitated by God, does not even mention removal of the indifferent judgment, which would be an easy and concise proof if the opinion were true. Rather, his whole proof is taken partly from the fact that the operation of the will immediately depends upon God, just as does natural operation, whence God can operate in the will as in nature, namely, through a decree not indifferent but connected with a determinate operation; and partly from the fact that God can impress upon the will some form or power necessarily connected with operation, as the wholly perfect habit of charity is connected with operation in the Blessed. And it should be noted that the Holy Doctor gives the example of the habit of charity, not of the beatific vision, lest he destroy the hypothesis of the indifferent judgment under which the present question proceeds. I ask, in what sense does St. Thomas dispute this question, whether God can impose necessity upon the will: by removing the indifferent judgment, or by preserving it? If you say the first, St. Thomas labors in vain to prove an affirmative opinion which no one opposes. And why does he pass over that judgment in silence? If the second, the Angelic Doctor evidently teaches our opinion.

17. Therefore, in the two modes observed by St. Thomas, God can impose necessity upon the will without removing the indifferent judgment. 1º By reason of the decree applying Omnipotence to simultaneous concurrence. If God withdraws this decree, the will will not remain free, since it lacks a most essential prerequisite for operating. But if the decree is indeed given, yet wholly connected with a determinate operation, after the manner of that by which God wills simultaneously to concur with a natural or necessary cause, there will no longer be in the will a power of omitting and therefore no freedom, since an irremovable and insuperable impediment to omission will be present. To say, however, that once an indifferent judgment is posited God is necessitated not to withdraw simultaneous concurrence and to prepare it by an indifferent decree plainly derogates from God's dominion and freedom. 2º By reason of some intrinsic power or quality distinct from cognition and necessarily connected with operation. Such among us is the Thomistic physical predetermination; and such it would also be according to its patrons if it belonged to first act or existed by way of a power. Hence the Thomists take great care that predetermination not be placed on the side of first act and not be an active power, but an application, in order that it may thus coexist with freedom. By this they plainly suppose that freedom can be destroyed from causes other than defect of an indifferent judgment.

CHAPTER II.
Whether Freedom Is Intrinsic and Essential to Acts of the Will.

18. Thus far freedom in first act, which pertains to the power, has been explained. Freedom in second act must now be explained, namely, insofar as it regards operation or the exercise of the free power; for operation too is called free and is free. For an operation to be free is nothing other than for it to be freely elicited, that is, elicited by one capable of omitting it or not eliciting it. It is questioned, however, whether the operation or action of the will has this of itself and intrinsically, or rather by an extrinsic and separable denomination. If an operation taken specifically intrinsically presupposes the whole first act of freedom, that is, all the constituents of the power of acting and not acting, in such a way that the same action cannot exist if any of them is lacking, it will certainly have from its intrinsic principles that it is free, and freedom will be called intrinsic to it. But if it is free only because here and now it flows from a will able to omit it, while of itself the same action could have existed in circumstances in which the will lacked the power of omitting and acted necessarily, it will be called free only by extrinsic denomination from the freedom of first act which in fact is presupposed, so that this denomination and consequently freedom is extrinsic and accidental to the action.

19. The discussion, as you see, concerns freedom of indifference or from necessity, for freedom from coercion and voluntariness are without doubt essential to acts of the will, from nn. 3 and 5. Nor is it now disputed whether every act of willing is free from necessity, but whether a free act differs essentially from a necessary one, or whether that very act which is free could have been necessary. The discussion likewise concerns principally action according to those who distinguish the act of willing from the action, for freedom in second act especially shines forth in action. We, however, who reject this distinction, shall speak interchangeably of act and action.

20. Some Thomists assert that freedom is intrinsic to volition, yet not essential, but consisting in a certain relational mode superadded to love, for example, and inhering in it, without which mode the same love could otherwise exist and be necessary. But this opinion is easily rejected, both from what was said in Logic against modes of predicamental relation and because, prior to such a mode, love is already presupposed as produced and existing, since the mode results from it and is received in it as in a subject of

inherence. Therefore either love is presupposed as produced by a will able to omit it, or by one unable to omit it. If you choose the first, love is already presupposed as freely posited, and therefore free in second act, prior to the superadded mode. If the second, the mode subsequently added to love is of no use; for in no way can love produced by a will unable to omit it become free.

21. With this opinion rejected, there are two principal positions. The first holds that freedom is intrinsic and essential to all acts of the will which are freely effected, to such an extent that it is wholly repugnant for the same acts ever to be effected necessarily. This seems to be the common opinion of the Thomists and pleases Fathers Hurtado, Quirós, Lynceus, and others, especially more recent authors. The second denies that acts of the will, at least from the general concept of freedom in second act, are free of themselves and essentially, and therefore holds that they are free by extrinsic denomination from the freedom of first act, with which of themselves they are not connected. The Scotists with Scotus and our authors commonly with Fr. Suárez hold this, in 1, 2, disp. 1, *De voluntario*, sec. 3, n. 18, and in Metaph., disp. 19, sect. 8, n. 6, and sect. 10, n. 4. This same opinion seems to me truer.

22. It is proved 1º: love, for example, can be understood to be free without there being understood in it an essential connection with or requirement for the power as free; therefore such a requirement does not belong to the concept of freedom in second act. I prove the antecedent: while prescinding from such a requirement and making no mention of it, love can be conceived as posited by the will in circumstances in which the will, on the part of first act, possesses the power of omitting it. For what prevents such a concept? But love thus conceived is by that very fact understood to be free; therefore, etc. The minor premise is clear, both because for love to be understood as free is nothing other than for it to be understood as elicited with a power of omitting it, that is, elicited by a power free in first act; and because by that very fact there is understood what suffices for the will to love not necessarily but freely, since it is conceived as loving with a power of not loving. The point is pressed: suppose that love of itself is indifferent to being effected freely or necessarily, yet here and now is effected by a power free in first act. Such love will certainly be effected freely, both because it is a contradiction in terms for it to be effected by a power free in first act and not to be effected freely; because it will not be effected necessarily but rather with the positive exclusion or absence of necessity essentially imported by freedom in first act; and because if that love were effected without freedom in first act it would be effected

necessarily, therefore conversely, etc. Nor should you say that the hypothesis is repugnant. For love thus indifferent of itself can be repugnant only because such indifference destroys the concept of free love, that is, love freely effected. But we are now showing the opposite, namely, that if such indifference of love were given, love would still remain freely effected precisely because it would be effected by a power free in first act.

23. This is confirmed by the example of external actions which are mediately free. Walking, for example, although of itself indifferent to being effected freely or necessarily, becomes free without any intrinsic variation of itself if it is effected by a man with a power of not walking; whereas it becomes necessary if effected by one lacking this power. The same therefore should be held concerning volition. For whether freedom is mediate or immediate does not vary the concept of a free operation as such, namely, an operation possessed with a power of not possessing it; and the example of an external action proves that this concept can stand with the aforesaid indifference of the operation.

24. It is proved 2º: a volitive action freely flowing from the will could have existed numerically the same while some constituent of freedom was lacking; but then it would not be free but necessary; therefore such an action is of itself indifferent to being effected freely or necessarily, and consequently is not essentially free. I prove the major premise: an honorable volition that is now free could have existed the same even if Omnipotence were applied through a decree not indifferent but wholly connected with such an action; but then some constituent of freedom would be lacking, namely, the indifferent application of Omnipotence; therefore, etc. I prove the major premise: the decree applying Omnipotence, insofar as free, is not an active power, for this power in God is necessary, since it consists in Omnipotence, which without doubt is a necessary attribute; rather, it is a mere condition and application of the power. Therefore, when only the decree is varied, so that a connected decree is present in place of an indifferent one, only the application of the power is varied, without any variation being made in the power itself or in the other co-principles. But an action ought not to vary intrinsically merely because of a variation in a condition or application when the principles of its own influx remain unchanged. Therefore the aforesaid action of the will could have been the same under a non-indifferent decree.

25. The minor premise of the subsumption is proved because this is the difference between principles influencing physically or properly and mere conditions: this numerically determinate action depends essentially upon such principles; but although it sometimes depends essentially upon

conditions or applications, it never depends upon these determinate ones, but only indeterminately upon some of the same genus, insofar as it requires the individual cause to be truly applied in that genus, whether through this or that application or condition. This is made clear by obvious examples. Thus the same external action, for example speaking or walking, can be the same no matter by what act of the will it is commanded, whether honorable or evil, whether from this end or that, because the act of the will is not the active power but the condition or application of the power to such an action. For the same reason an action of nature can be the same with this or that subsistence; likewise the same action of fire with the fire applied to the same patient through this or that location. Hence the action of fire A upon wood B need not vary whether the application occurs at Rome or Salamanca. The same also holds in cognition, if this is not a power but a condition for an act of the will, whose variation need not always redound into the volition. Provided the object is wholly the same and proposed under the same aspect, and is not rendered more or less applied, it can be loved by the numerically same volition whether it is applied through cognition A or through cognition B.

Incidental Question:
Whether an Action Essentially Depends upon
Its Prior Conditions Individually.

26. I know that Fathers Peynado, Ulloa, and other more recent authors, preceded by Fr. Ribadeneyra, disp. 11, *De actibus humanis*, ch. 4, hold that every action by itself essentially depends upon its causes not only physical but moral, from which it here and now proceeds. Since among moral causes are numbered the prior conditions which a physical cause needs for operating, these authors consequently hold that every action is by itself essentially bound to those individual conditions which in fact precede it. Their foundation is that this action, which is supposed in fact to depend upon these moral causes or conditions, either is intrinsically indifferent to depending upon these rather than others, or is not. If it is not, it therefore depends essentially upon these determinate ones by itself. But if it is indifferent, its indifference will have to be determined by another reflexive action. If that action is still indifferent, another determination will further be required, and so an infinite regress will result. But if the reflexive action is not indifferent, why should the same not be said of the direct action, thereby avoiding an entirely superfluous action of an action? This opinion, however, seems wholly foreign to the common judgment of the Schools; and it

concerns us to prove it false, both because of what has just been said and because we have often elsewhere indicated the opposite doctrine as unshaken.

27. It must therefore be rejected, 1º because it leaves no distinction between a physical cause and a moral cause or pure condition, at least when the latter requires physical existence and, on the ground of entitative perfection, is not incapable of influencing physically. Suppose, for example, what is commonly asserted, that a habit with respect to love is a physically active cause, whereas cognition is only a moral cause or pure condition required on the side of the cause. If the action of loving is essentially bound both to this individual cognition and to this habit, tell me what function the habit exercises such that it is said to influence physically rather than the cognition? Certainly both causes physically preexist on the side of first act; each so influences, according to your contention, as to make the physical action depend essentially upon itself individually; and the proportion of perfection in the cognition is no less than in the habit with respect to love, while the correspondence of formalities is even greater. Indeed, on the ground of perfection no entity is to be excluded from the function of a partial and instrumental power if a sufficient dependence of the action is established. What, then, is the difference? You will say that it is proved from elsewhere that cognition does not influence physically. I grant it; but in reality you establish the opposite when you now hold that cognition, certainly preexisting in first act with a precontainment of perfection, causes love through a physical action essentially bound to that individual cognition. Give me another notion of an influencing physical cause. What else would cognition do if it influenced physically? Or what more do those who attribute physical influx to cognition grant to it in reality?

28. 2º Because from this opinion the physical simultaneous concurrence of God with secondary causes could easily be denied by substituting purely moral concurrence. For the arguments brought against Durandus prove only that every action of a creature must immediately and by reason of itself depend essentially upon God. This would certainly stand according to the present opinion even if God were only a moral cause while the creature operated physically. 3º Because many absurdities, or at least consequences contrary to the most received doctrine, follow from this same opinion. It follows 1º that walking and every external action, when commanded by a supernatural volition, for example for an end of charity, becomes intrinsically supernatural, since it is bound to a supernatural principle and essentially inseparable from it. And since the volition does not influence physically, what supernatural power will then physically influence the

walking? Surely some assistance or infused habit will have to be placed in the feet, because nothing supernatural is produced without a physical cause of the same order. Likewise every movement of the body commanded by the will will be essentially voluntary, indeed essentially free with mediate freedom, if commanded by a volition intrinsically free. The movement of the tongue, for example, which in fact is commanded from vainglory will likewise be intrinsically evil and incapable of being determined by God. It follows 2º that a sinful action of the will elicited under prior supernatural cognition, see above disp. 7, n. 76, will be intrinsically supernatural, as essentially connected with such cognition; and consequently will be physically produced by the assistance of grace and will have to be attributed to God as Author.

29. It follows 3º that every miraculous action, for example that by which sight is restored to a blind man through a miracle, will be supernatural as to substance, or intrinsically different from a natural action, since it has different moral causes, conditions, or applications. How foreign this is from the common judgment of the Doctors, see *Physica*, tr. 1, disp. 3, ch. 5. It follows 4º that the creation of the rational soul essentially depends upon such matter and upon those individual accidents by which the little body is proximately rendered animable, for all these are moral causes or prior conditions in some manner determining God to create the soul here and now. But this consequence is both absurd in itself and further entails that the conservative action of the rational soul throughout human life must vary essentially at almost every moment, since at almost every moment the matter and its disposition change to some extent. At least, when the soul is separated, it will necessarily require a different creation. Indeed, neither an Angel nor any thing whatsoever will be conserved by the same action by which it is first produced, because in the second instant it is conserved at the exigency of itself as preexisting, and thus the action already presupposes a new moral cause.

30. It follows 5º that no one could understand or love here and at Rome by the same action, or while sitting and standing, because the presence or location of the soul required beforehand as a condition for operating is different in a different place or posture of the body. Indeed, even the union of soul and body would necessarily have to vary merely because of variation in presence, since presence too is a condition for intrinsic formal and material causality by which soul and body cause the man in the being of the whole. For this reason also, when an Angel changes place, he could not remain in the same action of seeing and loving God. It follows 6º that neither could God by the same external action give grace, rain, health, etc.,

in response to Peter's prayers and Paul's prayers. I omit other consequences that will readily occur to anyone.

31. Nor does the foundation alleged in n. 26 compel. For moral causality, or the physical dependence of an action upon a moral cause, can be explained otherwise, namely, by saying that it consists in the coexistence of the action with such a principle as is of itself apt immediately to influence morally upon this action and exists independently of the action itself. For example, the dependence of volition upon cognition A consists in the volition existing while cognition A exists in the one willing, a cognition of itself apt to direct the volition, that is, proposing the object which the volition regards, provided that such cognition does not exist dependently upon the same volition, as it would if it were produced by God from foresight of that volition, or if the volition itself were Divinely elevated to produce that cognition physically. The reason is that, once that coexistence with negation of the aforesaid dependence has been posited, prescinding from anything else, the volition is understood to be actually directed by such cognition, that is, to be effected from its light and manifestation, which is to proceed morally from it. Nor is there now any indifference left concerning this, because to will an object from the direction of cognition is nothing other than to will it at the time when cognition, possessed from another source, is actually present and shows what is to be willed; just as for you to walk under the direction of sight is nothing other than to proceed along the road which you actually see, nor are you in any way indifferent to walking blindly in the composite sense of vision.

32. Moreover, causality in general imports only a determination by virtue of which the indifference of such an effect is wholly removed, so that in a determinate manner it proceeds from such a cause. If the coexistence of both suffices for this, in such a way that although they can exist separately without this determination, they cannot so exist simultaneously in time, an action essentially and absolutely bound to the cause will be superfluous. So the matter stands in the present case. A physical action is of itself determined in such a way that, on the supposition that a moral cause or condition of itself apt to influence in its own mode upon this action exists from another source, the action does not arise physically from the active power without simultaneously depending upon or proceeding morally from such a condition or cause; that is, without being effected while the latter directs, determines, inclines, applies the physical cause, or otherwise contributes to this very action. Yet because the individual action does not essentially require this supposition, at least individually, but can exist without it, it cannot be said to be essentially bound to it.

33. Fr. Oviedo here, controv. 9, punct. 5, speaking of the influx of the commanding act upon the commanded act, well resolves several objections that can be made here. I nevertheless note certain points. 1º A moral cause is not now taken for a free cause or one operating well or badly, nor merely for a cause why an effect exists, so that the effect is attributed or imputed to it. Rather, in the present context it generally signifies whatever is conducive or requisite on the part of the cause for an effect upon which it does not influence physically, nor objectively, that is, by way of an end or motive object intrinsically attained through the intentional act which it causes. 2º The discussion concerns a moral cause immediate with respect to the action. For if it is only mediate because another likewise moral cause must intervene, its coexistence with the action does not suffice for moral influx. Thus if by two acts I know two ends A and B for which walking is useful, and will to walk not for end B but for A, the walking will not be morally caused by cognition B even though it coexists with it, because it cannot be caused by it except through the volition of end B, which is then absent. Understand the same of a commanded act of the will which only extrinsically regards the end proposed by cognition B. Such an act cannot be morally caused by that cognition except through a commanding volition which intrinsically regards that end. And generally no volition is immediately morally causable by cognition showing an object or motive which that volition does not intrinsically regard, although sometimes from coexistence with that cognition, as from a circumstance, it can be rendered culpable or imputable. Moreover, there are many moral causes which do not cause an effect except through the mediation of God's foresight and decree, and sometimes also through that of a creature willing to concur, as it were, for their sake. Thus merits and prayers cause the bestowal of a reward or gift; thus also the introduction of heat causes the expulsion of cold from a subject. In such a case, as I was just saying, moral causality does not consist solely in the coexistence of cause and effect, for example, merit and gift, because if the gift were given by God not for the sake of merit but from another motive, it would not be morally caused by the merit although coexisting with it. Therefore moral causality then additionally imports the Divine decree of operating as it were for the sake of such a cause or at its exigency. And because this mode of causing frequently occurs, it is therefore generally said that moral causality consists, namely partially, in the aforesaid decree. If, however, the discussion concerns the decree itself immediately applying Omnipotence to action A, the whole moral causality of this decree consists in its coexistence with such an action. To this also pertains the fact that some causes, in order to influence morally or to move in second act, must

not be impeded by an aversive act of the will whereby their inclination is repelled or weakened.

34. 3º Among moral causes or conditions for acting, some are necessary only naturally, such as the approximation of the agent to the patient; some are required even essentially, such as cognition with respect to volition; some in neither way, such as the commanding act with respect to the commanded act of the same will. But among those which are necessary either naturally or essentially, none is necessary individually, even with respect to an individual action, such that this numerically same action cannot remain if the moral cause or condition is numerically varied. Indeed, some are not even necessary according to determinate species for an individual action, but only according to a certain genus. For an individual action of walking, for example, does indeed require some volition from the genus of things applying the locomotor power, but not a natural volition rather than a supernatural one, nor one from this end rather than that. Understand the same concerning Divine decrees applying Omnipotence in relation to many external actions. Nevertheless, that determinate volition which in fact exists independently of the action of walking will in its own mode cause it here and now through the coexistence of both, although the action itself does not of itself require coexistence with that rather than another applicative volition. It is otherwise with a physical cause, for this numerically determinate action always essentially requires that physical cause individually and is in no way indifferent to depending upon another numerically distinct cause in its place. Understand the same also of an intrinsic final cause, that is, one moving by way of an object intrinsically attained, when it moves or finalizes individually.

Return to the Interrupted Question.

35. After these points have been established, not without usefulness, we return to the interrupted question concerning freedom intrinsic to acts and to the proof of the negative opinion. It is therefore proved 3º: freedom of contrariety is not intrinsic and essential to an act that is free in this way; therefore neither is freedom of contradiction. The consequence will be proved afterward. The antecedent is granted by Fathers Hurtado, Aldrete, Quirós, and other adversaries; and if it is denied, it can be shown thus. Let freedom of contrariety be constituted through two cognitions of the same object, one under the aspect of delightful, the other under the aspect of evil or inconvenient. Then, if the will simply loves the object, taking no account of the aspect of evil, that is, without expressly contemning it or turning away

from it, that love does not essentially require cognition of the object as evil; therefore it is not essentially free with freedom of contrariety, although in fact it is free with that freedom. I prove the antecedent: that love does not of itself require cognition proposing the object under an aspect which it neither regards nor takes account of; but in the case posited, cognition of the object under the aspect of evil is such; therefore, etc. I prove the major premise: no love of itself requires cognition of an object that is not its own, or under an aspect no more formally attained than if it were absent. For cognition is prerequired for love under no other title than that love not tend toward the unknown or under an unknown aspect. Toward this end cognition proposing the object under an aspect in which it is not an object contributes nothing.

36. This will appear more clearly if freedom of contrariety concerns a choice between distinct and incompossible objects, for example gaming and hunting during a given time. For then a simple love of hunting, taking no account of gaming, cannot of itself require cognition of gaming, as of an entirely extraneous object in no way pertaining to it. Thus no judgment of itself presupposes an apprehension of an object in no way pertaining to it; no conclusion presupposes premises concerning a middle in no way pertinent to its object; no external action presupposes a volition of another disparate effect; likewise no causality or purely physical action of itself and by reason of itself presupposes application of a cause that is not its own or of an active power not influencing upon such an action. The same therefore must be held in our case, especially since cognition is prerequired for volition only under the title of applying the object which is to be attained by it.

37. This is confirmed: suppose the will loves in instant A with cognition of the goodness of the object alone, which suffices for freedom of contradiction; then in instant B another cognition supervenes representing the same object under the aspect of evil. The same love can be freely conserved in instant B, but then it will already be free as regards specification, since a power toward hatred is now present. Therefore the same love is of itself indifferent to being free either only as regards exercise or additionally as regards specification, and consequently freedom of contrariety is not essential to it. I prove the major premise because love need not cease when none of its principles or prerequisites ceases, as in fact it does not cease through the arrival of that new cognition. For there remains, as I suppose, the same active power on the part of the will, the same preceding cognition, and Omnipotence indifferently applied. Nor should you imagine that absence of the cognition supervening in instant B is

an essentially necessary condition for such love to continue. For that cognition does not remove the true freedom of contradiction that was present in instant A, but only adds a new aspect of freedom, that is, broadens the preceding freedom and renders it unimpeded toward more exercises. But absence of a broader freedom cannot be an essentially necessary condition for a determinate free exercise to exist, since by the very broadening of freedom every exercise is rather rendered more fully under the dominion and choice of the will. A similar argument can be made concerning the Divine decree. For when cognition sufficient for love and hatred has been posited in instant A, God can prepare concurrence toward love with indifference only of exercise, while in no way preparing concurrence toward hatred. In that event, if love is elicited, it will be free only as regards exercise. Nevertheless, that very same love can be conserved in instant B, in which God now prepares concurrence also toward hatred; for this broadening, as it were, of concurrence diminishes nothing of the preceding freedom and therefore nothing of the proximate sufficiency of the will for such love. But then this love, intrinsically unchanged, will be free as regards specification.

38. Now the consequence first drawn in n. 35 is validly proved: 1º because in freedom of contrariety the contrary arguments are pressed and broken. 2º Because the same reason applies to each freedom. For just as an act is free as regards specification by the very fact that it is effected with a power toward the opposite act, although it does not itself require that power, why will it not also be free as regards exercise by the very fact that it is effected with a power of omitting, although it does not intrinsically and of itself require that power? Certainly the concept proper to each freedom is preserved in second act when such a requirement of the act is removed or prescinded from. And just as love of itself does not presuppose an unimpeded power toward hatred, because that power as such contributes or assists nothing toward love and is not necessary for the full sufficiency and power of loving to be preserved, so love should not of itself presuppose a power toward its own omission, because this power as such likewise does not contribute and is not necessary, etc. 3º Because if an act can by extrinsic denomination be made more free, for it is without doubt more free with freedom of contrariety than with freedom of contradiction alone, it will also be able to become simply free. For the same rule applies to "more" as to "simply," as is clear from the familiar maxim and is established in the denominations "known," "loved," etc., but especially in the denomination "mediately free and voluntary," which belongs to an external act.

39. What has been said thus far proves that acts of the will are for the most part only contingently free, or at least that nothing else follows from the general concept of free volition or freedom in second act. Nevertheless, an act of the will does not seem repugnant which, by reason of a special character or mode of tending, is essentially connected with freedom in first act and therefore is essentially free. For it can happen that by supernatural faith you believe God revealing that freedom has been granted to you for every act to be elicited during this hour, and immediately from this act of faith you elicit joy concerning the present freedom. This joy will essentially presuppose freedom, because under the title of supernaturalness it will essentially presuppose a cognition of faith essentially true concerning the existence of freedom, especially if this cognition is elevated, as it can be, to influence physically upon such joy.

40. Furthermore, hatred of God, or another act against the law of nature, if it possesses an expressly or formally preferential mode of tending, whereby it formally prefers this object to the opposed one, or tends toward it with formal contempt and rejection of the repelling motive, such an act, I say, seems of itself to presuppose an indifferent judgment, because it intrinsically, though in diverse ways, tends toward both motives, the attracting and the repelling. It likewise of itself presupposes in God an indifferent decree, because an act of itself contrary to the law of nature cannot be determined by God. Therefore from no source can it become necessary, and consequently it must be judged essentially free. This reason, however, does not apply to good acts, nor even to evil acts which do not possess that mode of tending but simply tend toward their own object as though taking no account or making no determination concerning the contrary object or the repelling motive. For these can become necessary, that is, not free, through defect of an indifferent judgment, as occurs in the drunk and insane. Indeed, perhaps even those evil acts which possess the aforesaid mode of tending can be deprived of freedom through defect of judgment, because the same acts can be elicited in sleep, drunkenness, and frenzy, where the will not rarely seems to be exercised with some cognition of the repelling motive. Yet such cognition does not suffice for the use of reason properly so called, nor does it deserve the name of indifferent judgment, according to what was said in nn. 13 and 14.

CHAPTER III.
Solution of the Arguments of the Opposing Side.

41. Keep before your eyes that "freedom in second act" means nothing other than "volition as free"; nor do these expressions differ except in their mode of signifying, or verbally, just as "entity and being," or as "formal truth and an act of the intellect as formally true." Hence freedom in second act is a concrete form, not wholly extrinsic to volition, but partly extrinsic and partly intrinsic, consisting, namely, in the composite of volition and freedom in first act; yet in such a way that volition is imported directly, and freedom of first act only obliquely. For part A to be imported directly, as I have often noted elsewhere, is for it so to constitute some concrete that the definition of the concrete is properly verified of it; and for part B to be imported obliquely is for it so to constitute the concrete that the definition of this latter is not properly verified of it. You have an example in the concrete "seen"; its direct part is the object, its oblique part the vision. To constitute "as that which" and "as that by which" comes to the same thing. Therefore freedom in second act, namely positive freedom, is directly constituted by volition, because it is defined as "the exercise of a free faculty," that is, "of one able to omit such an exercise"; and this definition is verified of volition alone, although it constitutively includes the freedom of the potency in first act. Hence freedom of first act causes freedom of second act partly in the genus of efficient cause and partly in the genus of formal cause: as efficient cause, insofar as it effects the entity of the volition through the power of the will; as formal cause, insofar as it is a partial form giving the volition the denomination "free." Thus sanctifying grace concurs toward merit both as an efficient cause, at least mediately, of the entity of the act, and as an ennobling form giving the act the denomination "condign merit."

42. It is objected, therefore, 1º: a free principle is more perfect than a necessary one; therefore it communicates to its action a special perfection lacking in a necessary action, just as a vital and a supernatural principle pour their perfection into their proper actions. Therefore a free action cannot be indifferent as to whether it is necessary. I answer: a radically free principle, such as the human will, is indeed more perfect than a radically necessary principle, such as the appetite of a brute; hence it also communicates to its actions a special perfection, namely aptitudinal freedom, or the capacity to be performed freely. Since this capacity imports intrinsic voluntariness, it is a special perfection lacking in the actions of a radically necessary principle.

But if the comparison is made between a proximately free principle and a radically free yet proximately necessary, or necessitated, principle, for example by a non-indifferent divine decree, there ought to be no excess of perfection either in the principle free from necessity or in its action. Not in the principle, because it adds only the extrinsic circumstance of "the indifference of the decree," from which our will is not rendered more perfect. Not in the action, because proximate freedom does not physically influence according to all its constituents, specifically according to the indifferent decree; and insofar as it does not influence, it does not diversify the action, since the action is specified, or derives its perfection, solely from principles physically influencing it or from the object intrinsically attained.

43. A vital and a supernatural principle influence according to vitality and supernaturalness; hence it is no wonder if they pour these perfections into the act. Therefore the parity must be denied. Add that the objection absurdly implies that an act of charity in the state of the wayfarer is more perfect than in the homeland, and that the necessary love by which God loves Himself is less perfect than the free love by which He loves creatures. It may also be retorted: freedom from necessity is not adequately intrinsic to the free principle, or will; therefore neither is it adequately intrinsic to its action. Accordingly, a free principle and a free action differ intrinsically and essentially from a natural principle and action, not indeed according to formal or proximate freedom, as though this were a perfection intrinsic to them, but according to remote or radical freedom. Yet they do not intrinsically differ from every sort of necessary principle and action, because "necessary," insofar as it is said of a cause or action, is not convertible with "natural," that is, intrinsically incapable of freedom; rather, it can contingently belong to a cause and action radically free.

44. It is objected 2º: a free action is the use of the dominion belonging to the free principle; therefore it intrinsically presupposes that dominion. It is also the term of freedom in first act and the effect of the free potency as such; therefore, in the being of a free action, it is adequately distinct from the freedom of the potency. This objection tells equally against most of the Adversaries in freedom of contrariety, and against everyone in the mediate freedom of external actions. It must therefore be denied that a free action, taken specifically, is intrinsically and essentially a use of dominion, because the same action can exist apart from dominion. It is therefore a use of dominion only through a partly extrinsic denomination, or through a coexistence, accidental to it, with dominion in first act; just as walking is a use of the will's dominion over the members of the body only through its accidental coexistence with a free command.

45. It must likewise be denied that such an action is intrinsically and essentially the actual term of the whole freedom in first act. For it does not terminate that freedom except on the supposition of its preexistence, and the action does not of itself require this supposition. Therefore in the character of actually terminating it is constituted by its accidental coexistence with that freedom. One may object: the term must be adequately distinct from the thing it terminates. I answer by distinguishing: it must be adequately distinct according to the aptitude for terminating, let this pass; in the being of an actual terminator, I deny it. For color, in the being of that which terminates vision, is constituted by the vision itself. Finally, it must be denied that the action, taken specifically, is of itself an effect of the potency as free according to all the constituents of freedom, because not all physically influence, nor are they essentially prerequired by the exigency of the action. If, however, the action is taken reduplicatively as free, then it is of itself an effect of the whole freedom of the potency, not in one but in two genera of cause, namely efficient and formal, from n. 41.

46. It is pressed: freedom in first act precedes freedom in second act, and the one is in a prior sign, the other in a posterior sign; therefore these freedoms are distinct from each other. I answer: they are indeed inadequately distinct, and as regards what is direct, which in the one is the entity of the will and in the other the entity of the action; but they are not adequately distinct, or distinct according to all their constituents, including those imported obliquely, because freedom of the action is a denomination constituted through freedom of first act. Yet the precedence or priority must be understood cautiously. In the genus of efficient causality, whether physically or morally, there is only priority and distinction of signs between the whole freedom of first act and freedom of second act taken as regards what is direct. In the genus of formal causality, however, priority and posteriority may be admitted between both freedoms adequately taken, in that way, namely, in which vision is said to be prior to the whole formal effect or denomination "seen," and this whole denomination is said to be posterior to the vision. For prior and posterior signs in the genus of formal causality are not adequately distinct, just as neither are the cause and effect themselves, because they are nothing other than the form, now taken abstractly, now concretely, or as denominating some subject; and here there is only the distinction of what includes and what is included.

47. It is replied: a free action, taken specifically, is naturally posterior to the whole freedom of first act and dependent upon it in the genus of efficient causality; but this posteriority and dependence must be intrinsic and essential to the action; therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved:

because it cannot consist in the mere coexistence of the action with freedom of first act. For if the action is elicited at instant A under a non-indifferent cognition, and at a sign posterior to the action an indifferent judgment supervenes, there will at that instant be coexistence of the action with all the constituents of freedom in first act; yet there will not be dependence and posteriority of the action with respect to them. I answer, granting the major premise, understood of the genus of efficient causality, partly physical and partly moral, and denying the minor premise. To the proof I answer from n. 31 that the dependence and posteriority of the action do not consist in coexistence of just any sort, but in the coexistence of the action with a free first act, or with an indifferent judgment, as possessed independently of such an action. For posteriority of nature, as we saw in Physics, is the non-mutual dependence of the effect upon the cause, and therefore constitutively imports the independence of the cause from the effect. Hence, if the indifferent judgment exists dependently upon the action, or, what is the same, in a sign posterior to it, it will no longer be able to precede it in the genus of efficient causality for the same instant. Add that the action will not then coexist with all the constituents of freedom, because there will not be present for that instant an indifferent decree of God regarding such an action.

48. It is objected 3º: a free action intrinsically presupposes an indifferent judgment; therefore it is intrinsically free, or intrinsically different from a necessary action. First, the antecedent is proved. Both because a free action is the choice of one rather than another, or of such an object rather than its opposite, and therefore must presuppose cognition of both. And because the will, acting freely, resists motives that draw it back; hence its action imports a resisting effort, which certainly cannot concern motives unknown to it. And because an indifferent judgment, insofar as it draws back, cannot belong to a prior sign, or to the first act of freedom; for in relation to this action it will be neither a cause nor a requisite for causing. Then the consequence is proved: because a necessary action is content with a determined judgment; indeed, an indifferent judgment cannot even be presupposed to it, otherwise there would be a judgment moving toward omission of the action when this omission is impossible to the will, or a judgment indifferently moving toward opposite extremes when the will is not indifferently movable toward both.

49. To the objection, which proceeds chiefly or uniquely in freedom of contrariety, I answer 1º by denying the antecedent if it speaks of every free action, or of the general concept of a free positive action. For this concept will stand provided that the action here and now is posited with a preceding

indifferent judgment, even though the action itself does not intrinsically require it. To the proof: not every free action intrinsically and from its mode of tending is a choice of one rather than another in such a way that it prefers one by formally postponing or rejecting the other. For often a free volition simply tends toward one object, deciding or caring nothing about the opposite, although there was prior cognition of the opposite. Such a volition, however, does not intrinsically presuppose cognition of the opposite, although by that cognition and by the whole freedom of first act it is extrinsically denominated "a choice of one rather than another," that is, as existing in circumstances in which the will could have preferred the opposite. Nor does every free action intrinsically import a resisting effort. Both because it may be denied that freedom of contradiction always requires a motive positively drawing back, and because, for the will to be said to resist, it is enough that it not allow itself to be drawn. For this no positive effort is required; suspension of consent suffices, and a fortiori the volition of the contrary object will suffice, even if it has no special tendency that it would not have apart from the motive drawing it back.

50. As concerns the priority of judgment with respect to volitional action, if the indifferent judgment is not a twofold cognition but a single cognition representing contrary motives, it is easily understood that the whole judgment precedes in a real sense if it precedes according to the alluring representation, since this same representation is really a representation of the motive drawing back. But if a really twofold cognition is supposed, the one purely inviting and the other purely drawing back, there is also in the latter a title of priority with respect to the volition from which it draws back, although it is not prerequired for that volition either as cause or as condition, provided that here and now it exists independently of the volition itself. The reason is that the cognition drawing back constitutes the power to omit this volition or to exclude it through an opposite act; but there must be understood as prior to the action not only those things which constitute the power to act, but also those which constitute the power not to act, or to perform the opposite. For it is contradictory that the will be understood as able to omit or exclude action A at this instant unless this is so prior to the action itself, or before the action itself is supposed to exist at the same instant, since it is altogether contradictory for the action not to be on the supposition that it is.

51. One may object: priority of nature and belonging to first act are found only in causes and requisites for causing; but a cognition drawing back is neither a physical nor moral cause of the action, nor is it requisite if the action does not intrinsically and essentially presuppose it by reason of

freedom. To solve this, a twofold priority in the order of causing must be distinguished: one conducing to the action's being, and this may be called "positive" priority, which alone is treated in General Physics where the priority of causes is discussed, and belongs only to causes and requisites for causing; another conducing to the action's not being, and this may be called "negative" or "adversative" priority, and it belongs not to causes or requisites for the action but only to those adjuncts or circumstances which constitute the power of omitting, or which so coexist with the action, without dependence upon it, that, so far as lies in them, they turn the cause away from acting or incline it toward the opposite action. That this is true priority and truly belongs to the sign of potency, or to first act, is demonstrated by the reason given in the preceding number; this is strengthened by the example of a habit opposing an action. For when the will, against the inclination of an intense vicious habit, freely elicits an honorable action, the habit certainly precedes on the side of first act; otherwise it would not render this action difficult, nor the opposite here and now possible or easy. Yet this habit does not influence, nor is it required by the intrinsic exigency of this action, since an honorable action, especially a supernatural one, cannot intrinsically depend upon a vicious habit, at least by an immediate dependence and one as it were *a priori*.

52. I answer 2º to the objection of n. 48, granting the antecedent concerning some free actions and denying the consequence. For, while an indifferent judgment remains, God can impose necessity upon the will, as we saw in n. 16. Hence, although the volition intrinsically presupposes an indifferent judgment, and although it is intrinsically preferential and resists a motive drawing it back, it will not for that reason be essentially free, nor intrinsically differ from every necessary action, since that very action can become necessary. Certainly the action by which fire resists contraries is necessary, as is that by which a horse, under the pressure of the spur, proceeds against the apprehension and fear of danger drawing it back. Nor does it appear contradictory in any respect that the will should be necessitated by God formally to prefer one of two proposed things to the other. To the proof: a necessary action in general is content with a determined judgment; but specifically it may require an indifferent judgment.

53. What is added concerning the motion of that judgment proves that the will cannot be necessitated by God under an indifferent judgment, but it proves this badly. For an indifferent judgment can move toward omission even if this omission is accidentally impossible because of a necessity of acting imposed by God. It can move, I say, not in second act, or as regards

efficacy, but in first act, or as regards sufficiency on the part of the object, namely by inclining the will in the genus of formal causality toward omission or toward the opposite act. Nor for this is it required that the will be movable toward either with proximate freedom. It suffices that it be passively movable, that is, receptive of the motion or inclination in first act which the indifferent judgment gives it in the genus of formal causality, and which suffices for the will, on the side of cognition, to be able in second act to move itself toward either opposite, unless it is necessitated from some other source toward one. Certainly it is not contradictory for a cause to act necessarily although at the same instant it already has something drawing it back or inclining it toward the opposite. For the will can doubtless be necessitated toward an honorable act in the composite sense of a vicious habit; likewise a horse, while apprehending and fearing danger on the road, nevertheless proceeds when driven by the spurs.

54. It is objected 4º, from Fr. Hurtado: formal malice is wholly intrinsic to wicked acts; therefore so also is freedom, which belongs to the concept of formal malice. The antecedent is proved: because if formal malice were extrinsic, it would consist in the freedom of the potency, or of first act; hence this freedom would be malice in the abstract, and the form infecting second act and rendering it worthy of God's special displeasure. But this is absurd, since freedom in first act is not evil, but willed and intended by God. Confirmation 1º: if love of a forbidden object is not evil from its intrinsic tendency, it cannot be rendered evil by coexistence with freedom of first act; for that coexistence will be a certain composite or aggregate of parts that are good, or at least not evil, in the moral order. Confirmation 2º: God does not hate freedom in first act, but only the second act of the one acting badly; yet He hates malice; therefore this consists in second act alone. Confirmation 3º: when loves evil by reason of their object are compared, the free and the necessary, the free terminates a special displeasure of God beyond the necessary, certainly by reason of freedom; but not by reason of freedom in first act, which does not displease God; therefore, etc. The same argument is made by comparing loves honorable by reason of their object; for the free beyond the necessary likewise terminates, by reason of freedom, a special complacency of God which is not terminated at freedom in first act.

55. First, the objection may be pressed in freedom of contrariety, which, just as it makes an act more free and imputable, likewise makes it more evil or more good; yet according to Fr. Hurtado it is not intrinsic to the acts. Next, if the discussion concerns goodness or malice insofar as derived from the object, then it is indeed intrinsic to the volition, just as is the tendency toward such an object, and is independent of freedom. For beatific love,

although necessary, is intrinsically most honorable; and a volition of lying, although possessed in sleep or madness, is intrinsically evil. But if goodness or malice is considered insofar as derived from circumstances, and especially from freedom in first act together with advertence to the goodness or prohibition, then it ought not to be adequately intrinsic to the volition, but can be constituted obliquely through the circumstances themselves.

56. It must nevertheless be noted that the formal malice even of a sin of commission, according to the more common Theology, consists in the privation of due rectitude. This privation does not formally include in its concept the freedom of the act, although it presupposes it in order that it result from the act or denominate it. Hence, for the proposed objection to have place, either formal malice must be posited in something positive, namely in the free tendency of the wicked act, or it must be taken for the proximate foundation of that privation, which consists in an act freely posited against the law of God, and which may be called "formal" malice, that is, imputable malice, in distinction from a wicked act that is not free, whose malice is called "material." In this sense, therefore, I deny the antecedent.

57. To the proof: formal malice, or morally imputable malice, must be considered like freedom in second act in n. 41, namely as a concrete form meaning the same as "an act freely posited against the law of God." Accordingly, this form is constituted directly through second act and obliquely through the freedom of the potency. Hence it must be absolutely denied that freedom of the potency is malice in the abstract or an infecting form, because the name of the constituted whole does not belong to the part imported obliquely. Thus the object is not the form of true cognition, or formal truth, although it constitutes it obliquely; nor can the smallness of a pygmy be called the greatness of a giant, which it likewise constitutes obliquely; and likewise with other predicamental relations. Therefore malice in the abstract does not in reality differ from malice in the concrete, and is the very act contrary to the divine law insofar as it exists in the circumstances of freedom in first act together with cognition of the prohibiting law. Nor is it novel that something not evil in itself, such as this freedom and cognition, should obliquely constitute a form or denomination of evil. For habitual sin is thus constituted not only from a past evil act but also from God's non-remission, which certainly is not evil. Likewise, the eating of meat is constituted in the character of objective evil and as incapable of being honorably loved through the law of fasting, which is objectively good and honorably lovable. It also often happens conversely that something good or better is constituted through some circumstance

that is not good: for food is rendered more precious and desirable through the circumstance of hunger or scarcity, and health through the circumstance of a plague raging in the region.

58. To confirmation 1º: it can happen that an act not evil from its intrinsic tendency is constituted in the being of sin through coexistence with freedom and cognition of the law, namely if it tends, without formal contempt of the law, toward an object that is evil precisely because forbidden, for example toward eating meat on a fast day. Nor is it absurd that sin or evil should sometimes consist in the conjunction or concurrence of parts none of which is evil in itself, namely when the character of evil is derived from the deformity, dissonance, or lack of agreement of the parts with each other, such as in our case between the act and the cognition of the prohibiting law. Thus on a fast day objective evil, worthy of hatred and incapable of being loved licitly, is constituted from the eating of meat and the prohibiting law, neither of which parts is evil in itself. So also, outside the moral order, monsters or deformed works, which are called faults of nature or of art, can be composed of parts individually beautiful but mutually discordant, for example unequal eyes or ears, or, to speak with the Poet, "If a painter wished to join a horse's neck to a human head."

59. To confirmation 2º: there is an instance in the eating of meat, which God, once the prohibition has been made, also detests as an objective evil, or judges unworthy of our love; yet He does not judge the prohibition itself thus unworthy, although the unworthiness and malice of such an object is constituted through it. God therefore hates "only" second act in such a way that by "only" freedom and cognition of the law are excluded from the office of an object terminating hatred, but not from the office of a circumstance constituting the act in the being of something hateful. For the act is not hateful after the manner of formal sin except as posited, and because posited, in the circumstances of freedom and obligation to omit it. Thus the will "alone," not cognition, is proximately able to love; yet in the being of that which is proximately able it is constituted through cognition. Likewise through cognition an object is constituted in the being of something able to function as an end, although not cognition but the goodness of the object "alone" functions as an end. The same is clear, to omit countless other examples, in a common nature, which "alone" is apt to be predicated of many, but not its precision or abstraction, through which nevertheless the nature is constituted in the being of something predicable.

60. Nor must whatever obliquely constitutes an act in the being of something hateful itself be hated or worthy of hatred, not even partially, unless perhaps it constitutes by way of the ultimate determinant; just as not

everything which constitutes a nature in the being of something predicable must itself be partially predicated. Nor must a plague or disease by which health is rendered more lovable be loved, nor sterility or scarcity by which wheat is rendered more precious be held in esteem. Therefore God hates formal malice, taken in the sense explained at the end of n. 56, only as regards what is direct, namely second act, while His hatred nevertheless presupposes or connotes the other constituents of malice. This again can be explained by the same examples. Hence the solution to confirmation 3º is now clear: for the free act beyond the necessary, whether honorable or wicked by reason of the object, terminates a special complacency or displeasure of God by reason of freedom in first act, not as an object terminating "as that which," but as a circumstance constituting second act in the being of something worthy or proximately apt to terminate it. Repeat the examples of health and wheat and the others just given.

61. It is replied: therefore, if Peter without an indifferent decree, or without cognition of the law, loves a forbidden object and preserves the same love at the following instant in which an indifferent concurrence or cognition of the law supervenes, he will thereby become formally sinful without a new exercise of freedom. I answer: he will indeed thereby become sinful, but not without an exercise of freedom that is, if not physically, at least morally new. For at the instant at which freedom and cognition of the law supervene, Peter can and must desist from preserving that act; and while he does not desist but freely preserves it, he conducts himself morally just as if he produced that act anew or elicited it for the first time. Therefore, according to all, the free preservation of a good or wicked act previously freely possessed brings a new increase of merit or demerit. Nor for this reason will freedom or cognition of the law be the ultimate determinant of the denomination "formally sinful" or "formal sin." For in the prior sign of that instant, cognition of the law and the whole freedom are understood as indifferent by way of first act, so as to coexist with the preservation or suspension of such a love. Hence preservation freely posited in the posterior sign by way of second act ultimately determines for that instant the coexistence of the love with the first act of freedom, and accordingly the denomination "formal sin."

62. It is objected 5º, from Fr. Quirós: while the will acts freely, it determines itself and the other co-principles to act; but this cannot stand unless free action is of itself and intrinsically a determination proper to the will alone, that is, unless it essentially has the feature of rendering the will determining while rendering the other co-principles purely determined by the will. If this is posited, the action will be essentially free; therefore, etc.

The minor premise is proved: because unless this is founded in a special character of the action, there will be no reason why the human will rather than Omnipotence, or cognition, or an infused or acquired habit, is called determining, since all these co-principles act immediately through the same action and all are supposed indifferent in first act. This objection must be solved by the Adversaries as well. For even if an essentially free action is admitted, a reason must be given why at this instant a free action is elicited that belongs to the will alone, rather than another intrinsically different action which renders cognition or habit determining, or which is free to God alone. What special right does the will possess that it alone should determine the indifference of first act which is common to the other co-principles? Everyone must therefore have recourse to the diversity of indifference, discussed above in n. 6, in the co-principles constituting the first act of created freedom. Namely, cognition, habit, and Omnipotence insofar as already indifferently applied by God possess only an indifference of non-connection, determinable by the created will; but this will possesses an indifference of dominion, or one immediately determinative of its own action. From this it comes about that, if an action arises from such a first act, it cannot fail to be the use of the dominion or determinative power of the will alone, which it therefore renders formally determinative of itself and the remaining co-principles, regardless of whether the action has this essentially or accidentally. For we have already seen in n. 44 that an action can be the use of a dominion with which it is not essentially connected.

63. If you ask why the power of determining its indifference belongs to the will rather than to the other principles, that question is independent of the present one and does not specially concern us. I nevertheless answer that it is the nature of the volitional principle alone that, once all prerequisites for operating are supplied and no impediment to determining itself is added, it can immediately determine itself and at the same time the other co-principles with which it has a common action. Or, what comes to the same thing, the concept of will includes an exclusive right that an action elicited in the aforesaid circumstances should denominate it alone as determining, while the other co-principles are denominated only as determined by another in second act, or as acting from the determination of another. Hence neither an indifferent judgment nor a habit possesses this power, because neither is a volitional principle. Nor does Omnipotence insofar as indifferently applied, because an impediment to immediately determining the created volition is added to it, namely its own tempering decree by which God freely wills to leave to the human will the determination of its act; for in the composite sense of this decree God

cannot immediately determine such an act. Finally, neither does the created will have this power when a non-indifferent cognition or something else connected with either extreme of freedom is added, because this is an impediment to its determining itself; as would also be a decree by which God prepared concurrence for the human will with adaptation to the will of an Angel.

64. From these points, to the objection of n. 62, I deny the minor premise; its proof has no force. For we have already given the reason for the requested distinction between the human will and the remaining co-principles. Hence, although the action is common to all the co-principles and denominates them all as agents, it does not denominate all as determining, because it is compared only to the will as its proper determination and as the use of dominion or determinative power. Nor does this arise from the character of the action but from the diverse nature or preparation of the principles constituting freedom in first act. Therefore it is something extrinsic and accidental to the action, since the same action in other circumstances could be a determination in second act proper to Omnipotence, cognition, or some other adjunct having connection with such an action, provided that the principles physically or objectively influencing it were not varied. Thus, according to Fr. Quirós, it is accidental to the action that it presuppose freedom of contrariety and be its proper determination and use. Note here that the will does not determine the other co-principles through some prior determination, but intransitively through the action common to all; this action is from all as agents, but not from all as determining. See what was said in Physic. tract. 2, disp. 8, cap. 4, n. 14, et sqq.

65. It is objected 6º, from Fr. Aldrete: a free action is essentially incompatible with an efficacious command of itself, or with a reflex act of the same will by which it is efficaciously commanded; therefore it is likewise incompatible with the other necessitating principles. The antecedent is proved: because if a free action did not of itself exclude such a command, it could not be freely elicited unless, prior to it, the absence or exclusion of the command were supposed to have been posited from elsewhere, just as it cannot be free unless a lack of predetermination or of some other necessitating principle is previously supposed. But this is contrary to experience, because the will often freely loves although prior to that love it makes no decision concerning the existence or absence of a command by which it can command such a love.

66. This argument, which Fr. Quirós examines, presses, and solves at greater length in disp. 101, n. 11 et sqq., is unstable on every side. For first it supposes what many deny, namely that the will can efficaciously command

itself a volition to be elicited at the same instant. It likewise supposes what many also deny, that an efficacious command removes the freedom of the commanded act. Next, it has no place whenever the will, without cognition and freedom sufficient for a reflex command, freely elicits a direct volition, as most often happens; for then the command is already supposed excluded from elsewhere in the prior sign because of the defect of cognition. But when freedom for a reflex command is simultaneously present, it may readily be denied that it is contrary to experience for there to be, prior to the immediately free direct act, a mere omission or nolition of the command. It may then also be said that the nolition or mere omission of the command is posited by the will neither prior nor posterior, but concomitantly with the direct act, because although command impedes the freedom of the direct act, it is an impediment removable by the will itself through another non-connected exercise.

67. Finally, even if the antecedent is granted, the consequence may be denied. For although a free action is connected with the absence of a command for the reason or experience alleged, it need not therefore be connected with the absence of every necessitating principle. One may object: one who is free to love Peter is simultaneously free to ask God for some principle necessitating such love; but this petition, which is supposed to be granted by God, if it existed, would remove the freedom of the love. And since, according to experience, it is not supposed freely excluded prior to the love, it must be essentially excluded through the love itself; therefore the love will essentially be incompatible with every necessitating principle. But in truth, freedom for such a petition is not ordinarily present; nor can it be present simultaneously with freedom for the love of Peter if the petition is supposed to be granted by God at the same instant. For freedom regarding the love presupposes God's concurrence prepared through an indifferent decree, and while this decree remains God cannot confer a necessitating principle. Add that even if the love of itself were incompatible with every necessitating principle as conferred by virtue of a free petition, it would not therefore exclude such a principle as posited from elsewhere.

68. It is objected 7º: by evident experience we know that we act freely; but this experience is not immediately had of freedom in first act. For no one immediately knows by experience whether God's concurrence has been prepared for him through an indifferent decree, nor whether there is an absence of predetermination or of another necessitating principle. Therefore either evident experience is immediately had of freedom of operation as distinct from the whole first act, or freedom of first act is known mediately and through its effect. But this effect, namely free operation, must therefore

be intrinsically connected with the first act of freedom; for the existence of a cause is not evidently known through an effect not connected with it.

69. First, the objection may be pressed in freedom of contrariety, which we likewise experience evidently, indeed more evidently. Next, at most it proves that free operation is naturally connected with the first act of freedom. For this suffices in order that through experience of the operation we have physical evidence of freedom in first act, just as by experiencing the accidents of bread we have physical evidence of the existence of its substance. From this it does not follow that the operation is essentially free, or that it cannot by divine power be separated from freedom in first act and thereby rendered necessary, as is clear from the same example of the accidents of bread. One may object: the connection of volition with the potency as free must be founded in its special mode of tending, which mode is essential to it, just like the mode of tending "efficaciously," "disjunctively," etc. I answer: it certainly is so founded; but from this it follows only that the natural connection is essential to the volition, that is, belongs to its essence, not that it is essentially inseparable from its term, namely freedom of first act. Thus in the essence of an accident is founded its natural connection with substance; likewise in the essence of prime matter its natural connection with form; yet neither connection is essentially inseparable from its term. The connection will indeed be essentially inseparable from such a volition, which cannot exist without by its own nature requiring freedom of the potency; yet it will not for that reason be essentially inseparable from that freedom, as the same examples demonstrate.

70. Moreover, independently of the natural connection of a free act, it can be said that we experience the freedom of the potency through an effect, not just any effect nor one posited in just any manner, but insofar as it is varied without obstacle, now posited, now omitted or revoked. For because we experience ourselves under the same cognition now willing, now not willing the same object, and now suspending or revoking our affection without any obstacle at all, from this alternation or variation we evidently know ourselves to be free. Thus from a similar experience in the action of walking we evidently know that our locomotive power is subject to our dominion, although neither does walking intrinsically presuppose this subjection, since the same walking can proceed from a necessitating decree of God, nor does the subjection itself on the side of the potency immediately fall under experience, since it requires God's decree to concur toward the external action in a manner adapted to our freedom, which certainly we do not experience in itself.

71. Finally, and this is the plain solution, it may be denied that we do not experience the freedom of the potency immediately in itself as regards its intrinsic and positive constituents, namely the will and the indifferent judgment. These we undoubtedly experience; and this suffices for us to be experientially certain of the existence of the whole freedom, because these constituents are connected by the nature of the thing with the others, namely with the indifferent decree and with the absence of predetermination or another necessitating principle, and consequently ground certainty and physical evidence that the others are posited. For miracles are not presumed, nor does their possibility obstruct physical and experiential certainty. By this reason we know certainly that fire will heat if applied, and that a stone will fall from on high if released, because we experience the heat of fire and the gravity of the stone, to which God's concurrence is naturally due whenever the conditions are present. Therefore, although the will does not require indifference of judgment or decree concerning every object, for it does not innately shrink from the beatific vision, nor does it suffer violence in sleep, in which an object is often proposed to it without an indifference suitable for freedom, it nevertheless requires by its own nature that, whenever an indifferent judgment is present, Omnipotence be applied indifferently and nothing necessitating action or non-action supervene. Hence through experience of such a judgment the existence of full freedom is known to us, certainly without discourse, or at least by a discourse no less easy than that by which the power of fire to heat becomes known. Nor is this known only to the learned, but also to the unlearned, because freedom is known experientially only as regards whether it exists, not as regards what it is, as is again clear from the example of a stone or fire. But a free action is most often not connected by the nature of the thing with an indifference of judgment sufficient for freedom. If, however, some action from its peculiar mode of tending essentially presupposes an indifferent judgment, it will indeed be naturally free, or free from a natural exigency, but not essentially, because it can be rendered necessary by a decree of God.

CHAPTER IV.

Whether a Pure Free Omission Is Possible.

72. Omission, as now understood, is the suspension or non-position of some act of the will. It is called a "non-pure omission" when it is caused by another act of the same will incompatible with the omitted act, whether caused directly, as when love is omitted by virtue of a nolition to love or through hatred of the same object, or only indirectly or occasionally, as if the

volition of praying is omitted through a volition of play, sleep, or another object incompatible with prayer. But it is called a "pure omission" if it is caused by no positive act of the will, either directly or indirectly. Hence, if someone omits the love of God in such a way that he has neither hatred of God, nor a reflex nolition to love, nor another affection incompatible with the love of God, he will have a pure omission of this love, even if perhaps he has other affections not incompatible with the love of God. For these will not obstruct the purity of the omission, because we are not now discussing the omission of all acts of the will together, but only the omission of some particular act, which is called "pure" because it has not been induced or determined through another act incompatible with the omitted one.

73. No one doubts that a pure necessary omission can be given through the defect of some prerequisite for the omitted act, for example through lack of cognition of the object. The only doubt is whether it can be given freely, so that when the will is free regarding act A it omits that act without eliciting another incompatible act. The negative opinion is frequently held by the Thomists, and among Ours by Cardinal Pallavicino, Aldrete, Quirós, and others, especially the more recent. But the affirmative is embraced by Frs. Hurtado, Arriaga, Ripalda, Oviedo, and most of Ours with Fr. Suárez, disp. 19, Met. s. 4, n. 8, and in 1, 2, tr. 5, d. 3, s. 2; likewise by the Scotists with Scotus apud Mast. hic dis. 7, n. 81, and by some Thomists. This question is disputed very extensively in Theology, where it is also asked whether a pure omission can be sinful, whether it can be meritorious, and whether it is possible even in God. Since these questions belong elsewhere, we must abstain from them now and discuss only, and not too diffusely, whether it can be free in a created will. The affirmative side is to be preferred, both because the arguments of the negative side do not compel, as would be required in a question of possibility, and because it is usually proved by sufficiently strong positive reasons.

74. It is proved, therefore, 1º: freedom of contradiction regarding the love of God can be given without freedom of contrariety, since the former extends more widely than the latter, as everyone supposes; but that will be freedom to omit love without positing another incompatible act; therefore it will be freedom for a pure omission. The minor premise is proved: freedom of pure contradiction is not freedom regarding incompatible positive acts, but immediately regarding acting and not acting. Therefore if it is given regarding love, it will be freedom not to perform, or to omit, that love without the position of another, etc. The antecedent is denied by the Adversaries, who distinguish freedom of contrariety and freedom of contradiction in this way: freedom of contrariety regards acts relating

contrariwise to the same object, such as love and hatred; freedom of contradiction, however, regards acts incompatible from another source, namely either because they regard incompatible objects or because one is a reflex nolition of the other and consequently causes its omission. They therefore hold that omission of love is never immediately free, but only mediately, insofar as it results from a nolition to love or from another act freely posited.

75. But against this doctrine, the antecedent is proved, 1º, from the very name and definition of freedom of contradiction. For just as freedom "of contrariety" is so called because it immediately regards contrary extremes, so freedom "of contradiction" is so called because it immediately regards contradictory extremes. Positive acts are not such extremes, but only acting and not acting, or the act and its omission. For this reason this freedom is defined by everyone through the power "to operate and not to operate," and not through the power "to operate in this or another manner," by which it should rather be defined if there were no immediate freedom not to operate. For a thing is badly defined through one immediate extreme and one mediate extreme when it can be defined through both immediate extremes, just as freedom of contrariety is defined. 2º: because, if the doctrine recalled is maintained, there will be no freedom except freedom of contrariety, or, what is the same, there will be no freedom except regarding contrary acts. For all acts by which love is excluded from a subject are contrary to love, just as all accidents by which heat is expelled from a subject are contrary to heat; and in particular what is more contrary to love than a nolition to love? The point is pressed: because freedom as regards exercise will never be given without freedom as regards specification, contrary to what everyone asserts. For no freedom will be possible which does not regard specifically different acts, or which can abstain from exercising love otherwise than by exercising an act specifically different.

76. The same affirmative position is proved 2º. If there are two cognitions of one object, one under the aspect of good and the other under the aspect of evil, the will is free regarding love and hatred, even if it cannot elicit any other act; and this is certain. But then it can omit both love and hatred at once; therefore it can omit purely. The consequence is legitimate, since there is then no power for another act. The minor premise is proved because there is then no principle vaguely necessitating toward love or hatred. For if there were any such principle it would especially be cognition, since God's decree is supposed in fact to be adapted to the exigency of cognition. But there is then no cognition which vaguely inclines, much less necessitates, toward love or hatred. There are only two cognitions, one of

which inclines determinately toward love, the other determinately toward hatred. One may object that vague necessity consists in the composite of both. But against this: by that composite the object is not represented as vaguely lovable or hateful, for the composite does not add a different representation or some mode of representing found in neither cognition. Therefore such a composite cannot induce a vague necessity to love or hate. The consequence is proved because cognition, whether one or twofold, necessitates only insofar as it moves, and moves only according to the force and mode of representation. The point is pressed: no cognition determinately necessitates toward love unless it proposes the object as necessarily lovable; nor does any determinately necessitate toward hatred unless it proposes the object as necessarily hateful. Therefore no cognition vaguely necessitates toward love or hatred unless it vaguely proposes the object as necessarily lovable or hateful. But the twofold cognition, even taken jointly or together, does not vaguely propose the object in this way; therefore, etc.

77. It is proved 3º. Someone can be free regarding the volition of object A with freedom as regards exercise alone, although he is not actually thinking about another incompatible object, as experience teaches. But then he can freely omit that act and cannot elicit another incompatible with it; therefore he is free to omit purely. You will deny the minor premise as regards its second part, because there must then be freedom regarding a reflex nolition of that act, and consequently some aspect of good must be known in its omission, or, what is the same, some aspect of evil, or some difficulty or inconvenience, must be known in the volition itself by virtue of which it becomes reflexively capable of being nolited. But against this: although for willing some cognition of the volition is prerequired, because the will wills to exercise itself, as we noted with Fr. Suárez, disp. 7, n. 85, nevertheless, in order that a volition be free as regards exercise, it need not be known as reflexively capable of being nolited. This is proved because from this it would follow that a reflex nolition, since it too is free as regards exercise, would likewise have to be known as capable of being nolited through another reflex nolition, and this in turn by another for the same reason, and so to infinity. Hence a direct volition could not be free without infinite reflections in the intellect and without freedom regarding infinitely many reflex acts, which is plainly absurd.

78. I see that this argument can be evaded by the Adversaries. It will be stronger if proposed thus. Let there be freedom regarding love and hatred of the same object, and simultaneously regarding a reflex nolition of the love because the love appears somewhat inconvenient. Then the will will be able

to elicit hatred while omitting not only the love but also the reflex nolition of love. For to omit love, hatred of the same object is undoubtedly sufficient; there is no need for a reflex nolition to love. And this nolition can likewise be omitted while hatred is posited, because hatred is not connected with it; for from the fact that one hates the object, one is not bound expressly to say, "I do not will to love." But the will, conducting itself thus in that event, purely omits the nolition to love. Therefore a pure free omission of some act is now possible. I subsume the minor premise: because the will then posits no act incompatible with such a nolition. For hatred of the object, although it does not entail the nolition to love, can nevertheless coexist with it, as is certain. If it is said that the nolition to love cannot then be omitted except through another reflex nolition of it, I infer that the will must then also be free regarding a nolition of the nolition. But the argument returns in this second nolition. For if the will then loves the object, it will consequently omit hatred and the nolition to love; and it can simultaneously omit the second nolition, because from the fact that it loves it is not bound to say, "I do not will not to will to love." Therefore it will purely omit this second nolition, since it will posit only the act of love, which certainly is not incompatible with a nolition of the nolition to love. If recourse is had to another, third reflex nolition, this too will be proved by the same argument capable of being purely and freely omitted if hatred is posited in place of love. And thus by alternately positing love and hatred the argument will press until one falls into the absurdity of infinite reflections or admits a pure free omission of some act.

79. It is proved 4º: if the pure goodness of object A is proposed to the will, and simultaneously some difficulty in loving it, with no other cognition present, the will is undoubtedly free to love and not to love object A even according to the Opponents, since it can reflexively nolit the love. Then argue thus: the will in those circumstances is also free to command reflexively the direct love; but the will can then purely omit the reflex command; therefore a pure free omission is not contradictory. The major premise is clear, because there is then cognition sufficient for a reflex nolition of the love, and therefore also for a command or reflex volition to love. For its own love cannot be proposed to the will as purely capable of being nolited, or as purely evil, when freedom to love is present, as is manifest; otherwise the will could not then, by the very love, exercitively will to love. Suppose this cognition to be present: "It is honorable, but laborious, to love object A." Certainly the love is not rendered purely capable of being nolited by this cognition. The minor premise is therefore proved: the will can in those circumstances immediately determine itself to love the object

without a preceding command. For the power to command does not remove the immediate power to love when cognition of the goodness of the object is present. Otherwise freedom of pure contradiction, which according to the Adversaries is constituted by the power to nolit and consequently also to will to love, would never be immediately determinable through love, which no one would say. But if the will then immediately determines itself to love, it will purely omit the command, or reflex volition to love. This is proved because the command is then omitted and nothing incompatible with it is posited: the nolition of love certainly is not posited; love itself does not conflict with the command; and in that hypothesis cognition is lacking for other acts.

80. If you say that a nolition of the command must then be elicited, against this, 1º: what the Adversaries commonly teach will then be false, namely that cognition of the lovable object and of the difficulty in loving suffices for the freedom of love. For cognition of the command will additionally be necessary to regulate the nolition to command. Against this, 2º: if the command must be reflexively capable of being nolited, it will simultaneously be reflexively capable of being willed, or commandable by another command, because it cannot be proposed as purely capable of being nolited, as we just said of the direct love. Therefore if the will immediately determines itself to the first command, it will purely omit the command of the command, because, as reflection will show, it posits nothing incompatible with it. But if it is desired that this second command likewise be omitted through a nolition of itself, it will also have to be posited as reflexively capable of being willed, or commandable by a third command, in which the same argument can be made, and so to infinity. Nor is it useful to deny with Fr. Quirós that an efficacious command concerning a love to be elicited by the same will at the same instant can in fact be given. For first, the other Adversaries do not think so. Next, Quirós does not deny that freedom regarding commands of this sort can be divinely given, and this suffices for us. Finally, neither does he deny that an inefficacious command is naturally possible; and our argument proceeds equally in the omission of this.

81. Finally, omitting other arguments of no great strength, our opinion can be proved against the Thomists from their own principles. For if, once freedom in first act sufficient for loving is posited, God denies, as He certainly can, physical predetermination toward love and toward every act incompatible with love, there will be a pure omission of love; but that omission will be free; therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved: that omission will be joined with a first act of antecedent and absolute freedom

regarding love. For according to the Thomists this freedom is not constituted by physical predetermination, nor is it removed by the defect of predetermination. But omission of love posited in a will truly and absolutely free in first act to love is a free omission. This is clear because it is an omission freely preventable. For one who truly can freely love can certainly freely prevent the omission of love. The argument is the same if God denies simultaneous concurrence toward every act when the whole freedom in first act proximately regarding operation exists; this certainly can be done, since according to several modern Thomists this freedom in a creature is not constituted through Omnipotence applied to concurrence but through the created co-principles alone. Likewise if God does not will to concur, or to grant physical predetermination, while an indifferent judgment remains; for according to the common opinion of the Thomists apud John of St. Thomas hic q. 12, a. 2, while such a judgment remains, not even by divine power can the will fail to be free.

82. Finally observe that, although a pure omission of a direct act rarely occurs, because the will can with difficulty refrain from every affection regarding an object indifferently proposed unless it turns toward another incompatible object, in which sense several Authors of our opinion say that a pure free omission is morally impossible, nevertheless a pure free omission of some reflex act occurs not infrequently, as is sufficiently gathered from the third and fourth proofs. Observe again that St. Thomas holds our opinion both in 2, d. 35, q. 1, a. 3, and in 1, 2, q. 6, a. 3, where he takes "voluntary" for free, as will be clear to the reader. But when in q. 2, De malo, a. 1, and 1, 2, q. 71, a. 5, he requires some act which is the cause or occasion of omission, he first speaks of a sinful omission; and then whatever the Angelic Doctor says there can easily be understood of omission insofar as it occurs morally or ordinarily. Finally observe that a pure free omission is possible not only of one but of all acts here and now free taken together, as is shown especially by the proof given in n. 76; nor is there in this collective omission any peculiar difficulty which is not most easily solved. See Fr. Oviedo hic controv. 10, p. 2.

CHAPTER V.

The Arguments of the Negative Opinion Are Solved.

83. It is objected 1º: the will, freely omitting, is reduced to second act, through which the indifference it possessed in first act is determined; therefore it must then posit some act. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it is reduced to a negative second act, I grant; to a positive

second act, I deny the antecedent; and under the same distinction, the consequence. Since freedom in first act by its concept is a faculty of acting and not acting, there immediately correspond to it two second acts or two exercises, namely "to act and not to act," of which the former is positive and corresponds to the will insofar as it is able to act, while the latter is negative and corresponds to the will insofar as it is able not to act. Therefore when the will freely omits, the very "not acting" is rightly called an exercise of freedom or a negative second act. It is replied, 1º: if no positive exercise is added to the potency free in first act, in reality nothing is added; therefore the potency is not reduced to second act but remains in pure first act. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: nothing is added, that is, no entity, I grant; nothing is added, that is, neither entity nor privation, I deny the antecedent and consequence. For the privation of an act producible at this instant is truly added; this privation does not stand on the side of first act, nor does it belong to the prior sign of freedom, as is known.

84. It is replied 2º: a positive potency is not a potency for a negative exercise; but a free potency is positive; therefore. I grant the major premise concerning a positive potency that does not possess dominion over its act, but deny it concerning a potency endowed with such dominion, such as free potency. For it truly exercises itself and its dominion by imputably omitting a positive act, although it is truly called and truly is a positive potency even insofar as it is compared with a negative exercise, that is, with omission as imputable, because as conceived under this comparison it cannot be separated from the precontainment of positive exercise. For unless it is understood as able to love, it cannot be understood as able imputably, or by dominion, to omit love. It is replied 3º: omission of intellection cannot be an exercise of the intellective potency; therefore neither can omission of volition be an exercise of the volitional potency. I deny the consequence, because the intellective potency, since it does not possess dominion over its act, never omits it by its own power or faculty, but only because of a defect in some prerequisite for operating by which it is rendered unable to operate. Hence the intellect as such then exercises no power, because it does not omit intellection from a power not to operate but from an inability to operate. This also happens to the will when it omits a volition non-freely, for example from lack of cognition. But when the will is free, it not only can operate but can also not operate, as is clear from the definition of free potency. Hence the omission of volition then proceeds not from an inability to operate but from a true power not to operate, which is certainly exercised through the omission itself.

85. It is objected 2º: if a pure free omission were given, it would be voluntary, since everything free is voluntary; but it cannot be voluntary; therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved, 1º: because the voluntary is defined as "that which is from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end"; but a pure omission, since it is nothing, cannot be from an intrinsic principle. 2º: because everything voluntary is vital, since it is an exercise of a vital potency as such; but pure omission has nothing of vitality. 3º: because pure omission is the absence of everything voluntary; therefore it cannot be voluntary, just as the absence of light cannot be light. I answer: "voluntary" is said in two ways: 1º intrinsically and elicitedly; 2º extrinsically and by dominion. What is voluntary in the first way is that which is positively elicited by the will from the motion of an end. What is voluntary in the second way is that whose position or exclusion is immediately subject to the dominion of the will; and because voluntariness of this sort is constituted through dominion itself, or through freedom in first act, it is therefore called extrinsic. Hence every free volition is voluntary in both ways; a necessary volition is voluntary only in the first way; and a pure free omission only in the second way. For although it is not elicitedly from the will, its exclusion nevertheless immediately lies under the dominion of the will, which could immediately have prevented it by positing the omitted act. In this sense I deny the minor premise of the objection.

86. To proofs 1º and 2º: to what is intrinsically voluntary there indeed belongs proceeding, or being directly, from an intrinsic principle and being formally vital; but not to what is purely voluntary by dominion, which alone is found in a pure free omission. For to such a voluntary it is sufficient to lie under the dominion of the will, because by that very fact it is held to be "indirectly" from the will, as St. Thomas says, 1, 2, q. 6, a. 3, and consequently it is also vital presuppositively, namely by presupposing a vital and intrinsic principle of an operation by which it can be prevented. Hence pure omission can be called an exercise of a vital potency as such, not through a vitality explained by the omission itself but through a vitality explicable through the opposite act. To 3º: the antecedent is true concerning what is intrinsically voluntary, but false concerning everything extrinsically voluntary. For extrinsic voluntariness, or voluntariness by dominion, is found not only in free acts, whose absence is pure omission, but also in anything immediately preventable by the will, even if it is merely negative. This doctrine is that of the Angelic Doctor, q. 2, De malo, a. 1, ad 2, where he says: "Something is said to be voluntary not only because it falls under an act of the will, but also because it falls under the power of the will; thus even not willing itself is said to be voluntary, because it is in the power of the will to

will and not to will." Likewise 1, 2, q. 6, a. 3, in the argument "But to the contrary," where he says: "That of which we are masters is said to be voluntary; but we are masters of acting and not acting, willing and not willing; therefore, just as acting and willing are voluntary, so also not acting and not willing." He confirms the same in the body of the article and later q. 71, a. 5, ad 2.

87. It is pressed 1º: therefore even a pure necessary omission could be voluntary, since necessity does not remove voluntariness, as is clear in beatific love. I deny the consequence, because a pure necessary omission first cannot be intrinsically voluntary, since it is not a volition; next, neither can it be extrinsically voluntary, because it is not subject to the dominion of the will, otherwise it would not be necessary. Thus necessity is compatible with intrinsic voluntariness, as in beatific love, but not with extrinsic voluntariness, or voluntariness by dominion, of which alone pure omission is capable; for necessity excludes dominion in first act, through which this voluntariness is constituted in almost the same way as freedom of the act is constituted through freedom of the potency. Hence extrinsic voluntariness cannot be separated from freedom in first act. It is pressed 2º: an omission can be mediately voluntary although it is not mediately free, as if someone by a necessary volition wills to omit hatred of an object; therefore it will also be able to be immediately voluntary although it is not immediately free. Again I deny the consequence. The disparity is that an omission reflexively willed has a source from which it can participate in mediate voluntariness without freedom, namely from a volition of itself, which can be intrinsically voluntary even if it is not free. But an omission not willed through a positive act, if it does not have extrinsic voluntariness by the title of freedom, necessarily lacks all voluntariness, since it is not intrinsically voluntary.

88. It is pressed 3º: everything voluntary must in some way be willed, at least exercitively. I answer: it must indeed be so if it is intrinsically voluntary; not otherwise. Let the same answer be given if someone objects that the free and voluntary is a certain difference of positive being, or also that everything voluntary proceeds from the innate inclination of the will. Finally, it must be denied that a pure omission of love, for example, is voluntary because it is virtually or interpretatively a nolition of love. For, apart from interpretations, a pure omission will be voluntary by this very fact, that it is immediately under the dominion and power of the will, as St. Thomas taught us above.

89. It is objected 3º: the will, as a rational potency, cannot freely determine itself except from some motive or end; but a pure omission can have no end or motive; therefore the will cannot freely determine itself by a

pure omission. The minor premise is proved because a pure omission, since it is a pure negation or pure non-being of a positive act, can have no tendency or intrinsic relation to an object; nor is it intrinsically different when it is posited necessarily and without a motive, namely when no cognition of the object precedes. Confirmation 1º: two incompatible motives can simultaneously be proposed to the will by which it is invited to omission of Mass on a feast day, for example hunting and play. Then if the will purely omits the volition of Mass, this omission is not first on account of both those motives taken together, since they appear incompatible with each other; nor next on account of either of them in particular, since pure omission of itself regards one no more than the other. It will therefore be without any motive. Confirmation 2º: no free exercise can be given without a directing cognition; but no cognition directs toward pure omission, because none directs except insofar as it proposes an object as worthy of love or hatred, and therefore none directs except toward love or hatred.

90. To the objection: several concede to pure free omission a direct and immediate motive, yet one that is extrinsic and interpretative or virtual, namely that which is proposed by cognition as drawing back from the omitted act. This is called extrinsic because the omission does not intrinsically regard it, and interpretative or virtual because the omission here and now proceeds from it, or is posited by virtue of it, just as if it intrinsically regarded it. But in the case of confirmation 1º they say that the omission is on account of both motives indeterminately or vaguely. And to confirmation 2º they will say that cognition of an object as hateful or unworthy of love can direct toward omission of love even if hatred is not posited. But I prefer the doctrine of Fr. Suárez, l. 12 De gratia, c. 2, whom several others follow, namely that a pure free omission needs no motive properly and directly inclining toward it, nor does it regard any motive even interpretatively, since rather it is the exclusion of every tendency and relation toward a motive. Indeed it seems altogether contradictory for there to be a motive immediately alluring toward omission of an act of the will: both because a motive of this sort would move the will in second act when the will was not moved but rather lacked all motion, which is a contradiction in terms; and because causality in the genus of final cause, which is proper to a motive, would exist without the action of an efficient cause, which is likewise contradictory.

91. Yet a pure free omission has an indirect and permissive motive, namely that which with indifference inclines toward the omitted act. For the goodness of the object, while it so invites to love that it does not compel love, or does not remove freedom to love, by that very fact permits or does

not impede omission of love. And this is to move "indirectly and permissively" toward omission, just as from the fact that God so wills a free honorable act that He does not impede a dishonorable one, He is said purely permissively to will the sinful act. Therefore the will needs a motive directly and positively moving it in order to determine itself to act, but not in order to determine itself not to act. For this it is enough that it can so act that it is compelled by no motive to act. Hence if it is asked why it omits love, it need not give a positive reason but only a negative one, namely: "I therefore do not love because the goodness of the object now known does not necessarily seize me or compel me to love." Nor by reason of being a rational potency does the will need any other reason in order freely to determine itself through negative exercise.

92. One may object: the will could not freely omit love of the object unless a cognition drawing it back from love were present; but this cognition draws back only insofar as it proposes and applies a motive for not loving or for hating the same object. Therefore this motive must be held to be proper to the omission. Add that the omission here and now depends upon or proceeds from such a cognition drawing back; but it proceeds from it only insofar as that cognition manifests a motive drawing back from love. Therefore it truly proceeds here and now from such a motive. I answer: first, from what was said above in n. 9, it could be denied that a positively retracting cognition is required for freedom of contradiction. Next, if such cognition is necessary, it is required for the omission only as a condition without which it cannot occur, so that the cognition inviting to love does not remove freedom, or does not necessitate toward love, but permits omission of love. For unless a cognition drawing back were present, the will would necessarily love by virtue of the alluring cognition, as the objection supposes. Nor does it matter that the cognition draws back only by proposing and applying some motive. It does not follow that this motive is proper to the omission, because a motive for purely not loving is never proposed, but always a motive either for hating or for positively noliting to love, namely when something inconvenient is apprehended in the love itself. Hence this motive, under the office of a motive, does not conduce to pure omission of love, although under the office of a condition it conduces in the sense explained. The reason is that it does not immediately allure toward omitting, but only mediately, namely through the positive act of nolition or hatred. If that act existed, it would render the omission non-pure; and when it does not exist, it leaves suspended in its motive the power of alluring toward omission.

93. Nor does it matter that pure omission depends here and now upon or proceeds from the cognition drawing back, even insofar as it manifests a motive drawing back from love. For it does not proceed from it insofar as it manifests a motive for pure omission, but insofar as it manifests a motive for an act opposite to love and thus performs the office of a condition without which the omission of love would not be permitted by the motive for loving. Here it must be noted that the motive of hatred can also be said permissively to move toward a pure omission of love, because this omission, insofar as pure, also involves omission of hatred, which that motive permits while it does not remove freedom. In order that it not remove freedom, the cognition inviting to love is a condition without which it cannot occur, for both motives and both cognitions are mutually conditions for not removing freedom and consequently for permitting omission of the act corresponding to each. Indeed, if it is desired that the motive of hatred also be called permissive in relation to the omission of love as distinct from omission of hatred, I permit it, provided no motive immediately and directly inclining toward omission is posited.

94. Now to the objection of n. 89, granting the major premise concerning either a direct or indirect motive, I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: it can have no direct motive, I grant; no indirect or permissive motive, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. To the proof I grant everything said there, but nothing follows against an indirect and purely permissive motive as explained by us. To confirmation 1º: properly speaking, a pure omission is never on account of any motive. Both because "on account of" indicates an intrinsic tendency toward the motive, of which tendency pure omission is incapable, while to be from a purely permissive motive is not to regard it or to be on account of it, but to be unimpeded by it; and because, as we saw, a motive immediately alluring toward omission is contradictory, whereas a motive on account of which a pure omission were properly given would be such a motive. Therefore in the proposed case the pure omission of the volition of Mass would not be on account of play or hunting, but would be purely permissively from the motive alluring toward Mass insofar as it does not remove freedom, and accordingly insofar as joined with other motives inclining toward opposite acts, which would behave as mere conditions or also as motives purely permitting the omission itself as pure. For this office it matters little whether they are or are not incompatible. To confirmation 2º: no free exercise, whether positive or negative, can indeed be given without directing cognition. There is nevertheless this difference, that positive exercise requires a cognition positively directing toward it, whereas negative exercise

requires only a cognition permissively directing, that is, so directing toward the act as not to impede but to permit its omission. This kind of direction can stand even if the cognition proposes the object only as worthy of love or hatred.

95. It must be noted here that a pure free omission essentially depends upon a preceding permissively directing cognition, not in the being of omission taken specifically, but in the being of a free omission, because in the being of such it is constituted through freedom in first act, just as we said of volition in ch. 2; and cognition is undoubtedly included in that freedom. The omission itself, taken specifically, while free also depends here and now, although contingently, upon the cognition which in fact precedes it, as upon a moral cause or a condition in some way conducing to omission. This dependence consists in the coexistence of the two, according to the doctrine and explanation given in a similar case above in n. 31 et sqq. Nor does it follow from this that coexistence of the omission with cognition of a direct motive, or one directly inviting toward omission, would also suffice for the omission to be said here and now to depend upon a direct motive. For we have already shown that there is no motive directly inviting toward omission except mediate or non-pure omission. Hence, while omission is immediate or pure, it cannot coexist with cognition of a motive which in relation to it is direct or more than permissive.

96. It is objected 4º: no cause can of its own accord impede a positive perfection of itself unless it compensates for that perfection by another; but the will, in purely omitting, compensates by no perfection for the positive perfection of the act, which is its own perfection; therefore it cannot of its own accord impede it by pure omission. Confirmation 1º: a positive formal cause having a purely negative formal effect is contradictory; therefore an efficient cause, such as the will as free, to which there corresponds a merely negative second act, is likewise contradictory. Confirmation 2º: innate appetite cannot tend toward a pure negation of good; but the will in first act is an innate appetite toward its second acts; therefore pure omission cannot be numbered among these acts. Or otherwise: every free exercise must be pleasing to the will, for the will freely exercises itself because it so pleases it; therefore it must conform to the inclination of the will. But a free omission by reason of itself is not conformed to the innate inclination of the will; therefore it must conform to an elicited inclination and consequently must be willed, or result from some volition.

97. To the objection: the doctrine of the major premise is true in natural or necessary causes, which according to the direction of the Author of nature always seek what is better for them and naturally possible, and do not

possess dominion over their appetite. But it is false in free causes, which by reason of the dominion of freedom can choose a lesser good, indeed can freely deprive themselves of every freely superadded perfection. Otherwise, among the positive acts toward which the will is indifferent, it could fail to elicit the best or better act only with impossibility; nor could it freely sin when it can elicit love of God, for the perfection of this love is not compensated by the perfection of a wicked act. To confirmation 1º, I grant the antecedent. For since the primary formal effect is constituted from the formal cause itself, if the latter is positive, the former cannot fail to be positive, although it sometimes grounds some negation by way of a secondary effect. But the consequence must be denied if the discussion concerns an efficient cause which not only can effect but can also not effect, such as by its definitive concept is a free cause.

98. To confirmation 2º: granting the major premise, which perhaps could be called into doubt, I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: toward its positive second acts, let this pass; toward both negative and positive second acts, I deny the minor premise and consequence. Nor does innate appetite toward positive acts, if it exists, impose necessity to elicit them. For "the will does not tend necessarily toward that to which it naturally tends, but voluntarily; hence it can also not choose it," as St. Thomas says in 2, d. 39, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5, while discussing the innate inclination of the will toward good; and he adds the reason: "Because natural inclination is according to the exigency of the inclining nature." Nor certainly could that appetite otherwise be joined with freedom, since it would have to draw the will toward the act of better character, which is a condition of innate appetite. To the other form of the confirmation, it must be denied that every free exercise must be pleasing or agreeable to the will except negatively. For it suffices that it not be positively displeasing, or displeasing by an elicited displeasure, as in fact the free exercise of pure omission is not. Hence this exercise need only be negatively conformed to elicited inclination, that is, not deformed from it. Nor will it be absurd if it is said to be deformed from the innate inclination of the will and therefore to inflict some violence upon it; for it does not thereby exceed the faculty of free potency, since innate inclination leaves freedom intact, as we have just seen.

99. It is objected 5º, from Fr. Quirós: if omission of love can be immediately free, it will also be immediately free when the will posits an act incompatible with love, namely a nolition to love or hatred of the same object. For in the sign prior to the nolition to love, the will will have immediate freedom to omit love, from which freedom the omission will be denominated immediately free even though a nolition to love concomitantly

accrues to it. But the consequence is absurd, because it would follow that whenever someone sins by a positive nolition against an affirmative precept, he commits a twofold sin, since he would have two immediately free exercises against the law, namely the nolition and the omission of the commanded act. I deny the consequence, at least if we speak of the natural or regular use of the same unvaried freedom, because omission of love cannot be immediately free unless it is pure, that is, joined with the absence of every act opposed to love. For if some act of this sort is present, it must exist prior to the omission of love and will therefore render that omission only mediately free, since it is infallibly connected with it, as is supposed.

100. The reason is that a nolition to love, and understand the same of hatred, is of itself apt morally to cause omission of love, namely by efficaciously entailing it, as no one doubts. And from another source it does not exist dependently upon the omission itself as its effect, because neither is such a nolition in our principles reciprocally entailed by that omission, nor under any other title must it presuppose that omission on the side of the cause. Therefore, while the nolition coexists with the omission, it morally causes it and consequently precedes it. The consequence is clear, because moral causality, according to the doctrine established above in n. 31 et sqq., consists in the coexistence of the effect with a cause of itself apt morally to influence such an effect and existing independently of it. Hence it must be denied that the will has immediate freedom regarding omission of love as separated from omission of the nolition or as prescinding from it. For it can immediately omit love only by simultaneously omitting every act opposed to love; if it posits any such act, omission of love will be purely mediate, or mediately free. Hence freedom in first act is not a form of itself apt to denominate omission of love immediately free except as joined with omission of every act opposing love; and through this omission the omission of love itself is constituted in the character of a subject suitable for such a denomination. Nor does indifference of cognition render the will free to omit except either immediately in the divided sense from an incompatible act or mediately in the composite sense.

101. One may object 1º that hatred can be given posterior to omission, in which event it will not be its moral cause, namely if, freedom of contrariety being posited, someone first exercises freedom of loving and not loving by omitting love, and then proceeds to exercise freedom of hating and not hating by eliciting hatred. I answer that it is contradictory for that freedom first to be exercised by the mere omission of love, although perhaps not by a nolition, at least in an Angel if not in a man, and afterwards by hatred at the same instant. Both because of what was said concerning moral causality, and

because that freedom cannot be understood as omitting love unless either by pure suspension it allows the whole instant to pass without love, or positively impedes itself from loving. I omit other hypotheses by which Quirós intends to prove that an act incompatible with love can exist posterior to omission of love. For even if admitted, they prove only that this can occur by divine power, and then only in such a way that the act is either not free or proceeds from a new freedom inadequately distinct from the preceding by reason of a new cognition. In that case, if a double sin is said to be present in the transgression of an affirmative precept, let this pass.

102. One may object 2º: at least an incompatible act can be given concomitantly with omission and thus permit the omission to remain immediately free. This is proved both by parity with a positive act, which can be freely possessed although something connected with it concomitantly accrues, and also because omission in our opinion can have its being from the will without awaiting a positive act. Therefore it can proceed from the will in such a way that, although a positive act arises simultaneously, it does not arise prior but in the same or a concomitant sign. If a volition, because it can have its being from the will without a reflex command, does not await a reflex command, why will omission await a positive act, since the will alone also suffices for omission? I answer by denying the assumption, because, as we have seen, an incompatible act cannot be given, at least naturally or speaking essentially, except as preceding the omission. To the proof, it must likewise be denied that something connected with a positive act by a non-mutual connection can be joined to that act in a purely concomitant manner. For if it does not exist posteriorly, it must exist prior as a moral cause. Omission can indeed have its being from the will without awaiting a positive act, but only when that act is simultaneously omitted. The example of a reflex command may be turned back: for a volition cannot coexist with a command without being caused by it; therefore likewise, etc. Hence, just as in the common opinion freedom to love with or without command is immediate regarding love only insofar as it can posit love while simultaneously omitting the command, so freedom regarding love and hatred is immediate regarding omission of love only insofar as it can simultaneously omit hatred, which, if it existed, would be like a command in relation to omission of love. Hence one omission through another is constituted in the being of an "immediately free" omission, just as a commandable act is constituted in the being of an "immediately free" act through omission of the command.

103. It must nevertheless be observed that a free omission of love does not presuppose omission of hatred as posited prior to it; otherwise a free

omission of hatred would likewise presuppose omission of love, and there would be mutual priority between these omissions when the will freely and purely omits both acts. For although hatred, when it exists, must precede omission of love because of its connection with it proper to a moral cause, nevertheless the omissions of both acts, freely posited, are posited concomitantly and neither precedes the other. This is for the contrary reason, namely because neither is connected with the other, nor follows from the other, nor is of itself apt morally to cause the other. The example of command is relevant here: when it exists, it precedes the commanded act; yet omission of the command, when posited at the same instant, does not precede but purely accompanies that act. And generally, whenever from the same freedom there proceed at the same instant two acts, or quasi-acts, not mutually connected, neither precedes the other, although perhaps one needs the other for the accidental denomination "immediately free."

104. It is objected 6º: if freedom can be immediately exercised through omission, it will also be capable of immediate exercise through a transient action. For the reason it could not be is that exercise of freedom is formally conceived in "willing and noliting"; but pure omission falls short of these no less than a transient action. If it is said that omission can be extrinsically and by dominion voluntary, the same can be said of a transient action. I answer by denying the consequence, because the exercise of freedom is formally conceived in "willing and not willing," or also in "noliting and not noliting," together with simultaneity of the power for both, and indeed in such a way that "not willing" is taken not as an indefinite positive term but as a negation, as is clear from the definition of free potency as commonly explained. Of these extremes, however, one is preserved in omission of volition, while neither is found in a transient action. Add that if such an action were immediately free, it would be intrinsically voluntary because the definition of the voluntary would belong to it; and yet it would not be intrinsically voluntary because it would not be a volition.

105. Finally observe that pure free omission is commonly said to be "interpretatively," "virtually," or "equivalently" a nolition of the omitted act. This must be understood "as regards the negative effect of excluding the omitted act," but not as regards the other offices or predicates of nolition, for example intensity, relation to a motive, etc. Thus a pure privation of heat can be called equivalently cold as regards the office of excluding heat, but not as regards the positive formal effect of cold or the office of disposing the subject for the form of water. One may object: a pure omission of love, if it is equivalently a nolition of love, will equivalently be its own contradictory, since it is also contradictorily opposed to that nolition, being the formal

negation or omission not only of love but of every act incompatible with love. I answer: pure omission of love does not equal nolition insofar as the latter is opposed to it, but insofar as it involves another negation not opposed to it, namely the negation of love. For it involves, besides this negation, as many other negations as there are acts opposed to love; and insofar as it is the negation of any one of these, it does not equal that act but love; and conversely, insofar as it is the negation of love, it does not equal love but a nolition, hatred, or any other act excluding love. If from this it is inferred that pure omission of love equals infinitely many acts, I first deny the consequence if the discussion concerns acts here and now free, since these are never infinite. Next, let the consequence pass with this restriction: "as regards the purely negative effect of excluding love"; for in this way complete privation of heat equals infinite cold as regards the negative effect of excluding all heat from the subject.

106. From what has been said it can be permitted without inconvenience that the will, freely and purely omitting love and the nolition of love, be said interpretatively to be at once willing and noliting to love: willing because it omits the nolition; noliting because it omits the love. This must nevertheless be understood precisely as regards the purely negative office of simultaneously excluding both acts, not as regards the other offices or predicates of volition and nolition, namely in the sense in which a subject divinely deprived of both cold and heat would be called interpretatively cold and hot. It may be objected: therefore if someone purely omits commanded love while the precept binds, he will be called interpretatively willing to observe the precept, since he omits the nolition of love. I answer by distinguishing: he will be called interpretatively willing, etc., precisely as regards excluding the nolition to love, which the precept then forbids, I grant; as regards the positive observance of the precept, which certainly commands love with all its predicates, I deny the consequence.

107. From this you will also solve what some object, namely that a pure omission of commanded love would be a sin of uncertain and indefinite malice, since it would equal a nolition of love, and this nolition could be of varying intensity and from various motives, so that it is uncertain of what sort and degree its malice would be. This, I say, is easily solved, because omission of love does not equal a nolition as regards intensity, motive, or species. Therefore the malice of omission is not to be measured from the malice which a nolition would have from these sources, but only from the obligation of the will in first act to love, which obligation is certain and determinate. For the pure exclusion of love, in which alone omission equals

nolition, prescinding from motive, has as much malice as the debt of loving to which it is opposed.

CHAPTER VI.
The Various Divisions of Acts of the Will Are Reviewed, and Certain Questions Are Briefly Decided.

108. Very many points concerning the various divisions and species of acts of the will can be disputed, and are treated expressly by Theologians. At present, besides general matters, we shall touch only briefly upon certain special points. The act of the will is divided, 1º, into "pursuit and aversion": the former regards an object under the aspect of good, the latter under the aspect of evil. This division comprehends all acts of the will and is thought to mean the same as the division into "love and hatred," which likewise is usually considered adequate. There are some, however, who think that there can be a pursuit or volition which is not love, and an aversion or nolition which is not hatred. For the devil vehemently wills or desires God's reprobative decree concerning men, yet does not love it, since the devil loves nothing divine. We, conversely, nolit that decree, and therefore pray to God, and indeed piously, "Do not cast me away from Your face," although it is sinful to hate anything divine. God likewise has a nolition, but not hatred, of the incarnation of the First and Third Persons of the Trinity.

109. But it is difficult to conceive that an elicited appetite seeking or desiring the existence of an object is not some love of it, since it is like a weight inclining the will toward the good of the object; or, for the opposite reason, that an elicited flight or aversion from the existence of an object is not some hatred of it. Nor perhaps will it seem difficult that the devil, although burning with hatred of enmity toward everything divine, whose existence he would destroy if he could, nevertheless knowing that some decree concerning men's salvation cannot fail to exist, loves that the reprobative rather than the predestinative decree should exist, precisely because it is useful for the eternal punishment of men. Or again, that in us displeasure at a reprobative decree can be reconciled with the love of charity, not as regards its entity, according to which it is not distinguished from a predestinative decree, but as regards its denomination, whose absence detracts nothing from the divine perfection, and not on account of itself but on account of the evil of punishment which it entails. Not every hatred is enmity or abhorrence; in a broader sense it comprehends any displeasure at the existence of an object, even if conceived on account of an extrinsic motive. In this sense perhaps the nolition of the incarnation of the

First and Third Persons can be called hatred. There is no occasion to examine these points. I would nevertheless note that, although every act of the will must be love or hatred of at least its formal object, some act can attain a certain partial or material object with respect to which it is neither hatred nor love. Thus a condition is often attained by an objectively conditioned affection, and a permitted object by a permissive volition, precisely as such.

110. Now pursuit or love is called "benevolence" when it regards the object as good in itself or for another, and not because it is advantageous to the lover; and if in this way it regards an object possessing reason, it is additionally called the love "of friendship." But when it regards the object as advantageous to the lover, it is called "self-love" or the love "of concupiscence." To this is opposed hatred of one's own disadvantage; to the love of benevolence and friendship are opposed the hatred "of abhorrence" and "of enmity." Moreover, love in general is often called "will," by which name sometimes the potency and sometimes the operation is signified. And when love is complacency in a good, prescinding from its absence and presence, so that it neither seeks its attainment nor loves it because present or possessed, it is called "love strictly speaking"; opposite to it corresponds "hatred strictly speaking" or "pure hatred." But when love regards the object as absent, or at least as not yet known to be present, desiring its existence or attainment, it is called "desire," and particularly "volition and appetite," although these two names are often extended to any act of the will. To this corresponds, in the genus of hatred, "nolition," or "flight from evil," certainly affective flight, and particularly so called for the effort to avoid evil; for generally any aversion is called "flight." Finally, when love regards the object as present, or as possessed, and because possessed, it is called "joy," and often also "delight and fruition." Opposed to this in the genus of hatred are "sadness and sorrow of soul." All these acts under these names belong to the concupiscible part, from disp. 5, n. 126. Those which belong to the irascible part, whose explanation is now omitted because it is lengthy and disputed among Theologians, are certain species partly of desire and partly of flight.

111. The differences thus far indicated are taken especially from the object; from this source any of the aforesaid acts can also be subdivided into various species according to the diversity of at least formal objects, for acts are specified by these, as we said elsewhere. From the mode of tending, 2º, and indeed adequately, an act of the will is divided into "efficacious and inefficacious." An efficacious act is one which is affectively connected with the existence of the object, so that from its mode of tending it is

incompatible with an impediment to the object's existence that is free to the will; in place of existence put absence or destruction of the object if you are speaking of hatred. An inefficacious act, however, is one that tends toward the object in a simple manner and lacks such a connection; this is called "simple complacency" or "displeasure." The efficacy of an affection is not to be derived from intensity but from an entirely essential character; for an inefficacious act can be more intense than an efficacious one. Here it must be noted that efficacious love can be, and often is, joined with inefficacious hatred of the same material object, and conversely, as happens in one who throws merchandise into the sea through fear of shipwreck, or who wills his leg to be amputated lest gangrene spread. These affections, however, require diverse motives, since one must tend under the aspect of good and the other under the aspect of evil. Further, both an efficacious and an inefficacious affection can be either objectively "absolute," without a condition, or objectively "conditioned," tending toward the object under some condition. Likewise it can be either "determinate or singular," designating for itself a definite term, or "indeterminate, vague, universal, or indefinite," according to different ways of simultaneously regarding several objects. Understand these names with the addition "objectively," for subjectively every affection is singular.

112. On the side of the principle, 3º, an act of the will is divided into "free and necessary," which also is an adequate division and has already been explained above. It is divided, 4º, into "natural and supernatural"; this division is likewise adequate and is taken from the efficient principle. But whether it must also necessarily be taken from the formal object is disputed among Theologians. Many deny this against many others, and hold that a supernatural object can be formally attained through a natural act and conversely a natural object through a supernatural act, because acts are not specified by objects as regards all their predicates, although they are so specified that they cannot regard diverse objects without becoming diverse from one another. But this controversy must be remitted to the Theologians, as also the fourth division of acts of the will into "good and evil" in the moral order.

On Intention and Choice.

113. Desire, or the volition of obtaining an end, is called "intention"; but a formal, express, and determinate volition of means useful for obtaining the intended end is called "choice." Theologians also treat these matters extensively, but here a few questions must be touched upon. It is asked, 1º,

whether intention and choice are really distinct acts. I answer 1º with the common opinion: an intention can be given which is not really a choice. This is proved because an end is often intended when suitable means have not yet occurred expressly or determinately. Therefore inquiry and consultation of the intellect concerning means to be chosen follows intention, and then the counsel of reason, that is, a judgment resulting from the consultation or connoting it and practically dictating that such a means is more useful than others or to be preferred. But then that intention is not a choice, as everyone sees. One may object: intention is love of an end as attainable; therefore, since the end is not attainable except through means, intention must be love of the means and accordingly choice. But against this: often an end is intended as attainable through means which are hoped not to be lacking even though they have not yet appeared in particular, as when a sick man intends health while not yet discerning which medicine he should use. Such an intention, although it is a virtual love of the means, or even, if you please, a formal love vaguely or indefinitely regarding some means, is not a choice; for choice is not just any love of means, but love expressly and determinately deciding to carry out this or those means. For no one is said to have chosen while he is still doubting and deliberating over the means to be preferred.

114. I answer 2º: an intention really identified with choice can also be given. This is proved because an end and a determinate means wholly sufficient for it can be simultaneously proposed to the intellect. In that event there is no reason why they cannot be desired simultaneously by one and the same act, since they are objects ordered or orderable to each other as formal and material, and intention and choice have no contrariety in their mode of tending. For the one wills that the end be caused by the means, the other that the means cause the end, where there is only diversity according to active and passive voice. Surely a traveler who encounters a spring along the road, why could he not by one and the same act will to quench his thirst by drinking the wholesome water? Nor is it an obstacle that the means is chosen because the end is intended. For "because" does not always denote real causality or priority of intention, but sometimes denotes a mere priority of reason, or indicates that love of the means would not be present here and now unless intention of the end were present, whether distinct from or identical with that love. Thus the neighbor is said to be loved on account of God because God is loved, even if both are loved by the same act.

115. Nor is it an obstacle that formal "premises" cannot be identified with the "conclusion." For under these names intellectual discourse is imported, which by its concept is a real progress from one act to another and therefore necessarily imports a plurality of acts, although the objects of the

premises and conclusion can indeed be expressly affirmed by one act which is not a discourse. But the concept of intention and choice does not require real progress or plurality; otherwise intention and choice would be contradictory in God, just as discourse is. Finally, neither is it an obstacle that choice is called by Aristotle "appetite preceded by deliberation," that is, an appetite of a means chosen after prior counsel or consultation of reason, a name which does not belong to intention. For first this name is imposed only upon choice concerning difficult or obscure matters; in manifest matters, for example in the case of the traveler just given, choice does not presuppose counsel, as St. Thomas warns, 1, 2, q. 14, a. 4, ad 1. Next, although intention from its generic concept does not require prior counsel, it can require it from a specific concept by virtue of which it is really identified with choice. Thus, although love of God from this concept alone does not prerequire cognition of the neighbor, it nevertheless prerequires it when it is simultaneously really love of the neighbor on account of God.

116. I answer 3º: every formal choice is in reality intention. This is plainly gathered from the doctrine of St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 8, a. 3, and q. 12, a. 4. It is proved because formal choice is that which wills a means formally on account of the end, that is, as useful, or because useful for obtaining the end, so that it intrinsically attains this motive, which in reality is nothing other than the very goodness of the end attainable through such a means. Therefore it is in reality a volition of the end and accordingly an intention, just as love of the neighbor on account of God is in reality love of God and true charity. One may object: choice indeed wills or loves the end, but not as the object "which," rather as that "by which," that is, as the reason for willing and loving the means; or, as others speak, choice regards the end only indirectly or obliquely. Therefore it is not intention, since intention must regard the end directly and love it as that which. But against this: formal choice essentially and by reason of itself presupposes cognition of the end as good and worthy of love, and is essentially directed by this cognition. For a means cannot be loved as useful, and because useful for obtaining the end, unless the end is known as lovable. The same choice intrinsically attains the end, not aversively but by pursuit, as is certain. Therefore it denominates the end as willed and loved "as that which." For what is it to be loved "as that which" except to be an object which, through cognition of its own lovableness, moves and allures in second act toward pursuit of itself? Hence, when formal choice follows an intention that is purely such, concerning which n. 113, it is an elective intention proceeding from another non-elective intention, and it depends upon the end both immediately, insofar as it intrinsically regards it, and mediately, insofar as it is caused by the end

through the preceding intention. Two volitions of the same end can easily coexist in the same subject and instant when they are somewhat heterogeneous and the later adds to the earlier a new tendency toward the material object.

117. It is asked, 2º, whether a material choice is possible. So is called a volition of a means in reality useful for obtaining an end which nevertheless does not intrinsically regard the end, and consequently does not love the means as useful for attaining the end but as an object good in itself, for example as delightful, and which nonetheless is posited here and now by virtue and efficacy of the preceding intention to obtain the end. For example: if a sick man, while intending to become healthy, wills a potion which he knows to be in reality useful and necessary for health, yet by a volition which does not regard it as useful but as pleasant and agreeable to the palate, the question is whether this volition can be called a choice, or rather whether it can proceed immediately from the intention of health. For if it does not so proceed, it is certain that it will not deserve the name of choice. The affirmative side is embraced by learned modern authors with Fr. Ripalda; but the common opinion stands for the negative side, to which I assent. This is proved because every true choice essentially requires cognition of the usefulness of the means for the end. For it must proceed from intention of the end, as I was just saying, and cannot proceed except through such cognition; it is certain and known from experience that intention does not possess the power of moving or determining the will except toward a volition of a means known to be useful for the intended end. Therefore every choice wills and loves the means as useful, and accordingly every choice is formal and none material. The consequence is proved because otherwise choice would not essentially require express cognition of usefulness. For a volition need not presuppose cognition of an object or predicate which it no more regards than if it did not exist. Nor say that such cognition is required for choice only mediately, or by reason of intention. For intention, in order to exist, does not need express cognition of a determinate means as useful, from n. 113. Therefore it requires such cognition only in order to cause choice. But if choice need not regard usefulness and only loves the object absolutely, just as if it were not useful, what does cognition of usefulness contribute to causing the choice?

118. It is objected: by virtue of intention the will is bound only to those things necessary for the end to exist, or for the means required for attaining the end to exist; therefore if it sees the means already posited, it is not bound to will their position. But a material choice suffices for this, namely one by which a means truly useful is chosen although not chosen as useful.

Therefore the will is not bound to formal choice. Given the premises, I answer by distinguishing the consequence: it is not bound to formal choice if it finds the means already posited, or even finds already posited from elsewhere the volition of the means which you call material choice, I grant; if it does not so find them, I deny the consequence. I admit that intention does not determine toward a volition of a means which is already seen to be posited; nor likewise toward a volition of a means not yet existing if accidentally it finds from elsewhere a volition of that means already posited which suffices for the existence of such a means even though it does not regard the means as useful. But such a volition will by no right be called choice, because it will in no way proceed from intention; and therefore the will will not be said then to will the means by virtue of the intention. Hence in that event the intention determines no choice and causes no existence of the means, because it possesses the power of determining and causing only under the tacit condition that the means is known as necessary and not yet posited nor efficaciously willed from elsewhere by the same will. Then it cannot otherwise cause the existence of the means except through a formal choice which it first causes. Understand this of an intention that is purely such; for when it is simultaneously intention and choice, it certainly immediately causes the means without another choice even if perhaps it finds it willed from elsewhere for its own sake.

119. It is objected again: a commanded act of the will need not intrinsically regard the motive of the commanding act. Hence if someone from fear of hell commands himself an act of charity, this act does not regard the motive of avoiding hell. Therefore choice likewise need not intrinsically regard the motive of intention. Confirmation: the will can extrinsically order acts of other potencies toward an end which they themselves do not regard, so that these acts, insofar as ordered by the will, are said to be on account of that end, for example philosophical cognitions on account of obtaining a professorial chair. Therefore it can similarly order its own act, so that this act is said to be on account of an end extrinsic to it and consequently deserves the name of choice. To the objection I deny the consequence, because a reflex command has a source from which it causes or entails the commanded act independently of the latter's tendency toward the same motive, namely because it is an express and immediate efficacious volition of the commanded act. But neither is intention an express volition of choice, nor is choice caused by intention under any other title than as the volition of a means useful for the end. Otherwise it would in vain prerequire cognition of usefulness, which is not necessary for intention to exist. But if intention expressly and determinately wills another act of the same will as

useful for the end, for example if someone intends to obtain grace while simultaneously willing an act of contrition as a means, then the willed act will not be the choice, but the means chosen through the intention itself, which will simultaneously be formal choice and will possess the force of a reflex command. To the confirmation I grant the whole, except the name "choice" for those acts, provided the extrinsic ordering is made through a preceding act of the will which is a command and formal choice in relation to the ordered acts. In that event those acts will not be choices but chosen means.

120. It is asked, 3º, whether an efficacious intention, when distinct from choice, removes the immediate freedom of choice. I say "immediate," because if the intention is free, the choice will likewise be free at least mediately and denominatively, like an external action freely willed. I answer with the common opinion that choice is most often immediately free, both because often the intention no longer physically exists, although it exists in memory, when one comes to the choice, and because most often there are several means, any one of which suffices for the end, and although the intention vaguely necessitates toward choosing some means, it does not necessitate toward this one rather than that. But if the means is unique and altogether necessary, then, supposing the actual intention, the choice will not be immediately free. This is plainly St. Thomas's opinion, 1, 2, q. 13, a. 6, ad 1, where he preserves freedom of choice, once intention is posited, for no other reason than that the means is not altogether necessary for the end, or at least is not apprehended as such. Certainly, once an efficacious intention is supposed, the will can no longer omit choice of a means which appears unique and necessary, as everyone supposes. Otherwise an efficacious volition of an object could coexist with an impediment to the existence of that object free to the will, contrary to the concept of an efficacious act from n. 111. Therefore, on the supposition of intention, the will is not free regarding that choice, since freedom necessarily imports the power of omitting. The difficulty concerning the merit of a choice of this sort will be solved below in discussing the commanded act. Observe, however, that even if the means is unique, the choice can be free as regards intensity, or circumstances of time and place or others, if the intention does not determine them.

121. It is asked, 4º, whether intention physically influences choice when it is distinct from it. Several not improbably affirm this; but most acknowledge only a moral influx by way of inclining or determining. Omitting other arguments, this can be proved because if active power, which certainly implies perfection, is granted to mere intention, there is no reason

to deny it to choice, since choice is also truly intention from n. 116 and is more perfect, or certainly not less perfect, than mere intention. Therefore one choice will actively cause another choice, and there will be an infinite regress. In what the moral causality of intention consists is clear from what was said in n. 31 et sqq. Here note that intention need not be previously known as existing in order to move toward choice. It indeed requires cognition of the usefulness of the means, but not reflex cognition of itself, because it does not move by way of object but by physically informing and inclining the will like a habit.

122. Note moreover that St. Thomas, 1, 2, q. 16, a. 4, seems to acknowledge between choice and execution of the means another act of the will which he calls "use," whose office is immediately to move the executive potency, for example the hand, to take the medicine previously chosen for health. Many, however, say that choice suffices for this office, provided it concerns a means to be executed immediately. Consequently they do not require that command of reason which St. Thomas also recognizes between choice and use, q. 17, a. 3, ad 1. Nor do they require "consent," that is, an act of complacency by which the will approves several choosable things before choosing one rather than the others, which St. Thomas himself places between counsel and choice, q. 15, a. 3; although the Angelic Doctor there, ad 3, distinguishes this act from choice when after counsel several choosable things please, but not when only one pleases. Finally note that, if the means is unique, according to several the volition of it is not properly a choice, because by force of the name choice expresses a relation to many choosable things from which one is preferred to the others. Others, however, think it sufficient for choice that it prefer a useful means to useless ones. But this is a question of terminology.

On the Commanding and Commanded Act.

123. An act of the will is commonly, though not adequately, divided into "commanding and commanded." Any act which determines toward another act of the same will, even if it does not have that act for its object, is called broadly or virtually "commanding," or a "command," with respect to it. Properly, however, in relation to an act of the will, no act is so called except one by which the will regards another of its own acts as an object, willing to elicit it, for example if it says, "I will to elicit contrition." An act of this sort, of which alone we now speak, is called a "reflex command," and that which it regards a "commanded act." That the will can in this manner command itself just as it commands the intellect and material potencies is the most

common opinion with St. Thomas, which experience confirms as regards an inefficacious command, that is, one not so connected with the commanded act as altogether to determine the will; likewise as regards an efficacious command concerning the future, or an indeterminate or confused command, as if someone now efficaciously resolves to elicit contrition tomorrow, or to elicit either perfect contrition or attrition, or to elicit an act of virtue whenever the occasion presents itself.

124. But it is asked, 1º, whether there can naturally be an efficacious reflex command concerning an act to be elicited determinately and in the present. The negative opinion is favored by Fr. Suárez, l. 11, De gratia, c. 11, n. 11. St. Augustine also seems to favor it, l. 8, Confess. c. 9, whose words Fr. Quirós reports hic disp. 87, n. 37, where he embraces this opinion. Its reason is that the will, while able to elicit an act, for example of religion, cannot in any sign efficaciously will to elicit that act in the present without being understood already to elicit it, or without that "willing" formally being the eliciting of the act of religion. For that willing is efficaciously to strive toward eliciting the act of religion; and so to strive is most formally to elicit such an act, since the will elicits an act in no other way than by striving to elicit it when it is able. Add that the goodness of the act of religion, when reflexively known as capable of being willed, allures toward possession of itself. Therefore, since that act can immediately be possessed through itself, the will will labor in vain through another distinct act.

125. Nevertheless, the affirmative opinion is very common and probable. For it does not seem difficult that from one motive the will efficaciously wills without delay to embrace another motive. For example, when a precept concerning an act of religion binds, and not without a temptation drawing back, why could someone not from the motive of charity, gratitude, or obedience, then more vividly proposed, efficaciously will without delay to elicit an internal act proceeding from the proper motive of religion? Add that an efficacious resolution to elicit an act of contrition when danger of death is present can physically remain when the danger is now present; but then it will be an efficacious command of contrition to be elicited at that same instant. The opposing reason can be pressed in an act commanding cognition. For similarly the soul does not elicit an act of faith except by striving to elicit it; but while it efficaciously wills to believe, by this volition the soul formally strives toward eliciting an act of faith. Therefore this act will formally consist in that volition. This instance presses more clearly if the potency is not distinguished from the soul.

126. Moreover, that reason is easily solved if you distinguish an imperative effort from an executive effort. These two efforts can easily be

distinguished and discerned from diversity of motive, or perhaps even from diversity of material object or mode of tending. Nor does it seem contradictory, although ordinarily it does not occur, that the commanding and commanded acts intrinsically regard the same motive, for example if through an act of pure charity there is commanded a formal sorrow for sin which intrinsically regards the goodness of God as its motive. But the fact that an act of religion, reflexively foreknown, allures toward possession of itself and can immediately be possessed through itself proves indeed that a reflex command is not necessary, and that the will can immediately determine itself to that act; but it does not prove that the command is useless. Both because it will contribute to the goodness of that act being loved for its own merits, since it is lovable not only exercitively but reflexively; and because it can help so that by the aid of another motive the temptation drawing back from the act of religion is more easily overcome. Here it must be noted that, although the commanded act does not intrinsically regard the motive of the commanding act, as most often happens, it is nevertheless said to be elicited on account of it as on account of a mediate and extrinsic motive, just as an external action is said to be on account of the end from which it is commanded by the will. For while it is caused by the act of command, it proceeds through that command from such a motive. Nevertheless an act of the will must always intrinsically regard some motive.

127. It is asked, 2º, whether an efficacious, determinate, and present command removes the immediate freedom of the commanded act, so that this act is free only mediately and denominatively from the act of command. This seems to be affirmed with the more common opinion, because of what was said in a similar matter concerning efficacious intention in relation to choice. Nor is it an obstacle that the necessity imported by command can be freely prevented by the will. For this proves that the commanded act is absolutely free to the will, but not on the supposition of the command. Thus, although walking is absolutely free to a man, it is not free on the supposition that he efficaciously wills to walk, and therefore walking is called free only mediately and denominatively. Likewise, even if the beatific vision or physical predetermination toward love were freely preventable by the will, once it was posited independently of the love the love would no longer be immediately free. That necessity is indeed consequent in relation to the will in first act, but it is not consequent, rather antecedent, in relation to the commanded action, since it does not result from or follow that action but precedes it, as is certain. Hence, although the will freely constitutes itself in the necessity of positing such an action, it nevertheless executes the action

with immediate necessity. But immediate necessity does not permit an action to become immediately free, as is clear from the terms.

128. It is objected: at the instant at which the will commands in the present, it possesses in first act immediate freedom regarding the commanded act, since concerning its object it has cognition immediately attracting and drawing back, as is supposed. But to this freedom there must correspond its own exercise, which is nothing other than the commanded act. And surely, once coexistence of such an act with that freedom is posited, all the constituents of an operation in the being of an immediately free operation are already present. I answer: there is indeed in first act immediate freedom regarding the commandable act, but it regards that act as to be posited in the divided sense from immediate necessity, and accordingly as joined with omission of the efficacious command. For it does not immediately regard the act as commanded, but rather as not commanded. Therefore at that instant immediate freedom in first act disjunctively regards two exercises, namely either a command necessitating toward the commanded act, or that act as to be elicited without command; whichever is posited, that freedom now has its proper exercise corresponding to it. Nor are there then present in first act two mutually independent freedoms, because immediate freedom regarding the commandable act must include either absence of the power to command or the power of omitting the command. As to what is added concerning the constituents, it must be denied when the command exists, because the commandable operation is not a subject capable of receiving from imperative freedom the denomination "immediately free" except as joined with omission of the command; consequently this omission must be numbered among the constituents of such a denomination. But this omission, when free, must be understood as concomitant with the commandable act, not prior or posterior to it, because neither does that act essentially and intrinsically entail this omission, nor is it entailed by the omission, although it needs the accompaniment of the omission for the accidental denomination "immediately free." Hence, although the command, when it exists, must precede because of its power to cause the commanded act, it is otherwise with omission of the command, which lacks such power and moreover is not the absence of an impediment irremovable by the will.

129. It is objected again: if the commanded act is not free by its own freedom but by the freedom of the command alone, it will lack its own merit, or add no merit to the command. Hence, when charity commands acts of other virtues, it will impede their merit, which is absurd. I answer:

first, the objection does not press in an indeterminate or confused command, nor in a determinate command concerning the future, or one not physically coexisting with the commanded act. Such also is ordinarily even the command by which someone wills, for example, to be contrite immediately; for "immediately" is commonly understood of the same moral and human moment within which many physical instants pass, and when the will elicits contrition it often no longer physically retains the act of command, although it retains it habitually or morally. Next, even if there is physical coexistence of a determinate and efficacious command with the commanded act, I deny the consequence. For merit is not constituted from freedom alone, but additionally from the intrinsic goodness of an act honorable in itself, or conforming to right reason; and the commanded act of the will certainly possesses such goodness when it intrinsically tends toward an honorable object as such and because such. When this goodness is added to the goodness of the commanding act and is denominated free by its freedom, it simply increases the merit of the command, because merit grows from an increase of any of its constituents. The same reason does not apply to external actions, although weighty Theologians hold that merit increases through these as well, because they do not import intrinsic goodness and moral rectitude.

130. It is asked, 3º, whether command physically influences the commanded act, or only morally. The latter seems more probable, by parity with intention influencing choice only morally. The moral influx must be explained through coexistence of the two, from what was said in n. 31 et sqq. An inefficacious command, which is rather improperly called a "command," can morally influence the commanded act, not by way of determining but of inclining. If it happens that two inefficacious commands preexist on account of two incompatible motives, both can simultaneously influence the commanded act, which without absurdity can be said then to exist on account of incompatible extrinsic motives inefficaciously pre-willed. Certain other questions remain, for example whether a good act can be commanded through an evil one, whether a supernatural act can be commanded through a natural one, and whether an act of a higher virtue can be commanded through an act of a lower. But these matters are too foreign to the present purpose. They must therefore be remitted to the Theologians, so that at last an end may be put to the treatise on the soul.

FOUR METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

— PROOEMIUM —

Metaphysics, if one considers the etymology of the name, is the discipline that rises beyond Physics, or above Physics; but if one considers the thing signified, it is the discipline that rises even above the mathematical disciplines and holds the highest place among the natural sciences. Hence it is called "first Philosophy," namely by primacy of dignity; nor is it distinguished merely by the name "Science," but also by the name "Wisdom." Its gaze contemplates, for it is a purely speculative science, the common notion of being prescinded from all materiality; likewise the common attributes of being, and those things opposed to real being, such as privations, beings of reason, or chimeras. It also considers the species, or quasi-species, nearest to being, such as the notions of substance and accident, and the nine Categories of the latter. It likewise contemplates the Angels and God Himself, insofar as His infinite perfection can be investigated by the natural light; for which reason it is called "natural Theology." The common method of the Schools, however, has transferred the treatment of God and the Angels to sacred Theology. The formal object of Metaphysics, or the formal aspect "under which," is commonly held to be real being as such, although some prefer for this office being prescinded from the real and the fictitious. The object "of attribution," however, may be called substance as such, within whose scope God will be the object "of

principality." In the scholastic manner we have scattered many matters proper to metaphysical discourse throughout both Logic, Physics, and Animastics. Many others, indeed all those belonging to this discipline, may be seen discussed with due dignity in the Excellent Doctor Fr. Francisco Suárez, who gave to an applauding and astonished literary world his entire work of Metaphysics, comprised in two distinguished volumes and perfect in every respect. Here, however, we cannot omit certain celebrated questions and some other matters more frequently treated in the School. We shall comprise them in four Disputations.

DISPUTATION I.

ON REAL BEING IN COMMON AND ITS ATTRIBUTES.

The term "being," as everyone here warns, can be taken either "participially" or "nominally," that is, either as the participle of the verb "to be," or as a substantive noun, just as the term "living" is customarily used sometimes as a participle and sometimes as a noun. Being taken in the former way signifies the same as "existing," or having actual existence; in which sense it is predicated contingently of creatures, as we shall explain in disp. 2, but necessarily and essentially of God. Being taken in the latter way, however, is usually defined as "apt to exist," or "having a true and real essence," that is, not fictitious, not chimerical, but capable of existing really without contradiction among its predicates. Here three things should be noted. 1º, "apt" is not taken in this definition for an aptitude or potency deprived of the act of existence, or distinct from it, for it prescinds from distinction and non-distinction; rather, it is taken for mere non-repugnance to existing, or for that potency which is legitimately inferred from act, even though it be wholly undivided and indistinct from act, according to the maxim, "The consequence from act to potency is valid"; hence one rightly argues, "God exists, therefore He can exist." 2º, this explanation of being should be called not so much a strict definition as a description; because the notion of being as such, being most universal and most simple, does not consist of genus and difference, and therefore cannot strictly be defined, unless perhaps one requires for the strictness of definition only that the essence or concept of the thing defined be suitably explained, whatever may

be the case as regards genus and difference; and that will be a purely verbal question. 3º, the name "essence" signifies the innermost and primary predicate of a thing, whether one or multiple, insofar as conceived in order to the act of existing. If it is explained through its order to the effects which it contains as their first and intrinsic principle, it is called "nature"; but if through its order to our concepts, it is called "quiddity," because it is that by which we answer one who asks: What is the thing?

Being taken nominally, therefore, is an essential predicate of all things whatsoever that have true and positive reality; for to be able really to exist belongs essentially to all of them. And it is in this sense that being is taken in the present Disputation. It is divided into "infinite and necessary being," which is God, and "finite and contingent being," which is the creature. The division into "uncreated being" and "created being" comes to the same thing; likewise the division into "pure act" and "being that is in some way potential." The difference, or quasi-difference, of uncreated being is called "aseity," because God is "being from Himself"; the difference of the creature, however, is "ab-aliety," because the creature is "being from another." Finite being is subdivided into "substance" and "accident." Substance is called "being through itself"; hence its difference is called "perseity," while that of accident is called "in-aliety," because an accident is "being in another." It suffices for now to have premised these points.

CHAPTER I.
Whether the Notion of Being Can Be Prescinded from All Its Inferiors.

1. This question is also usually proposed under other terms, namely: Can there be a concept of being as such that is one and common to all particular beings, namely God and creature, substance and accident, and the things contained under their genera? In this doubt some deny a single concept, not only objective but even formal. The act by which the intellect apprehends or represents an object is here called a "formal concept"; the object corresponding to such an act, insofar as represented by it, is called an "objective concept." Some therefore deny that the intellect can by one act be borne toward common being, and maintain that by the force of the name "being" several concepts must necessarily be aroused in the mind, namely one of God, another of creature, another of substance, another of accident. This, however, is commonly rejected throughout the School, and rightly so. First, because experience shows that the mind is not distracted into several and diverse acts when it conceives being as such. Second, because, as Fr.

Suárez rightly asks, if there is then no single concept in the mind, how many will there be? There will have to be at least eleven concepts, namely one for God and nine for the same number of Predicaments, since all are primarily diverse. Indeed, there will be as many acts as there are species and individuals of things, since in all these the argument drawn from the transcendence of being applies.

2. The entire controversy therefore comes down to the objective concept, namely whether it is one by a unity of reason, for it is beyond doubt that it does not have real unity; or, what comes to the same thing, whether by the intellect it is prescinded from all multiplicity and diversity found in particular beings. For if it is so prescinded, it will be one by a unity of reason, as is clear from what was said in Logic. The Thomists defend the negative side as altogether necessary for maintaining the transcendence and analogy of being; yet in explaining what in the object corresponds to the concept of being they differ greatly among themselves, as may be seen in Martínez de Prado 1, p. Met. contr. 6, ar. 3. The common opinion among the more recent Thomists, which the same Prado holds ar. 5 and which Bayona, or the College of St. Thomas at Alcalá, explains more fully q. 7, Logic. ar. 7, acknowledges that the objective concept of being is one in a qualified sense, or imperfectly prescinded, but denies that it is simply one, or perfectly prescinded. Their meaning is that being is prescinded from its inferiors only as regards what is explicit, as a thing defined is prescinded from its definition, or as man is prescinded from rational, or animal from sensible living thing, these examples being used by the cited College of St. Thomas; but not as regards what is implicit, because the notion of being, however abstract, actually contains implicitly all the inferiors which it transcends, and these belong to its essence, just as rational belongs to the essence of man, and so forth; nor can the notion of being be exactly defined except through substance and accident, as the same College says q. cit. n. 158 and 165. On the contrary, all Scotists with Scotus defend a perfectly prescinded and one concept of being, as does the common opinion of our authors with Fr. Suárez, disp. 2, Met. s. 2; and to these are joined some among the Thomists, such as Javellus, Scoto, Zumel, Ortiz, reported by Prado, Controv. cit. n. 31.

3. Our conclusion is that the notion of being can be perfectly prescinded from its inferiors, and consequently is simply one by a unity of reason. It is proved: wherever there is a real agreement and likeness of several things in some notion, that notion can be perfectly prescinded from them all; for by this very fact there is the foundation for perfect abstraction which all require in Logic, nor is there any other foundation by which the notion of body or

the notion of substance is perfectly prescinded from its inferiors. To this belongs the statement of St. Thomas, Opusc. 56: "Although several things, insofar as they are several, do not constitute one object of intellect, nevertheless several things, insofar as they are alike, constitute one object of intellect." But among particular beings, for example between God and creature, where the difficulty might have been greater because of the infinite distance, there truly is a real likeness and agreement in the notion of being. Therefore this notion can be perfectly prescinded from those beings. The other points seem evident; and the minor premise is not denied by the adversaries and is in fact indubitable. First, because God differs more from pure non-being than from created being; therefore He does not differ altogether from the latter; therefore He agrees with it in some respect. Second, because the creature, since it is participated being, participates entity from God; but not by identity; therefore by likeness and imitation. Third, because man was made to the image and likeness of God in other predicates that are less common, Gen. 1; therefore all the more in transcendental predicates. Fourth, because of other arguments by which St. Thomas proves this in various places, for example q. 2, *De veritate* ar. 11, and 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 29, and I^{a}, q. 4, ar. 3, where he concludes in the body: "Those things which are from God are assimilated to God insofar as they are beings, as to the first and universal principle of all existence." He warns, however, that God is not said to be like the creature insofar as likeness implies imitation of another as prototype, just as a man is not said to be like his image.

4. Nor does it matter that the likeness is not pure but mixed with unlikeness. For the real likeness which precedes and grounds a prescision of reason is never pure among those who deny the Scotistic formal distinction, as is clear in things which are really assimilated in animal existence. Nor does it matter that the unlikeness is greater and prevails. For between the substances of an Angel and a horse there is in the real state a much greater diversity than agreement, yet the notion of substance can be perfectly prescinded from them. Certainly it makes no difference whether the likeness is greater or lesser on the part of the thing, because the notion of body is prescinded from man and stone just as perfectly as the notion of man from Peter and Paul. Nor, finally, does it matter that the Thomists answer that the likeness between creature and God in the notion of being is only proportional, consisting in this, that the creature is related to its existence as God is to His. For a proportionality of this kind has a place in every likeness whatsoever, for example that of stone and man in substantial existence; for a stone is related to its existence through itself as man is to his. Hence perfect

prescision is not thereby impeded when the common notion is properly verified of each extreme, as is clear even in the comparison of two quantitative proportions, whence the name "proportionality" was transferred to the comparison of two relations in metaphysical predicates. For the fact that 5 and 50 are proportionally alike under the notion of "half," insofar as 5 is related to 10 as 50 to 100, does not prevent the notion of "half" or the notion of "double" from being perfectly abstracted from diverse numbers. Since, therefore, the notion of being properly belongs not only to God but also to the creature, perfect abstraction can stand together with that proportional likeness.

5. It is confirmed: those things are one by a unity of reason in some common predicate which are uniformly definable in it, so that the same definition is properly verified of each. This is expressly taught by Aristotle, 5, *Metaphysica* t. 11, and by St. Thomas there lect. 7, lit. I, who certainly speak of perfect unity of reason, such as an ox and a horse possess in the predicate animal, which example St. Thomas uses there. But in the predicate being, inferior beings are uniformly definable; for of each, insofar as it is being, it is properly verified that it is "apt to exist," just as of every animal, insofar as it is animal, it is properly said to be "apt to sense." Therefore all have perfect unity of reason in the predicate or objective concept of being. Nor is it an obstacle that the notion of being is not defined through genus and difference; for definition is taken broadly for an explanation revealing the force and content of a concept, even a simple one. In this way the inferiors of substance, or quantity, or quality are said to be uniformly definable under these concepts, though simple, or not constituted from genus and difference.

6. The point is pressed: whatever belongs to substance insofar as it is being also belongs to accident, namely to be able really to exist, to be distinguished from pure nothing, to exclude chimera, to be able to coexist with place and time, to have the attributes of truth, goodness, and so forth. Likewise substance, insofar as it is being, is not distinguished from accident; for one would speak falsely if one said that substance is not accident because it is apt to exist. Therefore substance under the reduplication or concept of being is altogether one and the same by reason with accident. The consequence is clear, first because there is complete identity and unity where there is no distinction but rather agreement in all things; second, because it is for no other reason that man and horse are altogether one under the concept of animal, and so of others by continual induction. The same argument applies to the creature in relation to God. The point is pressed again: the name "essence," insofar as it sounds the same as "real

being," according to St. Thomas, *De ente et essentia* cap. 1, "signifies something common to all natures by which diverse beings are placed in diverse genera and species"; but it would not be so common unless perfectly abstracted from all; for what is in some way contracted to accident is not common to substance, nor is that common to God which is not altogether abstracted from the imperfection of the creature. Therefore, and so forth. Likewise, according to St. Thomas, I^{a}, q. 5, ar. 3, ad 1, "substance, quantity, and quality, and the things contained under them, contract being by applying being to some quiddity." Therefore being as such is not from its proper concept contracted or applied to substance, quantity, and so forth, but is rather indifferent and applicable to anything whatever, and is logically superior to each. Hence this argument is as inept, "It is a being, therefore it is a substance," as this one, "It is an animal, therefore it is a man." But all these are proper characteristics of perfect prescision. I omit other arguments which the Scotists weigh at length.

7. But since the modern Thomists perpetually take refuge in unity in a qualified sense and imperfect prescision, or prescision according to the implicit and explicit, and say that being as such is common, superior, and indifferent as regards the explicit but not as regards the implicit, in order to close off this escape, I argue 1º, and indeed from Thomistic doctrine. The notion of being is prescinded "objectively" from its inferiors, that is, it is so prescinded that the inferiors remain properly unknown on the part of the object and are not attained by the cognition "being," nor do they properly terminate it in any way. Therefore by this cognition the notion of being is rendered perfectly prescinded and simply one. The antecedent is expressly conceded by the Thomists, as may be seen in Aguilera l. 5, Logic. disp. de Analog. dub. 6, n. 11, and in the College of St. Thomas at Alcalá q. 3, Logic. art. 4, where, after many confused statements about the prescision of the explicit from the implicit, it finally concludes n. 227 that those things which are implicitly included in some objective concept, "properly speaking, are not known, because in reality they are prescinded on the part of the object." Certainly the Thomists everywhere reject formal prescision and acknowledge none but objective prescision; and the arguments by which they contend that animal, for example, is objectively prescinded from rational, prove with the same force the objective prescision of being from substance, and so forth. Recall, as an example, the celebrated argument of an animal seen from afar, of which it is not known whether it is rational or irrational, although it is known to be an animal. The considerations of this argument apply equally here; for we often know with certainty that some

object is a being while at the same time we do not know, or doubt, whether it is substance or accident, as happens to many concerning light or quantity.

8. Now the consequence is validly proved because that is perfectly prescinded which is perfectly separated intentionally, or in the existence of the known, from another, as the Thomists themselves insist, especially here. But the notion of being is perfectly separated intentionally from its inferiors if it is objectively prescinded from them. Therefore, and so forth. The minor is proved because the notion of being through the cognition "being" exists intentionally when the inferiors do not exist intentionally, since the latter on the part of the object do not terminate that cognition but remain unknown. That this is perfect intentional separation I prove, first because if A exists really when B does not really exist, A is perfectly separated really from B, or in the real state; therefore likewise, and so forth. Second, because from the terms themselves, for one thing to exist when or where another does not exist is to be perfectly separated from it. Hence perfect unity of reason also follows. For in that state in which being has no diversity or plurality it is perfectly one, as altogether undivided; and therefore, if it had none in the real state, it would in that state be wholly undivided and one. "Universally," says Aristotle, 5, *Metaphysica*, "whatever things do not have division are said to be one insofar as they do not have it," which St. Thomas confirms there lect. 8 while speaking of unity of reason. But being objectively prescinded has in the intentional state no diversity or plurality, since all this consists in the inferiors, which are not transferred into the intentional state because they are not known. Therefore, and so forth. One may say: being in that state has plurality implicitly. Against this: according to you, to have plurality implicitly is compatible with plurality properly not being in that state in which being is, namely in the state of the known, since the plurality is properly not known, that is, does not in any way terminate cognition. Therefore it does not prevent the perfect unity of being in the state of the known. The consequence is clear from the parallel of unity in the real state, which certainly is not impeded by plurality that is not in that state.

9. I argue 2º. Inferior beings are not implicitly included in the concept of being; therefore being is perfectly prescinded from them. The antecedent is proved because to be implicitly included, as the adversaries themselves explain, is formally to belong to the essence of being insofar as prescisively known, as rationality belongs to the essence of man, and generally as those predicates by which a thing is defined belong to the essence of the thing defined. But inferior beings do not belong in this way to the essence of being as such. Therefore, and so forth. The minor is proved from what was just said: because being, according to the Thomists, is so prescinded from its

inferiors that these are not known nor do they terminate cognition on the part of the object. But it is repugnant for that not to be known on the part of the object which formally is the essence of the known thing and is placed in its definition. This is proved first from the terms themselves: who could believe that rational animal remains unknown on the part of the object while man is known? What does the cognition "being" attain on the part of the object if it does not attain some real essence? And if it attains some essence, certainly it is none other than the essence of being as such.

10. Second, from St. Thomas, 3, *De anima* lect. 12, lit. g, where he plainly teaches that no object can be understood prescisively without that which belongs to its notion or definition. Therefore, he says: "I cannot understand man while understanding nothing of animal, because animal belongs to the notion of man." But when the intellect understands "curved," the Holy Doctor adds, it understands it without flesh insofar as it is curved; not indeed so that it understands the curved to exist without flesh, but because it understands curved without understanding flesh, and this because flesh is not placed in the definition of curved. He adds that for this reason the intellect prescisively understands mathematical things without sensible matter, but not natural things, "because sensible matter is placed in the definition of natural things but not in the definition of mathematical things." Nor should it be said that St. Thomas speaks of perfect prescision, or of the excluding from the excluded, but not of imperfect prescision, or according to the explicit, which Thomists call prescision of the including from the included. For against this is the fact that St. Thomas plainly speaks of the prescision by which one thing is known while another is not known; but such is imperfect prescision as maintained by you. Hence I argue thus: according to St. Thomas's doctrine, whenever one thing is known without another, that is, without knowing the other, this other does not belong to the notion of the known object nor is placed in its definition. But according to you, when being as such is known it is known without its inferiors, that is, without knowing the inferiors, since these do not terminate cognition on the part of the object, as you concede. Therefore the inferiors do not belong to the notion of being nor are placed in its definition. Hence the prescision of being from its inferiors ought to be called "of the excluding from the excluded" in the existence of the known; for that is excluded from the state of the known which is not admitted within it but is left in the state of the unknown.

11. It is confirmed 1º from the same Angelic Doctor, q. 2, *De veritate* ar. 11, where, after proving some agreement between God and creature, he warns that certain names are said of God only symbolically, such as "lion, sun," and

the like, "because," he says, "matter enters into their definition, which cannot be attributed to God." And immediately he adds: "Sometimes, however, a name said of God and creature imports nothing from its principal signification such that the aforesaid mode of agreement between creature and God cannot be considered; such are all things in whose definition no defect is included and which do not depend on matter according to existence, such as being, good, and other things of this kind." He teaches the same doctrine I^{a}, q. 13, art. 1. This indeed needs no commentary to make it clear that it is opposed to the Thomists' doctrine which we reject. For if "no defect is included" in the definition of being, then being cannot be defined by substance and accident and the other inferiors which it transcends, for in these defect and manifold imperfection are undoubtedly imported. Therefore being does not implicitly include its inferiors as formally belonging to its essence. Likewise, if being definitively included the things which it transcends, matter would enter into its definition, which enters into the definition of lion, and whatever depends upon matter according to existence. But this is false according to St. Thomas. Therefore, and so forth. Likewise, being is more prescinded from matter than lion, as is clear from St. Thomas's words; therefore it is also prescinded as regards the implicit, for lion certainly is prescinded as regards the explicit.

12. Add that, according to St. Thomas in the Prologue to the *Metaphysica*, common being is separated from matter according to existence and notion: "Because," he says, "those things are said to be separated according to existence and notion not only which can never exist in matter, such as God and intellectual substances, but also those which can exist without matter, such as common being." Common being can therefore exist without matter, namely insofar as it is indifferent even to God and Angel; but no objective concept can be without matter if it is not prescinded from it as regards the implicit, but only as regards the explicit, as is clear in the concept of lion or animal. Therefore, and so forth. Likewise, in St. Thomas's phrase, to be separated "according to notion" is the same as "according to definition"; for "notion" sounds the same as "definition" in abstract things, as St. Thomas with Aristotle warns in innumerable places, for example I^{a}, q. 13, ar. 1 and 6. Therefore if common being is separated from matter "according to notion," it is separated "according to definition." Therefore it is not definable through matter, and consequently neither through the other inferiors which it transcends. Add further that the objective concept of being is most simple, because "that into which the intellect resolves all its conceptions is being," as St. Thomas says q. 1, *De veritate* ar. 1. But if it implicitly included its inferiors, it would rather itself be resolved into their concepts, as the

concept of man is resolved into the concepts of animal and rational; for generally the concept of the defined is resolved into those concepts through which it is defined, not conversely. For to be resolved is to be explained through simpler concepts and distinctions of essence.

13. It is confirmed 2º: if being definitively included substance and accident, it would not truly be said absolutely, "Substance is a being," just as it is not truly said, "A plant is an animal," because although a plant is living, the definition of animal includes not only living but also sensible, which does not belong to a plant. Nor is it truly said absolutely, "The soul is a man," because although man is physically defined through the soul, he is not defined through it alone but together with the body. And generally a predicate is not truly affirmed absolutely when its whole definition, whether physical or metaphysical, is not verified of the subject. One may say with the College of St. Thomas at Alcalá, cit. q. 7, n. 157, that "whatever belongs to the essence of being as regards the explicit" is verified of substance, but not "whatever belongs to the essence of being as regards the implicit." But against this, 1º: being does not have two essences, one explicit and another implicit, just as neither man nor animal does, but one essence more or less explained; more indeed through definitive concepts, less through the concept of the defined or definable. Otherwise the definition would not explain the essence of the thing, at least that essence which you call proper to the defined as regards the explicit. It is therefore repugnant that the whole essence of being as regards the explicit be verified of substance without the whole essence as regards the implicit being simultaneously verified.

14. Against this, 2º: the unshaken rule of the Summulae is that the defined and the definition are convertible, so that of whatever the definition is verified, the thing defined is likewise verified, and conversely. But whatever belongs to the essence of being as regards the explicit is the defined, and whatever belongs to the essence of being as regards the implicit is the definition, according to your doctrine. Therefore either both or neither is verified of substance. You will reply that the rule of conversion holds when the concept of the defined is univocal or perfectly one, but not when it is analogical and imperfectly one, or one only in a qualified sense. Against this: even among analogical things, in the sense in which the defined is verified, the definition is likewise verified. For in the sense in which medicine is called "healthy," the definition of "healthy" is also said of it, namely with the addition "causally"; and in the sense in which a statue is called "man," it is also called "rational animal," namely with the addition "apparently" or "representatively." Likewise conversion holds even if the

unity of the thing defined is imperfect or improper; for of whatever the concrete "white," which is one accidentally, or "heap of stones," which is one only by aggregation, is verified, the whole definition or quasi-definition of that concrete or heap is likewise verified. Therefore that rule is unshaken everywhere, as it has hitherto been held by all. And the reason is the one I touched upon just now: the essence of the defined as regards the explicit is not other than as regards the implicit, but one and the same, especially on the part of the object.

15. It is confirmed finally: the Divine will, according to the Thomists, so wills and loves the notion of being in a sinful act that it does not even implicitly will the malice, even if the malice consists in something positive and therefore is transcended by being. Indeed, the physical action of God, according to them, attains and causes the entity while not even implicitly causing the malice. Therefore malice does not implicitly and definitively belong to the essence of being, and consequently neither do the other inferiors belong to it, since the same reason holds in all, as the adversaries do not doubt. The College of St. Thomas, cit. q. 7, n. 155, answers that being can be attained by the Divine will without malice being implicitly attained, although the latter belongs to the essence of being as regards the implicit, because of two things which are distinguished only according to the implicit and explicit, one can be attained without the other by some power when one is contained within the sphere of such a power and the other is not, but not so if both are contained. Since, therefore, entity is contained within the sphere of the Divine will but malice is not, while both are contained within the sphere of the Divine intellect, one can be loved without the other, although implicitly included, but not known without the other. But against this, 1º: therefore the Divine will wills and loves something while not willing and prohibiting its essence. This, however, appears contradictory from the terms themselves, as also would the claim that a finite thing is really within the sphere of some power while the essence of such a thing is really outside it. Otherwise the same could be said of humanity and rationality.

16. Against this, 2º: we are not speaking here of the Divine intellect, which necessarily attains, and indeed explicitly, whatever is contained within its objective sphere. We are speaking of the human intellect, whose function it is to prescind and, among things contained in its sphere, to attain one without the other, and to which above all powers is attributed subtlety in distinguishing and separating predicates really indistinct. It would be astonishing if such a power were less prescisive than the physical causality of God. We everywhere experience the opposite, for example by prescinding the generic notion from every difference, and the specific notion from every

thisness, although the physical action or efficacious will of God cannot make a similar prescision. Against this, 3º: if the Divine will, in attaining the entity of a wicked act, does not implicitly attain its malice, our intellect can do the same; therefore it can perfectly prescind the one from the other. The antecedent is proved because our intellect can precisely attain that entity insofar as it is willed by God; for example, when it says, "The entity of a wicked act, insofar as willed by God, is not implicitly malice," which proposition is most true according to the Thomists. But then through the concept of the subject it attains entity without implicitly attaining malice. This is clear, first because it attains entity insofar as willed by God, in which sense it is not implicitly malice; second, because a predicate, in the sense in which it is truly denied of a subject, is not conceived as included in the subject, as is evident. Therefore when malice in the implicit sense is truly denied of entity, it is not conceived as implicitly included in entity.

CHAPTER II.
The Contrary Foundations Are Overthrown.

17. It is objected 1º, and principally from the transcendence of being, which we shall treat in chap. 4. The inferiors of being, and all their differences, belong to the essence of being as such. Therefore being cannot be perfectly prescinded from them, just as man cannot be prescinded from rational. The antecedent is proved, 1º, because being, since it transcends all things, belongs to the essence of its inferiors, so that every difference is formally being. Therefore conversely as well, for formal identity ought to be mutual; and it is altogether contradictory that A be formally B while being neither the whole essence nor part of the essence of B. 2º, because everything which is formally being and nothing other than being belongs to the essence of being. But all inferiors are formally being and nothing other than being, since they include nothing which is not formally being or which is extraneous and superadded to being. Therefore, and so forth. It is confirmed 1º because something cannot be separated from that which is inseparable from it; therefore neither can it be prescinded from that which is imprescissible from it, for to be prescinded is to be separated. But the differences are imprescissible from being. Therefore, and so forth. It is confirmed 2º because to be prescinded is formally to be segregated from the inferiors, whereas to be transcendent is formally to be imbibed in them. But these two are contradictorily opposed. Therefore, and so forth.

18. To the objection I deny the antecedent, notwithstanding the proofs. To 1º, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence; for formal identity is

not always mutual, as is clear in the generic notion with respect to species: man is formally animal, but animal is not formally man. One may say with the Carmelites of Alcalá that genus, properly speaking, is not prescinded from species but from differences. But this will be attacked, 1º because animal is prescinded and abstracted from those things through which it is contracted and determined. But animal is contracted and determined through man, as St. Thomas expressly teaches q. 21, *De veritate* ar. 1. Therefore, and so forth. 2º, because genus is truly prescinded from its inferiors of which it is predicated as genus. But such inferiors are species, for genus is not predicated of differences "as what," and consequently not as genus. Therefore. 3º, because animal is properly distinguished by reason from those things through which it is not defined, or which do not enter into the definition of animal. But animal is not defined through its species, and man and lion no more truly enter its definition than rational and capable of roaring. Therefore.

19. One may say with others that animal is therefore prescinded from man because man under the reduplicated differential concept is not formally animal; but if man according to every formality were animal there would be no place for prescision. But again this will be attacked because man under the specific concept does not reduplicate the differential concept, and yet animal is properly prescinded from him insofar as he falls under the concept "man," as we have just seen. Or otherwise: by the concept "man" no distinction of reason is made among the formalities of man, as is evident. Therefore there corresponds to it an objectively metaphysically simple concept, since it lacks all formal and actual distinction of parts, for a foundational distinction is not an actual distinction, and the Scotistic formal distinction is rejected by the Thomists. Therefore the essence of man, insofar as it falls under the concept "man," asserts no formality which is not animal. Yet animal is truly prescinded from man so taken and is distinguished from him by reason. The same point is pressed: the essence of man under the concept "man" is formally transcended by animal, as no one doubts; therefore, since under this concept it has no parts distinct by reason, it is wholly transcended, for in an object lacking parts either the whole is transcended or nothing is. Hence in this proposition, "Man is an animal," animal is predicated of the whole subject in the formal sense. Yet nevertheless this transcendence, or formal identity, is not mutual, since animal is distinguished by reason from such an essence considered under the concept "man." Therefore, and so forth. This example had to be defended because it breaks all the efforts of the contrary side.

20. I add another from Thomistic doctrine. The entire essence of being, taken as regards the explicit, formally transcends its inferiors, so that of every difference it is truly and explicitly said, "It is formally being"; and yet the inferiors do not belong to the essence of being so taken. This is clear, first because according to the Thomists the inferiors belong only to the essence of being taken as regards the implicit, which properly remains unknown while being is explicitly known; second, because "whatever belongs to the essence of being as regards the explicit" is predicated of substance and every inferior, as the College of St. Thomas testifies, as we saw n. 13. But accident is not predicated of substance, nor are the other inferiors predicated of any one inferior. Therefore the inferiors do not belong to the essence of being as regards the explicit. Consequently there is between the inferiors and the explicit essence of being a non-mutual formal identity. Hence in the formal sense it is not contradictory that A be B while being neither the whole essence nor part of the essence of B, for thus, according to the Thomists, substance is related to the explicit essence of being. If you ask whether this non-mutual identity is adequate, I say that it is adequate on the part of one extreme and none on the part of the other; and conversely the distinction of reason is adequate on this side and none on that side. These things will receive greater light from what is to be said in chap. 5.

21. To 2º, proof n. 17, I distinguish the major premise: what is formally being and nothing other than being by both mutual and non-mutual otherness, I grant; by mutual otherness only, I deny the major premise. Then I grant the minor premise as regards mutual otherness and deny it as regards non-mutual otherness. For in the sense in which the inferiors are distinguished from being, or rather being from them, they can be called "other" than being and something "superadded and extraneous" to being; not indeed by mutual extraneousness whereby they formally exclude being from themselves, for this is the extraneousness proper to difference with respect to genus and alone must be denied here with St. Thomas, but by non-mutual extraneousness, whereby the inferiors are not formally included in being. You will easily explain this by the example of man with respect to animal, or by that of substance with respect to the explicit essence of being. For it can similarly be said that man under the specific concept is not other than animal, and so forth. To confirmation 1º, I deny the antecedent, because a thing can be separated from a mode which is inseparable from the thing, that is, incapable of existing without the thing. For I can exist without my location in place A, although that location can in no way exist without me. Hence our opinion concerning non-mutual prescision is rather confirmed.

22. To confirmation 2º, granting the major premise, I distinguish the minor: these two are contradictorily opposed if they are effected through the same concept, I grant; if through different concepts, I deny the minor and the consequence. For animal under the concept "animal" is formally segregated from man, in whom nevertheless it is formally imbibed under the concept "man." But one will insist: if being remains included in the differences, how is it abstracted from them? I answer: in the same way as animal from man, although it remains included in him; or in the same way as, according to the Thomists, the explicit essence of being is known without the differences being known on the part of the object, although it nevertheless remains included in them. Certainly to be abstracted here means the same as to know one thing without knowing another with which it is really identified. Moreover, either you take the differences in the real state, and thus you are not speaking to the point, because no one doubts that being, and every mentally abstracted common predicate, remains really in the differences; or you take them in the formal sense, and in this sense they are not differences except insofar as known under their proper and discriminating concepts. But that being should remain included in them insofar as thus known, while at the same time being abstracted from them through another very different concept, namely the concept "being," contains not even the shadow of repugnance. Finally, note that this entire objection conflicts with St. Thomas. For if the inferiors belong to the essence of being and are mutually identified with it formally and definitively, it follows that imperfection, defect, and matter enter into the definition of being. The consequence is undeniable, but it is evidently contrary to St. Thomas, as we saw n. 11.

23. It is objected 2º from the analogy of being. If being were perfectly prescinded, it would be univocal; for it would be an entirely one objective concept and would assert no actual diversity, and for this reason the concept of animal and similar concepts are univocal. But being is analogical, according to the Philosopher and St. Thomas. Therefore, and so forth. I answer: whether being is univocal or analogical we shall discuss in the following chapter, where it will also become clear why being is not a genus, which is also usually objected here. Meanwhile the objection can be repelled by retorting it thus: being would be univocal if it is such according to the explicit, that is, according to that reality which is properly known on the part of the object through the concept "being," let this pass; if it is not univocal according to a reality of this kind, deny. And under this same distinction say that it is or is not analogical. Recall from n. 7 that the prescision of the explicit from the implicit among Thomists does not consist merely in

greater or lesser clarity of the formal concept, but is an objective prescision by virtue of which that which they call "explicit" is properly known, whereas that which they call "implicit" is properly not known and does not terminate cognition on the part of the object. The explicit is therefore distinguished from the implicit as a reality properly known from a reality properly not known. But this distinction, whether at pleasure it is called imperfect or perfect, certainly suffices for the explicit or known reality of being to be taken separately from the unknown reality; and thus taken it asserts no diversity, since all diversity remains on the side of the implicit according to the Thomists. Therefore being according to that reality will be univocal. Since the Thomists deny this, they are bound to solve their own argument.

24. It is objected 3º from Aristotle, who in 10, *Metaphysica* t. 8 teaches that being signifies the ten predicaments, namely immediately, as Averroes explains, or such that it "does not predicate another nature distinct from the ten predicaments," as St. Thomas says there lect. 3. Therefore being does not signify some degree prescinded or notion distinct from the predicaments. It is confirmed from the same Aristotle, 8, *Metaphysica* t. 16, where he teaches that being itself is immediately substance, quantity, and the remaining predicaments, because, as St. Thomas explains there lect. 5, "being does not await anything added" in order to become substance and so forth, "but from the beginning is immediately either substance, or quantity, or quality." Therefore being is not some common notion besides the predicaments themselves; hence it is not placed in definitions, as Aristotle warns there. To this is added that the predicaments are primarily diverse. Therefore they agree in no common notion. I answer: being signifies the predicaments not immediately in the formal sense, whatever Averroes may say, but virtually, insofar as it signifies a notion common to all the predicaments, in the way that animal signifies its species. Nor does Aristotle there treat immediate signification, but only general predication, in which he equates one and being because each extends to all the predicaments. St. Thomas, however, denies in being only "another nature" with the otherness intended by Avicenna, who, as the Holy Doctor says there, "held that one and being are accidental predicates and signify a nature added above the things of which they are said."

25. To the confirmation: being is said "immediately" to be substance and so forth insofar as, in order to be contracted to the predicaments, it does not await something added in the manner of a difference properly so called, namely something which is not formally being, just as difference is not genus, as St. Thomas explains cit. lect. 5. Nevertheless it awaits something contracting it in the manner of a more express and limited concept, as we

shall later say. For the same reason being is not expressly placed in those definitions which are given through genus and difference, namely because being is not a genus and is not related as matter to differences mutually distinct from the common notion, as St. Thomas observes there. Hence also is drawn the reason why the predicaments are said to be "primarily diverse," namely because they agree in no genus and do not differ through proper differences mutually distinct from the notion common to them, in which they truly agree, but differ by their whole selves, although by their whole selves they also possess a likeness of such a kind as provides a foundation for the abstraction of being. Certainly God and creature are primarily diverse beings, and yet "God has both likeness and unlikeness with all things at once," as St. Thomas says 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 29. Fr. Suárez explains certain other texts of Aristotle objected by the Thomists, d. 2, Met. s. 2, n. 27 sqq.

26. It is objected 4º against the prescision of being from God and creature. True likeness between God and creature is contradictory; therefore so too is the prescision of a predicate common to both. The antecedent is proved, 1º because there is no proportion of the finite to the infinite. 2º, because just as there is infinite distance between God and creature, so there is infinite unlikeness; but this excludes every likeness. 3º, because God is no less distant from creature than real being from fictitious being, since there is no distance greater than infinite; but real and fictitious being are so distant from one another that by no likeness do they ground the abstraction of a common predicate. Therefore, and so forth. It is confirmed 1º: being prescinded from God and creature would be a true reality which would be neither created nor uncreated, neither finite nor infinite, neither necessary nor contingent; but such a reality is contradictory. It is confirmed 2º: God according to every one of His formalities is most singular; but He would not be such if the formality of being which belongs to God could be abstracted and made common to creatures. Otherwise something identified with God could fail to be God, namely the predicate of being, which through abstraction will become indifferent to the creature. It is confirmed 3º: abstract being would be something prior, superior, and simpler than God; which is repugnant. It is confirmed 4º: there is no metaphysical composition in God; but there would be if the concept of being could be abstracted from God, for it would then be a potential concept and determinable by a differential concept, with which accordingly it would make a composition.

27. This objection, at least in large part, does not help the Thomists. First, because it is openly contrary to St. Thomas, who in the places cited above n. 3 expressly proves that there is likeness between God and creatures. Indeed, that a creature can be like God is clear from Sacred Scripture, Gen. 1

and 1 John cap. 3. Second, because it equally attacks the concept of being as analogical or prescinded as regards the explicit from God and creature. But whoever may object it, I deny the antecedent. To proof 1º: there is no quantitative proportion of the finite to the infinite, namely proportion taken for equivalence either in whole or in part, as though the finite were equal to the infinite, or its half, or equivalent to it as regards a third or sixth part, and so forth. But if proportion is taken for likeness, it is not to be denied; for infinite whiteness, if it existed, would be like finite whiteness under the notion of color or visible. To 2º: infinite unlikeness is quite compatible with some likeness when they do not produce opposite formal effects, as happens here; for infinite unlikeness only brings it about that God is a being infinitely greater and better than the creature, whereas likeness brings it about that each extreme truly is being, or apt to exist. But there is no opposition in two things truly apt to exist, one of which is infinitely greater and better than the other. To 3º: although God is no less distant from creature than real being from fictitious being, He is nevertheless distant in a different way, namely by a distance positive on both sides, the infinitude of which, as I was just saying, leaves room for each extreme truly and intrinsically to be being, and consequently to ground the prescision of common being. But real being is distant from fictitious being as being from non-being, or by a distance negative on one side, which wholly excludes intrinsic likeness.

28. To confirmation 1º I grant the consequence in the prescisive and formal sense; for thus it contains no greater absurdity than that animal as such is neither rational nor irrational, and substance as such neither corporeal nor incorporeal, neither animate nor inanimate, and so forth, although this is altogether repugnant in the real state. To 2º: God is most singular according to every formality as His, that is, conceived as proper to God; in which respect it is true that no formality belonging to God can be rendered common to another. Yet it is compatible with this that some formality which in reality belongs to God can be conceived without being conceived as so belonging or as proper to God. Thus an Angel according to every one of his formalities is incorporeal, and yet some formality belonging to an Angel, namely the notion of substance, can be conceived so as to be rendered common to corporeal things. God, however, is essentially singular because the Divine essence cannot be conceived without singularity, as the Angelic or human essence can be conceived. But the notion of being abstracted from God is not conceived as the Divine essence. The absurdity that something identified with God could fail to be God is frivolous; for it contains the fallacy of accident, like that old argument: "What I am, you are not; I am a man; therefore you are not a man." It will likewise seem harsh

that something identified with an Angel, namely the predicate of substance, can become a stone. Therefore the predicate of being, which by reason is rendered indifferent to God and creatures, is not one really, but rather really multiple, and is called one only by the unity of confused cognition; nor does being really identical with the being of God ever come to be identified with a creature. All these things are clear from Logic and are common to all generic and specific predicates.

29. To confirmations 3º and 4º, which the Thomists employ, one can answer by retorting them upon the explicit essence of being, or upon the reality properly known on the part of the object through the cognition "being." For this reality will be prior, superior, and simpler than God; and it will be potential to aseity and will make with it a metaphysical composition. Furthermore, it is in no way absurd that abstract being be prior to God by logical priority, which they call "priority in the consequence of subsisting," insofar as one validly argues, "This object is God, therefore it is being," but not conversely; and consequently it is not absurd that it be logically superior to God, that is, more widely extended in predication, insofar as being is predicated of more things than God. Certainly such priority and superiority is not proper to God, since it consists wholly in an imperfect and confused manner of conceiving several similar objects. Nor does anything prevent something from being simpler than God by merely logical simplicity, or by excluding a distinction of reason into several predicates; for in perseity, for example, or in any other ultimate difference, there cannot be distinguished by reason so many attributes as we distinguish in God, at least according to the implicit and explicit. Therefore nothing is simpler than God in the real sense, or even in the formal sense excluding metaphysical composition, in which sense St. Thomas speaks 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 32.

30. Finally, metaphysical composition, if it places in the object no distinction or potentiality from the nature of the thing but consists only in two inadequate concepts distinguished from one another by reason, one of which is determined through the other, is admitted by many in God as derogating in no way from Divine simplicity and supposing no imperfection in the object, but only in our intellect. We nevertheless deny it in God with St. Thomas, because every composition imports parts mutually distinct, as matter and form are physically distinguished and genus and difference metaphysically. But in God neither aseity nor any other formality is formally distinguished mutually from being, according to what is to be said in chap. 4. Hence the concept of being as such is not potential in the manner of a part determinable by another co-part; it can nevertheless be called "potential" if this means only that it is indifferent to being determined through various

narrower concepts in which it is formally included. Hence you will infer that even through the intellect nothing is prior to God by the priority of a part to the whole, in which sense St. Thomas speaks I^{a}, q. 3, ar. 5, in the argument "on the contrary," because in God there is no composition of parts, nor any part even through the intellect, since nowhere is there a part without a co-part. Finally observe that when the ancients sometimes say that God is not so much being as above being, above substance, and so forth, or that such names are more truly removed from God than fitted to Him, they do not thereby deny that names of this sort properly belong to God as regards the thing signified, but only warn that God infinitely exceeds all created beings, and that those names do not belong to God as regards the concrete mode of signifying. See St. Thomas I^{a}, q. 13, ar. 3 and Fr. Suárez d. 28, Met. s. 3, n. 13.

CHAPTER III.

Whether Common Being Is Univocal or Analogical.

31. The definitions of univocals and analogicals from Logic must be kept before one's eyes. And it must be supposed, 1º, that being is not purely equivocal with respect to God and creature, substance and accident. For this is evidently gathered from what was said in the preceding question, and St. Thomas shows it by many arguments q. 7, *De potentia* ar. 7 and often elsewhere. It must be supposed, 2º, that being is analogical by analogy not only physical but metaphysical. Those things alone are said to be physically univocal which are of the same ultimate species; hence among things which differ in species and agree only in genus there is physical analogy, in which sense Aristotle said, 7, *Physica* t. 31, that equivocations lie hidden under a genus. See St. Thomas there lect. 8. Metaphysical univocation, however, is taken for generic agreement; hence things which agree in no proper genus as such but only in transcendentals, such as God and creature or even substance and accident, must have metaphysical analogy. Therefore the question is only about logical analogy and univocation, or those taken absolutely according to Aristotle's definition in the Antepredicaments.

32. It must be supposed, 3º, that the name "being," insofar as it denotes real being, can be taken in four ways. 1º, for necessary and supreme being from itself; hence God is called by the proper name "He who is," according to Exod. 3, "I am who am," where the Septuagint has, "I am being itself." 2º, for being through itself, that is, substance; this usage is very frequent in Aristotle in the *Metaphysica*, and according to it substance alone is called being simply, whereas accident is called not so much being as something of being. 3º, for created or finite being insofar as it is common to substance and

accident, or insofar as it is divided through the ten predicaments. In this sense God is said to be the cause of all being, or to act under the notion of being, and being to be produced by God insofar as being. Nor is this usage improper insofar as it extends to accidents. For Aristotle, 5, *Metaphysica* t. 14, calls being in this breadth "being according to itself," or "through itself," namely insofar as being through itself is opposed to accidental being, whose parts do not properly combine into one, when "he divides being outside the soul through the ten predicaments, which is perfect being," as St. Thomas says there lect. 9. Likewise Aristotle, 6, *Metaphysica* near the end, and St. Thomas there lect. 4, say that not only substance but quantity, quality, and so forth are beings "properly so called." 4º, finally, being is taken most abstractly for that which has reality not fictitious, or contradistinguished from pure nothing and chimera, or for that which has true aptitude to exist, which we explained at the threshold of the Disputation. In this sense being is the subject of Metaphysics and is common to God and creature, because no defect is included in its definition, as we saw from St. Thomas n. 11. Therefore being is not now taken in the 1º or 2º acceptation, but in the 3º with respect to substance and accident, and in the 4º with respect to God and creature.

33. It must be supposed, 4º, that the present question, although ancient and famous, is in great part verbal. Scotus, the principal defender of univocation in being, acknowledges this; for in 1, d. 3, q. 2 he says: "Lest there be a dispute over the name of univocation, I call that concept univocal which is so one that its unity suffices for contradiction when it is affirmed and denied of the same thing, and suffices for a syllogistic middle such that extremes united in a middle thus one are concluded of one another without the fallacy of equivocation." But the Thomists freely concede all this, although they wholly deny univocation, for they admit that the concept of being is so one that this is a contradiction, "Accident is being; Accident is not being"; likewise that being is a middle properly distributed in a syllogism, for example, "Every being is good; a creature is being; therefore a creature is good." They therefore contend with Scotus not about the thing but about the name. On the other hand Fr. Suárez, a defender of analogy, d. 28, Met. s. 3, n. 17, says thus: "Although, to confess the truth, among those who admit one common concept of being there can scarcely be a disagreement about the thing in this question, but rather about the manner of speaking; for without doubt being has a great likeness to univocal terms, since by one concept, absolutely and without addition, it is predicated of God and creature, which agreement alone those who called it univocal considered." Indeed Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge the verbal

character of the question, 7, *Metaphysica* t. 15, where, after teaching that being is said neither equivocally nor univocally but "to one," that is, analogically, he immediately added: "But however one wishes to say these things, it makes no difference." These words, although St. Thomas there conveniently refers them to something else, can be referred to the question of analogy, and according to Bessarion's version they cannot conveniently be referred to anything else.

34. For this reason Aristotle sometimes inclines toward univocation, as in 2, *Metaphysica* t. 4, when he says: "Each thing itself is most of all among the others insofar as univocation with it is present in the others, as fire, for example, is hottest; for it is the cause of heat in the others." The meaning is that that is most such which is a cause to others that they be such univocally, or that they possess such a predicate said univocally of themselves and of the cause. For if the cause does not agree univocally with the effects in that predicate, the rule fails; and therefore the Sun is not hottest although it is the cause of heat in others, because it is an equivocal cause, as St. Thomas observes there lect. 2. "Hence, since heat," says the Holy Doctor, "is said univocally both of fire and of elemental bodies, it follows that fire is hottest." But from this rule Aristotle there infers that that is truest which is a cause to others that they be true, and likewise that that is most being which is the cause of entity in others, because "as each thing is disposed according to existence," these are his words, "so also according to truth." Since, therefore, God is the cause of truth and entity in creatures, and is Himself most true and most being, Aristotle holds that true and being are said univocally of God and creatures. What Ferrariensis answers in 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 32 is amusing. "It must be said," he says, "that Aristotle takes univocation for analogy when things agree in one notion proportionally." Admirable. Hence we possess an easy solution for all the texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas in which the analogy of being is asserted: with equal right we shall say that both take analogy for univocation. St. Thomas explains that text very differently. After the doctrine just reported concerning the Sun and fire, he speaks thus in cit. lect. 2: "The name of truth is not proper to any species but is related commonly to all beings. Hence, because that which is the cause of truth is a cause communicating with the effect in name and common notion, it follows that that which is the cause to subsequent things that they be true is most true." What is properly to be univocal if not to communicate "in name and common notion"?

35. These things being premised, the first opinion holds that being is analogical. Thus, as regards substance and accident, Aristotle l. 4, *Metaphysica* c. 2, and l. 7, c. 1 and 4, and l. 1, *Ethica* c. 6, to whom St. Thomas

assents in the same places and very often elsewhere; and as regards God and creature he teaches the same I^{a}, q. 13, ar. 5, and 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 32 sqq., and q. 7, *De potentia* ar. 7 and often elsewhere. Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and the other Thomists subscribe to this opinion in such a way that they would have being be purely analogical. Many of our authors with Fr. Suárez, d. 28, Met. s. 3 and d. 39, s. 2, join them. The second opinion asserts that being is univocal. Thus Frs. Arriaga, Oviedo, Lynce, Peinado, Ulloa, and commonly our more recent authors, who seem to call being purely univocal in the logical sense. Scotus with all the Scotists is usually cited for this opinion, and they indeed say that being is simply univocal; but, according to Mastrius d. 2, *Metaphysica* q. 5, ar. 1, they do not maintain, and this can be a third opinion, that being is purely univocal, but univocal-analogical. For the Scotists distinguish various degrees of univocation according to the various agreement or diversity of inferiors in participating a common notion, and acknowledge pure and complete or perfect univocation only in an ultimate species. In the other predicates, although there is perfect prescision and unity of the common concept, which they say simply suffices for the substance of univocation, they always maintain that something of analogy is admixed. Not indeed that analogy which is called "equivocation by design" and imports under a common name several notions or concepts, but another analogy compatible with the unity of a common notion and consequently with the substance of univocation. But an analogy of this kind, since it consists wholly in the proper concepts of the inferiors from which the common notion is prescinded, is not denied by the authors of the second opinion, nor will it be denied by anyone except as to the name. Hence you may gather a new argument that the disagreement is verbal.

The Question Is Resolved by Two Assertions.

36. I say 1º: The notion of being, if considered precisely insofar as signified by the name or concept "being," is univocal to God and creature, as well as to substance and accident. It is proved from Aristotle's definition: there is univocation when "the name is common and the notion signified by the name is the same," add, if you wish, entirely the same or simply the same, although Aristotle did not add this, namely with identity or unity of reason, as all understand. But the notion of being signified by the name "being," common to God and creature and so forth, insofar as signified by it, is entirely the same. Therefore, and so forth. The minor is proved because the notion of being, insofar as so taken, is perfectly prescinded from all plurality and diversity of inferiors, as most supporters of analogy among our

authors concede with Fr. Suárez, and as we sufficiently showed in chap. 1 against the Thomists. But this is to be entirely one and the same through the intellect, as no one doubts. It is confirmed: the notion of being, insofar as it falls under the concept "being," is not partly the same and partly formally diverse. Therefore it is not analogical and consequently is univocal. The consequence is clear from the definition of analogicals. The antecedent is proved because if it were formally diverse in some respect, it would not be perfectly prescinded from the differences or modes proper to particular beings, since all diversity comes from these. Since, therefore, it is perfectly prescinded, it is repugnant that, so taken, it formally import any diversity.

37. You will answer 1º from the doctrine of Fr. Suárez that the notion of being, as abstracted, is not entirely the same, because it does not descend uniformly to God and creature, but with an order of priority and essential dependence; and the common notion itself of itself demands this order, because intrinsically it requires to exist first and with complete independence in God, but subsequently in the creature and dependently upon God. But against this is the fact that this entire diversity of order must be referred to the real state or to the proper concepts of God and creature. It neither prevents being from being predicated absolutely of the creature without any mention of posteriority or dependence, nor causes the creature precisely insofar as being to assert such an order. Hence being as such is perfectly prescinded from this order of priority and dependence; otherwise it would not be prescinded from created and uncreated being, contrary to the doctrine of Fr. Suárez. Therefore the notion of being is prescinded from that in which this lack of uniformity or diversity of order formally consists; therefore insofar as prescinded in this way, it is not "partly diverse," as the definition of analogicals requires. Nor is it an obstacle that it intrinsically requires to have such an order in the real state. For at most this proves that it is diverse radically, not formally; but formal and actual diversity alone opposes univocation. It is proved because an order of priority and dependence is no more opposed to univocation than multiplicity and difference of essences. But this, when merely radical, does not oppose univocation; for every univocal notion is radically multiple, and every generic notion radically imports essences differing in species. How, however, a nature which is radically multiple or different can be verified of each inferior, see Logic tr. 3, d. 1, c. 5, n. 7 and 8; and thence you will easily gather in what sense the notion of being is verified of the creature although radically Divine and independent.

38. You will answer 2º from the Thomists that the notion of being is partly the same and partly diverse because it is the same as regards the

explicit and at the same time diverse as regards the implicit. But we sufficiently rejected this in chap. 1. Now, from what was said there, against this, 1º: in reality this amounts to saying that the defined belongs uniformly to inferiors to which the definition does not so belong, contrary to the rule of conversion discussed n. 14. If you say that the rule applies to a univocal defined but not to an analogical one, you beg the question, or say nothing beyond the very thing which is attacked by that rule. For according to you being is analogical precisely because its explicit is not convertible with its implicit, that is, the defined "being" with its definition. Therefore if for this reason it is not convertible because it is analogical, in sum it is not convertible because it is not convertible.

39. Against this, 2º: diversity as regards the implicit, understood in the Thomistic sense, does not oppose the univocation which we intend. It is proved: a diversity not signified by the name "being" does not prevent the notion of being, insofar as signified by such a name, from being univocal; for no notion precisely insofar as signified is rendered diverse in any way by a diversity without which it is signified, as is evident. But diversity as regards the implicit, in the Thomistic sense, is not signified by the name "being." Therefore, and so forth. The minor is proved: that which is not represented by the concept or cognition "being" is not signified by this name. But that diversity is not represented by this concept. This is clear because no cognition represents that which it leaves unknown, or which it does not attain on the part of the object. But the cognition "being" is so related to that diversity which the Thomists place in being as regards the implicit, as we saw n. 7. Nor should it be said that this diversity is implicitly represented. For according to your doctrine, to be represented implicitly is truly not to be represented, since it is truly not to be known or attained on the part of the object. The point is pressed: no notion in the intentional state, insofar as existing in it, is formally diversified by a diversity extrinsic to that state. But implicit diversity in the Thomistic sense is such; for it does not enter this state but remains outside it, since it is unknown.

40. The present assertion can furthermore be proved by the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas. First, because in the place cited n. 34 both expressly acknowledge the univocation of truth and being in common. Second, because both maintain the prescision of being from its inferiors even as regards the implicit, from which univocation necessarily follows, as the Thomists do not doubt, when both teach that the subject of Metaphysics is being as such and not particular beings, which are considered by other sciences. For Aristotle, 6, *Metaphysica* t. 3, says that it is proper to this Science to speculate "about being insofar as it is being, and what it is." There

St. Thomas, lect. 1, observes that no particular science considers, but rather presupposes, of its subject "that it is and what it is"; but Metaphysics considers both, because it considers being insofar as being. The same Aristotle, 4, *Metaphysica* t. 1, teaches that this Science "speculates being insofar as it is being, and the things which belong to it through itself," because, as St. Thomas notes there lect. 1, it does not consider the things which belong through themselves to particular beings, for these are accidental with respect to being as such; otherwise Metaphysics would have to consider the accidents sought through themselves in all the sciences. From these things it plainly follows that being as such does not assert the inferiors as regards the implicit. For otherwise all things down to ultimate differences and thisnesses, if the argument drawn from transcendence has any force, would belong to the "what it is" of being, as rationality belongs to the "what it is" of man; likewise all accidents of things would belong through themselves to being insofar as being, indeed all would be essentially included in it, as sensible is in animal. Since, therefore, Metaphysics considers in being "what it is and the things which belong to it through itself," it would be bound to consider all the aforesaid things, contrary to Aristotle and St. Thomas.

41. To this pertain the things we adduced from St. Thomas n. 11 and 12. Add to them what the Angelic Doctor says q. 7, *De potentia* ar. 5, ad 8, that some names are common to God and creatures "which, as regards the thing signified, import no imperfection, such as to be, to live, and to understand, and things of this kind," whereas there are other names which cannot be said of God except metaphorically because "they have matter in their definition." But if "to be" or "being" did not signify something implicitly abstracted from the creature, it would falsely be said that, as regards the thing signified, it imports no imperfection, just as it is falsely said that the name "man," as regards the thing signified, imports no rationality. Furthermore the name "being" would continually have matter in its definition. The same Holy Doctor speaks consonantly I^{a}, q. 13, ar. 3, ad 1, saying that some names signify perfections "in such a way that the very imperfect mode by which the Divine perfection is participated by the creature is included in the signification of the name itself, as stone, and so forth; but certain names," he adds, "signify the perfections themselves absolutely, without any mode of participating being included in their signification, such as being, good," and so forth. Therefore the finite, accidental, and other such modes of participation are not included in the signification of the name "being"; consequently it imports perfect prescision from finite, accidental being, and so forth. Note the word "included," by which signification as regards the

implicit is manifestly excluded; otherwise it could truly be said that no rationality is included in the signification of the name "man."

42. I say 2º: the notion of being, if considered according to the mode of existing which it has in its inferiors, is analogical; and this suffices for being to be called absolutely and simply analogical. The first part is clear because the notion of being exists in a very different way in God and in the creature. In God it exists independently, without limit, and most fully, as in the first font of all entity; but not so in the creature. Likewise in substance it has existence through itself and for itself, and prior and more principal existence, than in accident. Therefore, considered according to its mode of existing, it is without doubt diverse. Hence, since from another standpoint it is in some respect the same, both from real agreement and likeness and from the intentional unity of the common objective concept, it is now partly the same and partly diverse, and consequently analogical. The latter part must be commended by the authority of the wise, than which nothing is more apt or urgent in the use of names or in an almost verbal controversy. For Aristotle, St. Thomas, Scotus, Suárez, and most wise men call being absolutely analogical, certainly because of the diversity in the mode of existing which it has in its inferiors. This is clear. First, because all or almost all the arguments by which they usually prove analogy tend or allude to this. Second, because they do not derive it from a defect of prescision or unity in abstract being, for they unhesitatingly acknowledge this, especially Aristotle and St. Thomas, as we sufficiently showed. Third, because they themselves expressly warn whence they derive the analogy or why they generally deny univocation. For Aristotle, 7, *Metaphysica*, and St. Thomas there lect. 4, warn that one must consider not only how the common notion is predicated of several things, but also "how it exists, so that," says St. Thomas, "we do not say those things to be predicated univocally whose notion in existing is not one." Hence he infers that quiddity is not predicated univocally of substance and accident because "it belongs first and simply to substance, and consequently to the others." The same Holy Doctor, 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 32, denies that an effect has a univocal name with its cause "unless it receives the same species or form according to the same mode of existing"; and q. 27, *De veritate* ar. 7 requires in univocals likeness both according to natural existence and according to the same notion.

43. It is objected: this is physical or metaphysical analogy, which is found even in every generic notion. It is also extrinsic to the common notion and is signified by the name only mediately; hence it does not diminish logical univocation, which is now in dispute, nor prevent the definition of univocals from belonging absolutely to being as such. I answer: first, Aristotle and St.

Thomas more than once indicate that purely logical univocation apart from physical univocation, such as belongs to genus, is not univocation simply. Aristotle says this clearly, 7, *Physica* t. 31, where St. Thomas lect. 8 says thus: "He draws from the premises something worthy of consideration, namely that genus is not something one simply, whereas species is something one simply." The Holy Doctor asserts the same in 5, *Metaphysica* lect. 7, where he denies that those things are one simply which do not agree in one specific definition but only in a generic one, for example that of animal: "Hence," he adds, "they are never one simply, but only in a qualified sense, namely insofar as each of them is an animal." Therefore unity simply, without which certainly there is no univocation simply, excludes physical analogy according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, although in another sense that unity which is grounded in perfect prescision is called unity simply. To this also belongs that celebrated argument by which St. Thomas proves that nothing is said univocally of God and creature, namely that an effect which does not receive from its cause "a form similar according to species" to the form of the agent is not univocal with the cause in the name taken from that form. This argument concludes about physical univocation, not logical, as Ferrariensis admits in 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 32.

44. Next it must be admitted that the univocation which in assertion 1 we attributed to being is logical, while the analogy which we now grant is metaphysical. Consequently being is logically univocal and metaphysically analogical. The Excellent Doctor commends this doctrine as probable, d. 28, Met. s. 3, n. 20, and the Scotists in fact maintain it. But it should be noted that the proper analogy of being is not just any metaphysical analogy, such as is sometimes confused with physical analogy, but strictly metaphysical analogy, such as we described n. 31, namely one grounded in transcendence and excluding generic agreement. An analogy of this kind is the greatest among analogies compatible with unity of a common concept and far greater than that proper to genus. Hence there is stronger reason for being than genus to be called simply analogical, or even for genus more than being to be called logically univocal, as St. Thomas sometimes indicates.

45. There is, I say, stronger reason. First, because the analogy of being, since it is the greatest, attenuates and as it were overwhelms logical univocation. Second, because the diversity of inferiors from which it arises is not in the formal sense altogether extrinsic to the common notion. For it is not mutually extrinsic, or extrinsic through mutual prescissibility, because the diversity of the inferiors is formally imprescissible from the notion of being. Nor is a diversity of this kind signified purely mediately by the name "being," if we speak properly, although it is signified through the medium of

the common notion; for that does not properly mediate which is not reciprocally distinguished from the extremes. For this reason the prescision of being is usually called imperfect or incomplete even by those who admit one objective concept of being, namely because it is not mutual, although on its own side being is prescinded from the inferiors both implicitly and explicitly, and in this sense is perfectly prescinded according to what was said in chap. 1. Therefore there is a special foundation for the metaphysical analogy proper to being to be denominatively reflected upon the abstract notion and not to allow it to be univocal, even in the logical sense, except with the addition "in a qualified sense" or "imperfectly." Indeed, since univocation is considered by Logic insofar as it belongs to the five predicables, or insofar as it is proper to the genera and species contained under each predicament, in which complete prescision has place and no strictly metaphysical analogy is present, it cannot be denied that univocation is greatly diminished in the logical sense where these conditions are lacking.

46. From what has been said you will gather that common being, taken without a special reduplication, is univocal-analogical, as the third opinion said n. 35, yet so that it is analogical simply and univocal in a qualified sense. Although, if considered precisely insofar as signified through the common name, it is "properly" univocal, indeed, if one remains within the limits of abstract signification, "absolutely" univocal; nevertheless, because this univocation is as it were overwhelmed and absorbed by the prevailing analogy in existing, it must therefore, with reduplication excluded, be called univocal with the addition "in a qualified sense." By this addition propriety is not always diminished, but sometimes perfection alone, as when accident is called being in a qualified sense although it properly is being. One may say: the definition of univocals requires only that the notion signified by the common name be the same; but the notion of being is simply the same. I answer: it is indeed the same precisely insofar as signified, because thus it imports no diversity even as regards the implicit, in which sense we said that it is simply one and the same in chap. 1; but it is not the same absolutely by exclusion of diversity coming from every source, because in the very state of abstraction it is denominated diverse through the diversity of inferiors not altogether extrinsic to it.

47. Hence the authors of the second opinion suppose gratuitously and contrary to the mind of Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Scotus, as is clear from what has been said, that the definitions of univocals and analogicals speak only of the common notion precisely insofar as signified through the name. Those definitions can indeed be so understood, and in this sense Aristotle and St. Thomas sometimes acknowledge the univocation of true and being,

above n. 34. But more frequently they are understood of the notion signified through the common name, the proper names of the inferiors not being relevant, yet not precisely insofar as signified, that is, not merely according to what it has formally by the force of the common name or concept, but in addition according to the diversity which in the very state of abstraction it has or does not have denominatively reflected upon it from the state of contraction. For if it has such diversity, the notion signified through the name will then be diverse in some respect, although not by the force of the name. Thus in a man an external action, for example walking, is truly a free and human action, although it does not possess this precisely insofar as external, nor by the force of the locomotive power, but by denomination from the internal act. By this example also must be solved what can be objected here, namely that being as such should rather be called absolutely univocal than analogical, since it has the former formally and the latter denominatively. It must, I say, be solved by the example of walking, which although formally a natural action, or one devoid of freedom and voluntariness, is nevertheless called absolutely and simply a free, voluntary, and moral action, because what is possessed only denominatively is often regarded more in our manner of speaking.

What Kind of Analogy Belongs to Being.

48. It is clear from what has been said that the analogy of being is metaphysical, excluding generic agreement, and that it can be called logical at least negatively, insofar as it does not permit univocation to be perfect in the logical sense; although positively logical analogy is said only of that which prevents the unity of reason arising from a common concept, and such analogy must be far removed from being. But since two species of analogy are commonly distinguished, one called "of attribution," the other "of proportionality," while analogy "of proportion" is usually confused sometimes with the one and sometimes with the other, though properly speaking it is none other than that "of attribution," the question now is which of these belongs to being. The Thomists maintain that both belong to being, but in different senses. For if being is taken insofar as it asserts something intrinsically found in each and every inferior, they maintain that it is analogical by proportionality, because it signifies, at least implicitly, a comparison of two or more proportions, namely that the creature is related to finite existence as God is to infinite existence, or accident to its existence as substance to its own. But if being is taken as intrinsically belonging to the principal analogate and only extrinsically denominating the others, they

maintain that it is analogical by attribution, because the creature, by reason of its relation to God, is extrinsically denominated being from Divine being, and similarly accident from substantial being, just as medicine or urine is denominated healthy extrinsically from health intrinsically found only in the animal, which is the principal analogate. For modern Thomists generally reject an analogy of attribution which imports an intrinsic denomination in all the analogates. See Carmelites of Alcalá d. 10, Logic. n. 44, 30 sqq., and d. 11, n. 27; likewise College of St. Thomas at Alcalá q. 7, Logic. n. 28, and again n. 122.

49. But the Scotists and our authors with Fr. Suárez first reject from being the analogy of proportionality, either because such analogy always imports something improper or metaphorical, as in the name "laughter" insofar as it is said of the flowery beauty of a meadow, for which reason it must be excluded from being, since being is said without impropriety of the creature or accident, as the Thomists admit; or because, if some name analogical in this way is properly said of each analogate, as many think concerning the name "principle" insofar as said of the human heart and of the foundation of a house, it always imports several concepts, or one concept representing several as several. For if plurality is not represented as such, univocation is not impeded by that proportional comparison, "as this is related to that, so," and so forth, as we already noted above n. 4, since such a comparison has place in the inferiors of every genus, as the contrary side acknowledges. Hence, because the name being does not signify several as several, but a common notion prescinded from every plurality, it cannot in this way be analogical. Next, they reject analogy of attribution through extrinsic denomination because the name being belongs to the creature or accident immediately and formally by reason of the intrinsic aptitude to exist; nor is it easy to conceive how the denomination "real being" could be extrinsic. And although Aristotle and St. Thomas sometimes explain the analogy of being by the example of the name "healthy," insofar as common to animal, medicine, and urine, they do not therefore intend a parallel in all respects but only in this, that in each case there is attribution, or a relation of one thing to another or of several things to one, although not in the same manner.

50. Finally, the aforesaid authors concede to being an analogy of intrinsic attribution, grounded namely in this, that although the creature is intrinsically being from its own entity, nevertheless this entity asserts an intrinsic and essential relation to God as first being, and similarly the entity of accident to substance as the principal being for whose sake it is. The older Thomists plainly embrace an analogy of attribution of this kind, such as

Cajetan on I^a, q. 13, ar. 6, and Ferrariensis on 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 34, where he notes that it is not contrary to the doctrine of St. Thomas but rather according to his mind. Nor is it an obstacle that certain conditions are absent from it which St. Thomas sometimes requires for analogy of attribution, such as that the notion signified by the name is not really multiplied in the analogates, and that the first analogate is placed in the definition of the others when they are defined under the common name, in the way that animal health is placed in the definition of medicine when the latter is defined insofar as healthy, namely thus, "a cause of health in the animal." This, I say, is not an obstacle, because those conditions are not required for every analogy of attribution, but only for that which is more frequent and imports extrinsic denomination to all analogates except the first.

51. For my part, I assent to our authors in rejecting the analogy of proportionality from being for the reasons alleged n. 49; likewise in asserting an analogy of intrinsic attribution, or through a form intrinsic to all the analogates. Yet, while this analogy stands, I shall not refuse in addition to admit with the Thomists another analogy of attribution through extrinsic denomination, provided that the name being, insofar as analogical in this way, is in no respect univocal, nor properly said of the creature or accident, because its formal signification will be only Divine being or substantial being, just as the formal signification of the name "healthy" is solely the health of the animal. But it should be noted that if St. Thomas, whenever he says that being is analogical by attribution, speaks only of this analogy, as the modern Thomists maintain, he almost always speaks outside the present question; for he speaks of being not in the third or fourth acceptation discussed n. 32, but in the first or second, in which no one says that being is univocal to the creature or accident. Hence, since St. Thomas almost always concedes to being only analogy of attribution, for he is cited for analogy of proportionality only in q. 2, *De veritate* ar. 11, but seems to have abandoned it in I^a, q. 13, ar. 5 and 6, and l. 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 34, he is improperly cited by the Thomists against the univocation of being in the third or fourth acceptation.

Certain Arguments Against the Doctrine Given Are Resolved.

52. Against assertion 1 it is objected 1º from the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas, who not only say that being is analogical but expressly deny that it is univocal; and St. Thomas expressly proves that no name is said

univocally of God and creature, nor "according to the same notion," but so that the notion is partly the same and partly diverse. Therefore they acknowledge no univocation in being. I answer, 1º, from what was just said, Aristotle and St. Thomas speak only of being from itself or through itself, insofar as extrinsically denominating creatures or accidents, as the Thomists are bound to admit according to their doctrine of analogy of attribution. I answer, 2º: they speak of univocation that is such absolutely and simply, or in which the signified notion is the same both logically and metaphysically, or both formally by the force of the name and denominatively from the diversity of the inferiors. This univocation alone they remove from being; and in being they acknowledge a notion partly the same, that is, on the side of abstract signification, and partly diverse, that is, on the side of the diversity of inferiors, which, because it is more than generic and not altogether extrinsic to the common and abstract notion, is denominatively reflected upon the latter. As for the rest, that they admit something of univocation in being is sufficiently clear both from the place cited n. 34 and from the fact that they plainly suppose the unity of the objective concept.

53. It is objected 2º: if being, precisely according to the force of the name or common concept, were univocal, it would be a genus; first because it would be something universal or predicable and nothing other than genus; second because the definition of genus would belong to being, namely "predicable of several things differing in species as what they are." But the consequence is contrary to Aristotle, 3, *Metaphysica* t. 10, and entails contrary to common judgment that the ten predicaments are not supreme genera. I deny the consequence, although it is conceded without fear by several authors, because genus requires mutually distinct differences, or differences in which being is not formally included; but being is formally included in every difference by reason of transcendence. It is replied: this is to deny that being is a genus because some property or attribute of genus is lacking to it, while otherwise the essence and definition of genus are conceded to it, just as if someone conceded that thing A is a rational animal while at the same time denying it to be man because risibility is lacking. I answer: both Aristotle in the cited place and St. Thomas wherever he denies being to be a genus, especially I^a, q. 3, ar. 5, draw the first or only reason from the transcendence or inclusion of being in the differences. Both therefore hold that mutual distinction from the differences belongs to the essence of genus; otherwise they would behave just as if, to prove that a horse is not a man, they perpetually alleged the lack of laughter as the sole or principal reason.

54. Therefore that mutual distinction, or non-transcendence with respect to differences, truly belongs to the essence of genus and is signified in its definition when genus is defined through an order to inferiors differing in species. For the definition speaks properly of an order to inferiors insofar as they are such with respect to the common predicate, and consequently requires that the inferiors thus considered be properly species. And since every species properly so called can be resolved into two mutually distinct concepts, since they make a metaphysical composition, one common and the other differential, it follows that the definition of genus does not belong to a common predicate whose inferiors are not definable through it and another mutually distinct differential concept; since by that very fact such a predicate does not have an order to its inferiors as to its species, or as to things which with respect to it are properly species. See Fr. Suárez d. 39, Met. s. 3, n. 7. Being therefore truly is universal, not only according to us but according to all, especially St. Thomas, who, besides the texts already alleged, in 5, *Metaphysica* lect. 9 declares roundly: "Being is superior to each being as animal is to man." But it is not therefore properly a genus nor one of the Porphyrian predicables, because Porphyry did not speak of transcendentals, as is commonly noted in Logic. Being is nevertheless sometimes called genus, as by St. Thomas in the Prologue to the *Metaphysica* and elsewhere more than once, in a broad and improper sense.

55. It is objected 3º from the transcendence of being: once this is supposed, the notion of being cannot fail, even in the logical sense, to be partly the same and partly diverse, and consequently cannot be logically univocal. The assumption is proved because God and creature, and the same should be understood of substance and accident, so agree in the notion of being that they formally differ in that very notion, since they differ in aseity and ab-aliety, which are formally being and add nothing above being. It is confirmed 1º: those things which differ by the differences rational and irrational do not differ through animal because animal is outside the concept of the differences. Since, therefore, being is not outside the concept of aseity and ab-aliety, things which differ through these differences differ through being. It is confirmed 2º: the notion of being is essentially multiple because it is multiple through itself, since it is not multiple through something which is not formally being; likewise because the differences belong to its essence, since they add nothing above being, in which way the animal of man and the animal of horse belong to the essence of animal as such. Therefore the notion of being is not undivided as univocation requires. I answer: first, all these points can be retorted upon the explicit notion of being. See above n. 20, 23, and 39.

56. Next I deny the assumption. To the proof: God and creature agree in the abstract notion of being, or insofar as signified by the name or confused concept "being"; and they differ in that very notion not as signified by that name or concept, which alone could oppose logical univocation, but as contracted and imbibed in these concepts, "aseity, ab-aliety," which concepts add something above being by an addition importing non-mutual distinction. See above n. 21 and below chap. 5. To confirmation 1º I deny the antecedent if it speaks of animal under the concept "animal"; for thus man and brute could fail to differ through animal even if animal transcended the differences. That causal proposition therefore has force only to prove that man and brute do not differ through animal either as abstracted or as imbibed in the concepts of the differences. But although in this latter way God and creature differ through being, pure agreement in being insofar as abstractly signified is not thereby removed, and consequently neither is logical univocation. To confirmation 2º: if the discourse concerns the abstract notion of being, the antecedent is false in both parts, because the notion of being is prescinded from all multiplicity and difference, as we saw above. Hence it is not essentially differing or formally multiple through itself, but through something which, while formally being, is nevertheless not formally being itself. But human or equine animal, if conceived as proper to man or horse, does not belong to the essence of animal as such, although it is formally animal; neither does man or horse under the simple specific concept. Hence the example rather favors us. But if animal is prescinded from those oblique determinations "of man, of horse," it is then taken under the bare concept "animal."

57. It is objected 4º: no name is univocal with respect to things to one of which it belongs simply and to the other only in a qualified sense, as is clear in the name "healthy" with respect to animal and medicine, and in the name "white" with respect to a wholly fair man and an Ethiopian. But the name "being" is so related to God and creatures, and likewise substance and accident. For God alone is being most fully and totally; creatures, however, by comparison with God, are called in Sacred Scripture almost nothing, and as though they were not. Likewise substance alone is called being simply; accident, however, is called being in a qualified sense by Aristotle and St. Thomas. Therefore this name cannot be univocal with respect to them. It is confirmed: that alone is such simply which is signified by the first imposition of the name; but the name "being" was first imposed to signify that which is being through itself, and consequently God alone or substance alone. I answer: the whole argument is freely conceded if it speaks of metaphysical univocation, or of logical univocation altogether perfect, or of the name

"being" in the 1º or 2º acceptation n. 32. For thus at most it will be analogical by extrinsic attribution and in no way univocal, from what was said n. 51. But if this name is taken in the 3º acceptation, or rather in the 4º, as it is now taken, and the discourse concerns logical univocation truly so called, I grant the major premise when "in a qualified sense" alienates the name to an improper meaning, as happens in the name "healthy" with respect to medicine and in the name "white" with respect to an Ethiopian fair only in his teeth and black in the rest; but I deny it when that addition merely diminishes the perfection of one in comparison with the other and leaves intact the propriety of the common name, as happens here.

58. Thus a drop of water considered separately, by comparison with the Ocean, is water only in a qualified sense and in the existence of water is as though it were not, and as though nothing, while the Ocean is most fully and, as it were, totally water. Yet from this is excluded only univocation under the name "drop" or "Ocean," but not at all under the abstract and confused name "water," which abstracts from great and small and belongs without impropriety to the drop. The same occurs if the comparison is made in corporeal existence between a grain of sand and the entire terrestrial globe; or in the existence of living thing or substance between a tiny worm and an Angel. Similarly, therefore, God and creature cannot be univocal under the name "being from itself" or "being from another," but they can under the confused name "being," which involves no comparison but abstracts from finite and infinite, and in whose signification no mode of participation is included, as St. Thomas taught us above n. 41, and which is properly said of the creature, as is certain, as well as of accident, as the Thomists do not dare deny. Hence the objected examples of "healthy" and "white" are beside the point; for the creature is not being through mere extrinsic denomination as medicine is healthy, nor is it non-being according to some part of itself as the Ethiopian is almost wholly not white, but rather altogether excludes non-being from its quiddity. This same doctrine will easily be applied to substance and accident. Add in our favor the example used by St. Thomas q. 7, *De potentia* ar. 5, ad 8, where he teaches that the name "being" and other such names "are to be considered similarly" with respect to God and creature as the name "hot" with respect to fire and a heated brick, which name is properly said of both, but "more eminently and prior" of fire. Yet nevertheless this name is said univocally of fire and brick according to St. Thomas, as cited above n. 34. Therefore although the name "being" is said of God "prior and more eminently," it can be univocal to God and creature.

59. What was added in the confirmation is openly contrary to St. Thomas, who I^{a}, q. 13, art. 6, teaches that names common to God and creatures, "as regards the imposition of the name," are said by us first of creatures because we know them first. This reason also applies to accident in relation to substance. Therefore the name "being" was first imposed to signify sensible objects, and among these accidents, because of aptitude to exist; afterward it was extended to nobler objects which became known by discourse as apt to exist. And because in these the aptitude to exist is found prior and more perfect, the name "being" is therefore said of them prior and more eminently as regards the thing signified. Nor is substance alone, but accident too, being "simply" or "through itself," if this means the same as "properly and intrinsically."

60. Finally, one can object those arguments by which St. Thomas proves in many ways that no name is said univocally of God and creatures. But these either do not proceed concerning names taken most abstractly, or exclude only physical or metaphysical univocation, or even logical univocation altogether perfect or undiminished by reason of transcendence. For all names common to God and creatures, such as "living, wise, spiritual," and so forth, are transcendental with respect to God because they are implicitly included in all His attributes. To this pertains St. Thomas's argument, 1, *Contra Gentiles* c. 32, namely that a univocal name belongs to several things by participation, whereas nothing is said of God by participation, that is, partially and not according to every mode of perfection. This argument, I say, excludes only the univocation proper to species or genus, where none of the inferiors contains the whole extensive perfection of the common predicate either formally or eminently, and consequently each contains it partially. But if to "participate" a common predicate means nothing other than to contract it to oneself without formally containing all things to which it extends with logical indifference, God certainly "participates" the notion of being, because although He eminently contains whatever is being, He does not contain it all formally.

61. But when St. Thomas intimates that if a creature is defined in the existence of being, God must be placed in its definition, and likewise substance in the definition of accident, because the principal analogate is placed, obliquely, in the definition of the others, as animal health in the definition of medicine insofar as healthy; when, I say, he intimates this, he plainly speaks of the definition of creature or accident in the existence of being through extrinsic denomination from Divine or substantial being, according to n. 51, or in the existence of finite or inhering being. Otherwise there is no doubt that the creature or accident can be defined in the

existence of being taken most abstractly according to the 4º acceptation n. 32 without mention of God or substance; for to one asking why a creature or accident is being it suffices to answer: "Because it is something apt to exist, or having an essence not chimerical or fictitious." This the Thomists also acknowledge when they take being as analogical by proper proportionality. But this proposition, "The creature, insofar as being, depends on God," is true if finite being alone is reduplicated, or if it alludes to the mode by which the creature participates common being; but not if, apart from this allusion, it reduplicates being taken most abstractly. For thus, as we saw from St. Thomas n. 41, being is prescinded from every imperfection and mode of participating, and consequently from all dependence. Hence, if creature insofar as being and God insofar as being are taken in this sense, there is no difference or inequality but identity of reason or intentional indistinction, provided the mental expression "being" is really distinguished from the expression "God" or "creature."

62. Against assertion 2 two things can be objected. 1º, that to being as such, since it has one objective concept perfectly prescinded, the definition of univocals altogether belongs. Therefore being as such is perfectly and simply univocal, just as he is perfectly and simply man to whom the definition of man belongs. 2º, that analogy truly so called destroys all univocation; for it requires that the common notion be partly the same and partly diverse, and consequently does not permit it to be purely the same, as every univocal notion must be. But to 1º we already answered n. 47 that the definition of univocals can be understood either of the notion signified by the name precisely insofar as signified, or as taken purely logically; or of the notion itself considered absolutely in the state of abstraction, both formally and denominatively, or both logically and metaphysically. And in this second way it is to be understood when the question concerns univocation simply, according to the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas. If, however, the definition is understood in this way, it does not belong to being as such.

63. To 2º, we admit that the same thing cannot be analogical and univocal in the same sense, whether physical, metaphysical, or logical. Yet what is analogical physically or metaphysically can be univocal logically, because logical univocation is destroyed only by analogy likewise logical, although it is diminished and as it were overwhelmed by metaphysical analogy. The Scotists rightly warn that analogy is never so pure that it has nothing admixed either of equivocation or of univocation. For if a common name imports several concepts, or one concept representing several as several with some relation or proportionality, as the name "healthy" said of animal and medicine, or the name "dog" said of a terrestrial and marine

animal, then it will be equivocal-analogical, and therefore is everywhere called "equivocal by design"; this alone is analogical in the logical sense. But if it imports a wholly one concept even in its mode of representing, yet is referred to inferiors essentially diverse, then it will be univocal-analogical. Hence analogicals mediate only between "purely" univocal terms, such as the names of an ultimate species, and "purely" equivocal terms, such as names merely fortuitously imposed on several things.

Corollaries.

64. We have hitherto spoken of the analogy of real being taken most abstractly. On this occasion three further questions can be asked. 1º, whether being, insofar as said of real and rational, or fictitious, being, is analogical. 2º, whether real being is univocal to potential being and actual being. 3º, whether complete predicamental being is purely univocal. To question 1º it is commonly answered that being taken in this way is analogical by design, namely by analogy of improper proportionality, such as the name "man" has with respect to a true and painted man, or the name "laughing" with respect to a man and a meadow. For a being of reason, and the same should be understood of mere privation or lack, truly and properly is not being or apt to exist. Real and fictitious being can nevertheless be univocal in some extrinsic predicate, for example in the notion "known" or "extrinsically knowable" as such.

65. To question 2º I answer negatively, taking potential being as it is now taken, for purely possible being, or a being which asserts negation of existence together with aptitude, such as another World. The reason is that potential being, so taken, is more properly non-being than being, indeed properly it is nothing, or intrinsically has no quiddity. Therefore it cannot agree univocally under the notion of being with actual being, but at most analogically, as a true man with a painted man. One may say: real being as such signifies only what is apt to exist or has an essence, prescinding from actual existence; but this is properly verified of a merely possible thing. You will add that this proposition, "Man is being," is of eternal truth, and consequently is properly verified of man before he exists, indeed from eternity. I answer: being as such does indeed prescind from exercised existence insofar as it does not formally include it in its concept, but this is not a prescision of indifference, as though being could properly be preserved in some thing divided from existence, or conjointly with the negation of existence. Thus capable of roaring does not include animal in its concept, yet cannot be verified of a subject which is not really an animal. Likewise the

notion of being and every other common notion is prescinded from every difference, although it cannot be preserved in any thing which really lacks every difference. Existence therefore is required, at least as a condition without which not, for any thing to be properly called as having an essence or an intrinsic aptitude to exist; for what does not really exist, since it is intrinsically nothing, has no intrinsic aptitude. But the proposition "Man is being" is of eternal truth because it has this implicit condition, "whenever he exists," or something similar.

66. To question 3º it must be premised that "complete being" is here taken insofar as it belongs to predicamental degrees placed in a straight line, or on the trunk of the tree, namely those which are predicated of inferiors purely "as what they are," such as genera and species; whereas "incomplete being" is now said insofar as it belongs to differential predicates placed at the sides in each predicament, which are predicated "as qualitative quid." The sense of the question, therefore, is whether being precisely insofar as abstracted from the generic and specific degrees of all predicaments, and in this manner not transcendent because genera and species are mutually distinguished from differences, is univocal. I answer: if the discourse concerns genera and species taken second-intentionally, a univocal notion of being can indeed be abstracted from them under this concept, "Being predicable of several things as what they are." Being thus abstracted will be a certain reflexive genus which Aristotle does not exclude when he denies that the predicaments agree in some genus. But if the discourse concerns genera and species considered first-intentionally, I deny the supposition of the question, namely that the notion of being can be abstracted from these alone so as not to belong to the differences. For among degrees of this kind belonging to all the predicaments, once predicates of second intention are prescinded, no intrinsic agreement in the existence of being can be conceived besides that which is also common to the differences and grounds the abstraction of being as such or of finite being. Nor in this concept "complete being," as now taken with abstraction even from the supreme genera, can it be explained what special thing "complete" adds unless recourse is had to some extrinsic predicate of second intention. Hence, just as the notion of man, purely intrinsic, cannot be abstracted from Kings alone or from wise men alone, so likewise here.

CHAPTER IV.
Whether Being Formally Transcends All Differences.

§ 1. The Meaning of the Question Explained, the Opinions Are Reported.

67. Terms are called "transcendent" when they can be affirmed of all things, as is known from the *Summulae*; and in this sense no one doubts that being is transcendent. Here we are concerned only with "formal transcendence," that is, with the belonging of one thing to the essential concept of another as such. For A is then said formally to transcend B when A is contained within B's formal and quidditative concept. It is thus contained when B, under its proper concept, cannot be defined or quidditatively explained except through A, likewise taken under its own concept, so that A belongs directly, either immediately or mediately, to the definition of the extreme B. I say "directly," that is, as a predicate directly affirmable of B; for it is not enough that it belong obliquely to its definition, that is, as something connoted or as the term of an essential relation, in the way God is placed in the definition of a creature as such, substance in the definition of accident, and so with the rest. Likewise, "immediately or mediately," because, for B to be formally transcended by A, it is enough that B be defined through something definable through A. Thus man is formally transcended not only by animal, through which he is immediately defined, but also by living thing, body, and substance, through which he is only mediately defined, because animal is definable through living thing, this through body, and this through substance.

68. Hence you will infer that formal transcendence is compatible with the imperfect or improper distinction of reason which they call the distinction "according to the implicit and explicit," or that which obtains between a definition and the thing defined; but not with a proper and strict distinction of reason, at least if mutual. For the latter, as we saw in Logic, is constituted through concepts definitively diverse, so that one is neither the explanation of the other nor a part of its explanation. Yet if the distinction "according to the implicit and explicit" implies objective precision, as the modern Thomists maintain, it is not compatible with the transcendence of being. First, because such precision is a perfect intentional separation and exclusion of one thing from the concept of the other, as we showed above, n. 8 sqq. Second, because if a difference can be known without any being being

known on the part of the object, whatever arguments are brought forward for the transcendence of being are plainly rendered ineffective, as will be clear to anyone who considers them. Indeed, I do not sufficiently perceive how, among certain of our authors who defend objective precision, the perfect precision of being can be reconciled with its transcendence. Whatever may be the case concerning this, we shall speak here according to our principles, which admit no precision except formal precision.

69. Now it is beyond doubt that being formally transcends God and all creatures as regards the individuals, species, and genera directly placed in the categories. The sole question is whether it likewise transcends the differences formally taken under their proper concepts. Nor are we speaking only of the differences nearest to being as such, such as aseity, ab-aliety, perseity, and in-aliety, but also of the others dividing genera and species, such as corporeity, sensibility, rationality, Peterhood, etc. Here it should be noted that the Scotists do not wish aseity and ab-aliety to be differences, but intrinsic modes. Yet they dispute at length among themselves about the nature of an intrinsic mode and its distinction from a difference, and for the most part speak obscurely and perplexedly, as may be seen in Mastrius, d. 2, *Metaphysica*, q. 6, a. 1. In general they seem to agree that, when a common notion is distinguished by the nature of the thing from the contracting notion as reality from reality, it is then contracted through a difference; but when it is not so distinguished, it is contracted through an intrinsic mode. And because some of them affirm, while others deny, that being is thus distinguished by the nature of the thing from its immediate contractors insofar as it is common to substance and accident and to the latter's nine Categories, some accordingly call perseity, in-aliety, etc. differences, others modes.

70. We, who wholly reject the formal distinction by the nature of the thing, regard as ruinous whatever is founded upon such a distinction. Nevertheless we admit that, with respect to being, once formal transcendence is posited, there is no difference properly so called; for something is called such a difference only when it is mutually distinguished by reason from the common predicate which it contracts. Hence being from itself and being from another, or also being through itself and being in another, do not properly differ from one another, although they are properly diverse. For although everything that differs is diverse, the converse is not true, according to Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 5, t. 15, and St. Thomas there, lect. 12. Nevertheless "different" is often taken broadly for "diverse," as St. Thomas also warns there; and in this sense any notion of diversity is called a

"difference." It is in this sense that we are now speaking of the differences of being.

71. It must further be carefully noted that we are not here disputing about the transcendence of being taken according to second intention, but only according to first intention. That is, being is not taken according to the extrinsic denominations which it receives from the cognition "being," and which are objects of second intention, for example the denominations "precised and distinguished by reason" from every particular being, "indifferent" to God and creature, "predicable" of substance and accident, or even "formally transcending" all things. For it is certain that denominations of this kind are foreign not only to differences, but also to genera, species, and individuals, which without doubt are formally transcended by being. Being is therefore taken in personal supposition, or according to that being which is the object of first intention, namely insofar as it implies an intrinsic aptitude for existing and opposition to a chimera. This aptitude or opposition must indeed be taken as appearing through the cognition "being" (we are not disputing about other particular cognitions), yet in such a way that this cognition is not reduplicated as something affirmable, even partially, of the differences or inferiors of being, but only as a form of reason denominating that object which is affirmable according to its intrinsic features. You will easily perceive all this by comparing being, not now with differences, but with species or individuals, or by comparing animal with man and horse, where transcendence is indubitable. Yet this controversy can be reduced to formal concepts, from which the denomination "transcending and transcended," transferred to the object, formally proceeds in reality, although fundamentally it depends upon the object itself. For when two apprehensions are so compared that the force and efficacy of one in representing cannot be explained except through the other, then, although they are really distinct from each other, they can be called "transcended and transcending as that by which," because one denominates its object transcending and the other transcended.

72. You will say: to be transcendent is to be intimately included and contained in the essence of another; but this cannot belong to an object through an extrinsic denomination from cognition. Yet, unless recourse is had to Scotistic formal identity or to intrinsic virtual identity, it cannot be denied that formal transcendence implies a work of reason and depends upon cognition representing the object in a certain manner. For on the part of the thing all the metaphysical predicates of any object are one and the same; consequently, there is not one thing transcending and another transcended, nor anything not transcended. What is more transcendent and

more essentially contained than the definition with respect to the thing defined? And yet before the work of reason there is no transcendence of the definition, since there is no definition, just as there is neither genus nor difference. What is more non-transcending, or more formally outside an essence, than a difference with respect to its genus, for example rational with respect to animal? Yet before precisive cognition there is no such non-transcendence or foreignness. Therefore, the intimate inclusion or containment of one thing in the essence of another, when we speak in the formal sense, presupposes the essence of the object as known in a certain way, and implies two cognitions, one of which belongs to the explanation of the other. The cognition which so belongs denominates its object as "definitively belonging" to the essence of the object as known through the other cognition; and this is to denominate it "formally transcending" the essence of that same object and "intimately contained" in it, or rather "apt to be contained." These denominations indeed belong to the object according to first-intentional being; nevertheless, as regards their form, namely cognition, they are extrinsic to the object, just like the denomination "essentially predicable," or "predicable as what," which belongs to a generic or specific notion and which in reality coincides with the denomination "formally transcending," as the latter is now taken. Yet because denominations of this kind are founded upon the real and intrinsic truth of the object, they should be called fundamentally intrinsic.

73. As regards difference, it is here taken according both to first and to second intention. Aseity, for example, is taken according to first intention when it is defined as "necessity of existing without a principle"; but according to second intention when it is defined as a "contraction," or "suchness contracting being to God." Under this aspect it is indeed defined through being, but obliquely, or as through the term of a relation, and therefore transcendence cannot sufficiently be inferred from this alone, as we have already observed. In either way, therefore, the question is whether aseity is transcended by being, so that it is definable directly through being, at least mediately; or whether the intrinsic force and efficacy of its concept cannot be sufficiently perceived and explained unless aseity is understood to be being, or unless being under the concept "being" is essentially affirmed of it. It makes no difference whether aseity or any other difference is or is not capable of a strict definition constituted from difference and genus; for here "definition" is taken for a quidditative explanation of any concept, even a simple one.

74. With these things premised, the first opinion holds that being formally transcends the differences. Thus clearly Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 3, l.

10, and St. Thomas there, lect. 8, and also *Summa contra Gentiles* 1, c. 25, and *De veritate* q. 21, a. 1, and often elsewhere. All the Thomists subscribe to this, and among our authors Fonseca, Vázquez, Hurtado, Alfonso, Compton, Oviedo, Ulloa, and most others, together with Suárez, *Metaphysica*, disp. 2, s. 5 and 6. The second opinion denies the transcendence of being with respect to differences formally taken. Thus all the Scotists with Scotus, who hold the same concerning intrinsic modes and the attributes of being, and among our authors Arriaga, Lynceus, Quirós, Peinado, and many recent authors. These authors say, for example, that perseity is precised from being by a precision "of non-inclusion," and therefore is not being "formally and as that which," although it is being purely "constitutively and as that by which," insofar as it is that by which a determinate being, namely a substantial one, is constituted. Hence perseity, they say, is something, is possible, and is opposed to a chimera, purely "as that by which"; but "formally and as that which" it is neither something nor nothing, neither possible nor impossible, but is precised from all these extremes and formally includes only the predicates "difference, intrinsic mode, contraction, suchness," and the like, because it is defined through them.

75. Yet as regards the Scotists it must be observed that Scotus denies the transcendence of being in ultimate differences, but grants it in non-ultimate differences. He calls a difference non-ultimate when it is not taken from the same physical form from which the notion of the genus is taken, as if man were supposed to consist of two souls, one sensitive and the other intellective, and the difference "rational" were taken from the latter, while the genus "animal" were taken from the former. But he calls ultimate a difference taken from the same physical form or real entity from which the genus is taken, and which stands for the simple reality or formality of that form or entity, as in fact happens in man with respect to the differences "rational" and "sensible," and also in all differences of things that do not consist of several subordinated forms. Nor is it an obstacle that some are subalternate differences, because these also are called by Scotus ultimate in ultimate simplicity, although not in determination. Thus the Scotists understand Scotus, as may be seen in Mastrius, d. 2, *Metaphysica*, q. 7, a. 1 and 2; hence they scarcely differ from the others in the way they take differences. Others, however, explain Scotus's meaning concerning non-ultimate differences otherwise; concerning this see Suárez, cited sect. 5.

76. It must further be observed that several Scotists maintain that the differences do not formally include "being as what," but do include "being as qualitative." They call "being as what" being taken after the manner of a potential whole contractible and determinable by inferiors; but "being as

qualitative" they call being taken after the manner of that which actuates and determines. But Mastrius, cited disp. 2, n. 176 sqq., shows that this is in reality to grant the transcendence of being and to abandon the genuine opinion of Scotus, which, he says, "the older and more candid Scotists follow." Whatever may be said about their candor, I ask whether that "being as qualitative" formally implies an aptitude for existing or opposition to nothing and a chimera. If they deny it, the inclusion of "being as qualitative" is of no use for answering the arguments brought forward for the transcendence of being, as will become clear upon consideration. If they affirm it, as those Scotists seem in reality to affirm, they plainly grant the transcendence of being with which we are here concerned. For being is now taken precisely as expressing that aptitude or opposition to nothing and a chimera. Nor may it be denied that a common notion of being can be abstracted from all things including being, whether "as what" or "as qualitative," since they all truly agree and are assimilated in being opposed to a chimera, etc.; and from this foundation the Scotists prove the abstraction of being from God and creature, etc. The question, therefore, is whether that notion thus abstracted formally transcends the differences.

§ 2. The True Opinion Is Elicited and Proved.

77. In this celebrated and difficult controversy we must hold the first opinion, which asserts transcendence. It immediately appears persuasive from the fact that every difference of being has some true and real essence, that is, one which is neither fictitious nor chimerical; for the concept of aseity or rationality is not chimerical or fictitious. But this is to possess the very essence of being itself, which consequently is essentially contained in every difference. Nor does it help to say that the essence of a difference formally is neither real nor non-real, neither chimerical nor non-chimerical, just as man considered in himself is neither white nor non-white, but is precised from both. This, I say, does not help, because each of the differences of which we speak is formally something positive; otherwise God would not differ formally and positively from a creature through aseity, nor man from a brute through rationality. But to be something positive means the same as to be something real, or non-chimerical.

78. But that the truth of our opinion may appear more clearly, it is proved thus. Aseity, for example, which is a difference or intrinsic mode distinguishing God from a creature, is defined through being or through a predicate which is formally being; therefore it is formally transcended by being. And since the same reasoning holds in the other differences, none

escapes the transcendence of being. I prove the antecedent. First, aseity, if taken according to first intention, is defined through necessity of existing; but this necessity is formally being; therefore. I prove the minor premise: because necessity of existing formally implies a potency or aptitude for existing, just as an object necessarily existing formally contains being apt to exist. But such potency or aptitude is the very essence of being. More clearly: necessity of existing excludes contingency, and therefore the potency not to exist, by reason of which contingency is opposed to necessity; therefore, with still greater reason, it excludes impotence to exist. But that which excludes impotence to exist is formally being, as no one doubts; therefore necessity of existing is formally being.

79. If, with Peinado, tr. 2, *Logica*, d. 3, n. 46, you say that necessity of existing signified substantivally, in which sense it is the whole of God, is formally being, but not when signified adjectivally, the contrary is true. For that necessity is signified adjectivally when it is signified under the concept of a determination or mode essentially determining being so that it exists necessarily. But under this concept necessity of existing formally excludes contingency and impotence to exist, since it is conceived as an essential connection with existence. Therefore, even when signified adjectivally, it is formally being. The point is pressed: that which is conceived as a determination of being to exist necessarily is conceived as a predicate rendering existence necessary to God and essentially due to Him. But this predicate is formally being. I prove it: a predicate rendering existence possible to God is formally being according to all; therefore, with greater reason, a predicate rendering existence necessary and essentially due to God. First, because this is much more in the line of being. Second, because through such a predicate God is no less, indeed more, distant from nothing and a chimera than through possibility or aptitude for existing; and this aptitude, because of its distance from nothing and a chimera, is formally being. Add that a determination of being to necessary existence is essentially incapable of belonging to a chimera; therefore it is essentially distinguished and separated from every chimera and consequently essentially excludes it from its quiddity. But this exclusion is proper to being according to all. Likewise: what is due to the existence of a chimera cannot fail to be conceived as chimerical, that is, as wholly repugnant and impossible, however it be conceived. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, what is due to the existence of a being cannot fail to be conceived as being. But necessity of existing, under the aforesaid concept of determination, is what is due to the existence of being; therefore, etc.

80. Next, if aseity is taken according to second intention, it is defined as "the difference of necessary being," or, if preferred, "the intrinsic mode by which God is distinguished from a creature," or again "the suchness, contraction, determination of being to God." But these predicates are formally being; therefore, etc. I prove the minor premise. 1º As just argued: because each of these predicates is essentially incapable of belonging to a chimera and therefore of itself is distinguished from every chimera; and this is to exclude a chimera and to be being. 2º Because each is conceived as a formality of God, namely as apt to constitute God. But a formality conceived as apt to constitute God is conceived as apt to exist, since God exists according to all His formalities; therefore it is conceived as being. You will say: God exists according to all His formalities taken really, but not formally. On the contrary: I do not intend that every formality of God, taken precisively, be conceived as actually existing, but only that it be conceived as apt to exist really, or in a real state; and this seems undeniable if the formality is conceived as apt to constitute God. But this suffices for it to be formally being, just as being itself as such, taken nominally, is not conceived as existing; nevertheless, because it is conceived as apt to possess existence in a real state, it is conceived as formally being.

81. You will say again: aseity, formally taken, is apt for real existence only by pure identity, by reason of the being whose mode or determination it is and with which it can be really identified. On the contrary: at least aptitude for possessing real existence by identity belongs to the concept of a formality of God. But this aptitude is formally being. I prove it: aptitude for possessing chimerical existence by identity is formally a chimera; therefore, conversely, so too is aptitude for possessing real existence formally being, since the reasoning is the same. Certainly such aptitude, as also identifiability with real being, is essentially repugnant to every chimera. The same arguments can easily be applied to any difference, for example the rationality of man. For this is conceived as a formality apt to constitute man existing really according to all his formalities. It is also conceived as a suchness and determination of real being, really identifiable with it, or at least essentially connected with it no less than a physical mode with the thing whose mode it is; and therefore, according to the adversaries, a difference is not precised from being by a precision of indifference, but only by a precision of non-inclusion. By this very fact rationality is conceived as entirely foreign to every chimera, or as essentially repugnant to a chimera, and therefore as being. Add that rationality is that by which man is distinguished from every non-man; for this is the proper office of a difference as such, to distinguish a species from everything that is not itself,

as logicians know. Therefore rationality, insofar as it is a difference, distinguishes man from a chimera, because every chimera is a non-man. But that by which man is distinguished from a chimera is being; therefore.

82. Furthermore, the true opinion is confirmed. 1º Perseity, for example, which is the difference of substance, formally excludes its contradictory, and indeed positively, since its contradictory, namely "non-perseity," is negative; therefore it is formally being and consequently is formally transcended by being. The consequence is evident: because, if the antecedent is true, perseity formally excludes from itself the implication of contradiction and therefore repugnance to existing; and this is formally to be opposed to a chimera, or to be formally being. The antecedent, which Peinado denies, ibid., d. 3, n. 32, because, he says, perseity is formally only those predicates through which it is defined and is not defined through exclusion of its contradictory, but only through the "suchness and determination" of being to substance, is effectively proved thus. Perseity formally is that through which it is defined; therefore it is formally a predicate distinguishing it from everything that is not itself, since such a predicate belongs to the concept of every definition. Therefore it is formally a predicate distinguishing it from its contradictory, because nothing is more non-perseity than its contradictory. But such a predicate formally excludes the contradictory of perseity; therefore perseity formally excludes its contradictory. I prove the minor premise of the subsumption, because that predicate is neither formally identified with the contradictory of perseity, as is manifest, nor formally precised from it; otherwise it would not distinguish perseity from its contradictory, just as a predicate which is formally precised from darkness does not distinguish light from darkness.

83. The same point is pressed. 1º These concepts, "perseity, non-perseity," taking "non" not infinitely, as they say, but purely negatively, are contradictories in the formal sense; otherwise one could say without contradiction of the difference of substance, "it is formally perseity; it is not formally perseity." But the concept "non-perseity" formally excludes perseity, as is evident; therefore "perseity" likewise formally excludes non-perseity, for of two contradictories one does not exclude the other more than it is excluded by the other. Add that every contradiction necessarily concerns being and non-being, as Peinado admits, loc. cit.; hence if contradiction concerns those concepts formally taken, one must formally include being, the other non-being. 2º Perseity formally excludes from itself these concepts: "suchness, non-suchness; contraction of being, non-contraction." Therefore it formally excludes the contradictory of its own predicates, and consequently is formally something possible, or being. I

prove the antecedent: perseity is formally the very thing through which it is defined rather than not that thing; otherwise it would no more be than not be its own formal quiddity, nor could it ever be determinately conceived what perseity formally is. For whatever you say it is, I would no more conceive it formally to be that than not that. Since, therefore, perseity is defined through suchness and contraction of being, it is formally suchness rather than non-suchness, and contraction of being rather than non-contraction. But this cannot stand if perseity does not formally exclude from itself the concepts placed in the antecedent, as is clear both from the terms and by induction in similar cases; for that which does not exclude from itself the concept "man, non-man" is no more man than non-man, and so with the rest. 3º Perseity is formally a determination of being; therefore it is formally opposed to non-determination of being and consequently to its contradictory. Peinado denies the consequence, l.c., n. 83; but with equal right it could be denied that light is formally opposed to darkness, or man to non-man, or being to non-being. Surely determination, in the very sense in which it is determination, is opposed to indifference. If, therefore, it is determination in the formal sense, in that sense it is opposed to indifference, certainly for no other reason than because indifference is non-determination.

84. The true opinion is confirmed 2º. Perseity is formally a perfection; therefore it is formally being. The consequence is legitimate, because perfection is goodness, and goodness taken transcendentally either is formally the essence of being or presupposes it in the subject to which it belongs. I prove the antecedent: perseity formally taken is that title by which alone substance is rendered formally more perfect than accident. For substance is not rendered more perfect through the title of being as co-distinguished from the differences, since this title belongs to accident without distinction. But substance cannot through the title of perseity alone be rendered more perfect than accident if perseity is not formally a perfection; therefore. I prove the minor premise: because if perseity is not formally a perfection, no perfection accrues to substance by title of perseity. But substance cannot become more perfect than accident solely by a title through which no perfection accrues to it; therefore, etc. Otherwise: if perseity is not formally a perfection, being acquires from the addition of perseity no perfection beyond that proper to abstract being insofar as it is common to accident. But by a title under which being acquires no perfection beyond that common to accident, it is not rendered more perfect than accident. Therefore by the addition of perseity, or insofar as it is being through itself, it does not become more perfect than accident. The same

point is pressed more clearly in aseity, by reason of which being from itself, that is, God, is formally rendered infinitely better and more perfect being than a creature. For how could this stand if through aseity no perfection were added to being, but only a formality precised from perfection and non-perfection? I ask: does aseity perfect being or not? If it does not perfect it, how is being rendered infinitely perfect? If it does perfect it, then it is a perfection; for nothing is rendered perfect except by perfection, just as nothing is white except by whiteness, and nothing luminous except by light.

85. You will say with Quirós and Peinado: although perseity is not formally a perfection, it is nevertheless a greater degree, excess, or increase of perfection, and aseity is an infinite greater degree and superiority; this suffices for the perfection of being to be rendered greater by perseity, and infinitely greater and better by aseity. But against this, 1º because it appears sufficiently absurd that aseity formally and by reason of itself should not be something better, more estimable, and more desirable than ab-aliety, nor should simply perfect being. Certainly a greater degree and excess of perfection, especially an infinite one, is lovable and desirable by reason of itself, from the very terms and from common apprehension. But insofar as it is desirable, it unquestionably has goodness. 2º Because a greater degree of perfection formally excludes a lesser degree of perfection; therefore with still greater reason it excludes the nullity of perfection. But such nullity certainly is not excluded except by some perfection. 3º Because, if a greater degree is not formally a perfection, it adds no perfection to being; but being cannot be rendered more perfect without the addition of perfection; therefore. I prove the minor premise by the example of physical intensification, which all the adversaries teach necessarily occurs through the addition of degree to degree, precisely because, for example, a subject cannot be rendered hotter without the addition of heat. But the same or a stronger reason applies here, as will be clear upon consideration. And why should Thomists not equally be permitted to say that a greater radiation of heat, although not formally heat, is nevertheless a greater degree of heat?

86. 4º Because the argument of n. 84 still presses. For if perseity is a greater degree of perfection in such a way that in itself it is nevertheless neither a perfection nor perfect, it follows that the formal constituents of substance are not in themselves more perfect than the constituents of accident. For the formal constituents of substance are "the notion of being and perseity," and the formal constituents of accident are "the notion of being and in-aliety." Of these, the notion of being, as co-distinguished from the differences, is formally the same in both; while perseity, if not formally perfect, is not in itself more perfect than in-aliety. But that whose formal

constituents, considered in themselves, are not more perfect than the constituents of another is not formally more perfect than the other, as seems self-evident. Substance, therefore, will not be formally more perfect than accident. This is further clarified: two metaphysical composites, the form of one of which does not exceed the form of the other in entitative perfection, nor the matter of the one the matter of the other, are not unequal composites in entitative perfection, as is clear in physical composites, after the likeness of which we reason concerning metaphysical ones. But in the doctrine of the opposing side, "being through itself and being in another," that is, substance and accident, are two metaphysical composites in which neither does matter exceed matter, since the same notion of being is as matter in each, nor does form exceed form in entitative perfection, since "perseity and in-aliety," which are their forms as co-distinguished from matter, do not possess entitative perfection but are precised from it by a precision of non-inclusion. Therefore those composites are not unequal in entitative perfection.

87. Nor perhaps should it be said that one of these forms is more perfect than the other, not "as that which" but "as that by which." For to be more perfect "as that by which" is nothing other than to be that by which a more perfect composite is constituted. But if a form is neither a perfection nor perfect "as that which," that is, in itself and by reason of itself, it cannot be that by which a more perfect composite is constituted, supposing equality or identity of matter, as the arguments just adduced directly prove. Therefore, etc. What is more repugnant than that one collection of parts should be constituted more perfect than another collection when the parts of both, compared individually with one another, are equal in perfection, or at least not unequal, in themselves and "as that which"? Indeed, by this solution the mathematical principle "Equals added to equals do not make unequals" could be evaded; for one could invent things equal "as that which" which are unequal "as that by which," that is, which, notwithstanding the equality belonging to them in themselves, are apt together with other equal co-parts to make or constitute unequal composites. Hence you will infer that certain examples which the adversaries customarily object are useless. The rational soul, they say, although it is neither a body nor corporeal "as that which," nevertheless constitutes a complete body; unity constitutes number and is not number; abstractive cognition is predicable "as that by which," not "as that which"; rationality is not formally animal and is that by which a more perfect animal is constituted. Similarly, therefore, although perseity is neither entity nor perfection formally and "as that which," it will be able to constitute a more perfect being.

88. These examples, I say, are useless. First, because they could equally be adduced against the mathematical principle just mentioned. Second, because they would also attack the intensification of a quality through degrees. Third, because they prove that a real composite can be given from non-real parts, or a being physically constituted from pure non-beings, just as a number is given constituted from pure unities, none of which is number. They also prove that the constituent of being could have in itself and predicated of itself something directly opposed to being, just as the human soul in itself is "spirit," and abstractive cognition is "singular" in itself and of itself, which are predicates directly opposed to "body" and "universal." Hence some formality could be being "as that by which" and a chimera "as that which." We therefore do not maintain generally that the denomination of the whole belongs to every part, nor that "that which" and "that by which" always reciprocate; for this is evidently false. We maintain only that transcendental, or most general, predicates, namely "being, good," etc., cannot belong to the whole unless they belong to the parts, because it is self-evident that a being cannot be constituted from non-beings, nor something real from non-realities, and for the same reason not from things precised from reality and entity. Upon these predicates is founded the aptitude to constitute any positive denomination; and therefore their "that which" and "that by which" necessarily reciprocate in the parts, because the latter "that by which" must be founded upon the former "that which."

89. Finally, the true opinion is confirmed: some predicate must be admitted which formally transcends all differences; therefore the common being ought to be such a predicate. First, because no other claims transcendence by a better title. Second, because in any other thing thus transcending, the arguments by which the transcendence of being is attacked are manifestly broken. I prove the antecedent: because at least the predicate "difference," or "suchness," or "contraction," is formally contained in all differences, since all are defined through "suchness," etc. Some deny that a common notion of "suchness" can be abstracted from all differences. But without reason, because all differences are similar in the being of suchness, that is, in the office of determining and contracting some common notion; nor is there any difference of which the concept "suchness" is not properly verified, although that concept of itself designates none in particular and is not definable through aseity, rationality, etc. Hence this concept is truly common and abstract by the same title as the concept "being."

90. Others deny that the notion of suchness as such ever transcends its differences, because it is not contracted to the differences of being except

through further suchnesses which it does not transcend. Perseity, for example, they say, can be resolved into two concepts, one of which is suchness in common, while the other is a further suchness, or contraction of suchness as such, by which it is not transcended. If you object that a common notion of suchness can again be abstracted from this further suchness and other similar ones, they say that a new notion of suchness can indeed be abstracted, but one formally diverse from the preceding, to which another still further suchness and contraction corresponds, which it does not formally transcend; and so to infinity. But no matter how infinitely many suchnesses of suchnesses you invent, it must be verified of all of them that they are suchnesses and determinations of some common predicate. Therefore this concept, "suchness of some common predicate," formally transcends them all. Nor is it an obstacle that they are referred to diverse common predicates. For this also happens in the specific differences of animal and tree, from which nevertheless the common notion "specific difference" can be abstracted. Add that this concept, "a formality precisible from being and non-being," or this, "a formality not transcended by being," or again this, "a formality precisible from and not transcended by the common notion which it connotes," is a concept necessarily transcending all conceivable differences, if the doctrine of the adversaries is true, as will be evident upon consideration.

CHAPTER V.

The Contrary Arguments Are Answered.

91. It is objected 1º: perseity, for example, is not defined directly through being; therefore it is not formally transcended by being. I prove the antecedent. 1º Because perseity is defined as "suchness of being, or determination of being to substance," where being is placed only obliquely, or as something connoted, in the way God is placed in the definition of a creature as such. 2º Because perseity is defined as a formality adjoining and supervening upon being; therefore it is not defined directly through being nor does it include being; otherwise it would be conceived as adjoining and supervening upon itself. Confirmation 1º: either perseity is defined through being alone or also through something other than being. If the first is said, perseity will not differ formally from in-aliety, for the latter too would have to be defined through being alone. If the second, perseity includes a predicate formally other than being and consequently not transcended by being. Confirmation 2º: at least being under the concept "being" is not the adequate definition of perseity; otherwise being and perseity would be

convertible, like man and rational animal. Therefore being is not the entire essence of perseity, but at most a part of its essence. Therefore something essential besides being is given in perseity.

92. To the objection, I deny the antecedent, because perseity is defined, at least mediately, directly through being, since it is defined through predicates which are formally being even when it is defined as "suchness of being, or determination of being, etc." For suchness or this determination is necessarily conceived as apt to exist and as repugnant to a chimera, as we have sufficiently shown. To 1º of the proof: it makes no difference that mention of being is made obliquely in that definition, if it is proved from elsewhere that being is formally included in the direct concept. For such mention, although it does not prove formal inclusion, does not prevent it. Certainly several concepts directly contain the very thing which, by their manner of signifying, they connote or imply obliquely; as is clear in these: "nature of heat, essence of perseity, quiddity of being, intrinsic possibility of being, aptitude of a thing for existing."

93. To 2º of the proof: perseity is neither defined nor conceived as adjoining and supervening upon being as a difference properly so called, nor as a form added to a subject with a mutual distinction so as to compose with it; but only as something distinguished from being non-mutually, contracting and limiting the indifference of being as such without metaphysical composition. Although, properly speaking, perseity does not "adjoin" being, even though it is conceived after the manner of something adjoining, or under the species of an adjoining form, just as an Angel is conceived under the species of a young man; for this name is proper to a form which does not include in its quiddity the subject to which it accrues. It may nevertheless properly be called "superadded or supervening" upon being, because it is not formally included in the concept of being, although it itself includes being in its concept. Hence perseity does not supervene upon itself, because the being upon which it supervenes is not perseity itself, although perseity is being. And when St. Thomas says that "nothing can be added to being," he adds by way of explanation, "in the manner in which a difference is added to a genus."

94. To confirmation 1º: perseity is not defined through being alone under the bare concept "being"; consequently, it is also defined through something other than being by a non-mutual otherness, that is, by an otherness which includes being in such a way that it is not included in being, just as man under the concept "man" is other than animal. But this otherness does not prevent transcendence, as is clear from the same example. To confirmation 2º, I grant the antecedent, because we intend only that being belong to the

definition of perseity, just as according to all it belongs to the definition of substance, although by itself it does not explain substance. Yet I distinguish the consequence: being is not the entire essence of perseity, and the entire essence of perseity is not being, I deny; so that nevertheless the entire essence of perseity is being, I grant the consequence as regards the first part, but absolutely deny it as regards the second, because being is not a part of the essence of perseity, since no other co-part corresponds to it, nor is perseity resolvable into two mutually distinct concepts. You will say: therefore being is not something of perseity. I distinguish: it is not something of perseity actually, I grant, otherwise it would not be abstracted from perseity; aptitudinally or potentially, as they say, insofar as it can be predicated quidditatively of perseity, I deny the consequence. And if perfect universality is preserved in actual predication, being will be predicated of perseity, not as its entire essence, nor as a part of its essence, but as that with which the entire essence of the subject is identified. I speak of being under the concept "being"; for under the concept "perseity," which is truly a concept of being, being is indeed the entire essence of perseity.

The Non-Mutual Distinction of Reason Is Defended.

95. The solution just given, which will later also be useful for other arguments, rests upon non-mutual precision and distinction of reason. By virtue of this, being is precised and distinguished by reason from perseity, and understand the same of the remaining differences, although perseity is not conversely precised or distinguished by reason from being, but rather is formally identified with it. This doctrine is in reality the principal hinge of this controversy, or of the defense of our opinion. Nor must we have recourse with the Thomists to mutual formal inclusion, as though being implicitly implied the differences just as it is implied by them; for this supposes that being is not precised from the differences except according to the explicit, which has been sufficiently refuted above. But against the non-mutual distinction of reason it is objected: 1º there is parity with real distinction, which cannot fail to be reciprocal. 2º Otherwise the dialectical rules of Conversion would fail when one proceeds in the formal sense. For one would argue badly thus: "Every difference is formally being; therefore some being is formally a difference"; and the same would occur in other conversions. The principle "Things which are the same as one third thing, etc." would also fail, for perseity and aptitude for existing would each be formally identified with one formally single being, yet aptitude for existing would not formally be perseity.

96. 3º The identity of perseity with being is either adequate or inadequate. If adequate, the whole of perseity will be the whole essence of being, and thus being could not be distinguished from perseity unless it were distinguished from its whole essence. If inadequate, perseity will stand to being either as part to whole or as whole to part, and in either way both identity and distinction cannot fail to be mutual, as will be clear upon consideration. 4º If being is distinguished from perseity, it excludes it from its essence; therefore perseity will be excluded from the essence of being, for there is no excluding thing without an excluded thing. Therefore perseity could not be formally identified with the essence of being unless one absurdly said that it is identified with that from which it is excluded. Nor could being be formally included in perseity unless it were posited as included in the very thing which excludes it from itself and outside which it is. These arguments, however, do not press if the distinction of reason is rightly understood, which means the same as formal distinction among those who reject Scotistic formal distinction, as explained by us in *Logica*, tr. 2, disp. 1, especially c. 8.

97. A distinction of reason is only between objects as known by certain cognitions; indeed it consists in the cognitions themselves, not just any cognitions, but such that one does not belong to the explanation of the other, nor do both have a common explanation adequate to each. Hence it follows that the object of one as such is denominated "definable independently" of the object of the other as such, that is, as known through the other; and this is to be formally, or by reason, distinguished from it. If the cognitions can be compared reciprocally in this way, there will be a mutual distinction of reason, and they will denominate the objects as mutually formally distinct. Such are these concepts, "animal, rational." For because the object known through the cognition "animal" can be defined according to the import of this cognition without saying that it is rational under this name or another wholly equivalent one, and the same conversely happens to the object known through the cognition "rational," which likewise can be defined according to the import of that cognition without saying that it is animal, animal and rational are therefore mutually formally distinguished. But if the cognitions are not reciprocally compared in this way, but rather cognition A, as regards its explanation, depends upon cognition B, while B does not thus depend upon A and is not its total explanation, they will constitute a non-mutual distinction of reason and consequently a non-mutual formal identity; and object A will be denominated formally identified with object B, while at the same time object B will be denominated formally distinct from object A. Such is the relation

between these cognitions, "man, animal." For because the object cannot be defined according to the import of the cognition "man" unless it is said to be animal, while the object can nevertheless be defined according to the import of the cognition "animal" without saying that it is man, there is therefore a non-mutual distinction of reason between man and animal.

98. That such a distinction involves no repugnance is evident, 1º from this very example of animal and man, whose defense see above, nn. 18 and 19; see also the example taken from Thomistic doctrine in n. 20, and other similar examples which no one should reject. 2º On the contrary, because no contradiction follows from one cognition's depending upon the other as regards its explanation while the converse does not hold. For the same thing is not thereby affirmed and denied of the same subject; dependence is affirmed of one cognition and denied of the other. And although the object of both is really the same, nevertheless the denominations "formally distinct" and "formally indistinct or identified," which are indeed extrinsic from what was said at n. 72, are not supplied by the same cognition but by diverse cognitions, at least according to the direct aspect of the denominating form.

99. Hence the difficulties objected in nn. 95 and 96 are easily solved. To 1º, the parity is denied, because a distinction of reason, however proper it may be called in the line of reason, is absolutely improper and metaphysical, as we saw in Logic; hence everything belonging to real distinction need not be found in it. Thus, just as you would argue ineptly that there is no non-vital innate appetite from the parity of elicited appetite, which is always and necessarily vital, so here. Add that real distinction is explained through the negation of real unity between the extremes, and this negation cannot fail to be mutual, just like the negation of real union. But a distinction of reason is explained through the independence of one thing from another with respect to definition; and independence by the very terms need not be mutual, as obvious examples demonstrate.

100. To 2º, the inference is denied. To the example adduced there, we say that the conversion is valid if the subject of the converse, namely "some being," means the same as "some one of the particular beings," as it in fact does in common usage. But if "some being" means "something known by the expression 'being' alone," the conversion is invalid, because the predicate of the converted proposition is not made to stand for the subject of the converse proposition, as the rules of conversion require. For the converted proposition, "Every difference is formally being," yields this sense: "Every difference as such is definable through being," where the predicate is "definable through being." But this predicate does not coincide with the

subject "something known by the expression 'being' alone." For substance under the concept "substance" is not known by the expression "being" alone, although it is definable through being. Therefore, in order that the conversion be correct, the converted proposition must first be expounded as just stated; and then the converse must be formed thus: "Something definable through being is formally a difference." You have an example in this conversion: "Every man is formally animal; therefore some animal is formally man." This is certainly valid if "some animal" means, as it usually does, "some one of the species of animal"; but not if it means "something known by the expression 'animal' alone," because it then does not coincide with the predicate of the converted proposition, as will be clear from its exposition. Once the converted proposition has been expounded, however, it can legitimately be converted thus: "Therefore something definable through animal is formally man." Nor is it novel that some propositions cannot be converted unless first expounded or resolved, as is usually noted in the *Summulae*.

101. Hence you will infer that this proposition is true: "No animal is formally man," or "rational animal," if "no animal" means "no object as known by the expression 'animal' alone." Hence in this sense the following syllogism does not conclude, although it seems to be formed in Celarent: "No animal is formally rational animal; but every man is formally animal; therefore no man is formally rational animal." For it in reality has four terms, since the subject of the major premise means "known by the expression 'animal' alone," while the predicate of the minor premise means "definable through animal," since the minor yields this sense: "Every man as such is definable through animal." But these are unquestionably two terms, because something can be definable through animal although it is not known by the expression "animal" alone, as is clear in man known by the expression "man." Hence in that syllogism the consequence must be denied even after granting the premises. The same must be done by everyone in this other syllogism: "No animal is formally rational," taking "no animal" in the aforesaid sense; "but every man is formally animal; therefore no man is formally rational." You will easily apply these things to being and perseity. As for what was added in the objection concerning the principle "Things which are the same as one third thing, etc.," it has no weight; for that principle speaks of a "third thing" which is really one, and it cannot be adapted to a "third thing" which is intentionally one, since it is most certain that man and horse under their proper concepts are not identified with one another, although under those concepts each is animal, which is intentionally one.

102. To 3º, we choose the first alternative and say that the identity of perseity with being is adequate but not mutual. For the whole of perseity is the entire essence of being in such a way that nevertheless the entire essence of being is not the whole of perseity nor an actual part of perseity. Hence formal identity on the side of perseity is adequate, on the side of being none; distinction conversely is none on the side of perseity, adequate on the side of being. Nor does it therefore follow that being is distinguished from its own essence when it is distinguished from perseity; it follows only that it is distinguished from that which is the essence of being non-mutually, and consequently from that from which the entire essence of being is distinguished. According to this doctrine one must understand what we said above, n. 20, namely that it involves no contradiction that A be formally B and yet be neither the whole essence nor a part of the essence of B, namely by mutual identity. Although this could be understood as having been said dialectically because of the example there premised from Thomistic doctrine. The solution now given is explained by the example so often urged. For the whole man under the concept "man," under which he has no distinction of formalities, is formally identified with animal. The whole man, I say; for insofar as he has no parts under that concept, he cannot be identified except wholly. And yet animal as such is neither formally the whole man, nor does it include him, nor is it an actual part of him, nor is animal precised from its own essence when it is precised from man.

103. To 4º, I grant the antecedent and the first consequence, taking exclusion for indefinability, or for independence as regards definition. But I deny the second consequence, because perseity is excluded in such a way that it is not itself the excluder; and it can without any absurdity be formally identified with that from which it is formally excluded, because this means nothing other than that perseity depends for its definition upon that which does not conversely depend upon perseity. Repeat the example of man and animal. The same example proves that it is not absurd for being to be formally included in that which formally excludes it from itself and outside which being formally is; for this is likewise verified of animal with respect to man. "Inclusion" here does not signify inclusion of something located in a place, nor of a part in a whole, but merely the belonging of being to the definition of perseity. "Exclusion," on the other hand, signifies the independence of being from perseity as regards its own definition. But this independence does not conflict with that belonging. Nevertheless, "formal inclusion" is often taken for the implicit containment of one thing in another; and in this sense being with respect to perseity is "included and excluding" through diverse concepts: "included" through the concept

"perseity," "excluding" through the concept "being." Nor does the word "include" denote here any inequality between the including and the included, but only intimate identification, in the way being is said to include its essence, perseity its quiddity, and so forth.

Remaining Objections and Solutions.

104. It is objected 2º: substance formally differs from accident, but it does not differ in the formal notion of being; therefore it differs in some formality which is not being, and this formality can be no other than perseity. Having granted the major premise, I distinguish the minor: it does not differ in the formal notion of being as known under the concept "being," I grant; as known under the concept "perseity," I deny the minor and the consequence. When we speak in the formal sense, substance and accident are presupposed as known through their proper concepts, namely either these quasi-specific concepts, "substance, accident," or these quasi-differential concepts, "perseity, in-aliety." But both are truly concepts of being, not only because they attain being on the part of the object, but also because they are not properly precised from being on the part of the act; for on the part of the act they implicitly contain the formal notion of being, that is, the notion of being as it appears under the concept "being." For they are definable through that concept, although they are not convertible with it. Therefore to differ through such concepts is truly to differ in the formal notion of being, not insofar as it is explicitly represented through the concept "being," but insofar as it is implicitly known on the part of the act through the proper concepts of substance and accident. There is no repugnance in two things agreeing purely in some formal notion as explicitly known through concept A and at the same time differing in that same notion as implicitly known through concepts B and C, which are not convertible with A but are less extensive. Thus all differences both agree and differ formally among themselves in the notion of "suchness," from what was said at the end of the preceding chapter.

105. But you reply 1º: substance does not formally differ from accident through that predicate the entire formal notion of which belongs to accident. But if perseity has nothing which is not formally being, the entire formal notion of perseity belongs to accident and will be contained in the formal concept of accident; therefore substance does not formally differ from accident through perseity. I prove the minor premise: because the entire formal notion of perseity will be the notion of being, and this whole notion belongs to accident. Or otherwise: once transcendence is admitted,

no formal notion is found in substance which is not a formal notion of being; but the entire formal notion of being belongs to accident. Therefore no formal notion is found in substance which does not belong to accident, and consequently substance would formally differ from accident in no respect. I answer: the doctrine of the preceding number could also be adapted here. But more readily, to the first syllogism, after granting the major premise, I deny the minor, notwithstanding its proof. For from the fact that the entire formal notion of perseity is a notion of being, and that this whole notion, namely intensively, belongs to accident and is contained in its formal concept, it does not follow that the entire formal notion of perseity belongs to accident unless the identity of perseity with the notion of being is mutual. For if the entire notion of being is not conversely the entire notion of perseity, the former can indeed belong to accident while the latter does not, and the former without the latter can belong to the formal concept of accident. That the identity is not mutual is sufficiently clear from what has been said. Hence to the second syllogism, the premises being granted, I deny the consequence. Or, if preferred, I distinguish the major premise: no formal notion, etc., which is not a formal notion of being by mutual identity, I deny; by non-mutual identity, I grant the major and minor premises and deny the consequence.

106. You have a parallel instance against the adversaries if you compare two differences with each other. For in neither is anything found which is not formally suchness, or a notion of suchness; yet this notion likewise belongs to the other. Likewise if you compare man and horse under the specific concepts "man, horse," which concepts neither make nor presuppose an actual distinction of formalities, the entire formal notion of man under the specific concept is the notion of animal, and this entire notion belongs to horse. From the doctrine given, this proposition must be denied: "The notion of being is the formal notion of accident," or "of inaliety"; and generally every proposition in which some inferior notion is formally predicated of a common notion must be denied. For although the common notion is formally predicated of its inferiors, the converse does not hold because of non-mutual identity. Nor does it mean the same thing to say that the notion of being is contained in the formal concept of perseity, or in the formal notion of substance, and to say that it is the formal notion of substance or perseity. For the former requires only that the notion of being belong to the definition of perseity after the manner of a superior and inconvertible concept; the latter requires that it be a total explanation convertible with perseity, as "rational animal" is with man.

107. Hence, although perseity on its side is no less identified with being than man with rational animal, and differs from being only according to the explicit, nevertheless being on its side is less identified with perseity than rational animal is with man; indeed it is in no way formally identified with perseity, nor does it differ only according to the explicit, but is wholly distinguished as a perfectly precised concept which does not formally include perseity. Hence also substance and accident do not differ only according to diverse expressions of the same formal notion; rather, they truly differ according to formal notions diverse from one another. These indeed are formally identified with the same formal notion of being and on their side do not differ from it except according to the explicit; but because that same notion of being is not conversely identified with them, it permits them to be formally diverse from one another. Hence, furthermore, you would falsely say that everything formally identical with a common notion belongs to the essential concept of that common notion, unless you add "by mutual identity"; for otherwise man and horse under their proper concepts would belong to the essential concept of animal as such. Hence, finally, you will solve many other propositions and forms of argument, all of which it would be endless to review. Certain matters relevant here must also be reread above, c. 2 and c. 3 from n. 55.

108. You reply 2º: substance formally taken is either being precisely, that is, only being, or it is being and something else. If the first is said, substance will not formally differ from accident, which will likewise be being precisely. If the second, there will already be in substance a predicate distinct from being and therefore not formally transcended by being. This argument, however, has a parallel in substance taken really. In that sense, if substance is only being, it will not really differ from accident; if it is being and something else, something in substance will not really be being. Therefore substance in the formal sense is being precisely if "precisely" excludes everything else of which being is not formally predicated. It is not, however, being precisely if by this adverb one excludes also everything else which is not formally predicated of being. For substance is not only being, but also something else which is not formally predicated of being, although being is formally predicated of it. More briefly: substance is being and something else by a non-mutual otherness, but not by a mutual otherness.

109. You reply 3º: if there is nothing in substance and accident which is not formally being, substance will be similar to accident in every formality, and therefore supremely similar, or no less similar than one man to another; for there is no greater similarity than one which comprehends all formalities. This argument can likewise be urged in the real sense, in which

substance would similarly be supremely similar to accident, since it is similar according to its whole self, having nothing which is not really being. Therefore I deny the inference, because similarity is not rendered supreme by comprehending every formality in just any way, but by founding univocal concepts from the supreme genus down to and including the lowest species. But similarity between substance and accident is found in every formality in such a way that every formality of each founds only a concept common beyond the generic level.

110. You will insist: substance in the formal sense is not purely similar to accident; therefore it has something in which it is similar and something in which it is dissimilar. Having premised the parallel instance in the real sense, I distinguish the consequence as regards the second part: something in which it is purely dissimilar, I deny; something in which it is dissimilar not purely, I grant the consequence. No pure dissimilarity is possible between positive formalities, since at least they must agree in being apt to exist and to constitute something real; just as, according to the adversaries, they agree in being beings "as that by which," or suchnesses and determinations of being. Hence substance, in the very thing in which it is dissimilar from accident with the dissimilarity by which each is not being through itself, is formally similar to it with the similarity by which each truly is being. See what was said in Logic concerning formal distinction by the nature of the thing. You will insist again: a pure agreement of substance and accident can be conceived, as happens through the concept "being"; therefore their pure disagreement or dissimilarity can likewise be conceived. I grant the antecedent concerning agreement taken for unity of notion. But I deny the consequence, because although substance and accident under the concept "being" can be defined independently of the proper concepts by which they differ, under no proper concept can they be defined independently of the agreement expressed by the concept "being." Hence this proposition must be granted: "Substance contains nothing formally in which it does not agree with accident," provided that the word "agree" signifies a similarity which is not pure.

111. It is objected 3º: if perseity is formally being, it will be the entire quiddity of substance; therefore it will not be the difference of substance, nor will it be a contraction or determination of being to substance. Consequently being will not be contractible or determinable to inferiors through any superadded concept, but will be contracted and determined through itself. Likewise, substance is ineptly defined through "being through itself," just as man would be ineptly defined through "rational animal" if rational were formally animal. Furthermore, "being through itself" would

signify nothing other than "being and being." To the objection, I grant the antecedent, because "perseity and substance" differ only according to the manner of signifying by which they imitate abstract and concrete, without a proper distinction of reason, no otherwise than "being and entity," or "apt to exist and aptitude for existing." Hence I likewise grant that perseity is not a "difference" properly so called, because with respect to being there is no difference properly such, as we already warned above, n. 70, and as the Angelic Doctor warns in *De veritate* q. 1, a. 1 and often elsewhere. When Aristotle says that things which agree with one another differ by differences, he speaks of things agreeing in a genus properly so called, or he takes differences broadly for any concepts expressing diversity. In this sense substance and accident differ maximally, because they differ by their whole selves and through their adequate concepts; and therefore they are called "primarily diverse."

112. Furthermore, I grant that perseity is not a "contraction" or "determination" of being if by this name there is signified a form or mode co-distinguished from being. But if by this name is signified a concept truly limiting the amplitude of being and transcended by it, perseity certainly is a determination and contraction of being. Hence it must be denied that being is not contractible or determinable through a superadded concept; for the concept of perseity, as already noted above, must be called superadded to being, since it is not formally included in the concept of being. Now common predicates can be contracted in two ways: 1º through inadequate and properly differential concepts of inferiors; 2º through specific concepts, that is, concepts adequate to the essence of inferiors. Generic predicates are contracted in both ways. For animal, for example, is contracted not only through the concept "rational," but also through the concept "man," since to be contracted is to be limited in universality and determined so as to be of this species rather than another. Transcendental predicates, however, are contracted only in the second way, namely through adequate and quasi-specific concepts of inferiors, such as "substance," or the concept no less adequate, "perseity." Think the same of the concept "rationality" and similar concepts, which, although inadequate with respect to other species, can be called adequate or quasi-specific if the differences of genera are considered as certain inferiors of being directly subjected to it as though species. For the concept "substance" truly limits and determines being, both through implicit inclusion and through expression of identity in actual predication.

113. Nor is being therefore contracted through itself without any proper distinction of reason; for it is contracted through something from which being itself is formally distinguished, although that something is not likewise

distinguished from being. Nor is the definition of substance through "being through itself" inept, provided it is not offered as a strict definition but as a description containing an expression of the agreement and diversity of substance from accident. For substance is not strictly definable, that is, through genus and difference, since it is not properly a species but a supreme genus. Similarly the definition of man through "rational animal" would not be inept as a description if rational were formally animal; but because man is properly a species, he would then have to be strictly defined through other mutually distinct predicates. Finally, it is false that "being through itself" signifies nothing other than "being and being"; for it signifies such a being, a determinate being, a substantial being. You will say: "such, determinate, substantial" does not signify anything besides being. I distinguish: if "besides" denotes mutual distinction or otherness, I grant; if it denotes only non-mutual otherness, I deny. But such otherness is not denoted by "being and being."

114. From what has been said you will gather that in substance there is no metaphysical composition from a common and a differential concept, because every composition requires mutually distinct parts, which cannot be conceived in substance, since perseity is not formally a part but the whole quiddity of substance. Hence the concept "substance" is simple not only actually, but also virtually or fundamentally, because it is neither resolvable nor explicable through two truly distinct concepts; for duality or number is not made from concepts that are not mutually distinct. I speak of objective concepts according to definability denominatively received from formal concepts. You will further gather that the concept of being is not potential after the manner of a subject awaiting a form or act properly such. For perseity and any other difference are not compared with being as a metaphysical act with a subject, but only as an inferior concept with a superior by which it is transcended, approximately in the way the concept "man" is compared with "animal." Yet if potentiality signifies only indifference or determinability, the concept of being is potential; and there corresponds to it its determinant and contractor, or limiting concept, with only a non-mutual distinction and otherness, as explained.

115. It is objected 4º: generic predicates do not formally transcend differences, as the common opinion holds in Logic with Aristotle and St. Thomas; therefore neither does being formally transcend differences. I prove the consequence: because the arguments by which the non-transcendence of genera is usually proved apply also to being. Our proofs for the transcendence of being can likewise be countered by this non-transcendence. For roarability, for example, although it excludes non-animal

and is repugnant to every non-animal and non-living thing, although it perfects animal and is animal "as that by which," is not therefore animal or living formally and "as that which." Likewise, therefore, although perseity excludes a chimera and is repugnant to every chimera, although it perfects being and is being "as that by which," it will not therefore be formally being directly. To the objection, having granted the antecedent, I deny the consequence. To the proof, I admit that several arguments apply here which many authors bring forward for the non-transcendence of genera. But this has nothing to do with us, who deliberately abstained from those arguments in Logic and proved the non-transcendence of genera only from the supposition, admitted by all, that in man and every other species there is a metaphysical composition and a difference properly such, which is a certain predicable diverse from the species. This supposition we wholly reject in the inferiors of being as such.

116. The parallel instance appended does not help the adversaries, among whom the terms "being, apt to exist, distinct from its contradictory, opposed to nothing and a chimera" are formally synonymous, as Peinado warns, cited disp. 3, n. 14, while at the same time noting that the question proceeds equally concerning the attributes of being, namely the notions of "true, good," etc. If therefore it is proved that perseity immediately and by reason of itself excludes contradiction, or is opposed to a chimera, and is some goodness or perfection of being, as has abundantly been proved by us, the adversaries cannot deny that perseity is formally being, whatever may be the case with the alleged example of roarability. Concerning that example, however, it can be said that roarability excludes non-animal and is repugnant to it, not immediately and formally as though the contradictory of non-animal, but mediately and by connection, insofar as it is connected with the contradictory of non-animal, which is animal; just as human union or location excludes non-man and is repugnant to non-man, not because it itself is man, but because it is essentially connected with man.

117. But this doctrine has no place in the present case. For perseity, for example, cannot be connected with being or be a necessity of existing without being immediately opposed to a chimera, because nothing is more immediately repugnant to a chimera than necessity of existing or connection with aptitude for existing. But note that if "non-animal" is taken infinitely and in the formal sense, roarability does not exclude every non-animal; otherwise it would exclude itself, since it itself is in the formal sense a non-animal, that is, something which is not formally animal. Now from the fact that roarability perfects animal it does not follow that roarability is animal, because a perfecting form need not by the terms be the subject which it

perfects. It does follow, however, that roarability is a perfection of animal, because nothing perfects except a perfection. Likewise, therefore, if perseity perfects being, it must be a perfection; and if it is a perfection, it is goodness; if goodness, entity or being. Hence by reason of the matter one legitimately argues from the office of perfecting to the formal inclusion of being; and therefore the adversaries do not wish perseity to be a perfection, but only a greater degree of perfection.

118. Finally observe that perseity, for example, is transcended by being even according to the explicit. Those who posit objective precision between the explicit and implicit will explain this with difficulty. But according to our principles the reason is easy, because "perseity" under this very expression is definable through the concept "being"; and this is to be transcended by being according to the explicit. You will say: perseity, in the sense in which it is not being, is not formally transcended by being; but according to the explicit it is not being, since it is distinguished from being by the distinction of explicit from implicit; therefore. I distinguish the major premise: if that sense in which perseity is not being is or were proper in the formal line, I grant; if it is improper, as it really is, I deny the major. Then, having granted the minor, I deny the consequence. For perseity according to the explicit not to be being, or to be distinguished from being, means nothing other than that the expression "perseity" is not the expression "being." But this does not suffice to render objects properly distinct in the formal sense unless the indefinability of one through the other under those same expressions is added; and this is not added here on the side of perseity, as is evident from what has been said. Observe again that some other arguments adduced by certain authors presuppose the objective precision of being from the differences. In these the supposition must be denied, as must also the claim that one who precisely conceives being "objectively" does not know the differences; for he does not know them only "formally," that is, he does not know them under their proper concepts, but only under the common concept, through which they are nevertheless truly attained on the part of the object.

CHAPTER VI.
On the Attributes of Being, Including the Principle of Individuation.

119. The attributes of being are certain predicates convertible with being and no less transcendent than common being itself, which nevertheless possess proper concepts not synonymous with the concept of being, but in

some way founded upon it. They are usually indicated by the barbarous word "Reubau," which, besides the letter E denoting "Being," contains the initial letters of these five names: "Thing, True, Good, Something, One." There are those who think that these signify an equal number of attributes of being. But the common opinion removes Thing and Something from the number of attributes, because "thing and being" are regarded as synonymous when each is taken according to its most abstract signification; hence the predication "Being is a thing" is taken as nugatory or identical. Likewise "something," when taken substantivally and transcendentally, is synonymous with being, for it means the same as "that which is not nothing." If, however, you take "something" as equivalent to "some other thing," as though it signified otherness or distinction from everything that is not itself, it will indeed be an attribute of being, but one included in the attribute of unity. Of those five names, therefore, only three, namely "true, good, one," signify an equal number of attributes of being because of some distinction from being.

120. But you will ask what kind or degree of distinction this is. It is agreed among all that it is not a strictly real distinction, but rather that these attributes are really identified with being. The Scotists, however, here introduce their formal distinction, which is actual before the work of the mind, and maintain that the attributes of being are not only distinguished from it by a mutual distinction of reason which prevents formal transcendence in either direction, but also are realities superadded to being and distinguished from it by the nature of the thing. For these attributes are properties or attributes of being, and indeed real and positive ones; but they would not be such unless in reality and independently of the precision of the intellect they flowed or emanated from being, and consequently were distinguished from it by the nature of the thing as superadded realities. But this Scotistic distinction is rejected by the Thomists and our authors, both generally elsewhere and specifically here, because between being and its attributes, at least as regards their direct import, whatever may be said of the connoted or oblique import, not even a proper or perfect distinction of reason can be admitted. For by the very fact that they are real and positive predicates, they of themselves are repugnant to every chimera and wholly exclude contradiction and nothingness from themselves; hence they formally include being in themselves. They likewise are formally included in being, however abstract. For being, as precised from every predicate from which it can be precised, is intelligible, since in fact it is understood. But intelligibility is transcendental truth, or at least presupposes it, according to

all. Therefore being in that precision includes truth and consequently the remaining attributes, since the same reasoning applies to them all.

121. Thus being and its attributes, insofar as intrinsic or really identified, mutually formally transcend one another; nor are they otherwise distinguished even by reason except according to the implicit and explicit, with some diversity in what is connoted, as is commonly said of the Divine attributes both among themselves and in comparison with the essence. They have diverse connotations: for the concept of being connotes existence as though the term of aptitude, while the concepts of the attributes connote other things, as I shall presently say. Hence you will infer that attributes of this kind are not properly and strictly "properties" or "attributes of being," either physical or metaphysical; for an attribute ought to be distinguished from its subject and defined through the subject placed not directly but obliquely. But these attributes must be defined directly through being and are not even distinguished from it by reason except improperly. Nevertheless they are called "attributes of being" in a broad or improper sense, namely with reference to the order or manner of our conceiving. For regularly we first conceive that an object is being before we attribute to it the name "true," etc.; and therefore the explicit concept of true is in some way founded or rooted in the concept of being after the manner of an attribute, and is demonstrable through it as though *a priori*, namely by the priority as of a formal cause with respect to us, such as a formally transcending predicate has with respect to what is transcended when it is conceived after the manner of a foundation in relation to it. Nor is there the same reason for "rational animal" to be called an attribute of man; for although it differs from man according to the explicit, it does not differ in what is connoted, nor does it presuppose another better-known explanation of human essence. Hence with respect to man it stands as "apt to exist" stands with respect to being.

122. Observe, however, that if the distinction according to the implicit and explicit is not "improper" but "imperfect" in the line of reason, as several maintain, the attributes of being will not improperly be called metaphysical attributes or properties of being. Indeed, if the name attribute or property be extended to extrinsic denominations perpetually required by something intrinsic, it could even in the real sense belong to the attributes of being, as I shall touch upon in n. 125. Absolutely, however, it must be granted that these attributes are "real" as regards what they signify in first intention, because the concept "true," for example, signifies something real, namely the whole reality of being. In this sense it is truly said that Metaphysics demonstrates real attributes of its subject. Nevertheless it must

be denied that they are real as regards the office of an intrinsic property or attribute, because this office implies distinction from and emanation from the subject, which here is not given really outside the soul, but is a work of reason improperly or imperfectly precising, and therefore is signified only through names of second intention. You will say: therefore Metaphysics could not demonstrate real attributes of its subject, because demonstration requires three things distinct from one another, namely subject, middle, and attribute. I deny the consequence, because for demonstration a distinction according to the implicit and explicit between subject and attribute suffices, just as it suffices between attribute and middle; for example when it is demonstrated that being is one because it is undivided.

123. You will further ask whether, besides "true, good, and one," there are other quasi-attributes or attributes of being in common. The common answer is that there are no other simple attributes; concerning this see Suárez, *Metaphysica*, disp. 3, s. 2, n. 11 sqq. Nevertheless the Scotists add other attributes which they call "complex" or "disjunctive," because they are signified by a complex term with a disjunction. They say that such are "necessary or contingent, same or diverse," etc., because each of these complexes is convertible with being; for the inference holds, "it is being, therefore necessary or contingent," and conversely. But this is to confuse divisions with attributes. For with equal right it could be said that "rational or irrational" is an attribute of animal, "sensible or insensible" an attribute of living thing, and so with the rest, since in every adequate division there is convertibility between the divided whole and all the members disjunctively taken. Nor is it an obstacle that in Aristotle "even and odd" is called an attribute of number, and "straight and curved" an attribute of line; for from this it follows only that the name attribute is sometimes used for anything convertible, but in an excessively broad and improper sense. Leaving aside these attributes, therefore, we shall now briefly explain only the three aforesaid attributes of being.

On Transcendental Truth.

124. Truth is of one kind "formal," which consists in the conformity of an act of intellect with its object, or in cognition's representing and enunciating the object as it is. We treated of this in *Logica*, tr. 5, d. 2. Another is "transcendental," so called because it belongs to every being and even to false cognition, or cognition destitute of formal truth; hence it is called an attribute or attribute of being in common. Some explain this through the discrimination or separation of real being from every fictitious or merely

apparent being. Thus that is called true gold which is not counterfeit, a true man who is not painted, a true friend who is not feigned, the true God who is distinguished from fictitious gods or from those so called metaphorically. This way of speaking is indeed customary and common, but it does not explain any property of being, at least one co-distinguished from unity. For if for being to be true means the same as for it truly to be a being, not fictitiously or merely apparently, "true" adds nothing, even as connoted, over real being, of which we are now speaking; for "real being" and "being truly such" are synonymous like "sword" and "blade." If you say that it adds a negation of fiction or deceptive imitation, first, that negation seems sufficiently expressed by "real"; and second, if it signifies anything special, it must be reduced to the attribute of unity, of which later. Likewise those must be rejected who explain truth through the conformity of a thing with its intrinsic principles, and by principles understand essential predicates or the solid nature of each thing. This explanation indeed explains nothing; for under it "being is true" means the same as "being has the essence or nature of being."

125. The common opinion therefore explains transcendental truth through the conformity of being with an intellect actually knowing or capable of knowing that real being as it is. Hence, just as formal truth is explained through conformity of the act with the object, so transcendental truth through conformity of the real object with an act of intellect enunciating that it is what it is. There is, however, this difference, to avoid a circle: formal truth consists in the actual conformity of cognition, to which it is therefore partly extrinsic, since it is constituted from act and object; but transcendental truth lies in the aptitudinal conformity of the object, that is, in the intrinsic aptitude of the object for terminating and verifying cognition by which its reality is enunciated. Hence transcendental truth and the intelligibility of real being are commonly taken as the same. But it should be noted that both "intelligible" and "true" can be taken as a denomination derived into the object from a possible intellect or cognition. Thus, formally speaking, it is not an intrinsic attribute or attribute of being, since it is an extrinsic denomination, although essentially required, unless perhaps one wishes to call an "attribute" or "property" whatever necessarily follows the essence of the subject and perpetually accompanies it, even if not wholly intrinsic. For in this way an attribute of being will be that denomination, and indeed also the actual conformity of the object with Divine cognition, or the denomination "known" through it, since every being is essentially connected with Divine knowledge as existing. In this sense authors should be understood when they sometimes say that the attributes "true and good"

add something of reason over being; for extrinsic denominations are commonly called beings of reason, namely fundamentally or occasionally, in relation to our manner of conceiving.

126. But if the attributes of being are taken as wholly intrinsic, only fundamental or aptitudinal intelligibility is the truth of which we speak. Although this requires intellection of itself to be possible, it is not constituted through such intellection, but only connotes it as the term of an exigency when known under the proper concept "truth," just as Omnipotence under its proper concept connotes possible creatures. But you will ask whether transcendental truth expresses conformity to every possible intellect or only to the Divine intellect. Some maintain that this truth implies only conformity of the object with the Divine ideas. This can indeed be sustained in truth restricted to created being, but not in the truth proper to being as such insofar as it comprehends also the uncreated; for God does not have an idea of Himself, since an idea is an exemplar of a work to be made. Others prefer conformity with Divine cognition while abstracting from the character of an idea. The more common opinion prefers conformity with cognition both created and uncreated. According to this opinion it must consequently be said that every being is immediately and essentially connected not only with the Divine intellect but also with the non-repugnance of every created intellect whose cognition it can terminate and verify, so that if a created intellect were repugnant, no being would be true or even being, and consequently the possibility of every being would fail, not formally or through an intrinsic ground, as they say, but argumentatively or through an extrinsic ground, in the sense in which Omnipotence would fail if by impossibility a creature were repugnant, as explained in Physics.

127. But you will object: if every being is connected with created intellect as possible, transcendental falsity will also be found in all things, because every being will be essentially apt to terminate and falsify a cognition which says that it is what it is not or is not what it is, since the created intellect is capable of such cognition concerning any being whatsoever. I answer: this objection is not avoided by denying that connection unless the connection of God with possibles is also denied. For if God is connected with the possibility of a created cognition denying that God exists, He will be essentially apt to render it false; and consequently He will have transcendental falsity if the objection is valid. Therefore I deny the inference, because such aptitude is not falsity but is transcendental truth itself, or is included in it. For by the same aptitude of the object by which a cognition saying that being is what it is is verified, a cognition denying this

or saying the opposite is falsified. Falsity, therefore, must be taken as opposed to truth, or as its exclusion, and consequently must be taken in relation to the same cognition which truth connotes. In this sense only non-being or chimerical being is transcendentally false, that is, destitute of transcendental truth. You will say: even a chimerical being can verify a cognition saying that it is what it is, for example, "a chimera is impossible." I answer: concerning the object and verifier of this cognition and similar ones, we shall speak in the last disputation. Meanwhile it may be said that transcendental truth is not defined in relation to a cognition which says of any object whatever that it is what it is, but to one which says this of being, or of a real object; and truth of which we speak consists in the aptitude proper to being for verifying such cognition of itself, although the aptitude itself need not be explicitly attained.

On Transcendental Goodness.

128. Concerning goodness or good in common and its species, we said something in *Animastica*, disp. 7, c. 3. More may be seen in the Excellent Doctor, *Metaphysica*, disp. 10. "Good" quite frequently means the same as "perfect," and "goodness" the same as "perfection." But "perfect" can be taken in two ways: 1º for what is complete and consummate in every perfection due to it, even integral or accidental; and in this sense it is not transcendent. 2º For what has essential integrity, or lacks nothing in order to possess a real essence; and in this sense it is transcendent and convertible with real being. Yet under this aspect it is not conceived as a property of being, but as the very quiddity of being itself. Therefore good, if it is to add something over being according to our manner of conceiving, must be conceived under the character of something "convenient" to another. But under this character too it may be conceived in two ways: 1º as convenient to itself, that is, as suitable to itself or as agreeing and cohering well with itself; under this aspect it is called "absolute good." 2º As convenient to another, that is, as useful, fitting, or in some respect agreeable to another; under this aspect it is called "relative good." In the former way it unquestionably is convertible with being and is repugnant to a chimera, because every real essence coheres with and agrees well with itself, while every chimera, as involving contradiction, has essential incoherence. Yet in this sense goodness also seems to be conceived as the quiddity of being rather than as its property or quasi-property.

129. In the latter way, good is also reciprocal with being, as the Excellent Doctor proves by induction in the cited disputation, sect. 3; for there is no

being which with respect to some other is not useful, fitting, agreeable, or in some respect pertaining to it. At least with respect to the Divine will or to a creature, relative convenience is found in every being; not indeed convenience of usefulness alone, which grounds the love of concupiscence, but also some fittingness or agreeableness by reason of similarity, etc., which convenience is presupposed even by that love which is called benevolence, or by which an object is loved because it is good in itself, from what was said in *Animastica*, disp. 7, n. 61 sqq. In this sense good can be called a property of being, because under its proper concept it superadds to being a respect or relation, namely transcendental or according to "being said," of convenience to rational appetite, whose possibility it essentially connotes. Hence "good" and "desirable or lovable" are everywhere taken as the same, and these names must be explained according to what was said in the similar case at nn. 125 and 126. Observe two things here. 1º Not every convenience with respect to will, or every sort of desirability, is transcendental goodness, but only that which is founded upon a real essence. 2º Transcendent evil, that is, what is opposed to transcendent good and excludes it, is found only in non-beings or chimeras. Hence if there is moral evil consisting in something positive, which is disputed, it will exclude only moral good, not good taken transcendentally, since it is some being desirable to a created will under the title of the delightful.

On Transcendental Unity.

130. Unity is commonly called the first attribute of being; but because this primacy is not easily proved if distinction and emanation properly so called are excluded, it matters little whether it is explained before or after truth. Unity is opposed to multitude, and each may be either quantitative or transcendental. Quantitative unity or multitude is that which implies the indivision or division of physical quantity; it is also called "categorical" because it determinately belongs to the category of quantity. Transcendental unity or multitude is that which can be found in every genus of beings by title of indivision or division. The same twofold sense belongs to number, which over multitude adds only the act of a soul counting several units in order. Consequently there is one quantitative or sensible number, namely that which results from division of a continuum and is called a species of quantity; and another transcendental number, which has place even in spiritual beings, as when we say "three" Angels, "three" rational souls, etc. See St. Thomas, *De potentia* q. 9, a. 5, ad 8.

131. Unity, therefore, according to common apprehension and according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, *Metaphysica* 5, t. 11, and often elsewhere, signifies indivision, just as multitude signifies division; and "one" means nothing other than "something undivided," just as "several" or "many" means nothing other than "beings divided from one another." Thus one is reciprocal with being; for what is something undivided is being, and what is divided is not one being but beings. Nor is it an obstacle that Aristotle placed one and many as quasi-species of being. For either he made an analogical partition into one through itself and one accidentally or improperly, in the way even a multitude is called one, for example one heap of stones; or he divided being into a simple one and a composite one, which he signified by the name "many" because it includes several parts distinct from one another, though not divided. Yet each is properly one, because each implies actual indivision, which suffices for the proper concept of unity. Nevertheless it should not be denied that the unity of simplicity, such as is found, for example, in an Angelic nature, is more perfect than the unity of composition which is found, for example, in human nature.

132. Unity is called an attribute of being because, although it includes entity, it superadds the negation of division. Yet this negation is such only in name, because it is explained by the negative term "indivision." For since division is a negation, indivision in reality will be something positive; for on the part of the object there does not seem to be possible a negation of a negation unless it consists in something positive. Thus immortality or incorruptibility, although explained by a negative term, because on the part of the object it is the negation or exclusion of death or corruption, which consists in negation, is in reality a positive perfection. The addition of unity over being must therefore be understood according to the explicit by reason of a diverse connotation, insofar as unity under its proper concept connotes division as an excluded term, or as a term of opposition, just as immortality connotes death as a term of repugnance. This explanation pleases many and seems clearer and easier than that handed down by Suárez with many others, who place indivision in an objective negation of multitude taken according to something positive.

133. But you will ask what division transcendental unity excludes. I answer: it excludes division of being within itself; hence one is commonly defined as "undivided in itself." It is customary to add "and divided" or "distinct from every other"; yet this addition is not thought necessary to define unity, because the division or distinction which it expresses is founded upon that indivision as a consequence of it. Unity, therefore, is indivision of being in itself. This indivision can still be taken in two ways: 1º

as excluding division of being into several selves, or into several things such as itself; 2º as excluding division of being into its constitutive parts. In the former sense it is rather indivision from itself than in itself, and it would better be called identity than unity; and whatever it is called, it does not suffice for the concept of one properly such. For even a heap of wheat is undivided into several heaps identical with itself, although it is not properly one. Nevertheless it cannot be denied that such indivision is included in the concept of unity. Therefore indivision in itself must chiefly be taken in the latter sense. In this way it belongs to every and only a being properly one, even one really simple or indivisible, because this most especially excludes from itself division of parts, since it does not consist of parts.

134. That you may better understand what has been said thus far, observe the following. 1º One and multitude are not opposed as being and chimera, but as being and beings. Nor does unity exclude every multitude from the nature of things, since rather every multitude is constituted from units; it excludes only multitude within the one being itself, or inside it, namely that which is conceived as resulting from division of its parts, or also from division of itself into several selves. 2º For multitude opposed to transcendental unity, distinction of parts does not suffice; otherwise man would not be one, nor would unity belong to any composite. Parts actually distinct are indeed customarily called "several," even when they are actually undivided. Yet this plurality, which is founded on distinction alone, is not the multitude of which we speak, because it does not conflict with unity as such, although it conflicts with the unity of simplicity, since it can coexist with actual indivision. Therefore the multitude opposed to unity as transcendental is a multitude resulting from things divided, not merely one resulting from things distinct, although both are customarily called transcendental multitude insofar as they are not limited to the category of quantity but can be found in every genus of beings.

135. 3º The division excluded by unity properly so called is not a mere negation or lack of physical union or simplicity, but further implies a lack of proportion in the parts, if there are any, for their being united through themselves, that is, not accidentally. For if this lack is not excluded, we admit that there can be indivision taken for intimate conjunction, even indissoluble, or for physical union of parts; but there will not be transcendental unity in the composite, since according to common agreement this is proper only to a being which is one through itself and does not extend to one accidentally, because the latter is rather many than one. This is easily perceived in one by aggregation, which is most of all called one accidentally, for example a heap of wheat. Yet if the discussion concerns one

accidentally which results from subject and physically united accident, this falls little short of unity properly so called. What proportion is required in parts to constitute one through itself was stated in *Physica*, tr. 1, d. 2, c. 4, n. 13. From this third observation you will gather that the unity of man and of any composite one through itself does not consist in physical union alone, but in this together with a certain intrinsic and entitative proportion of the parts, and consequently in reality implies the whole entity of the composite.

On the Principle of Individuation.

136. Transcendental unity is usually divided into formal and individual unity. Formal unity, as now taken, is not a mere unity of reason, but is real unity insofar as it implies the distinction of a thing from every other thing of a diverse species or genus. It is also commonly called essential, because it accompanies essence in the state of abstraction when essence is mentally precised from singularity. Individual unity, however, is real unity insofar as it implies distinction from every other singular thing, whether similar or diverse, or insofar as it constitutes a thing incapable of division or multiplication into several things of the same name and essence as such a thing; for in this an individual thing differs from a common and universal one. These unities are therefore real, although they are distinguished from one another not really but by reason alone, as was said in Logic. Individual unity is also called "singular and numerical," because it constitutes "a singular and one in number"; and these two names mean the same thing, according to Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 3, t. 14, and St. Thomas, *Contra Averroistas* c. ult., where he warns that something is not called one in number because it is one of a number, but because in numbering it is not divided; and therefore every separate substance, such as an Angel, is one in number. Accordingly, that formality which ultimately constitutes an individual in the being of such is indiscriminately called "individuation, singularity, numerical difference," and also "haecceity," because through it a thing is "this." Yet it is one thing to be distinguished "numerically" and another to be distinguished "only numerically," or "purely numerically"; the latter is said only of things contained under the same lowest species.

137. Now when the principle of individuation is asked about, the discussion is not about an extrinsic causal principle, namely efficient cause, final cause, etc. For no one doubts that individuation is caused by those principles from which the production of the individual arises or upon which it depends *a priori*, since such production must terminate in a singular thing. The discussion, therefore, concerns an intrinsic or formal principle, namely

one belonging to the intrinsic and ultimate constitution of the individual, or founding on the part of the thing that formality which is called "individuation" and which in created things is distinguished by us through reason from specific essence or nature. In this sense one individuation can be compared with others both outside and within its species. Thus, if concerning the individuation of Peter one asks why it is this human haecceity rather than an equine one, and again why it is Peterhood rather than Paulhood or another differing only numerically within the species man. Under the former comparison, its root is unquestionably the specific nature. Hence the doubt remains only under the latter comparison.

138. In this doubt the Thomists say 1º that in spiritual substances having no order to matter, namely Angels, the principle of individuation is specific immateriality, which renders all haecceities besides one impossible within the same species, and therefore demands and radically includes from the specific concept the one individuation which it possesses. For the Thomists think that several Angels of the same species are even divinely impossible, because matter is the sole root of purely numerical multiplication. Hence they say 2º that in material substances the principle of individuation is matter, because such substances, since from their specific concept they are indifferent to several individuals, must through matter be determined to one rather than another. They say 3º that substantial forms, including even the rational soul, are individuated through matter or through an order to matter, for the same reason. And when against these assertions it is objected that matter too has a common concept and itself needs individuation; likewise that the same individual matter can successively constitute two men and successively receive forms of the same species, especially rational souls; the Thomists answer that they are speaking of individual and designated matter, and deny that the same designated matter can constitute two men or receive two forms of the same species. But not all explain "designated matter" in the same way. Some hold it to be matter as affected by quantity; others matter as receptive of quantity; others as rooting quantity; others as sealed by the accidents of the corrupted composite, or also as underlying the action of the agent toward the new form. Some understand bare quantity, others quantity clothed with certain qualities or circumstances, including place and time; and others speak otherwise. Finally they say 4º that all accidents are individuated through their subject, and therefore it is wholly repugnant for two accidents differing purely numerically to regard the same subject or be received in the same one.

139. But this entire doctrine greatly displeases the Scotists and our authors, and is extensively and solidly attacked by the Excellent Doctor,

Metaphysica, disp. 5. These four assertions of the Thomists can now be briefly attacked. The first is attacked because in the Angel Gabriel, for example, there is no predicate by which it is repugnant for him to coexist with others of the same species, just as there is none by which he excludes coexistence with others of the same proximate genus. Recourse to immateriality begs the question. For why should Angelic immateriality not admit purely numerical multiplication just as it admits specific multiplication? Why should it not differ under both titles from Divine immateriality? Why, once one finite and limited perfection has been produced, should God's Omnipotence be so exhausted that it cannot produce another wholly similar one? Add that according to the Thomists every accident, however immaterial, can be multiplied within the same species. The same therefore should be thought of every created substance; for just as every accident is limited by receptibility in a subject, even a spiritual one, which is analogically called matter by the Thomists, so every created substance can be limited by receptivity or by a potency for receiving accidents, or at least by the very quiddity of creature.

140. Hence it is gratuitously said that matter is the sole root of purely numerical multiplication, unless by "matter" there is understood potentiality and perfectibility by another, which is commonly called "metaphysical or analogical matter." This matter indeed transcends all creatures, because none is pure act and consequently none is wholly without potentiality and perfectibility by another, either as by form or as by subject; and at least all can at God's will receive and lose their being. In this sense Aristotle can be understood, *Metaphysica* 12, t. 49, when he says that "whatever are many in number have matter," and thence infers that the first Mover cannot be more than one in number because He is devoid of matter. And when he says in *Metaphysica* 5, t. 12, that "those are one in number whose matter is one," by "matter" he understands individuation or the individual, as Scotus rightly observes. For because the individual in the categorical order is the first basis and first subject predicable of no other, just as matter in the physical order is the first subject receivable in no other, Aristotle therefore sometimes from this analogy calls individuation matter, just as from the opposite analogy he calls the abstract quiddity of a thing form. Thus, for example, in *De caelo* 1, t. 92, he warns that "this heaven" is one thing and "heaven simply," that is, quidditatively conceived, another: "And the latter," he says, "is as species and form; the former as mixed with matter." Here he is not speaking of physical matter and form, for heaven is constituted from these both in species and in the individual. Other texts of

the Philosopher should be interpreted similarly, some of which may also be referred to sensible individuation, or individuation with respect to us.

141. The second assertion is attacked because both matter and form are from their concept indifferent to several individuals and therefore each is included in the concept of man as such. Why, then, will one rather than the other be the principle of determinate individuation? Certainly in Peter, if matter is this matter, form also is this form; therefore by reason of each Peter will be this man. St. Thomas expressly teaches this, *Summa Theologiae* I^{a}, q. 29, a. 4, saying that "this flesh, these bones, and this soul are principles individuating man." If you say that form is this form by reason of matter, I ask: whence is matter this matter? If by reason of itself, why not form? Surely the title of first subject is irrelevant, since matter as such, or insofar as it belongs to the essence of man in common, is also first subject, yet is not this matter. If you have recourse to quantity by which matter is rendered "designated," first, quantity according to the Thomists is received in the whole composite and affects form no less than matter; therefore it will immediately render each "designated." The same must be said of any accident. Next, whence is quantity itself this quantity? If you have recourse to position, the same question will arise concerning it. If quantity is individuated through itself, whence does it possess this privilege over matter and substantial form?

142. Furthermore, neither quantity nor any other accident can be an intrinsic and constitutive principle of a substantial individual. First, because "substance is individuated through itself," according to St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I^{a}, q. 29, a. 1; and as he himself says in *De potentia* q. 10, a. 3, speaking of the constitution of a "person," which is the name of an individual substance, "Substance cannot be constituted through an accident." Second, because an individual is one through itself according to all, and the category of substance is pure, or unmixed with the others, from first substance, that is, individual substance, up to the supreme genus. Third, because it would follow that the matter of what is generated and what is corrupted is not the same, since according to the Thomists quantity changes in every generation. If for this reason you say that matter is intrinsically individuated through an order to quantity, which order is identified with matter, the contrary is that this order is found in all matters, and indeed toward the same quantity; for any matter is receptive of any quantity, especially according to the Thomists, who teach that quantity varies with form. Therefore matter is not rendered this rather than that matter from that precise order.

143. The third assertion is attacked because, first, the rational soul is not individuated intrinsically through matter; otherwise separated souls would not be singular or numerically several. Next, neither is it individuated through an order to matter, because the order to any matter whatsoever is common to all souls, as is evident from nutrition. For over the course of life every soul loses matter previously possessed and informs new matter from manifold nourishment; and it can even inform matter belonging to another soul, as happens among barbarians who eat human flesh. Nor does recourse to original matter help. First, because this too is lost over the course of life and exchanged for other matter according to St. Thomas. Second, because it is absurd, or at least founded on no reason, that God could not infuse soul B, or another differing only numerically, into the same original matter in place of soul A. This attack also applies to material forms. For although a material form cannot naturally be separated from the matter to which it has once been united, except the soul of a perfect brute which, if indivisible as the Thomists maintain, gradually changes its matter just like the human soul, nevertheless that same form could originally have been united to other matter, and another numerically distinct form could have been received in its matter.

144. Finally, the fourth assertion is attacked. 1º Because in the same matter and quantity of air manifold light produced by the Sun is successively received with only numerical distinction; likewise in the same eyes many visions of the same object, for example when someone looks at the Sun at intervals. For once light or vision has been corrupted, the same one is not reproduced, as the Thomists admit. Therefore neither subject nor order to subject singularizes or numerically distinguishes accidents, since these cannot be numerically distinguished through that in which they agree. If you have recourse to the subject as connoting distinct actions or productions of such accidents, I shall ask whence the actions themselves derive numerical distinction, since their subject is the same in the examples adduced and in others easily supplied by anyone. Diversity of instant or time is of no help: first, because it is too extrinsic a circumstance; second, because neither light nor action is of itself tied to such a time or moment, otherwise, once it had passed, the thing could not be conserved even divinely; third, because concerning time itself insofar as it implies real motion, I shall likewise ask whence it is rendered individual.

145. 2º Because certain accidents differing purely numerically can even be received simultaneously in the same subject, for example several intelligible species, each of which represents one individual man or ass. The Thomists say that such species can indeed exist simultaneously, but not in

complete act, only in incomplete act, that is, not in the act of operating or in first act proximate to operation, but only in remote first act. But this gains them nothing. For those species, preserved in the same memory, even if they neither operate nor are excited, truly exist in the nature of things and physically inform the subject; therefore they truly are individual, since nothing but a singular thing really exists or physically informs. They are also, in that incomplete or remote act, truly distinct from one another and only numerically, since in no respect do they differ specifically. They therefore have individuation and numerical distinction not derived from the subject, since the same subject is common to all. 3º Because at least quantity is not individuated through a subject, unless one wishes by a ridiculous circle to have matter individuated through quantity and quantity through matter. Therefore the same must be said of qualities, which certainly do not need a subject more, nor are they more ordered to it.

146. There are scarcely any foundations of the Thomistic doctrine besides the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas. But what Aristotle means has been stated above. Whenever St. Thomas says that individuation and purely numerical distinction are taken from quantified or designated matter, he is not unreasonably explained as speaking of sensible individuation and distinction, or individuation with respect to us as discerning and numbering similar individuals by sense. This interpretation is evident from the Angelic Doctor himself, *De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis* c. 3, whose sufficiently clear words Suárez reports, cited disp. 5, s. 3, n. 33; and other consonant texts may be seen in *De principio individuationis*. We admit that individuation or distinction of similar individuals, insofar as sensible to us, proceeds from quantified matter, and indeed matter designated through qualities and even through circumstances of time, place, and others expressed in those verses "Form, figure, place, etc.," concerning which in Logic. Individuation thus taken can be called "external and physical," that is, knowable in a physical manner, because physical science does not abstract from sensible matter. But as taken in the present controversy it must be called "internal and entitative." Hence St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I^{a}, q. 3, a. 3, and *De potentia* q. 9, a. 1, and often elsewhere, plainly teaches that an individual substance includes accidents or is constituted from them in the being of an individual, although elsewhere he generally asserts that substance is individuated through itself and cannot be constituted through accidents, as we saw in n. 142. These two assertions seem unable to be reconciled except by understanding the former as speaking of external and sensible individuation and the latter of internal and entitative individuation, of which we now speak.

147. Nevertheless the adversaries object certain arguments from reason. 1º Numerical unity and distinction is called "material," while specific unity is called "formal"; therefore the former must be taken from matter and the latter from form. 2º Incommunicability is proper to the individual, and in corporeal things this can proceed only from matter, which alone is incapable of being received by title of first subject. 3º The Angel Gabriel, for example, has nothing from which he could participate specific nature in a limited way, because every limitation proceeds from matter or subject. Therefore he contains it without limitation, that is, both extensively and intensively, so that he does not allow it to extend to other individuals. 4º Experience shows that several forms of the same species, substantial or accidental, cannot be simultaneously received in the same subject; and therefore like does not act upon like. These arguments, however, are weak. To 1º: numerical unity and distinction is called "material," first because it stands as material in the consideration of sciences which treat universals; second because it constitutes an individual, which from n. 140 has a certain analogy with physical matter. It is everywhere said that genus is taken from matter and difference from form; yet genus is not absent in Angels, where there is no prime matter. Ask the Thomists how generic agreement and numerical distinction can be taken from the same principle.

148. To 2º: the individual is incommunicable only as a superior is communicated to an inferior, or as something predicable of many; for in this it differs from the universal. But ability to be communicated to another through physical union is not contrary to the notion of an individual. Thus singular matter is communicated to form, a singular soul to a body, singular quantity to matter, singular humanity to the Divine Word. Nor is the irreceptibility of the first physical subject proper to an individual as such, for matter in common is not individual, although it has the concept of first subject, which is its essence. To 3º: the Angel Gabriel is sufficiently limited by his own potentiality and by the finitude proper to a creature, so that he does not contain the whole possible extension of his species, or so that coexistence with others specifically similar is not repugnant to him. And it is false that every limitation proceeds from matter unless analogical matter is meant. You will say: Angelic nature is form or act receivable in no potency; therefore it has nothing from which it can be limited, for "Each thing is limited through its opposite," as they say, and the opposite of act is potency. But this absurdly proves Angelic nature to be pure act like the Divine nature, since it would lack a limiting principle. Therefore, just as according to all it is limited through its potentiality so as not to be pure act, so according to us

it is thereby limited so as not to be essentially unique or numerically incapable of multiplication.

149. To 4º: the incompossibility of substantial forms in the same subject does not arise from individuation or purely numerical distinction, for it applies no less to forms specifically diverse. Whence it does arise, see *Physica*, tr. 1, d. 5, c. 4. Concerning accidents, I admit that not every specifically similar accident can naturally be simultaneously received in the same subject. They can nevertheless be received successively, at least with privation or some other diverse accident intervening, as is clear from the example of light, or even of water when it becomes hot from cold and then again grows cold with a new coldness. This suffices to prove that accidents are not individuated through the subject; otherwise they would be distinguished numerically without distinction of the principle of individuation. Likewise, some things differing only numerically can naturally inhere simultaneously in the same subject, as is evident from intentional species. Why not all can do so must be explained not from numerical distinction, but from superfluity, which nature abhors, or from incapacity of the subject.

150. The best rule seems to be that given by the Excellent Doctor, cited disp. 5, s. 8, n. 14 sqq.: namely, those specifically similar accidents can exist simultaneously in the same subject which within the individual line differ from one another by office or relation to a term. Such are intentional species and acts of the soul regarding objects distinguished only numerically. For although they agree specifically, they nevertheless differ from one another more than two species or cognitions of the same object, because they intrinsically regard distinct objects, and cognition of Peter alone cannot terminate in Paul, etc. But those accidents cannot exist simultaneously which, besides entitative distinction, possess nothing not common to the others of the same species, such as two quantities or two homogeneous heats. According to our principles concerning the heterogeneity of degrees of intensity, this is easily understood. According to other views, it may be said that homogeneous insensible qualities can naturally be joined in the same subject until they complete an intensity up to eight, but not beyond, because of the natural incapacity of the subject or uselessness for the ends of nature.

151. Having rejected the positions of the Thomists, it must be said that each thing is really individuated through its own entity adequately taken; and that the intrinsic or formal principle of individuation, if taken for the ultimate predicate metaphysically constituting an individual thing, is each thing's haecceity really identified with the thing itself and distinguished by

reason alone from its specific nature. But if it is taken for the real and internal foundation from which haecceity is taken by the intellect, it is the whole entity of the thing. Think the same of the principle of numerical distinction, since this is either included in individual unity or necessarily results from it. Therefore, if you ask why Peter is this man, I answer: because he has this soul, this matter, and this union. If you ask why the soul is this soul rather than another of the same species, there is no other intrinsic reason except that it identifies with itself its own entity and not another; while the extrinsic reason is the will and power of God, who could and willed to produce this soul rather than others here and now. Understand the same of matter, union, whiteness, an Angel, etc. You will say: therefore the intrinsic principle of individuation and specification will be the same. I distinguish the consequence: it will be the same formally, or according to our reason, I deny; it will be the same really, I grant the consequence. For Peter through the same real entity by which he is numerically distinguished from Paul is specifically distinguished from a horse.

152. The entity of a thing indeed often identifies with itself a respect or order to matter or subject, as happens in every substantial or accidental form. But this order does not individuate the form precisely because it regards an individual subject. First, because no form, except modal forms, of itself regards subject A more than B. Second, because the same subject can be regarded by several numerically distinct forms, even modal ones; for with respect to the same body and the same soul several unions differing only numerically are possible. Therefore, in order that an order to a subject individuate a form, that order itself must be individual through its own entity. In this way Peter's soul, for example, truly is individuated through an order to matter, not because it regards matter A rather than others, but because it regards any matter through this individual order, which is the entity of that same soul. Let the same be said of accidents. An accident, however, is said to be individuated through the subject, that is, through an order to the subject, whereas complete substance is said to be individuated through itself, because substance, just as it has entity, so also has unity through itself or toward itself; while every accident according to its whole entity is intrinsically ordered to a subject, in whatever grade it is conceived, whether generic, specific, or individual.

153. As regards purely numerical multiplication within the same species, or its absolute possibility, its extrinsic root is the Omnipotence of God; while its intrinsic root, taken for the capacity or non-repugnance of one individual to coexist with others specifically similar, is metaphysical or analogical matter as explained by us in n. 140. Nor perhaps does St. Thomas,

when he says that several Angels of the same species are repugnant, intend anything other than that they are repugnant in relation to natural causes distinct from God. For it truly is repugnant and implies contradiction that purely numerical multiplication of substances which neither have matter nor an order to matter should arise from such causes. Finally, if you ask why, from the infinitely many individuals possible in any species, this one rather than that is produced here and now by secondary causes, there is no other reason than the will of the Author of nature, who prepares concurrence for individual A and not B, etc.; for otherwise neither the power of the agent, nor the potency of the patient, nor the ultimate disposition itself has a connection with the production of fire A rather than B, and so with the rest. How the freedom of the creature is not thereby impaired, nor the act of sin attributed to God, see *Physica*, tr. 2, d. 8, c. 6, n. 26 sqq.

DISPUTATION II.

ON THE POSSIBILITY AND EXISTENCE OF CREATED BEING.

From being in common we proceed to created being, which means the same as that which has a real, finite essence dependent upon the First Cause. It is clear from what has often been said that by the name "essence" are signified those predicates through which a thing is defined, for example, in man, rational animal. This essence, insofar as it is common to every created being, has only two things worthy of examination, namely possibility and existence. For it can be considered either as possible, that is, as apt or not repugnant to exist, or as not implying contradiction in its predicates; or as existing, that is, as actually placed outside its causes. Under either consideration there is a question whether it adds anything beyond the quidditative predicates, or in what its possibility consists, and in what its existence consists. But it must be noted that for a thing to be possible does not mean the same as for it to be purely possible. For "purely" excludes actual existence, or adds the lack of exercised existence; for nothing is called "purely possible" unless it can exist in such a way that nevertheless it does not actually exist. It is then also said to be "in the state of possibility," which state therefore involves the lack of existence and is really negatively distinguished from the "state of existence," as non-being from being. Therefore, for a thing to be possible precisely means that it can exist, or that it excludes contradiction, not by removing existence but by prescinding from it, at least explicitly. In this sense the possible involves two things, at least according to the mode of signifying. One is the subject that receives the

denomination "possible," and is commonly called the possible "as that which," or "directly," or taken "materially" or "subjectively," or even "the substrate of possibility"; and no one doubts that this is identified with the essence of the thing. The other is possibility in the abstract, that is, the form, or quasi-form, which gives the denomination "possible." But this possibility can further be either radical or formal. The radical possibility of creatures, or, what means the same, causal, active, inferential possibility, undoubtedly consists in the Omnipotence of God, especially insofar as it is connected with possibles; and this is also commonly called extrinsic possibility, because the term derives from it the extrinsic denomination "producible," just as color is extrinsically denominated "visible" from the visual power. Formal possibility, which is also commonly called passive and intrinsic, is the immediate reason by which the essence of a creature is rendered capable in itself of existing, or of excluding contradiction. It is this that must now be discussed.

CHAPTER I.
In What the Possibility of Created Being Consists.

1. The sense of the question is: what in reality is that immediate reason, or with what is it physically identified, by which a creature is rendered in itself capable of existing? The "first opinion" holds that possibility consists in a certain quidditative being, necessary and indefectible, which is actual, not with the actuality of existence, but with the actuality of essence, and consequently is from eternity a true real being, actually distinct from God and set apart from nothing. In this very being the opinion places the essence of the creature, to which existence is added through production in time. Thus, after Henry, among the Thomists Capreolus and Nazarius hold, as reported by Martinez de Prado 1ª p. Met. controv. 7, n. 2; Godoy agrees, tr. 3, *De scientia Dei* § 3 and 4; likewise Basil of León and some of Ours, cited by Fr. Quirós disp. 108, s. 2.

2. The "second" opinion attributes to creatures from eternity a certain being actually distinct from God, yet not real simply speaking, but "diminished," and intermediate between real being and being of reason. With this it identifies the possibility and essence of the creature insofar as the latter verifies propositions of eternal truth, or terminates God's necessary cognition. Thus the Scotist Ponce, who cites Scotus and all his disciples on his own behalf. Yet Mastrius, a writer of the same School, disp. 8, Met. q. 1, vindicates them from such an opinion, and especially Scotus, whom Fathers Suárez and Vázquez had already sufficiently vindicated. The

"third" opinion does not seem to acknowledge any possibility intrinsic to things, for it identifies not only the radical or inferential possibility of a creature, but also its immediate and formal possibility, with the Divine predicates, especially with omnipotence and the intellect or knowledge of simple intelligence; and it judges similarly concerning the impossibility of a chimera. Thus, with Fr. Antonio Pérez, Fr. Ribadeneira in various places, whom some more recent authors follow. The College of St. Thomas at Alcalá also holds this opinion and attributes it to other Thomists.

3. Finally, the "fourth," and common opinion in every School, identifies the formal possibility of created or creatable things with the things themselves, or with their essence. It asserts that this essence, and therefore this possibility, was nothing from eternity, nor is it absolutely anything or a being before it is produced by God in time and actually exists. This opinion seems to me most true. And first, that the essences of things should not have been absolutely nothing from eternity, but some actual thing outside God, as the first opinion said, is plainly most foreign to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, who says thus q. 3, *De potentia*, a. 5, ad 2: "From the very fact that being is attributed to a quiddity, not only being but the quiddity itself is said to be created; because before it has being, it is nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the Creator, where it is not a creature, but the creative essence." And 1ª p. q. 61, a. 2, he asserts that it is certain "by Catholic faith" that "God alone is from eternity," adding: "For thus did God produce creatures, that He made them from nothing, that is, after they had been nothing." And lest he be thought to speak of nothing as regards existence but not essence, he had already said q. 45, a. 1, that "nothing and no being are the same," and consequently that creation is "from non-being, which is nothing." On the contrary, this does not seem foreign to the doctrine of Wycliffe, among whose errors Waldensis, l. 1, *Doctrina fidei* c. 8, numbers the statement that creatures from eternity have some real being distinct from the being of God. Whatever may be the case concerning this,

4. the "first opinion" is effectively refuted. For that actual, quidditative, eternal being can neither be from itself nor be made by God. Not from itself: both because, according to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers cited by Fr. Suárez, d. 31, Met. s. 2, "Whatever has not been made by God is either God or nothing"; and according to St. Thomas, Opusc. 27, *De aeternitate mundi*, "That something besides God could always have existed, … not made by Him, is an abominable error, not only in faith but also among the Philosophers." And because that actual being would be infinite and another God; for all prove the infinity of God from being-from-Himself. Nor may it be said that this being-from-itself is depressed and limited from other

sources so that it does not rise to infinity. For the atheist will say the same about God's being-from-Himself, or about the being-from-themselves of atoms as regards existence. Again, it cannot have been made by God. 1º Because it is certain by faith that God did not begin to operate *ad extra* from eternity, but in time. 2º Because the essence of the creature would already have been existing from eternity, since every production terminates at existence. 3º Because neither would it have been made freely by God, since according to the Adversaries that essential actuality is metaphysically necessary and incapable of being prevented; nor necessarily from some other source, since it is certain both by faith and reason that God effects nothing without liberty, or by necessity of nature.

5. Moreover, God would not have made the world from nothing, but from something, namely from the actual essence of things, which through all eternity preceded the creation of those very things. Nor could God reduce any thing to pure nothing, since something actual, distinct from nothing and indestructible by God, would always have to remain of it. A creature could also glory that it possessed something not received from God, or not dependent upon His free will; and to the Apostle's words, 1 Cor. 4, "What have you that you have not received?" anyone could answer: I have, indeed, my entire essence, which independently of creation and of the will of God is from eternity an actual being, and therefore something actually true, good, etc. Moreover, it would be without reason denied that this possibility also actually exists from eternity. For what is existence except actuality through which a thing is separated from nothing and is actually a being?

6. These objections also bear against the "second opinion." For concerning that diminished being one can similarly ask whether it is from itself or from God, and, if from God, whether freely or necessarily. Likewise, once it is posited, God could make no thing from nothing and could wholly annihilate no thing. Likewise a creature could glory in such being as something not received, at least not received gratuitously, etc. But that it should be something intermediate between real being and being of reason seems plainly inconceivable. For who can conceive some actual being posited in things independently of our precisions, which neither implies nor does not imply contradiction? Or which participates both in the potency and the impotence to exist? Certainly, if it is such, it will no more be the possibility than the impossibility of a creature; nor will it suffice to terminate and verify a proposition of eternal truth concerning the essences of things, such as "Man is a rational animal," or "is a real being," which certainly does not affirm something intermediate between real being and being of reason. Therefore, when Scotus says that creatures from eternity have in, or from,

the Divine intellect "diminished being," or "being in a qualified respect," no actual being distinct from God is to be understood, but only the denomination "known." This denomination, insofar as it is actual from eternity, imports only the Divine cognition; and although this cognition simply exists in itself and properly is cognition of a created object, nevertheless with respect to that object it is not called "existence" except in a qualified respect, that is, improperly, namely with the addition "intentional," which is a diminishing addition. Therefore an object, while it exists only in cognition, is said to "exist diminishedly," or to have "diminished being." See Mastrius, l.c.

7. From what has been said it follows that, if formal possibility is identified with the essence of the creature, it is not something actual from eternity. That it is in reality so identified is proved briefly, and at the same time the "third opinion" is refuted. 1º By the authority and argument of St. Thomas, who 1ª p. q. 25, a. 3, besides the possible relatively, or denominatively from the power of God, acknowledges the absolutely possible through the intrinsic relation or compatibility of predicates. He proves this because otherwise there would be circularity in manifesting Omnipotence, since God is said to be omnipotent because He can do all possible things: "For this," he says, "would be nothing other than to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that He can do. It remains, therefore," he adds, "that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things absolutely possible; and this is another manner of speaking of the possible." St. Thomas does not deny, nor do we deny, that Omnipotence is inferential possibility by reason of its connection with possibles, or even an extrinsic form truly denominating creatures "possible." But besides this, with St. Thomas, we further assert a possibility wholly intrinsic, through which things from their own essence, prescinding from every other thing, are truly said to be and are possible. Certainly possibility and producibility are the same in a creature. But in a creature, besides the extrinsic producibility consisting in the power of the cause, there is found intrinsic and passive producibility, namely an aptitude for terminating production, wholly identified with its essence: both because this producibility corresponds to active power as a terminus, and because a creature through its essence is a being from another, which means the same as a causable being, or one apt to be caused. Therefore, etc.

8. 2º Because man, for example, identifies with himself that which belongs to the formal concept of being, as is certain. But an aptitude for existing belongs to the formal concept of being, since being is defined through it; and this aptitude is possibility itself, as is clear from the terms

and from the fact that one can neither be conceived nor found without the other. Therefore, etc. 3º Because for a thing to be possible is not to imply contradiction, or not to involve opposite predicates in its objective concept, as all agree. But man through his essence, prescinding from everything else, has the property of not implying contradiction, or of not being constituted by opposite predicates, since through it he has his own predicates and not others; and these predicates by themselves exclude contradiction or opposition among themselves, since they are really identified and therefore most compatible with one another. Therefore, etc.

9. 4º Because man identifies with himself something through which he is distinguished from every chimera, or from every impossible or non-possible object as such. Therefore he identifies with himself true possibility. The consequence is clear, because possibility alone distinguishes the subject from every non-possible, just as whiteness alone distinguishes from every non-white, humanity alone from every non-man, entity alone from every non-being, and so in the others. But the antecedent seems altogether evident, since man undoubtedly identifies with himself something incapable of belonging to any non-possible object. He identifies with himself real entity, and therefore aptitude for existing; likewise a connection with God, or with Omnipotence as productive of man. Otherwise the essence of a creature would not of itself be a being from another, nor dependent upon God or requiring dependence, but rather would of itself be indifferent to an event in which God would be repugnant, which is plainly absurd. This connection is an essential determination of man to be possible, and can belong to no chimera. But a predicate identified with man and incapable of belonging to any chimera undoubtedly distinguishes man from every chimera, just as rationality distinguishes him from every brute.

10. Confirmation: at least man, in contrast to a chimera, identifies with himself a capacity to be extrinsically denominated "possible" from Omnipotence. For if of himself he has nothing by which he is rendered a more suitable subject of this denomination than a chimera, why does the denomination belong to him rather than to it? Certainly the denomination "possible" is not arbitrary, nor variable as regards its subject at God's pleasure, but is altogether necessary and immutable. Therefore it demands a special character in its own subject in contrast with a subject that is not its own, that is, in man in contrast with a chimera, and indeed a necessary and immutable character, which certainly sufficiently distinguishes and separates man from every chimera. I say that it demands this character in its subject taken specifically and as adequately distinct from Omnipotence. For otherwise, if on the one hand you take the complex of Omnipotence and

man, and on the other the complex of Omnipotence and a goat-stag, you will find nothing special in one rather than the other. Why then do you find in the first the denomination "possible" for man, and in the second the denomination "impossible" for the goat-stag? Otherwise: are the constitutives of the two denominations diverse, or not? If not, how do they constitute diverse denominations? Or how is there diversity in these without diversity either of form or subject? If, because of this, you choose the first: therefore, since the form is the same in each case, namely Omnipotence, diversity must be posited in the subjects as contra-distinguished from Omnipotence, and consequently they are distinguished from each other by reason of themselves. Add that no form contains opposite formal effects except with respect to diverse things, namely subjects having diversity from some other source. But no formal effects are more opposed than the denominations "possible" and "impossible." This diversity, capacity, or intrinsic character must be kept before one's eyes, by which man, in contrast with a chimera, is rendered apt to be denominated "possible" by the necessary attributes of God. For it is possibility in the true sense of the word, since it sufficiently distinguishes man from every non-possible. And whatever it is called, against it all the contrary arguments are pressed.

11. What we have so far presented is so clear that the Adversaries finally admit that some possibility is identified with a creature; but they call this "secondary," while they call that which consists in the necessary attributes of God "primary." But this is in reality to concede what we intend, namely that besides inferential possibility identified with God, whether this be called "primary," if one likes, because of the priority proper to the root or because of the primacy and eminence of perfection, there is another possibility intimate to creatures and consisting in their essence. But this alone will properly be "formal possibility": both because it alone is the immediate reason why a creature is distinguished from a chimera; because it alone belongs directly to the formal concept of a creature; and because that primary possibility is rather radical or inferential, and is called "formal" only improperly, insofar as it is a form extrinsically denominating possibles. Nor may it be denied that this secondary possibility is possibility properly so called, since it truly and properly distinguishes its subject from every non-possible, as we have shown. One may say, and to this the effort of the Adversaries finally returns: this secondary possibility is not that possibility by which man, for example, even before he exists, indeed from eternity, is rendered properly and simply possible, and which by way of object verifies a proposition of eternal truth, or God's necessary cognition of the possibility of man. For a subjectively contingent possibility such as that identified with

man does not suffice for these functions; rather, a possibility subjectively necessary, immutable, and eternal is required.

12. This, however, is refuted 1º because the intrinsic possibility of man is truly necessary by that necessity signified by the term "possible," properly so called. For "possible" means the same as "that which, if it existed, would not imply contradiction." Here, at most, there is signified a conditioned necessity of excluding contradiction, namely under the condition that the subject exist, or for the case of existence. But under this condition intrinsic possibility is subjectively necessary. For man, on the supposition that he exists, necessarily is a real being and therefore does not imply contradiction. Confirmation: no greater necessity is required in the verifier of a necessary proposition than in the terminus of an antecedent, necessary, eternal metaphysical connection. But possibility identified with man, which you call "secondary," is the terminus of a connection of this kind, since it is the terminus of that necessary and eternal possibility which you call "primary," and which undoubtedly is metaphysically and antecedently connected with its terminus. Therefore it will also be able to be the verifier, etc.

13. 2º Because from eternity there is truly asserted not only possibility in the abstract but also in the concrete, that is, the formal effect or denomination "possible," since the truth of this act, "Man is possible," is eternal and necessary. But such a concrete, or denomination, is constituted through a subject absolutely contingent, namely the creature itself. Therefore it can also be constituted through a form or possibility absolutely contingent and indistinct from the creature; for it imports the subject no less essentially than the form. 3º Because this denomination, "apt to be rendered possible by Omnipotence," is just as necessary and eternal as this one, "possible through Omnipotence, or through something Divine." For the latter cannot stand without the former, and from eternity God necessarily knows that man, in contrast with a chimera, has of himself something special by which he is intrinsically capable of being denominated "possible" from Omnipotence, as we showed n. 10. But nevertheless both the form and subject of the denomination "apt to be rendered, etc." is identified with the creature and is consequently contingent in existing. Therefore the same can be said of the denomination "possible" itself.

14. 4º Because these propositions, "Man is identified with himself, is an animal, is a finite being," likewise, "A lie is evil," and other similar propositions, are also of eternal truth. And yet the verifier of them on the part of the object is not something Divine. For greater clarity I suppose that possibles are known by God not only in Omnipotence as in a connected medium, but also immediately in themselves, as the Adversaries concede,

expressly Fr. Ribadeneira, disp. 9, *De scientia*, c. 1. Rather, the verifier is something consisting in man himself or in the lie, namely identity with himself, animality, finitude, malice. If perhaps you deny that these propositions are verified through these, I infer: therefore, just as this act, "A lie is evil," and understand the same of the others, is not verified through formal malice but through something Divine, which certainly cannot be formal malice, so also this act, "A lie is possible," will not be verified through formal possibility but through something Divine distinct from it. Therefore from the function of verifying such an act you wrongly conclude that formal possibility consists in something Divine.

15. 5º Because every proposition is verified through that which it enunciates, according to the universally received dictum of Aristotle: "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is called true or false," where by "thing" is understood the object enunciated. But this proposition, "Man is possible," or at least this no less eternal and necessary proposition, "Man is capable of being denominated possible," enunciates something identified with man. Therefore it is verified through this very thing. Certainly these propositions, "Man exists while excluding contradiction," and "Man, if he exists, will exclude contradiction," have the same object and differ only in the mode of tending, no otherwise than these: "Man runs while moving himself," and "Man, if he runs, will move himself." But the former absolute proposition is verified on the part of the object through something identified with man. Therefore so is the latter conditional proposition. But that conditional proposition conveys the same sense as "Man is possible," as Doctors commonly assert and the Adversaries do not deny. Therefore, etc.

The Common Explanation of Possibility Is Incidentally Freed from Certain Difficulties.

16. Although the definition or explanation of possibility through the exclusion of contradiction, or through the fact that two contradictories do not follow for the case of the subject's existence, is commonly approved, there are nevertheless some to whom it is displeasing as though it belonged to things other than what is defined, namely chimeras. Hence they object 1º: this objective concept, "a true and real Peter who is not a true and real Peter," is chimerical; and yet, if it existed, it would not imply two contradictories, for it would be constituted from a true and real Peter, to whose concept it belongs to exclude contradiction. The same argument is made concerning this object, "a possible chimera," which is likewise chimerical; and yet, if it existed, two contradictories would not follow, since

the concept of possibility consists in this, and that chimera would participate in that concept. 2º One argues well thus: A chimera involves two contradictories; therefore it does not exist. Since, therefore, the consequence holds from the opposite of the consequent to the opposite of the antecedent, one will rightly argue thus: A chimera exists; therefore it does not involve two contradictories. But by this very fact this proposition will be true: "If a chimera existed, it would not involve two contradictories." 3º If two contradictories existed simultaneously, a chimera would exist; but then two contradictories would not exist simultaneously. Therefore if a chimera existed, etc. Proof of the minor premise: because if two contradictories existed simultaneously, neither would exist, for since each is the defect of the other, each would be lacking; therefore both would not exist simultaneously.

17. These and other similar arguments are mere sophisms. To 1º: that concept would be constituted from a true and real Peter in such a way that at the same time it would be constituted from what is not he, or from the lack of that same Peter as true and real. Therefore it is already expressly posited as composed of contradictories. Precisely excluding contradiction does indeed belong to the concept of a true Peter precisely as such; but not to the concept of Peter as true in such a way that at the same time he is not true. For it belongs to the concept of the latter simultaneously to exclude and not exclude contradiction, where there is a reflexive contradiction. Likewise, that concept, "a possible chimera," means the same as "simultaneously involving and not involving contradiction," from which contradictories certainly follow, at least reflexive ones, namely involving and not involving, etc. It would indeed participate in the concept of possibility, but at the same time it would not participate in it. Consequently, if it existed, it would be that from which two contradictories would not follow and would follow. But "not following and following" is itself a pair of contradictories. Thus, if this concept, "an irrational man," or this, "a rational horse," existed, it would participate and not participate in the concept of rationality, and therefore would simultaneously be and not be rational. And just as from this the definition of man through the concept of rational animal should not be rejected as though it belonged to things other than what is defined, namely chimeras of this sort, so, etc.

18. To 2º: the first inference is good; the second is bad. Nor does the rule "From the opposite of the consequent," etc., speak of an opposite of the consequent that is expressly chimerical. For from this the opposite of the antecedent often follows no more than the antecedent itself, because then especially the common dictum applies: "From the impossible anything

follows." Hence, although you rightly argue thus, A man who is not a man is a chimera; therefore he does not exist, you nevertheless argue wrongly thus, A man who is not a man exists; therefore he is not a chimera. One may say: if anything follows from the impossible, and one thing no more than another, then from the impossible hypothesis that a chimera exists, two contradictories would no more follow than not follow. Therefore a chimera will be no more impossible than possible. I answer by denying the second consequence: because, as we have already noted, the very following and not following of two contradictories from that hypothesis is itself a pair of contradictories. But possibility is explained through no two contradictories whatever following, even reflexive ones, and consequently through "not following" divided and separated from "following." To 3º, I deny the minor premise, or distinguish it: then they would not exist and at the same time would exist, I grant; they would not exist precisely, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. To the proof: each would indeed be lacking, but at the same time neither would be lacking by the very fact that the formal defects of each would simultaneously exist. For those defects are the contradictories themselves, as the objection supposes.

19. One may object: by these reflections the way of proving from the concept of possibility that any thing is possible is blocked. For if you prove, for example, that man is possible because, if he exists, two contradictories will not follow, the Adversary will distinguish thus: they will not follow and at the same time will follow, I grant; they will not follow precisely, I deny. But just as concerning this chimerical object, "a rational brute animal," we rightly deny that it is a man because it is posited as rational in such a way that at the same time it is not rational, nor is the way thereby blocked for proving from the concept of rationality that Peter is a man, as though one might equally reply that Peter is rational in such a way that at the same time he is not rational; so must we judge in the present matter, for exactly the same reason. When the matter concerns an object chimerical from its very terms, we rightly and deservedly employ distinctions of this kind, since they are not fabricated at pleasure but elicited from the proper concept and notion of the terms. And what wonder is it if the possibility of such an object can be proved in no way? But when the discussion concerns an object clearly or doubtfully possible, those distinctions, unless first confirmed by a valid argument, are altogether to be rejected or disregarded as mere mockeries of syllogistic form.

20. Finally, if you ask whether true and real existence is assumed on the part of the hypothesis when it is said that man, "if he existed," would not imply contradiction, the answer seems affirmative. Otherwise there would

be no true connection of the condition with the conditioned. Nor therefore will there be a tautology, as though one said, "If he truly existed, he would truly exist"; for "to exist" and "not to imply contradiction" are not synonymous terms. Thus it is not ineptly said, "If man exists, a rational animal will exist." Indeed the same must apparently be affirmed when the implication of a chimera is asserted under the hypothesis of existence, so that "if a chimera existed, it would imply, etc." means the same as "if a chimera had real existence, it would simultaneously have and not have it." Nor does it matter that this is an inferential conditional. For although real existence according to itself does not imply contradiction, it does imply it as applied to a chimerical subject. Thus true rationality, as applied to a brute, implies its being together with its non-being.

CHAPTER II.
Inferences from What Has Been Said, and the Explanation of Several Difficulties.

21. From what has so far been said, the following are inferred. 1º When the discussion concerns formal possibility, the abstract "possibility" does not differ from the concrete "possible," nor from the subject, except according to the mode of signifying, or verbally; namely in the way in which "entity and being," or "identity and the same," or even "aptitude and what is apt" for the denomination "possible" differ from one another. 2º Since the term "possible" signifies the same as "not implying contradiction if it exists," or "whenever it exists," it determines in predication the verb or copula "is" to a conditioned signification. Hence this proposition, "Man is possible," which means the same as "Man can, is able, is apt to exist," although absolute in sound, is conditional in sense, since it can be expounded through this: "Man, if he existed, would not imply contradiction." And because in this sense that proposition is true at whatever time it is uttered, even if from eternity, the verb "is" in it is therefore said to be extended to all times, or released from time, that is, not bound to the present or to a determinate time. 3º Other propositions that are called "of eternal truth" must be understood similarly, namely those that enunciate the essentials of things or are taken as immutable principles, for example, "Man is a rational animal," "Two and three are five," "The whole is greater than its part." For they convey a hypothetical sense, namely, "Man, if he exists, or whenever he exists, will be a rational animal," and so with the others. See Fr. Suárez, disp. 31, Met. sect. 12, from n. 38. The reason is that, if these propositions conveyed an absolute sense by taking the verb "is"

according to a state, either they would not be necessary and true from eternity, or the essence of a creature would necessarily and from eternity have been something actual, which we showed to be false against the first opinion.

22. It is objected: in the hypothetical sense this is also true, "Man exists," or "Man is," by understanding, namely, "if he exists." Therefore it will be a proposition of eternal and necessary truth. I grant the consequence if that condition posited in the antecedent is understood. Yet this will not occur unless one departs from common usage, because the verb "exists," as also the verb "is" in a proposition of the second adjacent, is according to common usage taken absolutely, or according to a state. On the contrary, when an essential predicate is added, common usage and sense take the verb "is" through alienation or extension to the time that would obtain under the hypothesis of the subject's existence. The Adversaries must admit this if these two propositions are compared: "The existence of a creature is limited actuality"; "The existence of a creature exists, or actually is." The first is scientific, necessary, and of eternal truth; but not the second, although they agree in object and differ only in the mode of tending or of taking the verb "is." Nor can it be said that the first is verified through an essential or diminished actuality which exists from eternity, since this, according to its own authors, is really distinguished from existence; nor again through the attributes of God, because it enunciates nothing Divine, as is clear from the terms.

23. It must be observed here that no formal truth of a proposition or cognition is in fact eternal except in the Divine intellect, as St. Thomas warns, 1ª p. q. 10, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 16, a. 7. Hence, when some proposition of ours is said to be "of eternal truth," this must be understood either "presuppositively," insofar as that proposition supposes God's necessary cognition of the same object, or even "by extension," both insofar as in it the verb "is" is hypothetically extended to every time, and insofar as it is true at whatever time it is uttered and, if it had existed from eternity, would also have been true from eternity. But objective truth, that is, truth intrinsic to created things capable of being enunciated, is neither eternal nor absolutely necessary or immutable, as St. Thomas likewise warns, q. 1, *De veritate*, a. 5, who again expressly asserts ibid. a. 6, ad 6, that the truth of a thing is only "immutable as regards the essentials of the thing while the thing remains," that is, on the supposition or under the condition that the thing remains or exists.

24. 4º Since intrinsic possibility is identified with the essence of the thing, and consequently also with existence, because existence is not really

distinguished from essence, as we shall later say, this possibility does not exist from eternity or before the thing exists, and consequently neither does the denomination "formally possible." Hence St. Thomas, 1ª p. q. 9, a. 2, says: "All creatures, before they were, were not possible to be through any created power, since nothing created is eternal, but through the Divine power alone, insofar as God was able to produce them into being." Therefore, speaking of intrinsic possibility, which St. Thomas himself plainly acknowledges, 1ª p. q. 25, a. 3, and taking the verb "is" according to a state, so that it signifies the actuality of being as presently exercised, it is truly said of a Peter who does not exist, "he is not possible," just as it is truly said in the same sense, "he is not a man, nor an animal," or even, "he is not Peter," because he is negatively distinguished from himself, that is, he is not actually identified with himself, since neither he nor his identity, etc., actually exists.

25. Nevertheless, that proposition, "Peter is not possible," must not be granted unless the speaker expressly declares that he is speaking in such a sense. For otherwise it is simply false, and the opposite, "Peter is possible," is simply true even before existence: both because it can be referred to extrinsic or radical possibility, and because, even if it is referred to formal possibility, the verb "is" with the predicate "possible" conveys a hypothetical sense according to the property of speech determined by common usage. This holds even if it be said: "Now," or "from now, absolutely and necessarily Peter is possible"; for from common usage this sense can and should always be conveyed: "If Peter now existed," whether you wish to speak of the "now" of eternity, "he would now," or "from now, exclude contradiction absolutely and necessarily." Nevertheless these syncategorematic expressions can be referred to present necessity and expounded in this sense: "now, or from now, it is absolutely necessary, or there is absolutely a necessity, that if Peter exists, he exclude contradiction." Thus indeed they are verified through the attributes of God, but they do not fall upon formal possibility. They can likewise be referred reflexively to the truth of affirmation, in this sense: "now, or from now, it is absolutely and necessarily true," that is, "it is affirmed," that "if Peter existed, he would exclude contradiction." Thus, however, they will be verified through the affirmation of possibility, and from eternity through Divine cognition.

26. Further, in order that an affirmation or judicative cognition be absolutely and presently true, the present existence of the object is not required, unless this is enunciated as present. For although formal truth consists in the conformity of judgment with its object, or, as St. Thomas speaks, in the adequation and commensuration of intellect and thing, and consequently is constituted through act and object, as we showed in Logic;

nevertheless the proper sense of the term "truth," or of the denomination "true," insofar as it is proper to judgment, does not always require the coexistence of both constitutives. It requires the act to be present, but the object only for the time for which it is enunciated. Hence, if an enunciation concerns the past, or the future, absolute or conditioned, there suffices for truth an object which was, or will be, or would be. This suffices, I say, for "truth" properly so called to be given already now in the present judgment, because the property of this term requires nothing else. "In this adequation or commensuration of intellect and thing," says St. Thomas, q. 1, *De veritate*, a. 5, "it is not required that both extremes be in act"; and the Holy Doctor adds as an example this proposition: "Antichrist will be born."

27. There are certainly many denominations which are said simply to exist in the present although not all their constitutives are present. Thus, to omit properly successive beings such as "hour, day, month, etc.," which are called simply present by reason of one part or point, an eighty-year-old man is now called "old," wine "aged," a house "ancient," although old age, age, and antiquity are constituted through past years. Thus also a man now living is now temporally called "prior" to Antichrist and "posterior" to Adam, although these denominations are constituted through termini, or their ages, which do not now exist. Thus likewise the essence of a possible creature which will never exist is properly and simply said from eternity to be "known" through Divine cognition, "possible" through Omnipotence as an extrinsic form, and "terminating" the metaphysical connection of the attributes of God, with which possibility is identified according to the opponents. And yet denominations or formal effects of this kind are constituted through a subject that is not from eternity, since it is the very essence of the creature. If you dispute with the authors of the first and second opinions, take as an example the existence, for example, of another world, which is likewise denominated from eternity "known, possible, and terminating" the connection. Therefore whether denominations, when they are not wholly intrinsic, require or do not require all their constitutives to be simultaneously present depends upon their diverse character and upon the diverse sense and property of the terms.

28. Hence it must be conceded that this act, "if Peter existed, he would not imply contradiction," exists from eternity in the Divine intellect "as true, and insofar as true"; because the reduplication "insofar as" accommodates its force to the character of the denomination to which it is added, and consequently denotes only the absolute existence of the act, but the position of the object merely conditionally, that is, the position which truly would obtain if the condition were fulfilled. Here again the recent examples apply.

For we also truly say that a man now exists "as old, and as prior," or "posterior" to others. Likewise, that cognition exists from eternity, not merely in any manner, but "as denominating" a creature known; and extrinsic possibility "as constituting" a creature in the being of a possible, or in the being of one terminating an eternal connection. One may say: it implies contradiction for a true act to exist as true when its verifier does not exist. I answer: this no more implies contradiction than that a constituted thing, or denomination, or formal effect exists when not all its constitutives exist. What, then, of the examples just adduced?

29. Likewise, this no more implies contradiction than that an act exists as true in a place where its verifier does not exist. And yet, when I say here, "The Pope exists at Rome," this act truly exists in this place as true, while its verifier exists only at Rome. Similarly, when I see a stone, this true act, "The stone is," physically exists within me as true; yet its verifier does not physically exist within me or in my intellect. Nor may it be said that these acts are verified through the Divine decree concerning the position of such objects, which by reason of immensity is everywhere. For first, that our present cognition, even intuitive cognition, which says nothing about a Divine object, should immediately be verified through such a decree seems an excessively exotic doctrine and wholly alien from common sense. Again, either the verifier of those acts is that which they enunciate, or it is not. If you say the first, then since they enunciate only the Roman presence of the Pope and the existence of the stone outside me, which certainly do not exist in the same place or subject where the truth of the acts is, the objection remains in full force. If the second, then neither will the act enunciating that Peter is possible be verified through what it enunciates. Therefore, although it exists from eternity as true and joined to its verifier, it does not follow that Peter's possibility must exist from eternity.

30. Therefore this proposition, "Present truth cannot be given," or "an act as true cannot exist, without a present verifier," should be distinguished thus: if the verifier is other than the object of the act, let it pass; if it is not other, I subdistinguish: if the act enunciates the object as now present, I grant; if it enunciates it as past or future, absolutely or conditionally, I deny. For then a verifier which was, will be, or would be present suffices. If you prove this from the fact that what is constituted cannot actually exist unless all its constitutives actually exist, I distinguish again: if the constituted thing by its proper character requires simultaneity of the constitutives, I grant; if it does not require it, as in the examples given above, I deny. And the "truth" of an act, or the denomination "true," is of this character, since in this non-requirement of simultaneity it in some way imitates a successive whole,

although it differs from it in other respects. I am always speaking of the verifier which stands on the part of the object and is called objective. The act itself, however, since it principally and directly constitutes truth, can be called the subjective verifier; and it is certain that without this truth cannot exist.

31. Finally, it must be observed that in God's necessary cognition of the possibility of Peter, for example, we can distinguish, according to our mode of conceiving, four judicative tendencies. 1º "It can happen that Peter exists." 2º "It is necessary," or "There is a necessity presently from eternity, that if Peter exists, he not imply contradiction." 3º "It is true that, if Peter existed, he would exclude contradiction." 4º "If Peter existed, he would exclude contradiction." Of these, the first is immediately verified through Omnipotence; the second through Omnipotence and the other necessary attributes of God connected with possibles; the third through Divine cognition itself, which it reflexively affirms, and also obliquely through its object, which would be; the fourth, which alone directly and immediately affirms formal possibility, is immediately verified through the essence of Peter. And our cognition saying, "Peter is possible," or "can exist," when we speak of formal possibility or intrinsic potency, corresponds in sense to this last one. If the discussion concerns radical or extrinsic possibility, the sense will be according to the first tendency, "It can happen," etc. It corresponds, I say, in sense, not in words or expressions, because one must not suppose that Divine cognition is as it were formed with the present-tense verb "is" or "can," while alienating or extending it. For it affirms intrinsic possibility by the simplest conditional mode, which we cannot explain better than through the terms of the fourth tendency. If you further ask whether, or from what, this proposition is verified when uttered in an entirely absolute sense, "It is not repugnant for Peter to exist," we shall answer in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III.
The Contrary Arguments Are Answered.

32. It is objected 1º from a manner of speaking also used by the Ancients, by which the possibility of a creature is said to be necessary, indefectible, indestructible by God, and eternal; attributes which cannot belong to the essence or existence of a creature. I answer: the same attributes are also commonly bestowed upon the essence of creatures among the Ancients. Hence the sciences, because they discuss the essences of things while abstracting from existence, are said to concern necessary, incorruptible, and eternal things. And therefore this proposition, "Man is a rational animal," is

no less said to be of eternal and immutable truth than this one, "Man is possible." Therefore let the authors of the third opinion explain expressions of this kind concerning essence, and we shall in like manner explain the same concerning possibility. Against the first and second opinions you have the objection at n. 22. Moreover, not only possibility in the abstract but also the denomination "possible" itself, as belonging both to the essence and to the existence of a creature, is called eternal and indefectible, although it is constituted through the essence and existence themselves. See n. 27. Likewise, that capacity or intrinsic character through which the essence or existence of man is rendered a suitable subject of the denomination "possible" is eternal and indestructible by God, although it is indistinct from the very essence and existence of man. See n. 10.

33. Therefore, when it is said that the possibility of a creature "is necessary, is eternal," etc., if the verb "is" is taken according to a state, the expression must be referred to extrinsic or inferential possibility; otherwise it will be false and must be altogether denied, from n. 24. But if the "is" is taken by extension or alienation from an absolute sound to a conditioned sense, as it very frequently is in reality, the expression is true even in relation to intrinsic or formal possibility, because it signifies only that the exclusion of contradiction in a creature would be necessary if existence were posited, and indeed in such a way that not even God could prevent it under that hypothesis; and likewise that it would be eternal if existence were posited from eternity, as is evident, at least in a permanent creature. But in this sense the same attributes belong to the essence and existence of a creature. The only difference between possibility and existence is in the use of the terms. For by the term "possible" or "possibility," according to common usage, a hypothetical sense is denoted even if it is not expressed; but not so by the term "existence" or "existing," which rather imports an absolute sense unless something else is expressly declared, or unless its own quiddity is predicated of existence. See n. 22.

34. Hence, although this proposition, "Possibility is necessary," is simply granted, nevertheless this proposition, "Existence is necessary," must simply be denied. For although they speak of the same subject, they present a different sense, or a different acceptance of the verb "is," according to common usage, which must be followed when simply granting or denying. Therefore it must rather be simply granted that the existence of a creature is contingent and defectible. And when it is objected that the necessary cannot be identified with the contingent, I grant if they are such in the same sense, that is, if both are absolute or both hypothetical; but I deny if one is necessary only hypothetically and the other contingent only absolutely. For

nothing is absolutely contingent which is not necessary under the hypothesis, or on the supposition, according to the dictum: "Everything that is, on the supposition that it is, necessarily is."

35. Hence you will gather that nothing is verified of formal possibility which is not also verified of existence, and conversely, provided each is taken in the same sense. And when God is said to be free regarding the existence of things but not regarding possibility; or to be metaphysically connected with the possibility of a creature but not with existence; or to know possibles through the knowledge of simple intelligence, but existing things only through the knowledge of vision: no entitative distinction between possibility and existence is denoted. Rather, only a diversity in the acceptance of the same object is indicated, now in a hypothetical sense, now in an absolute one. This diversity, according to common usage, is sufficiently understood through the very terms "possibility" and "existence," unless another intention of the speaker is expressed. Therefore the same existence of man is free to God as regards the exercise of being absolutely, and is not free to God as regards the exercise of excluding contradiction whenever it is; not because these exercises are entitatively distinguished from each other, but because one and the same entity of man is apt to terminate an act of Divine liberty absolutely decreeing that man be, while at the same time it is not apt to terminate another act of Divine liberty conditionally decreeing that, if man be, he exclude contradiction. From this there follows only that the same entity is apt and not apt with respect to diverse acts, one of which is possible and the other impossible to Divine liberty.

36. Similarly, for God to be metaphysically connected with the possibility of man and not with his existence is nothing other than for God to be metaphysically connected with the entity of man through a connection having a conditional mode of inferring, and not to be connected with the same entity through a connection having an absolute mode of inferring; the latter connection is impossible to God. Finally, God knows nothing through the knowledge of vision which He does not know through the knowledge of simple intelligence, although the latter extends to more objects. But because these kinds of knowledge have a diverse mode of tending, one absolute and the other hypothetical, one is contingent and the other necessary, notwithstanding the identity of the object, which is simultaneously absolutely contingent and conditionally necessary, as we have seen. Although conditionality, to note this incidentally, stands only fundamentally on the part of the object, formally it consists in the mode by which the act tends, and which the particle "if" expresses, just as disjunction, which the particle "or" expresses, formally consists in a mode of tending. To persuade

the Adversaries of this whole doctrine, press the objections of n. 32, especially that taken from the intrinsic aptitude of existence to be denominated "possible." For such an aptitude is not free to God, but terminates God's metaphysical connection and is known through the knowledge of simple intelligence, although it is wholly indistinct from existence itself.

37. It is objected in reply: the efficient cause through its action gives existence to the effect and does not give possibility. Likewise, the possibility of the effect is presupposed for acting, and indeed as constitutive of the proximate potency; but existence is not thus presupposed. I answer: the first complex proposition can and is commonly granted simply, because the first categorical proposition is commonly taken in an absolute sense, the second in a hypothetical one, from what was said n. 33. The meaning of those who speak thus is that the action of the efficient cause ultimately determines the effect to be absolutely, but does not determine it such that, on the supposition that it be, it exclude contradiction. For the effect is essentially determined to this through itself or through the supposition itself; and an action which, under such a supposition or hypothesis, tended toward such an end would be essentially useless, just as an action determining Peter so that on the supposition that he is a man he be a rational animal. For the rest, both possibility and existence are given through action absolutely, and are not given conditionally; that is, each terminates an action determining in an absolute mode, and neither terminates another, essentially useless and impossible action determining in the hypothetical mode just explained. Therefore the entire distinction stands on the part of the actions which are connoted. To the other proposition objected, it must be denied that formal possibility is subjectively and positively presupposed for acting; inferential possibility, consisting in the power of the cause, is indeed presupposed. It is presupposed only objectively and negatively, insofar as in verifying this proposition, "If the effect existed, it would exclude contradiction," it does not depend upon action as present. It must also be denied that it is constitutive of proximate potency, or of the proximate first act for acting. For although impossibility, if it were given, would be an irremovable impediment, this is sufficiently excluded through inferential possibility, which stands on the part of first act.

38. It is objected again: a man who will never exist is from eternity not only conditionally but also absolutely possible. For he would not merely be possible, but is possible; nor merely could he exist, but can exist. Therefore the possibility of man would not merely be given from eternity, but is absolutely given. But why do you not infer that the existence of man also is

absolutely given from eternity, from which, as from a subject, the denomination "possible" is constituted? Or why do you not infer the same of man's passive aptitude, whereby in contrast with a chimera he is rendered possible from eternity by God's necessary attributes? For he not only would be but is apt from eternity; nor merely could he but can be rendered possible, since, as you contend, he is absolutely rendered so. Therefore, to the objection, I grant the whole if the discussion concerns inferential possibility and that which denominates extrinsically. But if the discussion concerns immediate and formal possibility, I distinguish the antecedent: he is not only conditionally possible, with a condition of itself included in the term "possible," I deny; with another condition extraneous to this term, I grant the antecedent. And I also grant that such a man is absolutely possible if "absolutely" removes extraneous conditions and is taken in the sense explained n. 25. I likewise grant that according to the common manner of speaking such a man not merely would be but is possible, and not merely could but can exist, because the verbs "is" and "can" either are referred to extrinsic denomination and the power of the cause, or are not taken according to a state. Nevertheless I simply deny the consequence concerning formal possibility, because it presents its position as exercised from eternity.

39. It is objected 2º: when Peter does not exist, there is in the present a verifier of this proposition, "Peter is possible," even speaking of formal possibility. Therefore Peter's formal possibility is presently given. Proof of the antecedent: because that proposition is presently true; therefore its truth, or that which is "its being true," is presently given. But its verifier is included in this. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 1º: something is presently given which would not be presently given if that proposition were presently false; but this something can be nothing other than its verifier. Therefore, etc. Confirmation 2º: the falsity of that proposition would not presently be given. Therefore there is presently the lack of falsity, or of that which is "its being false." But this lack is the existence of the verifier, namely Peter's possibility. Therefore, etc. This objection, which, like the others concerning this question invented by authors of Ours, the Thomists eagerly seize upon against the determination of middle knowledge, is clearly instantiated from n. 10 in this proposition: "Peter, in contrast with a chimera, is of himself apt to be rendered possible by God's necessary attributes," or "is of himself a suitable subject for the denomination possible." Likewise, from n. 27, in this: "This man is old," or "is posterior to Adam and prior to Antichrist." Likewise in this: "The Pope exists at Rome," when proved at Salamanca. See n. 27.

40. Next, it is easily solved from what was said from n. 26 to 30 by denying the antecedent. And in the proof, if "presently" is referred to the

mode of enunciating, whereby the object is enunciated as present and the verb "is" is taken according to a state, I deny the antecedent; for thus the proposition "Peter is possible" is false. But if it means the same as "at present," and denotes only that that proposition, insofar as it can thus be expounded, "If Peter existed, he would exclude contradiction," is presently true, which seems to be the sense of the objection, I grant the antecedent. Then I distinguish the consequence: its truth is presently given, etc., taking "is given" according to the character and nature of the subject, I grant; otherwise, I deny. And granting the subsumed minor premise, I deny the final consequence. When the discussion concerns a conditional proposition, for its truth to be given, or for that which is "its being true" to be given, is for an act enunciating an object as it would be, or as it truly would be given if the condition were fulfilled, to be presently given. Therefore this truth, or this "being true," is a certain subject constituted by its nature from an act which is and from an object which would be. Consequently, in order that such a subject be presently given according to its nature, everything constitutively included in it need not be presently given; rather, it suffices that the act be presently given and that the object truly would be given if the condition were fulfilled. Hence the reflex proposition saying of the direct conditional, "it is presently true," or "its truth is presently given," is equivalently complex and can be expounded thus: "the act presently exists, and the object would be given under the hypothesis under which it is enunciated."

41. To Confirmation 1º: if we speak of that proposition as possessed by the Divine intellect, granting the major premise as it stands, I deny the minor premise. For there is presently given, not only in the other attributes of God but also in the act itself, radical truth, or a metaphysical connection with the object and with formal truth, which connection would not be given in the case of falsity and is something other than the objective verifier of the act. But if we speak of a proposition of a created intellect which is not intrinsically connected with the object, or if the major premise is reformulated thus, "Something distinct from the proposition and standing on the part of the object is presently given which would not be given, etc.," then I deny the major premise. For although there is presently given "its being true," which would not be given in the case of falsity, this nevertheless does not constitutively import something present distinct from the act; rather, it imports a present act and adds an object, not as now existing, but as it would exist under the hypothesis just as it is enunciated. Let the example be this act, "Peter is posterior to Adam," which is presently true although there is not presently given on the part of the verifying object

something which would not presently be given if it were now false. For it would be false without an intrinsic change in present things, provided Adam had not existed before Peter.

42. To Confirmation 2º, admitting the enthymeme, I deny the subsumed minor premise: both because, speaking of a Divine proposition, the lack of its falsity can consist in the existence of the proposition itself, which essentially excludes falsity from itself; and because, even if the lack of falsity is taken for the lack of a falsifying object, this lack, insofar as presently given and according to a state, is not the existence of the verifier, namely Peter′s possibility, but a pure negation, or the pure non-being of a falsifier. One may say: the falsifier of that act is, or would be, Peter′s impossibility; but the lack of this impossibility is possibility. Therefore, etc. I distinguish the minor premise: the lack of this impossibility formally excluding it from Peter under the hypothesis, or for the case of Peter′s existence, I grant; formally excluding it from the state of existence absolutely and independently of cases or conditions, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. For although Peter′s possibility does not actually exist, his impossibility nevertheless absolutely is not and does not exist in the nature of things. Consequently it is formally excluded from the state of existence through its purely negative lack, absolutely and presently given, if lacks can thus be given, or through its absolute non-being. Thus, although the essence of man, for the case of existence, is a lack of identity of himself with a non-man, nevertheless independently of cases and of the essence of man as presently posited, there is now and always an absolute lack of the identity of man with a non-man, that is, this identity is never given in the state of existence. You also have an example in the lack of man′s intrinsic ineptitude to be denominated "possible" from Omnipotence.

43. One may say again: at the time when a proposition′s falsity is not given, truth is given. I deny this absolutely, because if the proposition does not exist, at that time neither its falsity nor its truth is given. Indeed, even if the act exists and at the same time there is a lack of falsity consisting in the lack of a falsifying object, truth need not thereby be given according to a state as regards the part in which it includes the verifying object. For if the proposition does not speak about such a present time, it is neither true nor false in relation to the object insofar as it is posited or not posited at this time, just as "Man exists" is neither true nor false about a stone because it does not speak about a stone; and for the same reason "Peter ate yesterday" is neither true nor false in relation to today′s eating. Since, therefore, the hypothetical proposition about which we are disputing does not speak of the time which is, but of the time which would be if the condition were posited,

it can now fail to be false according to a state without its truth thereby being given according to a state secundum quid. Nevertheless truth of this kind is said simply to be given now because the truth of a hypothetical act, simply so called, does not import all its constitutives according to a state; just as falsity opposed to this truth does not import all its constitutives according to a state, since it must similarly be constituted from a falsifier which would be.

44. Hence a present hypothetical act is not exempted from the falsity opposed to its truth by the lack of a falsifier precisely insofar as presently given; for, unless something else prevents it, falsity constituted through a falsifier which would be can stand with such a lack as now given. It is therefore exempted through that lack insofar as it would have to be given from the hypothesis, or insofar as it would result from the fulfillment of the condition. If perhaps you infer: therefore nothing is presently given by which such an act is exempted from falsity of this kind. I distinguish the consequence: if you speak of a Divine act, I deny; for it is sufficiently exempted through its radical truth. If of a human act which is not radically true, I grant the consequence, from n. 44, where the same difficulty was solved with only a difference of terms. For a similar reason, the truth of a hypothetical act can stand with a lack of the verifier as absolutely and presently given, because it does not conflict with such a lack in any manner whatever, but only insofar as the lack supposes the condition fulfilled. Certainly it is no more repugnant in terms that the truth of an act be joined with the lack of its verifier than that a metaphysical connection be joined with the lack of its terminus. And yet the metaphysical connection of Omnipotence with man′s passive aptitude to be rendered possible, or with the resulting malice of sin under the condition that man, with advertence to the prohibition, freely lie, is from eternity joined with the lack of its terminus.

45. It is objected 3º: presently, absolutely, and according to a state the verifier of this act, "Peter is not possible," is lacking, speaking of a Peter who will never exist. Therefore presently, absolutely, and according to a state the verifier of the contradictory, "Peter is possible," is present, and this is Peter′s possibility. The consequence is clear: both because the verifier of each of two contradictory acts cannot be lacking in the same sense and at the same time, since one or the other must be true; and because the verifier of the former negative act would be the defect of possibility, while for this defect to be lacking is for possibility itself to be present, in which the verifier of the latter affirmative act consists. But the antecedent is no less clear: both because otherwise such an act would be true; and because its verifier is a chimera,

and every chimera is presently, absolutely, and according to a state lacking. Confirmation 1º: the formal defect of possibility, that is, "non-possibility," is not absolutely and presently given; otherwise it would truly be said, "Peter absolutely is not possible." Therefore its contradictory is absolutely and presently given, for in whatever sense one contradictory is not given, the other is given. But the contradictory of that defect is formal possibility. Confirmation 2º: Peter is not now absolutely impossible; therefore he is now absolutely possible, for in whatever mode he is not impossible he is possible. Or otherwise: Peter's impossibility is now lacking absolutely and independently of conditions. Therefore his possibility exists in the same manner; otherwise two contradictories would simultaneously be lacking absolutely. Confirmation 3º: it is absolutely repugnant that Peter be a chimera. Therefore the repugnance of Peter's identity with a chimera is absolutely given. But this repugnance is Peter's very formal possibility.

46. This objection, which is a repetition of the preceding under other terms, is not difficult to solve from what has been said. First, the proposition "Peter is not possible" can deny extrinsic or radical possibility; and thus from its falsity it follows only that Omnipotence exists. Next, it can deny intrinsic possibility according to a state; and in this sense it is altogether true when Peter does not exist, as we noted n. 24, nor is its verifier lacking, because it is verified through the lack or non-existence of Peter. Finally, if it is taken, as it commonly is, in a hypothetical sense and is equivalent to this, "If Peter exists, he will imply, or not exclude, contradiction," then to the objection, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. For the verifier of the negative act is or would be the contradiction of Peter's predicates for the case of existence, namely presupposing existence and coexisting or joined with it. This contradiction is indeed presently lacking when Peter's existence is lacking, for there is no contradiction joined with existence when existence is not given. But it does not therefore follow that the verifier of the affirmative act is presently given in the same hypothetical sense. For this verifier is the exclusion of contradiction for the case of Peter's existence, and consequently is joined with such existence. But from the fact that a contradiction joined with Peter's existence is not presently given, it does not follow that the exclusion of contradiction joined with the same existence is presently given. For when existence is not given, neither contradiction nor the exclusion of contradiction is joined with it. Thus, from the fact that the lack of Antichrist joined with Adam's existence is not now given, it does not follow that the existence of Antichrist joined with Adam's existence is now given.

47. To the first proof of the consequence: the verifier of each of two contradictory acts indeed cannot simultaneously be lacking for the time or case for which the object is enunciated; but it can be lacking for another time or case for which it is not enunciated. But the object of those acts, insofar as they signify hypothetically, is not enunciated for an absolutely present time, nor for the case of Peter′s non-existence. Hence neither act is true nor false in relation to such a time or case. Nor is the former, "Peter is not possible," falsified by the defect of the verifier precisely insofar as now given, but insofar as it would conditionally be given, namely for the time or case of Peter′s existence, if this were posited. Read again what was said nn. 43 and 44. To the second proof: the verifier of the negative act taken hypothetically is not the defect of possibility as now absolutely given and independent of the hypothesis of Peter′s existence. For this defect is not lacking but is presently given when Peter does not exist, since it is the same as the defect of existence according to a state; nor would that proposition be false but contingently true if it spoke of this defect. Therefore that verifier consists, or would consist, in the defect of possibility, that is, in the contradiction of predicates, as posited on the supposition of existence, and consequently as joined with Peter′s existence. But for such a defect to be now lacking is not for possibility now to be present as verifying the affirmative act, just as for the defect of Antichrist as joined with Adam′s existence to be now lacking is not for Antichrist now to be present as joined with Adam′s existence.

48. To Confirmation 1º, I distinguish the antecedent: the absolute formal defect of possibility, independent of the supposition of existence, is not presently given, I deny, for this defect is presently given when Peter does not exist; and it is truly said, "Peter absolutely is not possible," taking "is" according to a state. The formal defect of possibility as presupposing Peter′s existence and joined with it is not presently given, I grant the antecedent. But I distinguish the consequence: its absolute contradictory, by which namely it is absolutely excluded from the nature of things, is presently given, let it pass; its conditioned contradictory, which namely is opposed to it only on the supposition, I deny the consequence. And only in this second mode is formal possibility contradictorily opposed to non-possibility. If you ask what the absolute contradictory of that defect is, first, the lack of Peter′s existence could suffice, for through this lack the defect of possibility as joined with Peter′s existence is sufficiently excluded. Next, because this defect, so taken, is a chimera, and every chimera necessarily and at every time is lacking, or is not given in the nature of things, its contradictory in this sense can be the pure lack or pure formal non-being of such a chimera, as we already said n.

42. This lack as regards its negative being will be necessary in the same sense in which the lack of a goat-stag is said to be necessary.

49. Moreover, the dictum, "In whatever sense one contradictory is not given, the other is given," is absolutely denied by many, because if it is taken crudely, many false and absurd things follow. For example: if man's existence is not given independently of God's will, the lack of man will be given independently of God's will; if God's existence is not given contingently, God's lack will be given contingently; if an existing Peter is not given in the composite sense of a chimera, a lack of Peter existing in the same composite sense will be given; if the formal defect of my existence insofar as lasting yesterday is not given today, my existence insofar as lasting yesterday will be given today; if the lack of a tailed man is not given, a tailed man will be given. Therefore it can happen that one of two contradictories is not given with some mode or addition without the other thereby being given with the same addition or mode. Moreover, it is falsely supposed that there are objective contradictories of things, that is, lacks or formal defects having some negative being independently of the fiction of the intellect. For we shall reject lacks of this sort in the last disputation. For the moment, however, we allow this common manner of speaking; and according to it we assigned at nn. 42 and 48 the absolute contradictory of the chimerical defect of possibility, which namely must be given at every time at which that defect is not given.

50. To Confirmation 2°, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence, speaking of the formal possibility of a Peter who does not exist and taking the verb "is" according to a state. For just as Peter, while he does not exist, is not absolutely irrational, nor immortal, nor immobile, nor blind, nor unlearned, without thereby being absolutely and according to a state rational, mortal, mobile, seeing, or learned, so, etc. For truly affirming any predicate absolutely and presently, the existence of the subject is required; but not for truly denying it. Nor is it true that Peter is possible in the same mode in which he is not impossible unless this is added, "on the supposition that he exists"; just as it is true only with this addition that he is mortal or mobile in the same mode in which he is not immortal or immobile. Nor are the predicates "impossible" and "possible" contradictories independently of a supposition, but only contraries, both of which can simultaneously be lacking when the subject does not exist, as is clear from the same examples.

51. Hence, to the other form of the Confirmation, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence together with the reason added. For possibility and impossibility are not contradictorily opposed independently of the condition as a thing and its pure negation, or as the pure non-being

and being of a thing. For possibility, although it is explained through the "non-implication" of contradiction, is in reality a positive concept, or a positive exclusion of contradiction, since it consists in the compatibility or identity of the predicates of a thing. Impossibility, however, since it is the simultaneity of contradictories, is not a merely negative concept but one mixed of negative and positive, that is, of being and non-being simultaneously given. Nevertheless they are said to be contradictorily opposed for the case of the subject's existence, because for this case they can neither simultaneously be present nor simultaneously absent. Thus are opposed, when Peter exists, his rationality and irrationality, or mortality and immortality; or thus are opposed in Peter these two concepts, "to be white," and "simultaneously to be and not be white," which for the case of receiving whiteness can neither truly be denied together nor affirmed together, although absolutely both can simultaneously be lacking, and consequently absolutely have only contrary opposition.

52. To Confirmation 3° I distinguish the antecedent: it is absolutely repugnant, etc., with extrinsic or radical repugnance, I grant; with intrinsic or formal repugnance, I subdistinguish: if "absolutely" is referred to the case of Peter's existence, I grant; if it prescinds from this case, I deny the antecedent, and likewise the consequence, if it speaks of formal repugnance while Peter does not exist. Just as this proposition, "Peter is absolutely possible," can according to common understanding be expounded in this sense, "Peter, whenever he exists, will absolutely exclude contradiction," so also this proposition, which signifies the same, "It is absolutely repugnant that Peter be a chimera," can be expounded in this way: "Peter, whenever he exists, will absolutely be repugnant to the identity of himself with a chimera." Thus expounded, it is true; otherwise, if it denotes that the intrinsic repugnance of Peter to being a chimera is absolutely and presently given, it is false. For Peter is intrinsically repugnant to identity with a chimera through that by which he is a real being, and therefore through his essence and existence, which certainly is not absolutely given when Peter does not exist.

53. You may also, if you like, distinguish the antecedent otherwise, namely thus: it is absolutely repugnant that Peter be a chimera, by a merely negative repugnance, consisting, namely, in the necessary lack of Peter's identity with a chimera, which lack we admitted with respect to every chimera at n. 48, let it pass; by a positive repugnance, which alone is Peter's possibility, I deny the antecedent, and under the same distinction the consequence. Finally, remember that this entire objection, together with its proofs and confirmations, is evidently instanced from n. 10 in Peter's

intrinsic capacity or aptitude to be the subject of the denomination "possible." For in like manner the verifier of this act, "Peter is not of himself a subject apt to be denominated possible," is absolutely and presently lacking. Therefore the verifier of the contradictory act will be presently given. You will find the same by applying the remaining forms of argument to the aptitude or ineptitude whereby Peter, in contrast with a chimera, receives the denomination "possible" or "impossible."

54. It is objected 4º: the impossibility of a chimera is not identified with the chimera. Therefore neither is Peter's possibility identified with Peter. Proof of the antecedent: the impossibility of a chimera is possible; but nothing possible is identified with a chimera. Therefore, etc. Proof of the major premise 1º: because the possibility of a chimera is impossible. Therefore its impossibility is possible. 2º Because it is possible for a chimera to be impossible; indeed, this is altogether necessary. 3º Because if a chimera's impossibility were impossible, the chimera itself would be possible, just as Peter is truly possible because his impossibility is chimerical; and generally that is possible whose impossibility is impossible. This argument also has an instance in the passive incapacity of a chimera to receive the denomination "possible" from God's necessary attributes. For such an incapacity is not identified with the chimera but will be possible: both because the capacity of a chimera for that denomination is impossible; because it is possible, indeed necessary, that a chimera be thus incapable; and because, if such incapacity were impossible, the chimera would be possible, as is clear from the same example of Peter, etc.

55. For the answer it must be noted that the impossibility of a chimera is also of two kinds. One is extrinsic or inferential, consisting in Omnipotence and the other Divine attributes; and concerning this we freely concede whatever the objection intends. The other is intrinsic or formal and immediate, consisting in the essence of the chimera, that is, in the simultaneity of two contradictories, or in the simultaneous contradiction of predicates, namely in the conjunction of being and non-being, or other predicates at least virtually contradictory. For it can hardly be denied that such a conjunction or simultaneity by reason of itself is incapable of existing, just as it is incapable of being denominated "possible" by anything Divine. Speaking, therefore, of this immediate impossibility, I deny the antecedent of the objection. To the proof, I deny the major premise, notwithstanding the proofs added. To 1º, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence; and besides the recent instance, I press thus: the exclusion of contradiction in a chimera is impossible, otherwise the chimera could exclude contradiction. Therefore the contradiction of predicates in a

chimera is possible. Behold a consequence deduced with equal right, and yet to be denied by all unless they wish the essence of a chimera to be possible. But in a chimera possibility and exclusion of contradiction mean the same, and impossibility and contradiction of predicates are the same. Therefore in a chimera both impossibility and possibility are impossible: the former because it is contradiction or conjunction of contradictories, the latter because it is exclusion of contradiction from contradiction. Nor should this be surprising in a chimerical subject, that is, one teeming with contradictions.

56. To 2º: that modal proposition, "it is possible," or "it is necessary," etc., can be granted absolutely, because it is commonly taken in an inferential sense, namely this: "Something is possible and necessary from which it follows that a chimera is impossible," or "an extrinsic connection with the impossibility of a chimera is possible and necessary." In this sense it is verified through Omnipotence. But if it signifies that this object, "a chimera to be impossible," has in itself some positive possibility or necessity, or that the predicate "possible" or "necessary" belongs immediately to such an object, it must be denied. In the same sense this equivalent proposition must also be denied: "It is possible and necessary for two contradictories to be joined in a chimera." For the essence itself of a chimera consists in this "being joined," which certainly is neither necessary nor possible. One may say: at least there belongs to a chimera the necessity of not existing, or the necessity of implying contradiction if it exists; and therefore this proposition, "If a chimera existed, it would imply contradiction," is necessarily true. I answer: this is a purely negative necessity, which means the same as the non-possibility of existing, or of excluding contradiction if it existed. This non-possibility is by no means founded on a truly real predicate, as in God the non-possibility of lying is founded upon the attribute of veracity, but on the contradiction of predicates. Nor is any other necessity required on the part of the object in order that that proposition be necessarily true.

57. To 3º, I deny the inference. And I distinguish that proposition, "That is possible whose impossibility is impossible": when the discussion concerns an object whose essential concept is distinct from contradiction of predicates, as happens in Peter and every other real being, I grant; when it concerns an object whose essential concept consists in contradiction itself, as happens in a chimera, I deny. For then that whose impossibility is impossible is that whose essence is impossible, since impossibility is its essence. I ask you whether the conjunction of contradictories in a chimera is impossible. If you deny it, the essence of a chimera, which consists in such a

conjunction, will not be impossible. If you affirm it, the chimera will be possible, just as Peter is possible because in him the conjunction of contradictories is impossible.

58. Finally, certain consequences from what has been said must be observed. 1º The essence, existence, and formal possibility of creatures are distinguished from God from eternity, not as being from being, but as that which is not from that which is, namely by a negative distinction on the part of creatures. 2º From eternity the possibility or essence of Peter was not actually, exercisedly, and positively diverse from the possibility or essence of a lion; nevertheless it was not the same, but was negatively distinct, that is, not identified. All are obliged to say the same concerning the existences of Peter and the lion. Indeed Peter's possibility was not from eternity actually positively distinct from a chimera, but only negatively, insofar as it was not a chimera; or also conditionally positively, insofar as, if Peter had existed from eternity, he would from eternity have been positively distinguished from a chimera. If you infer from this: therefore Peter was from eternity no more possible than impossible. The consequence must simply be denied because of what was said nn. 25 and 38. But if you speak of intrinsic possibility and take the verb "was" exercisedly, or without the extension which the predicate "possible" of itself denotes and requires, I grant the consequence. For in this sense neither was man from eternity more rational than irrational, nor was human existence rather the act of being of a man than of a goat-stag, since neither had then become existent.

59. 3º The lack of Peter's existence is also the lack of essence and formal possibility in an absolute, or non-hypothetical, sense. In this sense, whenever it is verified that Peter does not exist, it is also verified that he is not a man, nor intrinsically and formally possible, although the latter, as we have often noted, is not commonly uttered in that sense. 4º Besides the lack of existence, which can be called the absolute contradictory of possibility, another conditioned contradictory corresponds to possibility taken hypothetically, that is, on the supposition of existence, namely impossibility. Yet from n. 51 this is not a pure lack, but a concept mixed from positive and negative. 5º Similarly, impossibility has two contradictories: one by which it is excluded from Peter hypothetically, namely under the hypothesis of Peter's existence, and this is Peter's possibility itself; the other by which it is absolutely and always excluded from the state of existence, and this is a pure necessary lack. By reason of this, independently of Peter's existence, this proposition can be verified absolutely and according to a state: "Peter is not impossible," or this one: "It is not repugnant for Peter to exist," if namely

they mean the same as "Peter's impossibility does not exist," "There is no repugnance of Peter to existing."

60. I add that these propositions can be verified, setting aside necessary lack, through Peter's absolute existence and lack taken indeterminately. For since Peter's impossibility is something constituted from being and non-being simultaneously posited, it is sufficiently excluded either through Peter's pure being or through his pure non-being. For in general a simultaneous composite is excluded by the contradictory of either constitutive, just as man is excluded by lack of union. On the other hand, although both Peter's existence and his lack are determinately contingent, nevertheless taken indeterminately one or the other is necessary, because both cannot simultaneously be lacking. One may say: the indeterminate necessity that Peter either purely exist or purely not exist is Peter's very possibility, and yet it is not identified with him. I answer: this necessity, insofar as formally indeterminate, consists in God's necessary cognition, because just as conditionality, so also indeterminateness must be referred to the mode of tending of an intentional act. But taken fundamentally and objectively, it consists in the essence of a real being, which, since it is not a chimera, necessarily falsifies this proposition, "Peter simultaneously is and is not," and therefore necessarily verifies this one, "Peter either is or is not." I add further that the contrary arguments are solved much more readily by denying objective lacks or pure negations, as they in fact must be denied. Therefore, when it is said that when the thing is lacking its contradictory is given, the supposition must be denied; and when, Peter not existing, the verifier of this act is asked for, "Peter absolutely is not impossible," or "absolutely has no repugnance to existing," the answer must be that it consists in Peter's very repugnance or impossibility, which absolutely is not given nor can be given. See the last Disputation.

CHAPTER IV.
Whether Existence Is Really Distinguished from Essence in Created Being.

61. The essence of a thing is the complex or identity of the predicates through which the thing is defined. Existence, however, is the actuality through which the essence itself is actually a being and actually something in the nature of things, or through which a proposition of the second adjacent is verified, "The essence is." Hence "existence" means the same as the "being of a thing," an expression which the Ancients almost always use. It is also said to be the function of created existence formally to place the thing

outside its causes, because it constitutes the thing actually distinct from its causes; "formally," I say, for "by way of process" an effect is placed outside its causes through causality or action, which nevertheless is not the existence of the effect except with the addition "by way of process." The existence of a creature is preceded by the state of possibility. Besides the power of the cause, namely God, this state does not import anything positive and present, but only the lack of the thing, the non-being of the thing, the nothing of the thing, even as regards essence or quiddity. For, as St. Thomas said above n. 3, "A quiddity, before it has being, is nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the Creator, where it is not a creature but the creative essence." In this state a thing is said to be "purely" possible, that is, capable of being something in such a way that presently it is nothing. "Capable," I say, through the power of the Creator, which alone is present in that state. For intrinsic possibility, just as the essence of the creature, before it exists has no state by reason of itself, nor is anything in itself, from what was said in the preceding question. Read again the words of St. Thomas above n. 24.

62. This same thing is signified by saying that a thing is "in potency only," or "in pure objective potency"; for this means the same as that the thing is in the power of the cause and not in itself. Here it must be noted that the power of a cause, because it regards the effect as object, is called the "objective potency" of that effect, just as the representation of cognition is commonly called the "objective being" of its terminus. Objective potency can furthermore be taken in two ways: 1º for the intrinsic possibility of a thing insofar as objected to the intellect through hypothetical cognition: "If the thing existed, it would not imply, etc."; 2º for merely negative non-repugnance, or for the mere non-being of a repugnance of the thing to existing. For a creature is truly said, in a purely negative sense, to be absolutely non-repugnant before it exists, because its repugnance, being chimerical, absolutely is not nor can be given. But in either of these senses objective potency with the addition "pure" imports the lack or nothing of the thing for such a state.

63. Hence you see that the state of possibility and the state of existence are so opposed to one another that one imports the thing and the other nothing of the thing. You also see why an actual essence, or, what means the same, an existing essence, is said to be distinguished from itself as purely possible, as being from non-being or as something from nothing: namely because it, as purely possible, is not in itself a being or anything. Indeed it is not even that very thing which afterward is actual, because it does not exercise identity with it, and therefore is negatively distinguished from itself as actual. The present question, therefore, is not whether existence is

distinguished from essence as purely possible, or insofar as it is in the state of possibility, or insofar as it is in potency only or in pure objective potency. For concerning this there can be no doubt, except perhaps among those who attribute some actuality to the essences of things from eternity. The sole question, therefore, is whether existence is really distinguished from an actual essence placed outside its causes, which now truly is and when it is; so that, for example, in an Angel already produced and physically existing there are two really distinct entities, one of which is the essence denominated existing "as that which," the other the existence which thus denominates it. Or in other terms, whether the essence which exists is really distinguished from the existence by which it exists; or again, whether in a thing physically existing, "that which is" and "that by which it is" are really distinguished.

64. In this sense all Thomists embrace the affirmative position. Some distinguish essence from existence as a thing from a mode, in the manner in which body is distinguished from local presence; but most, according to Martinez de Prado, l. 1, p. Met. contr. 7, n. 75, assert a distinction real on each side, or of thing from thing. The negative position is defended by all Scotists with Scotus, according to Mastrius, d. 8, Met. q. 2, a. 2, although they introduce their formal distinction from the nature of the thing, likewise all Nominalists, and almost all of Ours with Fr. Suárez, disp. 31, Met., throughout. This negative position, which seems true to me, is proved thus. Essence formally exists through that by which it is actually a being and actually something; but through itself, not through something distinct from itself, it is actually a being and actually something. Therefore through itself, not through an existence distinct from itself, it formally exists. The consequence is legitimate, and the major premise altogether certain: both because "being in act" and "existing" mean the same, especially in St. Thomas; and because in this proposition, "Man is actually a being," this proposition is contained, "Man is"; for "actual being" is not a distracting predicate or one alienating the force of the copula or verb.

65. Therefore I prove the minor premise: an essence which exists is actually a being and actually something through that by which it is distinguished from the purely possible and ceases to be in potency only or in the state of possibility. For being in act and being in potency only are immediately opposed, nor does the state of possibility in a creature formally cease except through the state of existence. But an essence which exists is through itself distinguished from the purely possible and ceases to be in potency only. Therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: the essence of a creature which exists is through itself distinguished from the Divine power,

as is clear; likewise through itself it ceases to be nothing and is distinguished from its own nothing, otherwise it would not through itself be distinguished from what is not itself. But this is formally to be distinguished from the purely possible and to cease to be in potency only, since from the preliminary remarks, nn. 61 and 62, pure possibility and the state of being in potency only are constituted from the nothing of the creature's quiddity joined with the Divine power. Therefore, etc.

66. The argument is pressed 1º: the essence of an Angel exists through that by which it is formally outside its causes, namely outside God, for by that very fact it is no longer in potency only and consequently is a being in act. But it has this formally through itself. Therefore. Proof of the minor premise: for the essence of an Angel to be outside God is for it to be something distinct from God, or to be other than God. For as long as it is only within the power of God, it is not other than God but is God Himself. But that essence is formally through itself other than God, since an Angel is essentially distinguished from God. Therefore it is formally through itself outside God. Or otherwise: the quiddity of an Angel, when it exists, through itself is the essence of a creature and is not the creative essence. What could be more evident? Therefore such a quiddity through itself excludes the state in which it has no being. For a creature's "quiddity, before it has being, is not a creature but the creative essence," as St. Thomas expressly said, cited n. 61. But the state in which a quiddity has no being is formally excluded only through the being of the quiddity itself. Therefore such a quiddity through itself is its own being.

67. The argument is pressed 2º: the essence of an existing man through itself is truly and properly a rational animal, since through itself it is truly and properly the quiddity of man. Therefore through itself it is truly and properly a thing, something, a being, since these predicates are formally included in rational animal. Therefore through itself it formally excludes the state in which it is not truly and properly such predicates. But this is the state of non-existence. Therefore the essence of man formally excludes through itself this state, which certainly is excluded only through existence. Proof of the subsumed minor premise: because the essence of a creature, when it does not exist, is not truly and properly a thing, or a being, or something. Otherwise these predicates would truly and properly belong to it from eternity, and consequently God would not have created the world from nothing but from a true thing, from a true being, from something properly so called. The argument is pressed 3º: the essence of a creature which exists is through itself good with transcendental goodness, since this goodness together with the other attributes of being is included in every real essence.

Therefore through itself it exists, or is its own being. Proof of the consequence from St. Thomas, who often teaches that goodness is founded upon "being," expressly 1ª p. q. 5, a. 1, where he says that the notion of good consists in what is appetible and perfect, and adds: "Everything is perfect insofar as it is in act. Hence it is manifest that a thing is good insofar as it is a being," that is, existing or having being; "for being," he says, "is the actuality of every thing."

Various Answers Are Refuted.

68. You will answer 1º: the essence of an existing creature is through itself distinguished from the nothing of essence, but not from the nothing of existence. Against this: either the state of pure possibility includes the nothing of essence or it does not. If you say the first, then such an essence, by the very fact that it is distinguished from its own nothing, is distinguished from itself as purely possible, and therefore from itself as non-existing, which is formally to exist. If the second, then a creature, before it exists and consequently from eternity, excludes the nothing of real essence. Therefore from eternity it is truly and properly a thing, a being, something, since these are the predicates by which such nothing is excluded and real essence is constituted. From this follow all the absurdities which we considered above, ch. 1, nn. 3-6. It also follows against St. Thomas cited n. 61 that the quiddity of a creature, before it exists, is not so nothing that it is not something distinct from the creative essence; for it will be truly something of finite real essence. I ask you: does being a real essence actually belong to a non-existing quiddity, or only possibly? If actually, it plainly falls into the first opinion refuted in ch. 1. If only possibly, this stands together with the nothing of essence, just as to exist purely possibly coheres with the nothing of existence; for a creature, before it exists, possibly exists. The reason is that to be something purely possibly is not yet to be something, but for it to be possible that something be.

69. You will answer 2º: the essence of an existing creature through itself is a being nominally, not verbally; but being taken nominally prescinds from existence. But besides the fact that this diversity of acceptance has no place in the other transcendentals, such as "thing, something, good," etc., against this 1º: nominal being, although it somehow prescinds by reason from existence, does not really prescind from it, that is, through a real subjective indifference to being and non-being, nor in such a way that it is truly and properly predicated of an essence for the state of non-existence. This is clear both because, if nominal being prescinded from existence in this manner, it

would not be verified of God, nor of the very existence of a creature; and because, if a creature in the state of non-existence were a nominal being, it would simultaneously be the remaining predicates contained in the word "Reubau," since all are synonyms or attributes of being taken nominally. Therefore it would from eternity and apart from the free influx of God be truly and properly a thing, something, good, etc.; and the absurdities of the preceding number would follow. For here also I shall ask whether the creature is such from eternity actually or purely possibly. Hence the notion of nominal being includes existence, or at least is essentially connected with it, since it cannot stand without it. Therefore, if the essence of a creature identifies nominal being with itself, which cannot be denied unless it is denied that it is a real essence, it identifies existence with itself, or at least an essential connection with existence. In Thomistic principles this connection is no less difficult than identity, because it suffices that existence not be contingent with respect to essence, and that essence cannot be joined with the contradictory of existence, but essentially carries existence with itself and therefore is essentially distinguished from the purely possible.

70. Against this 2º: nominal being means the same as "apt to exist" by an intrinsic aptitude. But a creature in the state of non-existence does not have an intrinsic aptitude for existing. For if it had one, through it it would be possible in that state; and thus St. Thomas, 1ª p. q. 9, a. 1, would have falsely said that "All creatures, before they were, were not possible to be through any created power, but through the Divine power alone." Therefore a creature in the state of non-existence is not nominal being. If, therefore, when it exists it is nominal being through itself, through itself it is incompossible with the state of non-existence, which is for it to exist through itself. Certainly nominal being is not no being. Therefore it is not given outside God in that state in which no being is given besides God. Such, however, is the state of non-existence preceding the creation and existence of things; for according to St. Thomas cited above n. 3, creation is "from non-being, which is nothing, and nothing and no being are the same." Hence the same Angelic Doctor, q. 21, *De veritate*, a. 2, says: "It is impossible that there be any being which does not have being"; and 1ª p. q. 5, a. 3, he proves that "every being, insofar as it is being, is good," because "every being, insofar as it is being, is in act." Here he certainly includes nominal being, whose attribute is goodness. Since, therefore, the essence of a creature identifies with itself nominal being insofar as being, it identifies with itself being in act.

71. A third answer, with several modern Thomists followed by Master Froylán, l. 1, Physic. q. 3, a. 1, § 4: while the essence of a creature is produced,

it has a twofold actual and exercised being. One is "complete and in accomplished being"; and this is existence, which Froylán, l.c. § 1, defines as "the ultimate act of a being, by which a thing is completely placed outside its causes." The other is "incomplete, by way of process, and in becoming," by which namely the essence, prior by nature to existence, is already actual with the exercised actuality of essence, which actuality it did not have in the state of possibility. Nevertheless the essence, thus actual, is still on the way toward existence and does not yet completely terminate the productive action, because this also terminates at existence. Therefore through this being by way of process, which is not distinguished from essence, it can be verified that essence through itself is distinguished from the purely possible and from its own nothing, and is truly and properly something and a nominal being. But against this 1º: a creature according to that being by way of process already begins to be distinguished from the purely possible, or from that which is in potency only. Therefore according to that being it simply exists. For, as St. Thomas says, 1ª p. q. 6, a. 1, ad 4: "According to that by which something is first distinguished from what is in potency only, it is simply called a being"; where by "being simply" he understands an existing being, as will be evident to anyone reading the context of that passage.

72. Against this 2º: before these moderns, nothing was understood by the term "existence" or "being" except the actuality by which a thing is formally constituted outside its causes, by which it terminates the action of the Creator, by which it ceases to be nothing and is something, by which an essence is now actual and not merely possible. But all these are verified of that actual and exercised being which is conceded to essence before superadded existence. Certainly, if with that actual being posited a further act is still awaited so that the thing may exist, it could with equal right be said that three other acts following in the order of nature must be awaited, at all of which the production of the thing must terminate in order to be completely terminated. Consequently the thing would be "on the way" to existing until the last arrived. For a way can by its terms be short or long, nor does it require two steps rather than three or four. Therefore only the fourth, which will customarily be "the ultimate act of being, etc.," will denominate the thing "existing," while the other intermediate acts will denominate it "approaching more and more" to existing.

73. Against this 3º: that actual and exercised being of essence is really identified with the essence itself, as the Adversaries admit; otherwise our argument from n. 64 returns in its entirety. But against it the reason operates by which Thomists prove the distinction of essence from existence, namely that the being of a creature is contingent, or contingently predicated

of a creature, and is not verified unless the thing is subject to the action of an efficient cause. You may say from Froylán, l.c. § 3, that this actual being of essence is predicated contingently, not by reason of itself but by reason of an extrinsic connotate, for it connotes the action of an agent without which it does not denominate. Let that be so. But why do you not say the same of existence? Because, you say, existence in its formal concept does not connote anything extrinsic. But this says nothing. For although existence as such, insofar as it abstracts from created and uncreated, does not connote the action of an agent, just as the actuality of essence as such does not connote it, nevertheless created existence, which alone is now at issue, undoubtedly connotes the action of a cause, since by its concept it is the existence "of a being from another." Or explain why the actuality of essence which you assert connotes action. There is certainly not even a shadow of disparity. I omit what I have more than once said elsewhere against the doctrine of Connotates, which Froylán presupposes here. Finally, this being by way of process can be refuted from St. Thomas, II *Contra Gentiles* c. 19, who says: "Between being and non-being, which are as it were the extremes of creation, there cannot be anything intermediate." Likewise from the same Holy Doctor, q. 29 *De principio individuationis*, saying thus: "There are not in the soul two acts, namely its essence, which is its potentiality, and its being." But if what you say is true, there will be in the soul two exercised acts, one essential and the other existential.

74. A fourth answer, from the College of St. Thomas at Alcalá: the essence of a creature is distinguished from nothing and from the purely possible through itself as existing, but in such a way that essence is the reason of distinguishing, while existence is the condition from which actual essence prescinds in no sign, because essence does not precede existence by priority "in which," but "from which." But this answer was refuted in Physics where we treated the existence of prime matter, and it is now again opposed. 1º Because the reason distinguishing essence from nothing and from being in potency, or the purely possible, is the very reason of existing. Therefore, if the existence which you superadd is not the reason distinguishing essence from nothing and from the purely possible, it will not be the reason of existing, but at most a condition for existing, like creation or productive action. Proof of the antecedent: because the reason distinguishing from nothing and from being in potency is the reason constituting essence properly as something and as a being in act, since something is immediately opposed to nothing, and being in act to being in potency. But the reason constituting properly as something and as a being in act is the reason of existing, as is clear from the common notion and from St. Thomas, 1ª p. q. 5,

a. 1, ad 1, where he takes simply being and being in act as the same and adds: "By its substantial being each thing is called simply a being." Certainly the essence of man does not need a superadded condition besides productive action in order simply to be identified with itself, and consequently to be properly and simply a rational animal. But in whatever sense it is simply a rational animal, it is simply a being, and by that very fact it is existing. Therefore, etc.

75. 2º Because nothing contingent, or contingently supervening upon an essence, can be a necessary condition for such an essence to be distinguished from what is not itself, or from its own nothing, or from the creative essence, since this distinction is most essential. Otherwise whiteness could be a necessary condition for man to be essentially distinguished from a non-man or from God. But the existence which you posit is, according to you, contingent, or contingently supervenes upon essence. Therefore it cannot be a necessary condition for essence to be distinguished from its own nothing, or from itself as in the power of the cause, which is to be distinguished from the creative essence. 3º Because, if the reason distinguishing essence from the purely possible requires some condition distinct from itself, this could be productive action, which, since it is incompossible with the state of possibility, is a most sufficient condition for that reason of distinguishing to be exercised. 4º Because, since existence according to you is an effect of essence as material cause, essence must in the sign of the cause prescind from it and therefore precede it by priority "in which," as this priority is explained by the College of St. Thomas. For essence according to the Thomists is of itself indifferent to existence, and every cause of itself indifferent to an effect prescinds from it in the prior sign, as is evident by induction. At least a precision of non-inclusion must be admitted. For if existence is included in the prior sign of its material cause, it will be prior to itself; and similarly it could be imagined that something can effect its own first existence, because although an efficient cause must exist prior to the effect, it could be understood as pre-existing through the very existence which it effects.

76. Finally, you will answer from Aguillera, l. 1 Physic. q. 14, n. 45 sqq., that the essence of an existing creature is not distinguished through itself, nor essentially, from nothing and from the purely possible, nor is it essentially something when it exists, but accidentally; because it is contingent to such an essence that it be something or nothing, just as it is to man that he be white or black. Therefore, just as a white man is distinguished only accidentally from himself as previously black, because according to himself he is neither white nor black, so it must be judged in

the present matter, because the essence of a creature according to itself is neither something nor nothing, neither in act nor in potency, but indifferent to each. But this, speaking of a real and subjective indifference which imports a real distinction of the subject from something and nothing, which is the sense of the present question, seems the most wretched evasion of all. For if man is not essentially something, he will not essentially be a rational animal, since according to all the latter is transcended by the predicates contained in "Rebau," which are thing, being, something, etc. I ask you: what do you conceive when you conceive the essence of man according to itself, if you conceive neither something nor nothing on the part of the object? Is that object some reality? Then it is something. Is it no reality? Then it is no essence. Therefore it is nothing.

77. You will say: man is essentially something insofar as something is opposed to being of reason or to a chimera, but not insofar as something is opposed to the nothing of existence. Against this: first, this is to recur to the distinction of being taken nominally and verbally, and we have already refuted this recourse from n. 69. Next, either in the state of possibility together with the nothing of existence there is a nothing of essence or there is not. If there is, then by the same reason by which man is indifferent to something and nothing of existence, he will be indifferent to something and nothing of essence, namely because he can now be something, now nothing. Therefore he will be subjectively indifferent to being or not being a rational animal, so that this is predicated of man accidentally, like being white or black. If there is not, then you fall into the answer already refuted n. 68, and are obliged to concede that the essence of man from eternity excludes the nothing of real and human essence; that in the state of possibility there is properly something real distinct from God and opposed to a chimera independently of creation and God's free will; that it can glory in a true reality of rational animal not received from God according to itself, etc. Add that St. Thomas would have falsely said that the quiddity of a creature, before it exists, is nothing, if this nothing is not the nothing of essence but of some contingent addition; no otherwise than it would falsely be said that man is nothing before he is white, or when he has the nothing of whiteness. Finally, to omit other things, is man according to himself, in a real sense, something opposed to a chimera actually or potentially? If actually, then according to himself he is in act. If potentially, then according to himself he is in potency. If neither, then according to himself he is neither actually opposed to a chimera nor able to be opposed.

Other Proofs of Our Opinion Are Indicated.

78. Our opinion is proved 2º. The essence of a creature immediately through itself, not mediately through a superadded existence, terminates the action of the agent. Therefore it exists through itself without awaiting a distinct existence. The antecedent is clear, both because the essence of a creature immediately and by reason of itself is a being from another, a participated being, a being received from God; nor can it be called a being received from God through a superadded existence, since this does not cause the essence but is rather caused by it according to the opponents. Therefore, just as air does not receive its substance from the sun through the medium of light because light is not the cause of the substance of air, so, etc. Again, by the example of Christ's sacred humanity, which terminates its own production and not through a superadded existence. For according to the Thomists no existence is superadded to it except the existence of the Divine Word, and this certainly does not terminate the production of the humanity. Nor recur to the hypostatic union. For if a created existence is superadded to this, why not also to the humanity? If only the Divine existence is superadded, then the union does not bring a superadded existence at which the production terminates. Again, by the example of prime matter, whose creation does not terminate at the existence of form, which alone is superadded according to the Thomists; otherwise the existence of form would simultaneously be created and educed.

79. Now the consequence is proved: because a thing exists through that by which it terminates the action of the agent, since this suffices for the thing to be produced or placed outside its causes, and to be a being in act. For action cannot terminate at nothing or at the purely possible. You may say: although essence terminates action prior by nature to a distinct existence, it is not thereby outside every cause, because it is not outside the formal cause of being, which is the superadded existence. Against this: this formal cause is gratuitously required by you, and against St. Thomas, who q. 6, *De potentia*, a. 6, ad 4, acknowledges no formal cause of being besides form in composite things and adds: "If, therefore, there be some created substance which is form only," such as the essence of an Angel, of which he there speaks, "it can have an efficient principle of being, not a formal one." Therefore it suffices that an Angel be understood outside the efficient cause for it by that very fact to be understood as existing. To this also pertains the

statement of St. Thomas, 1ª p. q. 44, a. 1, ad 3: "It belongs to each thing to have an agent cause according as it has being."

80. It is proved 3º: the essence of a creature, according to the Thomists, is the material cause and sustaining subject of superadded existence. Therefore it is understood as existing prior to such existence, which is consequently superfluous. Proof of the consequence from what was said in Physics concerning the existence of prime matter, where we showed that a material cause cannot cause unless it is presupposed as existing prior to the effect. Certainly prior to such existence essence must be supposed as proximately capable of receiving it and of being really united with it. Therefore it must be supposed as already produced and distinct from nothing, unless you wish existence to be really united to nothing or physically received in it. Recourse to being by way of process or essential being is precluded from n. 71, as also from n. 74 recourse to the very receivable existence understood by way of a condition in a sign prior to itself. Certainly no form constitutes its own recipient, but presupposes it constituted from some other source and is adequately distinguished from it as such, as is clear from perpetual induction.

81. It is proved 4º: the existence which Thomists distinguish from the essence of a creature has its own real essence, since among them it is a true entity and quidditatively definable, and is therefore commonly defined by Thomists as "the ultimate actuality of being," or "the ultimate act in the line of being." But this essence does not exist through an existence distinct from itself; otherwise there will be an infinite regress, since this further existence must also have its own essence, in which essence the argument will again be formed. Therefore the same must be said of every essence of a creature. Proof of the consequence: because in the essence of existence the arguments which the Thomists derive from contingency of existing, or from the indifference of essence to being now purely possible and now existing, manifestly fail. You may say 1º: existence does not properly exist "as that which," but is that "by which" something exists, or is the ultimate reason of being. Therefore it does not require a further existence, just as there is no union of union nor action of action. But first, since existence truly is a positive entity, properly produced and placed outside its causes, and properly distinct from nothing, what does it lack in order properly to exist? Next, whatever may be the case concerning the term "as that which," at least the essence of existence without further actuality exists "as that by which," and is the exercise of existing with respect, for example, to man, although it contingently exercises this function. For it does not always actually exist "as that by which," but before production merely possibly, or in potency only.

Therefore the same contingency and indifference operates in an essence existing "as that by which" and existing "as that which." Consequently either each or neither must be distinguished from the exercised act of existing. If the same indifference existed in union or action as in the extremes or in the effect, there would indeed be a union of union and an action of action. Hence the example is turned back upon you.

82. You may say 2º: existence is not indifferent to being sometimes in act and sometimes in potency, because, since it is essentially act itself, if it were at some time in potency, it would then be an act in potency, which implies contradiction in terms. Therefore it cannot by reason of itself be capable of not existing "as that by which." For if it did not exist "as that by which," it would be non-existing existence, which implies contradiction just as much as a man who is not a man. Therefore the entire indifference, potentiality, and possibility of being and not being stands on the part of that essence which exists "as that which." This doctrine admirably shows into what straits the Thomistic opinion is driven. Against this 1º: the existence of a creature by reason of itself is a contingent or defectible perfection; otherwise it would not be a limited perfection. Therefore by reason of itself it is capable of failing, and consequently of not existing "as that by which," for it does not so exist when it fails.

83. Against this 2º: before man is produced, his existence does not exist "as that by which," for an existing "as that by which" is not given without something existing "as that which," as is evident. Therefore at that time man's existence is not in the exercised act of existing "as that by which." On the other hand it truly is in potency to this act, since it is truly contained in the Divine power and it is not repugnant through itself that it so exist. Therefore it can now be in act and now in potency. Against this 3º: God knows the existence of a creature through the knowledge of simple intelligence; otherwise, when from the direction of this knowledge He decreed the existence of things, He would decree what was unknown. But through this knowledge He does not know existence as absolutely posited in exercised act, otherwise this knowledge would in no way differ from the knowledge of vision. Therefore He knows that existence as possible, indeed with its own possibility. For since it is a true entity and truly producible by God without any contradiction of its predicates, how does possibility not belong to it?

84. Finally, our opinion can be proved from Aristotle, II *De anima* t. 37, who says: "For living things, to live is to be, and the soul is their cause and principle"; where he plainly speaks of substantial living, which the soul formally provides. St. Thomas agrees there, lect. 7, litt. d, saying: "The soul is

the cause of being for living things; for through the soul they live, and their very living is their being." But living is the essence of living things, as no one doubts. Therefore in living things, and consequently in the other creatures, essence and being are the same. Let St. Thomas also be heard, Opusc. 29, *De principio individuationis*, where he says thus: "There are not in the soul two acts, namely its essence, which is its potentiality, and its being; but its being is its actuality, by reason of which the very essence of the soul is the act of the body." But if essence and being were two entities, there would undoubtedly be two acts in the soul. For the essence of the soul through itself is act, since it is defined as "the act of a physical organic body, etc." Therefore essence and being are not two entities. Again, the soul is the act of the body by reason of an actuality essential to it, since through its essence it has the property of actuating the body, as is clear from its definition. Therefore, if being or existence is that actuality by reason of which the essence of the soul is the act of the body, as St. Thomas says, existence is the essential actuality of the soul.

85. Moreover, according to the Thomists, the soul is united to the body prior to the existence added by them. For, as Master Prado says, controv. 7, n. 103, "the union of form with matter is understood prior to the very being." Therefore already prior to superadded existence the soul is understood to actuate the body and to be the act of the body. For the soul's being united to the body and actuating it are the same, unless you absurdly wish that union to be not act to potency but the potency of one thing to another. Therefore the soul, before that Thomistic being is understood, is already understood to have its being, since by reason of this it is the act of the body, according to St. Thomas. Furthermore, the soul through its essence is substantial act, for "act" and "form" are synonymous. The existence of substance is also a substantial act, as the Thomists rightly hold with the Angelic Doctor according to Prado, l.c. n. 317; and the existence of an absolute substance is not a purely modal but an absolute act and an absolute form, according to the common opinion of Thomists. Therefore, if essence and existence are really distinguished, there will simultaneously be in one existing man two acts of the same order, namely substantial acts. But, as St. Thomas says in so many words in the cited Opusc. 29: "It is impossible for one thing simultaneously to participate in two acts of the same order."

86. To this also pertain the arguments which Thomists with St. Thomas urge against a form of corporeity distinct from the soul in living things. Likewise pertinent is the celebrated dictum: "From two beings in act one thing essentially cannot be made," as also this: "Whatever comes to a substantially complete being constitutes one thing accidentally." For matter

united to the soul prior to superadded existence is already a being in act and substantially complete. Therefore with a new act of existence it will not be able to constitute one thing essentially, such as an existing animal. Finally, it seems altogether absurd that in man there should be some substantial form which supervenes upon the rational soul, indeed which is more perfect and noble than the rational soul. For the being of a thing is something most perfect among all things, since it is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections, according to St. Thomas, q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 2, ad 9, and often elsewhere. Therefore existence is said by most Thomists, according to Prado, controv. 7, a. 6, to be simply and absolutely more perfect than essence.

87. Because of the testimonies of St. Thomas, both those just cited and those adduced above, which manifestly favor our opinion, I am reluctant to believe that the Angelic Doctor is opposed to us in the present matter. He does indeed favor in many places the manner of speaking of the contrary position, when he often insists that God alone is His own being, that essence in creatures is other than being, that it is compared to its being as potency to act, and that in every creature there is a composition of essence and being. Yet nowhere, so far as I know, does he use the adverb "really," or the expression "real distinction" or "real composition." But for propositions of this kind to be verified, a distinction of reason suffices. Thus one frequently finds in St. Thomas, for example q. 1, *De veritate*, a. 1, and 1ª p. q. 3, a. 5, that difference is other than genus, or a nature extraneous and superadded to genus, that it stands to genus as act to potency, and that composition from genus and proper difference belongs to a creature and is altogether foreign to God. Yet from this it may not be inferred that genus and difference are really distinguished according to St. Thomas. Add that the Holy Doctor sometimes seems under the term "being" to comprehend subsistence.

CHAPTER V.

The Contrary Arguments Are Answered.

88. Objection 1: the essence of man is necessary, whereas existence is contingent; and therefore this proposition, "Man is a rational animal," is of eternal truth, whereas this one, "Man exists," is contingently true. Therefore the essence and existence of man cannot be identified. This objection remains answered above, nos. 21 and 22, and more fully nos. 33 sqq., provided that what we said concerning possibility is applied to essence. The objection is now pressed explicitly in existence compared with its own quiddity, or with the predicates by which it is defined; for such a quiddity is

no less necessary than the essence of man. And this proposition, "Existence is the actuality of being," or, to speak in the Thomistic manner, "is the ultimate act of a being," or even, "is really other than the essence of man," is of eternal and necessary truth; yet it does not enunciate an object distinct from the object of this contingently true proposition: "The existence of man is actually exercised," or, "is outside its causes," or, "exists as that by which." The objection is also pressed from that transitional and essential being which the Thomists acknowledge as prior to superadded existence and which, although indistinct from essence, belongs to it only contingently, since it is not verified except when essence already terminates the action of the agent.

89. I answer briefly that both essence and existence are absolutely contingent and hypothetically necessary, or necessary by supposition. And because a proposition enunciating essence is commonly taken in a hypothetical sense, this being the only scientific sense concerning created things, since the sciences do not consider whether things are, but what they are whenever they are, whereas one enunciating existence is taken in an absolute sense, therefore the former is of eternal truth and the latter of temporal and contingent truth. If, however, both are taken in the same sense, there will be no difference. Hence this proposition, "Existence contingently belongs to the essence of man," is to be distinguished thus: in the sense in which essence contingently belongs to itself, I grant it; in another sense, I deny it. Or again thus: it belongs contingently, if contingency implies the intrinsic defectibility of the essence itself, I grant it, for the essence itself is truly defectible and truly fails by reason of itself when it does not exist, because then nothing of the essence is given; if contingency denotes the defectibility of existence while essence remains, I deny it. For the Thomists themselves commonly say, in Prado, cit. controv. 7, n. 70 sqq., that not even by divine power can essence remain without existence, or conversely. Likewise these propositions, "It is accidental to a creature to exist," or, "Existence comes to it accidentally," must be understood thus: they are to be denied if they denote that existence supervenes upon a creature or upon its already produced essence after the manner of an accident, or after the manner of a defectible form while the subject remains; but they are to be granted if they are equivalent to this proposition, "It contingently happens that a creature exists," which means the same as, "The essence of a creature is contingently given."

90. Objection 2, and reply: the essence of a creature, for example of man, is indifferent as to whether it has or does not have existence, for it does not exist necessarily; but it is not indifferent toward itself. Therefore it is not its

own existence. This is confirmed in many ways. 1º Man was never in potency to his essential predicates, but he was in potency to existence; therefore existence is distinguished from those predicates, etc. Likewise, man through his essence is possibly existing, but he is not possibly man; otherwise he would be man as he is white. 2º The essence of a creature is distinguished from "not being"; therefore also from "being," since it is indifferent to both. Certainly nothing indifferent to act and non-act is identified with act, as is evident from the example of the intellect compared with the act of knowing. 3º If the creature were not through itself, it would necessarily not be; therefore, if it were through itself, it would necessarily be. 4º The essence of a creature can be joined with the contradictory of existence and conceived under the negation of existence; but it cannot be conceived under the negation of itself, nor joined with its own contradictory, unless it becomes chimerical. Therefore, etc. 5º God cannot remove any essential predicate from man; but He can remove existence from him. Therefore, etc. 6º Things that are really separated are really distinguished. But the essence of a creature is really separated from its existence, as happens not only in every merely possible essence, but also in the actual essence of the humanity of Christ, which exists without its own existence through the being of the Divine Word, according to St. Thomas, III[a], q. 17, a. 2; indeed, according to the Sixth Synod in the Epistle of Sophronius, who says: "The humanity of Christ in the Word, and not in itself, had one existence." Therefore, etc.

91. This objection also, with its confirmations, admits of counterinstances from no. 88, especially that taken from the quiddity of existence itself, as will readily be evident to anyone who applies it. To answer it directly, it must be noted that the essence of a creature does not have toward "being and not being" a physical, subjective, and positive indifference, such namely as belongs to prime matter or to any subject which really remains the same in itself under both extremes, namely under a form and its negation. For the essence of a creature under "not being" does not really remain the same in itself, but rather is really nothing in itself. It therefore has a logical and objective indifference as to whether it is or is not: "logical," insofar as it can successively verify two contradictory propositions, "Essence is; Essence is not"; "objective," insofar as the essence of man, for example, whether it absolutely is or absolutely is not, is presented in the same way to scientific cognition in the proposition, "Man is a rational animal." Since this proposition yields a hypothetical sense, namely, "If man is, he is a rational animal," or, what amounts to the same, "If man exists, he has existence identified with rational animal," it does not require for its truth, although neither does it exclude, that the essence of man absolutely

be, as we said at length in chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, that essence, when it exists, has an indifference taken for the intrinsic defectibility of the existing subject, namely the essence itself, insofar as there is no repugnance in its failing in itself; and this may be called "negative indifference." Finally, it has "extrinsic indifference" by reason of the cause, insofar as from the indifference of Omnipotence to produce or not produce the essence of a creature, this essence is extrinsically denominated indifferent as to whether it is or is not. This whole doctrine must be admitted by the Adversaries concerning the essence or quiddity of that existence which they distinguish from the essence of man.

92. Hence, to the objection, I distinguish the major premise: it is indifferent with logical and objective, or even negative and extrinsic, indifference, I grant it; this suffices for the essence of man not to exist necessarily. With physical, subjective, and positive indifference, I deny the major premise. I likewise distinguish the minor premise: for in the former mode of indifference essence is also indifferent toward itself, since it can happen that it is nothing in itself. Hence I deny the consequence; because, just as from logical, extrinsic, etc., indifference no distinction of essence from itself is inferred, neither is a distinction from existence inferred. To confirmation 1º, I distinguish the major premise: in physical and subjective potency, such as an existing man has for understanding, loving, etc., I grant it; in objective potency, such as we explained at the beginning of the question, I deny the major premise. The minor premise being similarly distinguished, I deny the consequence. If man, before he exists, is not in potency to his essential predicates, then he is actually a rational animal, and thus has an actual essence from eternity, as that first opinion said which we rejected in chapter 1, and which the Thomists sharply reject, although in the present matter they seem to fall into it. Man, therefore, in the sense in which he is possibly existing, is also possibly man; but not in the sense in which he is possibly white. For a man who is not white, even if he exists, is possibly white through a physical, subjective potency for receiving whiteness.

93. To 2º, I distinguish the antecedent: the essence of a creature is distinguished from "not being" when it is, I grant it; when it is not, I deny the antecedent, for "not being" is verified of that very essence. Then I distinguish the consequence: it is distinguished from "being" when it is, I deny it; when it is not, I subdistinguish: it is distinguished as a non-being from a being, I grant it; as a being from a being, I deny the consequence. The reason for these distinctions is evident from what has been said. If, however, by "not being" one wishes to understand an objective lack or negation, a non-existing essence is distinguished from such "not being" purely

negatively, that is, it is not identified with it; because in that state, since it is in no way anything in itself, it is identified with no extreme, whether negative or positive. What is added concerning something indifferent to act and non-act is true when the indifference is physical and subjective, but not when it is only logical and objective. To 3º: for a creature not to be through itself can be understood in two ways. 1º As meaning that it has nothing of itself when it does not exist; and thus I deny the antecedent. 2º As meaning that not-being is involved in the concept of creature for the case of existence, as it is involved in the concept of a chimera. In this sense I grant the antecedent, because, given that concept, if the creature were, it would simultaneously be and not be; and this is to have a repugnance to existing, and therefore necessarily not to be. But I deny the consequence, because from the fact that a creature, if it were, would be through itself, there does not follow a repugnance in it to not-being; for since a creature, while it is, is essentially defectible, it can happen that it ceases to be that very thing which it is.

94. To 4º, I deny the major premise, because it properly means that the essence and the contradictory of existence can be given simultaneously on the part of the object, or can truly be conceived as two extremes simultaneously given. This is altogether false, since in reality essence is not given when existence is not given. Essence and non-existence can therefore be given simultaneously only in the intellect, one as conceived absolutely and the other as conceived hypothetically, namely when there is this cognition, "The creature does not exist," whose sense is: "At present that object is not given which, if it existed, would be the essence of a creature." If this, and nothing else, is what is meant by saying that essence is conceived under the negation of existence, I grant the major premise; but I deny the minor premise, because essence is similarly conceived under the negation of itself, under nothingness or its own contradictory. For whenever there is nothing of existence, there is nothing of essence; nor does essence thereby become chimerical, because it is not conceived as absolutely joined, nor as hypothetically to be joined, with its own not-being or with its own nothingness. To 5º, I distinguish the major premise: God cannot remove any essential predicate, etc., while the man remains, or is not destroyed, I grant it; when the man is destroyed, or does not remain, I deny the major premise, for then God removes from man not merely one essential predicate, but absolutely all of them. The minor premise being distinguished in the same way, I deny the consequence. When the essences of things are said to be invariable and incapable of being overturned or changed by God, the sense is that a thing cannot remain, or exist, without thereby having such an essence

as its definition explains. But when existence ceases, the essence itself is utterly overthrown and is so changed that what was something is now nothing. See above no. 23 for St. Thomas's express doctrine supporting this answer.

95. To 6º, I deny the minor premise, which is badly proved. For, first, a merely possible essence is not the essence of a creature separated from existence, since at present it is not the essence of a creature, just as an extinguished fire is not a fire separated from a burning fire, since it is not fire. The essence of a creature, therefore, taken in this way, is nothing except in the potency of the cause or in the intellect or idea of the Creator, where it is not a creature but the creative essence. Next, that the humanity of Christ does not have its own existence must be wholly denied with all theologians apart from the Thomists, and even with St. Thomas himself, q. unic. *De Verbo Incarnato*, a. 4. See Suárez, both tom. 1, in III^{a}, disp. 36, and *Metaphysicae Disputationes*, disp. 31, sect. 12, a n. 15. Nor does St. Thomas in the cited place, III^{a}, speak so clearly that he should be thought to have retracted the opinion which he had previously taught. Sophronius, however, in the Sixth Synod rightly says that the humanity exists not in itself but in the Word, because although it has its own existence, it is nevertheless in the Word as in a *suppositum*. Indeed, an accident does not exist in itself but in a subject; yet it does not exist through the existence of the subject, but through its own existence, as the Thomists commonly acknowledge in Prado, cit. controv. 7, n. 83 sqq.

96. Objection 3: a creature does not exist through its essence; therefore it exists through something distinct from its essence. Proof of the antecedent: both because God alone exists through essence, and because, if man existed through essence, he would be essentially existing, just as he is essentially an animal; hence he could not fail to exist, just as he cannot fail to be an animal. Confirmation 1º: existence is not placed in the metaphysical or physical definition of man; therefore it is outside his essence. Confirmation 2º: if a creature does not involve composition from essence and being, it will be altogether simple in the being of a being; therefore God will not be simpler than a creature, which is absurd. First, I ask the Thomists whether superadded existence exists through essence, and whether a creature through essence has exercised transitional or essential being, by which it precedes existence. Next, to the objection I distinguish the antecedent: if "through essence" excludes "existing defectibly and by participation," as in fact it does according to the common manner of speaking, I grant it; if it only excludes existing formally through something

other than essence, or through a superadded form, I deny the antecedent and consequence.

97. To the proof: God alone exists through essence in the first sense just explained, because He alone exists from Himself, necessarily and indefectibly; just as He alone in the same sense is said to be a being through essence, true through essence, and good through essence, although it is certain that the essence of a creature identifies with itself all transcendental predicates, such as being, true, good, etc. It is also not rarely said that God alone is His own being; but then by "being" subsistence is also included, or sufficiency of being is signified together with complete independence and aseity. Although man exists through something indistinct from his essence, he is not therefore said to exist essentially, although he is said to be essentially an animal; because "essentially" excludes contingency, and when joined to the predicate "existing" it signifies absolute necessity, whereas when joined to the predicate "animal" it signifies only conditional necessity. See above nos. 21 and 22. Yet if the same sense, whether absolute or conditional, is maintained in both cases, man will no more be essentially an animal than essentially existing; and it is most true that man can absolutely not be an animal, just as he can absolutely not exist.

98. To confirmation 1°, I distinguish the antecedent: existence is not placed, etc., explicitly, I grant it; implicitly, I deny the antecedent and consequence, speaking of existence in common. For this is included in real being as such and, together with it, transcends all positive predicates, in which therefore it is implicitly contained, just as being is. Indeed, St. Thomas, I^{a}, q. 50, a. 5, in explaining how "being" belongs to an angelic nature, uses the example of a circle, to which roundness belongs "according to itself." But roundness undoubtedly belongs to the definition of a circle. It may also be said that existence is implicitly placed in the definition of man, not as absolutely and presently given, but as to be given hypothetically, or in the case that man is given; or, what amounts to the same, not as absolutely affirmable, but as hypothetically affirmable. Nor is animal or substance placed in the definition of man in any other sense. If one asks whether existence as absolutely affirmable is distinguished from existence as hypothetically affirmable, I answer: it is extrinsically distinguished according to the different tendency of cognition which it connotes; intrinsically, however, it is not distinguished when it is. But when it is not, it is distinguished negatively, that is, it is not actually identified, because it is nothing; and this then suffices for the truth of this negative proposition: "Existence hypothetically affirmable is not absolutely affirmable." Understand the same of essence if it is similarly compared with itself. To

confirmation 2º, I deny the consequence, because a creature always admits some real composition, at least from nature and subsistence, or from substance and accident.

99. Objection 4: the existence of a creature must be receivable in essence; therefore it must be distinguished from essence. Proof of the antecedent: otherwise it would follow that the existence of a creature is pure and unlimited act; for such is an act not received, since act can be limited only by a receptive potency. I press the objection: the essence of an angel is of itself an act, both because it is everywhere called a "form" by St. Thomas and the rest, and because it is not pure substantial potency, since this is the concept of prime matter, especially among Thomists, and also because, according to many of them, it identifies with itself an essential actuality by which it is rendered proximately receptive of existence. Therefore the essence of an angel must be receivable in a subject, lest it be pure and unlimited act. One may say that this essence is limited by its potency receptive of its own being, which it identifies with itself. Very well. Therefore it is not generally true, as the Thomists insist, that an act not received, or irreceptible, is altogether pure and infinite; rather, this at most will be verified of an act which is neither receivable in a subject nor receptive of another act or form. For receptivity, since it is perfectibility and potentiality, is foreign to pure act, as no one doubts. But the existence of a creature according to our principles is always either receivable or receptive: receivable, if it belongs to a substantial or accidental form; receptive, if it belongs to prime matter, an angel, or any substance not received in a subject, because any such substance can receive some natural or supernatural accident, at least presence in a place, or even the Thomistic mode of relation by which it is rendered like or unlike another, etc.

100. Reply 1º: existence cannot be receptive of a further act, because, as St. Thomas says, q. unic. *De anima*, a. 6, ad 2, "Being itself is the ultimate act, which is participable by all, but itself participates in nothing." Therefore, if existence is not received in a subject, it will be limited in no respect. Moreover, existence cannot be in potency to anything else, since rather all things are in potency to existing. I answer: existence is not receptive of a further act distinguishing a thing from nothing and a chimera, because it itself completes this distinction; and whatever act comes to an existing subject does not thereby tend to distinguish it from nothing. Hence existence may not unsuitably be called "the ultimate act in the line of being," namely of created being, and precisely insofar as distinguished from nothing and a chimera. For a thing, insofar as it is virtually in the potency of a cause, is already distinguished from a chimera and nothing in "first act"; insofar as

it is transitionally in the action of the agent, it is distinguished in "second and, as it were, intermediate act"; insofar as it already formally exists, it is distinguished in "ultimate act." This act participates in nothing, that is, it desires or awaits nothing further for this office of distinguishing from a chimera and nothing, although it can participate in and receive many other perfections in the substantial or accidental line of being.

101. We admit the name "ultimate act" only in this sense. In other respects, existence is rather the first act, or the first actuality of things, upon which all the other actualities physically added to the subject supervene. Hence St. Thomas, q. 3 *De potentia*, a. 7, says: "Being itself is the first effect, and more intimate than all other effects"; and I^{a}, q. 8, a. 1, he says: "Being is that which is most intimate to each thing, and which is more deeply *in esse* than all things." Now, that all things are in potency to existing is most true, provided it is understood of objective potency and of things not yet produced, and of existing through the proper existence of each. But this does not prevent one existence from being in physically receptive potency with respect to another, not so that it exists through that other or is distinguished from nothing through it, but so that it is physically perfected by it in some genus and constitutes with it some composite. Thus the existence of a rational soul is truly in potency to the existence of grace, so that through it the soul may formally be sanctified, and so that from both there may result the concrete "holy."

102. Reply 2^{o}: we commit a circle in explaining the limitation of a creature; for according to us a substance is limited because it is receptive of accidents, and it is receptive because it is limited. I press the objection: according to you, the essence of a creature is limited because it is receptive of its being, and it is thus receptive because it is limited; for if it were unlimited, it would not receive its own being, as is evident. Therefore you too commit a circle. In the present matter we admit with the Thomists that the root of limitation is potentiality, which without doubt is given wherever either receivability or receptivity is given; and we add that one or the other of these is in fact found in every creature independently of the distinction between essence and existence. What trace of a circle is there here? And when it is said, "A creature is limited because it is receptive, and receptive because it is limited," no strict causality is indicated, but the mutual convertibility or formal identity of the two concepts; in which sense it is commonly said, "God is pure act because He is in no way potential, and He is in no way potential because He is pure act."

103. Another root or reason of limitation can also be assigned in the existence of a creature, namely that it is an act received, not in another, but

from another, through the causality by which every creature receives or accepts its being from God; for it is repugnant that an act so received, or receivable, should be unlimited. One may say: causality or causability itself presupposes the limitation of the creature, which would not be causable unless it were a limited being. True, and by the same reasoning it will be permissible to say that rational animal presupposes the essence of man, because Peter would not be a rational animal unless he were a man. Causability, therefore, does not presuppose limitation, but entails or includes it, as aseity entails infinity; and nothing in a creature is conceptually prior to the very concept of "creature," which is the concept of "a being from another," or, what amounts to the same, "a causable being." One may again say: by this route the possibility could be defended of a created substance which identifies with itself a sanctifying form or an act of understanding; for it would not therefore cease to be limited, provided that it is received from another. But I ask whether the possibility and limitation of that substance can be defended by the Thomistic route of the distinction of essence from existence, namely by saying that such a substance would be limited provided it did not identify its being with itself? Whatever one says, let the same be said to oneself; for this is not the place to examine those questions, which are ordinarily decided from other principles not pertinent here.

104. One may further say: if a creature receives existence from God, it must be distinguished from it, both because nothing receives itself, just as nothing is received in itself, and because a benefit must be distinguished from the recipient. But again I ask whether a creature receives from God its essence as co-distinct from every superadded form. If one affirms this, then the creature must be distinguished from its essence, if the argument has any force. If one denies it, then an angel, for example, does not have its real essence from another, but from itself; nor is it bound to give thanks to God its benefactor for being a substance, a spirit, intelligent, volitional, etc.; and therefore it will be able to give many answers to one asking, "What do you have that you did not receive?" Accordingly, a creature truly receives or accepts from God not only what it has through union, but also what it has through identity; because to receive in this manner means nothing other than to be, by the benefit of God, what it is. But a benefit or gift conferred need no more be distinguished from the recipient than from the giver; and yet the Divine Word has bestowed and bestows Himself upon us as the greatest benefit. Recall the hymn at Lauds for the feast of Corpus Christi.

105. Objection 5: what identifies with itself the first and ultimate act in the line of being is infinite in the line of being, both because it thereby embraces the whole line of being, and because this is the general rule in

every line. Hence nothing can identify with itself the first and ultimate act in the line of understanding without becoming infinite in that very line. But if essence is not distinguished from existence, a creature identifies with itself the first and ultimate act in the line of being; for in the line of being the first act is essential actuality, and the ultimate act is existence. Therefore the creature will be infinite in the line of being. First, I press the objection concerning superadded existence, which, since it identifies with itself both its essence and the existence through which it exists as that by which, will identify the first and ultimate act in the line of being. Next, it is false that existence is the ultimate act in the Thomistic sense, namely by comparison with another essential act; otherwise St. Thomas, cited in the preceding chapter, would falsely have said that "there are not two acts in the soul, namely its essence and its being."

106. Therefore the existence of a creature can be called the ultimate act only by comparison with the power of the cause and the action of the agent, as was explained in no. 100: ultimate, I say, not in the line of being in its full breadth, for in that sense this line embraces every possible perfection, but only in the line of finite being insofar as distinguished from nothing and a chimera, such that each being is ultimately distinguished from these by its existence, which is indeed limited in entitative perfection. No infinity follows from the identity of the creature with an act ultimate in this sense. Nor would infinity follow from the identity of an intellectual subject with the "ultimate act in the line of understanding," if by this name any act of understanding whatever were signified, for example one of a clarity of four degrees; although this identity is repugnant in a created substance on another ground, because an act of understanding would then both be and not be a vital act, concerning which see *Animastica*, disp. 1, n. 23. And in general no infinity in a line follows in the subject, whatever may be the repugnance from other grounds, precisely from the fact that it identifies with itself an act, unless the act is ultimate in such a way that it attains the ultimate, that is, the highest degree of perfection in that line. But whence does one prove that the existence of man, for example, is an act ultimate in this manner in the line of being?

107. Objection 6: existence in common does not have differences through which it is multiplied; therefore it cannot be multiplied in creatures except by order to a subject in which it is received. Proof of the antecedent: if it had any differences, they would be the very same differences which diversify essences, namely rational, capable of laughter, etc. But these cannot be differences with respect to existence in common. Therefore. Proof of the minor premise: because rational, for example, is indifferent to existence; and

no difference is indifferent to the common notion which it contracts. Confirmation: because if existence could be contracted through differences, it would be conceived in potency with respect to them; therefore it would not be conceived as ultimate actuality. To the objection, I deny the antecedent; for existence has the same differences as being as such, in which it is in fact included. To the proof, I deny the minor premise, which is badly proved; for rational is not indifferent to existence except logically and objectively, or also negatively and extrinsically. In this sense it is indifferent to every common notion which it contracts, indeed even to itself. See nos. 91 sqq. To the confirmation: when a common notion is in question, especially one that is transcendental, "in potency" precisely means the predicability of the superior concerning the inferior; and this predicability cannot be denied to existence in common, since it is undoubtedly a superior notion with respect to human existence, stony existence, etc., whether it is distinguished from essence or not. Yet it is consistent with this that it be conceived as ultimate actuality, that is, as needing no further really superadded act in order to distinguish being from nothing. A similar argument, and a much more pressing one, will be found answered in the *Logica* concerning the common notion of the individual.

108. For the solution of other difficulties, note the following. 1º The passage of essence from the state of possibility to the state of existence is not a physical passage or physical change requiring a common subject which is the same in itself under both states; rather, it is a merely logical passage consisting in this, that the essence which God can produce successively verifies two contradictory propositions: "Essence is not; Essence is." This passage does not require a subject the same in itself for both times, but rather implies that previously there was nothing of the subject and afterward there is the subject. Understand similarly the passage of essence from not-being to being, or conversely. This is not the succession of one form to another contrary form, nor of form to privation, but of one contradictory to the other, that is, of subject to non-subject, or conversely. Hence, when it is said that essence becomes something from nothing, do not suppose that essence was already essence under nothingness, but understand that essence comes to be after it was not essence; nor suppose that nothingness becomes something, but that it is excluded by something. For "from nothing" is equivalent to "after there had been nothing," as St. Thomas admonishes, I^{a}, q. 61, a. 2. All these points must be commended to the Adversaries by the example of superadded existence, whose quiddity likewise passes from nothing to something, etc.

109. 2º Nevertheless, we truly say that the same essence of a creature which now exists was previously possible, for nothing exists outside God unless before existence it was possible. But this is true because it is understood according to the character of the term "possible," by which the verb "was" or the word "same" is amplified or alienated and is taken with the addition "in the potency of the cause" or "in the Divine cognition." For that term, insofar as it denotes a state prior to the state of existence, signifies extrinsic possibility, that is, the potency of the cause; or, if it is also referred to intrinsic possibility, it signifies the truth of hypothetical cognition concerning it, which truth is then absolutely given although the object is not present, from nos. 26 sqq. Hence this proposition, "The same essence of the creature which now exists was previously possible," does not denote intrinsic identity previously present, but yields this sense: "In God there was a potency of bringing it about that the essence of the creature should be the same as it now is," or again this: "God truly knew that the essence of the creature, if it existed, would be the same as it now is." The Adversaries are bound to say the same concerning the quiddity of superadded existence.

110. 3º For the truth of a negative proposition, a positive distinction of subject from predicate is not required; a negative distinction suffices, consisting in the mere defect of exercised identity because the subject is nothing. Hence the fact that it is truly said, "The essence of Antichrist does not exist," is of no help to the Adversaries; for it is likewise now truly said in an absolute and exercised sense, "The essence of Antichrist is not essence," and also, "The existence of Antichrist does not exist as that by which." Antichrist is also truly said to be objectively indifferent as to whether he is man or not man, not in a composite sense but in a divided sense, that is, such that at one time he is man and at another is not man, but nothing.

111. 4º Some distinction of reason must be admitted between the essence and existence of a creature, for at least they are distinguished according to implicit and explicit, since they are not synonymous terms. Yet a strict reasoned distinction of reason must be denied if essence and existence are taken in the same sense. For actual essence cannot be conceived without actual existence; nor merely possible essence, or essence in potency, without merely possible existence, or existence in potency; nor essence prescinding from the states of being in act and merely in potency without existence likewise prescinding from these states. For essence hypothetically conceived as "something real, if it is given," which is the manner in which it is said to prescind from the states, is formally existence taken hypothetically as "something real, if it is given." The example of roundness and the circle, taken from St. Thomas in no. 98, pertains here. But if the comparison is

made between essence thus hypothetically conceived and existence as exercised, that is, as absolutely conceived or asserted, there will be between them a certain reasoned distinction of reason, not one implying different definabilities, but one implying only a non-mutual inference by reason of the diversity of acts of intellect in the mode of tending toward the same object. For although, for example, these concepts, "That which is a rational animal, if it actually is," and, "That which actually is a rational animal," regard altogether the same object, they do not mutually infer each other as regards verification, since the former is verified of man from eternity, but not the latter. Hence the former is in a certain way more extensive, namely in breadth of time or verification, not of object.

112. From these formal concepts, to the former of which, according to common usage, corresponds the name "essence," and to the latter the name "existence of man," unless something else is explained, there is derivatively denominated in the object a certain special distinction of reason, namely a certain appearance or imitation of that distinction which is really given between potency and act, or between subject and accident. For essence under the hypothetical concept is rendered extrinsically indifferent as to whether existence under the absolute concept is truly affirmed or denied of it; and this predication, "The essence which is a rational animal, if it actually is, now actually is a rational animal," to which in reality this proposition, "The essence of man exists," is equivalent, is verified only accidentally or contingently, after the manner of that which predicates a real accident of a subject. Indifference of this sort is therefore a certain potentiality of essence, which, while it verifies that absolute predication, is conceived as though actualized by existence and as making with it a certain shadowy composition after the manner of a subject with an accident. But all this is the work of reason and extrinsic to the object, although founded in that negative or purely objective indifference of the creature toward existing discussed in no. 91. But because such a foundation is not given in God, from whom all contingency and indifference in existing are utterly removed, therefore no potentiality or composition with existence can be conceived with foundation in the Divine essence.

113. From what has been said one will infer in what sense being taken nominally prescinds from existence. First, it prescinds as explicit from implicit. It also prescinds from existence as exercised, or as absolutely affirmable, in which way existence means the same as being taken participially, by a precision of independence or inconvertibility in predicating, in the manner in which we said that essence prescinds and is distinguished from existence through diverse modes of conceiving. For

nominal being is in reality being conceived hypothetically, namely thus: "that which, if it actually is, is intrinsically apt to exist really, or to exist without contradiction." But from existence as hypothetically conceived it does not properly and strictly prescind, but formally includes it no less than real essence. The whole doctrine given from no. 111 onward can readily be confirmed by the example of existence compared with its own quiddity.

DISPUTATION III.
ON SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT.

Created being is divided into substance and accident. Here the name "substance" is taken as restricted to finite substance, lest it be more extensive than the thing divided; for if it prescinds from limitation, it properly belongs to God. It is likewise taken not insofar as it generally signifies the essence of any thing whatever, in which sense even the essence of an accident is called its substance, but insofar as it signifies being opposed to a physical accident. This division is more immediate by immediacy of universality than the division of created being through the ten predicaments, because several of these agree in the notion of accident; although in another sense the division of being into ten genera is called immediate, namely by exclusion of a more immediate or superior genus, for accident as such is not properly regarded as a genus, either because it is transcendental or because it is analogical in another way. Nevertheless, this predicamental division, which we gave in the *Logica* and summarily explained there, will supply the matter of the present Disputation as regards those members which have not yet been expressly explained in the course of this Work.

CHAPTER I.
On Substance in General.

1. Substance derives its name both from subsisting and from standing under accidents; but as regards the thing signified, it is commonly defined or

described as "a being through itself," and conversely accident as "a being in another." Yet there remains a difficulty of no small importance concerning the sense of the phrase "through itself." If it excludes being in another as in a subject upon which it formally depends in coming to be and in conservation, which dependence the phrase "in another" seems to denote, it indeed belongs to complete substance, as well as to prime matter and the rational soul; but it does not belong to every substance. For the soul of a horse and every other corporeal substantial form, likewise the human union and the mode of subsistence, although they are truly substances, are nevertheless sustained by and depend upon a subject no less than accidental forms. For this reason authors disagree considerably in assigning a concept of substance common to all complete and incomplete substances.

2. Other explanations being omitted, that one should rather be embraced which we have already indicated more than once elsewhere, namely, one which takes "through itself" as the same as "for itself." Accordingly, substance in common is to be described thus: "a being existing for itself," or, "apt to exist for itself," such that "for itself" excludes existing by its nature ultimately or principally for something adequately distinct from itself, to be intrinsically perfected or affected. Hence an individual substance so exists that by its nature it is not ultimately for a subject upon which it rests, or for another thing to which it must be physically united as to a whole, as to a subject adequately distinct from it. Conversely, an accident is "a being in another," that is, "for another," such that by the intention of nature it is ultimately or principally for an adequately distinct subject which it intrinsically affects or to which it must be physically united. This explanation of substance, as regards its sense and almost its very words, is given by Fr. Oviedo and approved by others.

3. This explanation belongs first of all to every substance. There can be no doubt concerning uncreated substance, nor concerning created substance altogether complete, such as an angel or a man, that is, a human person. But we know no incomplete or partial substances besides prime matter, substantial form, their informative and continuative union, to which add the hypostatic union in Christ the Lord, subsistence, and an integral nature in relation to the *suppositum*. And all these, although they truly are for the *suppositum*, which is principally and ultimately intended by nature, nevertheless are not in it as forms in a subject, but as parts in a whole, from which therefore they are not adequately distinguished. Therefore they do not exist for something adequately distinct, but truly for themselves. Prime matter is indeed immediately for form, union for the extremes, and the mode of subsistence for nature; but not principally or ultimately, because

nature ultimately intends the *suppositum* as constituted from these parts and for its sake institutes the order of the parts among themselves. It intends it, I say, ultimately, because the *suppositum*, even a created one, terminates in itself and is not ordered to another to be intrinsically perfected, although it can be for another as an extrinsic end, in the manner in which creatures are for God and the elements for mixed bodies.

4. Next, the same explanation belongs to substance alone. For there is no accident which is not principally for something adequately distinct from itself, as the end "for which," to be affected by it through physical union. For every accident by its own nature is instituted to redound to the good or evil of the subject to which it is physically united or must be united, as is evident from common apprehension and can be established by induction, even in supernatural accidents, as in grace and the beatific vision. One may say: an artificial form, although truly an accident, is not intended for the matter of a house, for example, but for itself or for the house in the being of an artificial composite. I distinguish: it is not intended by art or the artisan, I grant it; it is not intended by nature, I deny it. For an artificial form consists in a certain figure or presence of stones, timbers, etc., which is a mode instituted by nature immediately for quantity and mediately for corporeal substance.

5. One may further say: just as the equine soul is for the horse, so whiteness can be said to be for the white thing, which is a concrete not adequately distinguished from it. I answer: whiteness is indeed for the white thing, taken directly or as regards the subject; but not taken in the being of a concrete, or of the denomination constituted from subject and form. For the entire constitution of the concrete and the resulting denomination "white" is not intended by nature for itself, but for the sake of the subject. If one seeks another reason under which it would be for the very nature of things, none appears to us from the common judgment of philosophers. For the ancients, instructed by the light of nature, judged nothing to be through itself and for itself except either simple things having no order to a subject and possessing in themselves the first root of operations, or things composed of the first subject and first act, taking the name "first act" for the form which would be the first effective root of the operations of the composite. Hence they regarded all other acts, and consequently the denominations resulting from them, as existing not for themselves but for the subject. Christians, however, who from the principles of Faith gather that the *suppositum* exists for itself and adds something over and above the integral nature, whether simple or composed from first subject and first act, also include subsistence among the constituents of things existing for themselves. Whatever, therefore, implies order to a subject and is otherwise

distinguished from subsistence and from first act and its union is not to be judged to exist for itself or for the concrete which it constitutes. But that this order and distinction are found in whiteness, heat, quantity, etc., must be gathered from special indications, which need not be exhibited in the definition of substance or accident, just as the indications from which it is gathered that the power of reasoning is not found in a horse, lion, etc., are not exhibited in the definition of man.

6. From what has been said one will infer that the self-sufficiency of substance, insofar as it is abstracted from all complete and incomplete substances, indeed implies independence from a subject, but not from just any subject; rather, from a subject for whose sake it exists or on account of which it is. Thus Aristotle, St. Thomas, and the other ancients are to be understood when they indiscriminately say or suppose that substance is "through itself" because it does not depend upon a subject. They can also be understood of predicamental substance, that is, complete substance, which alone is placed in the direct line of the predicament and which is truly independent of every subject in which it is, although it does not exclude a subject from which, as from a part of itself, it is constituted. Here it should be noted that the self-sufficiency of substance is sometimes taken by St. Thomas, for example I *Contra Gentiles*, c. 25, purely negatively, namely for the negation of being in a subject; and therefore the Holy Doctor denies that self-sufficiency belongs to the intrinsic notion of substance. But now it is taken positively by all, namely for the foundation of that negation, or for the positive independence of a thing from a subject. One will further gather that the being-in-another of an accident, which is also called "inherence" and "inhesion," conversely implies the dependence of a form upon a subject, not dependence of any kind, but that which regards the subject as the intrinsic end "for which," or as that for whose sake the entire form is.

7. Now concerning universal substance it is asked, 1º whether it has a concept common to created and uncreated substance; and, if it does, whether that concept is univocal. To the first part I answer affirmatively, provided that "substance" is not taken from the office of standing under, but from that of subsisting or existing for itself. First, the concept of complete substance, or substance not ordainable to the physical constitution of some whole, properly belongs not only to an angel but also to God, because the name "complete" does not necessarily signify composition, but only a perfection not needing a complement; nor is there any reason why such a perfection cannot perfectly prescind from being composite or simple, finite or infinite. Next, the concept of substance as abstracting from complete and incomplete and signifying only the self-sufficiency or being-for-itself

explained in no. 2 is also properly verified of God, because although it does not exclude incompletion, neither does it formally include it. Hence the same arguments apply to it which we gave concerning the concept of being, disp. 1, c. 1. To the second part of the question it must be said that this concept, insofar as it is common to God and creature, is analogically univocal, or logically univocal and metaphysically analogical, because of what was said concerning the concept of being, d. 1, c. 3.

8. Question 2º: does the notion of substance formally transcend all the differences or formalities of its inferiors? I answer 1º: this notion is formally transcendental with respect to God, because it is at least implicitly included in aseity and in all the Divine attributes because of their infinite perfection. From this there arises in concepts common to God and creature the metaphysical analogy which excludes generic agreement. I answer 2º: the notion of predicamental substance, that is, finite and physically complete substance, does not formally transcend the differences of its inferiors; for it is properly a genus, and genera are not formally included in differences, as I presuppose from the *Logica*.

9. I answer 3º: the notion of substance abstracting from complete and incomplete, as explained in no. 2, is commonly called "transcendental" in order to distinguish it from predicamental substance by its greater universality, because it is predicated even of every real constituent or physical part of substance. Whether, however, it formally transcends metaphysical differences, for example the rational difference of man, is doubtful and for me remains a problem. The affirmative side can be supported both because the definition of substance given in no. 2 seems to belong to "rational" taken differentially, and because rational, after the manner of a form, constitutes a substantial metaphysical whole, namely the human species; but substance cannot be constituted except from substances, especially as regards the form. The negative side can also be supported, both because the arguments which we adduced for the transcendence of being in disp. 1 do not seem compelling here, and because if rational is formally substance, it will be a physically complete substance. For it undoubtedly implies physical completion; otherwise it would be distinguished from genus and species not purely formally but really and inadequately, as a soul is distinguished from a man. But if it is a physically complete substance, it will already formally include the supreme genus of predicamental substance, and consequently the other intermediate genera. Since there is no leisure to discuss this question more fully, I leave it undecided.

10. Question 3º: is God contained in the predicament of substance? The common opinion answers negatively, and rightly. For in this predicament, as constituted by Aristotle, only genera, species, and the individuals contained under them are placed directly; divisive differences of genera and constitutive differences of species are placed indirectly or collaterally; and finally the parts or physical constituents of substance are placed there reductively. But God is neither a part of substance, nor a difference, nor a genus, nor a species subjected to any genus, since neither being nor substance is a genus with respect to God; consequently He is not an individual contained under some predicable or subjectable species. Moreover, Aristotle says that it is proper to predicamental substance to stand under accidents. One may say: predicamental substance is physically complete substance, but the notion of complete substance properly belongs to God. Likewise, first substance pertains to this predicament, and this name belongs to God above all. I answer: not every complete substance is predicamental, but only that which is finite, since it alone can admit generic and specific grades, and it alone stands under accidents. Nor is God first substance in the Aristotelian predicamental sense. For when Aristotle divides substance into first and second, by the name "first substance" he understands a substantial individual contained under a species and genus, not an individual which is uncaused and the first principle of all substances, in which sense God alone is first substance.

On the Properties of Substance.

11. Question 4º: what are the properties of substance? I answer: Aristotle enumerates six for predicamental substance. To understand them, one must recall from *Logica*, tr. 4, *De Praedicamentis*, c. 2, the division of substance into first and second, which division Suárez accurately discusses and explains, d. 33, *Metaphysicae Disputationes*, s. 2. First substance is called a wholly individual substance physically complete in the order of being through itself, for example Peter; second substances are called the genera and species of this predicament under the intention of universality. The first property of substance, therefore, is "not to be in a subject," namely one in which it is physically sustained. How this property belongs both particularly to complete substances, as well as to prime matter and the rational soul, and generally to all substances, even incomplete ones, has already been explained from nos. 1 to 6. It must now be noted that, if it signifies positive independence, it is a property only from the mode of signifying and conceiving, insofar as we conceive independence from a subject as in some

way resulting from the fact that substance is directed to itself or is for itself, although perhaps no distinction of reason is given except according to implicit and explicit.

12. The second property is "to be predicated univocally." This does not belong to first substances, but only to second substances; nor in these is it a real property, unless taken purely fundamentally, but an intentional one arising from cognition. Nor is it a property of substance in the fourth mode, but only in the second, since it also belongs to accident, for example to color with respect to whiteness and blackness. If one asks whether created substance, insofar as it abstracts from whole and partial substance, is univocal, I answer: it is analogical according to the concept of independence from every subject, because although this belongs in some way to all substances, even partial ones, it is not verified of some except with the addition "as that by which, or constitutively." But according to the concept of independence from a subject as ultimately intended, by which account it is co-distinguished from every accident, it is logically univocal, because this concept is verified without any impropriety of every partial substance. It may nevertheless be called metaphysically analogical because of the attribution of part to whole, at least if it formally transcends the differences.

13. The third property is "to signify this something," that is, to be conceivable after the manner of an individual standing by itself, demonstrable, and having the notion of a *suppositum*. This property belongs to first substance alone. For second substance, as Aristotle admonishes, signifies "what kind of thing" rather than "this something," either because it is constituted in second being through accidental abstraction, or because it cannot exist unless communicated to an individual through identity, just as a quality cannot exist unless communicated to a subject through union. Nevertheless, even second substance is said in a certain way to signify "this something," insofar as genus and species are conceived as standing by themselves and imply a substance proportioned to their grade, as Suárez shows, d. 34, *Metaphysicae Disputationes*, s. 8.

14. The fourth property is "not to admit more and less," namely in gradual intension through the physical addition of degree to degree. This property belongs to every substance, although not to substance alone, since it also belongs to quantity. Corporeal substance, however, admits more and less in entitative extension through the addition and subtraction of parts, which bring with them an increase of quantity, as is evident in the nutrition of living things. There is also within the genus of substance, if diverse beings are considered, more and less according to essential perfection, which is commonly called virtual intension. Hence an angel is a substance intensively

greater or better than a stone; form according to Aristotle is more substance than matter; and God is most of all substance.

15. The fifth property is "not to have a contrary." By the name contraries Aristotle understands forms which are maximally distant under one genus and therefore expel one another from the same subject, such as heat and cold, or whiteness and blackness. In this sense every complete substance lacks a contrary, since it is not in a subject; yet this property does not belong to complete substance alone, but also to prime matter, quantity, and not a few qualities. Some acknowledge contrariety in substantial forms; and in reality it does not easily appear why a soul and the form of a corpse should not be said to be contrary to one another, as also the forms of fire and water. Perhaps Aristotle, when he defines contrariety by the opposition of forms concerning the same subject, by the name "subject" understands not prime matter but a being in physical act.

16. The sixth property is "to be capable of receiving contraries," namely successively, as the same man is now cold and now hot, now foolish and now wise. This is a property of almost every complete substance which we know among creatures; for even an angel is receptive of love and hatred concerning the same object. If, however, the heavens are altogether incorruptible, as many hold, they will not be subject to contrary qualities. And at least there appears no repugnance in a complete body incapable of receiving contraries. Hence this property does not extend to every possible substance. Nor, again, is it limited to substance alone, since it is also found in quantity and in the accidental powers of the soul, which according to the Thomists receive assent and dissent, love and hatred. Among incomplete substances it belongs especially to prime matter and also to the rational soul; to the rest, however, it belongs at least as that by which, insofar as from them a *suppositum* is constituted, to which principally and as that which it belongs to receive accidents and undergo contraries. Finally, from the mind of the Philosopher a seventh property can be added, "to stand under accidents," which is the best known of all and belongs to every created substance, both from what was said in *Animastica*, disp. 4, c. 3, and because at least no created substance is possible which is not receptive of its own location. Yet it is not a property of substance alone, since some accidents can stand under others, although not after the manner of a first subject needing no other.

Various Divisions of Substance Are Indicated, and
the Quiddity of Mode Is Explained.

17. Question 5º: what are the divisions of substance? I answer: created substance is divided, 1º, into complete and incomplete. This division is commonly taken both metaphysically and physically. If it is taken metaphysically, by the name "complete substance" are understood the individual, species, and genera placed directly in the predicament of substance, while the name "incomplete substance" is attributed to collateral differences. Yet in this sense the division seems excessively analogical or improper. First, because differences perhaps are not formally transcended by the common notion of substance, because of what was said in no. 9; and if that is true, they cannot be called substances except as that by which, or connexively. Secondly, because a generic, and indeed a specific, grade awaits some complement with which it constitutes a metaphysical substantial whole, namely the specific and individual difference. Therefore properly there is no substance complete in the metaphysical line except the individual alone, or first substance. Hence species and genera do not seem to be called complete substances in the metaphysical or logical sense under any other title except because they are conceived after the manner of a whole or as though standing by themselves and do not expressly connote a subject in which they logically are. Differences, however, are called incomplete substances because they are substances at least as that by which, and are otherwise conceived as though adjacent, expressly connoting the genus which they contract and affect as though it were a subject. Therefore that division is properly to be taken of physical or real completion and incompletion.

18. In this sense every partial substance is called "incomplete," namely one which is ordered to the constitution of some substantial whole. We enumerated its various species in no. 3. That is called "complete" which desires no complement of its own order, although it can be further completed or perfected in the accidental order. If nothing is lacking to it in the being of a radical active and passive principle of natural motions or properties, it is called complete in the being of nature; but if it awaits nothing further in the whole order of existing for itself, it is called complete in the being of a *suppositum*, or complete simply, and this alone is placed directly in the predicament of substance. That which is complete in the being of nature is either simple, as in an angel, or composite, as in man; and

in the latter a twofold completion can be distinguished: one essential, which implies all parts necessary for the definition of the species to be verified; the other integral, which implies all continuative unible parts which nature requires in order to be substantially perfect in its species. Such completion does not seem necessary for the direct line of the predicament, for a man mutilated of a finger simply contains all grades of predicamental substance. That which is complete in the being of a *suppositum* cannot be altogether simple among creatures, because it must always be really composed of nature and subsistence. See Suárez, d. 34, *Metaphysicae Disputationes*, s. 3.

19. It is divided, 2º, into living and inanimate, or lacking life. This division was explained in *Animastica*, d. 1, c. 1. It is divided, 3º, into spiritual and corporeal. This division also, which is also common to accident, remains explained in *Animastica*, d. 2, c. 1. It is divided, 4º, into absolute and modal. This division, which likewise is common to accident, requires that the quiddity of mode be explained, or how modal entity differs from an absolute thing. Every quality is sometimes called a mode of substance, according to St. Thomas, I-II^{a}, q. 49, a. 2. Also, the limitation of each finite thing according to the measure prescribed for it is commonly called a mode, according to St. Augustine, l. 4 *De Genesi ad litteram*, c. 3: "Mode is that which measure prescribes." In this sense also the same Augustine, *De natura boni*, c. 3, requires three things for the goodness of a created thing, "species, order, and mode," that is, due commensuration with its principles, as St. Thomas explains, I^{a}, q. 5, a. 5. Again, mode is sometimes taken metaphysically or logically for any objective concept contracting and determining another broader concept rationally distinct from it. Thus a difference is commonly called a mode of a genus; and concepts virtually simple and not mutually distinct from a common concept are especially called modes, for example aseity and from-anotherness with respect to being. Hence it is commonly said that being is contracted to God and creature and to the supreme genera not through differences but through modes. The Scotists require other conditions for these metaphysical modes, which they call "intrinsic." See above disp. 1, n. 69.

20. "Mode" is not taken in the present matter under any of these notions, but insofar as this name signifies an entity essentially attached to another really distinct entity whose indifference it determines. Such an entity, which is properly called a "physical mode," is commonly believed to be location or local presence, the union between soul and body, the inherence of an accident in a subject, action, passion, etc. The arguments which we gave in the *Physica* for a modal union distinct from its extremes can readily be adapted to other modes of this kind. Nor indeed does it seem

possible to doubt that Peter's sitting, for example, is first some reality, since it is neither nothing nor a mental fiction. Next, it is distinct from Peter, for Peter could otherwise not exist except while sitting. Finally, it is essentially attached to Peter, or inseparable from him by its concept, since it is Peter's ultimate determination and exercise of sitting, nor can Peter's sitting be conceived as existing while Peter does not exist. This, therefore, and other similar ultimate determinations of things indifferent of themselves to exercising some office or undergoing some denomination, we call real physical modes. There are those who assert that these were unknown to the ancients and invented or fabricated by the moderns. But that the Subtle Doctor Scotus acknowledged them in things is shown from various passages by Mastrius, disp. 2, *Metaphysica*, q. 6, a. 1. Durandus and Giles also acknowledged them, according to Suárez, disp. 7, *Metaphysicae Disputationes*, s. 1, n. 18. Indeed, Aristotle and St. Thomas plainly presuppose them when they speak of position, motion, action and passion, etc.

21. Authors explain the quidditative concept of a physical mode in more than one way. Their various explanations being omitted, the following seems sufficiently suitable: "A real and ultimate determination co-distinct from an indifference which of itself belongs to a thing existing under some proper denomination." [illegible] it follows that a mode is inseparable, even by divine power, from the modified thing; for it is contradictory that an actual and ultimate determination not actually determine, and likewise contradictory that an actual determination exist without a thing actually determined, and consequently actually existing, if the determination is toward a denomination proper to an existing thing. But in order that the nature of mode may become clearer, the following must be observed. 1º A mode necessarily connotes an indifference which it determines; otherwise it will not be a mode, even though it be an entity unable to exist without another. Hence in the Divine Persons the Son is not a mode of the Father, although inseparable from Him, because He connotes no indifference in the Father. Nor is a creature which is produced by God through a distinct action a mode of God, although it cannot exist without God, because it does not determine God's indifference to acting, but presupposes it already determined through the action. On the part of the determinable thing, however, obediential indifference suffices, by which it can lack the determination at least by divine power. Hence an accident *inesse* in a subject through a mode of inherence because it can by divine power fail to inhere, as in the Eucharist. Indifference to this or that determination of a certain genus likewise suffices, even though it be vaguely connoted together with some determination, as happens in the indifference of a thing to local presence.

22. 2º Since a mode is an ultimate determination in its genus or office, it must determine absolutely, not merely conditionally. Hence, if two entities of such a kind were given that either could exist separately without the other, yet both could not exist together unless united, in which event no intermediate union is needed, neither would be the modal union of the other; because although each is a determination toward union, it does not determine absolutely but conditionally, namely on condition that the other exists. Consequently neither is an ultimate determination, since each is indifferent of itself and awaits the other in order to be completed in the being of a determinant. For this reason, although two whitenesses mutually determine one another to the denomination "similar" without a superadded mode of relation, the one is not thereby a mode of the other. From this office of ultimate determination it also follows that within the same genus there cannot be a mode of a mode, for example a union of a union or an action of an action; for besides the fact that an infinite regress would follow, a reflexive mode would presuppose in the direct mode some indifference to exercising its office, and such indifference is incompatible with the concept of an ultimate determination. There can, however, be a mode of a mode in a different genus. Thus the informative unions of the integral parts of man are united among themselves through a continuative union, and the union of the body and soul of Christ the Lord is united to the Word through the hypostatic union. From the same concept it follows that a mode is essentially connected with an individual thing; for if it were indifferent to numerically distinct things, it would need a further determination toward one rather than the others.

23. 3º A mode, whatever some may say, need not always be a determination of a thing toward another extreme distinct from it. For although it often concerns two extremes, it does not have this from the common concept of mode. Hence it can be a determination of a thing toward itself or toward a denomination resulting from itself, as happens in subsistence and in location, which can be conserved without an extrinsic place. 4º A mode need not be intrinsically united to the thing which it modifies unless by a special office it is intrinsic. This is evident in a transient action, which is not received in the agent although it is truly its mode, as being the ultimate determination of the power of the cause toward acting; indeed, an action can, at least by divine power, be locally distant from the agent. Hence there can be an extrinsic mode, or one extrinsically denominating a thing, which is inseparable from the thing only in existing, insofar as it cannot exist in reality unless the modified thing exists. Hence an external action of God can without absurdity be called, and is called by Fr.

Oviedo, controv. 4, *Metaphysica*, punct. 6, n. 2, an extrinsic mode of God; not insofar as mode signifies limitation and connotes measure according to the notion given in no. 19, but precisely insofar as it signifies the ultimate determination toward acting, bringing no change to God but only denominating Him extrinsically. The same mode can also be, and commonly is, intrinsic to one thing and extrinsic to another. Thus a transient action is intrinsic to the term and extrinsic to the agent. One may say: then cognition could be called an extrinsic mode of the object, since it ultimately determines it to be known. I answer: created cognition could indeed be so called if it is essentially connected with the present existence of the object; but not if it lacks this connection, because then it does not determine toward a denomination proper to an existing thing, but toward one which of itself can belong to a non-existing thing. Divine cognition, however, is in no way a mode of a created object, both because it exists from eternity without that object and because the object is not indifferent to being known by God.

24. 5º Not every mode is purely a mode, that is, having only that perfection which the bare concept of ultimate determination toward such an office explains, for example toward acting, uniting, or locating. Rather, a mode can also identify with itself other perfections which are not inferred from this concept but are gathered from other indications. Thus, if an angel, as many hold, identifies with itself its own creation, it is an extrinsic mode of Omnipotence, as Fr. Oviedo rightly infers, loc. cit.; but it is not purely a mode, because it simultaneously identifies other perfections of angelic nature which are not inferred from the bare concept of ultimate determination toward creating. Another example is found in the act of understanding, concerning which we spoke in *Animastica*, disp. 8, nos. 29 sqq. One may say: then a mode can be identified with an absolute thing. I distinguish: with an absolute thing of which it is the mode, I deny it; with one of which it is not the mode, I subdistinguish: if "absolute" says a complete exclusion of modality, I deny it; if it only says a specific perfection prescindible from modality, or suitable for other offices besides ultimately determining the indifference of another, I grant the consequence.

25. Hence one will infer that the common statement that a mode is of more tenuous entity is to be understood of modes that are purely such, such as actions distinct from cause and effect, locations or local presences, unions between altogether absolute extremes, etc. For these add scarcely any perfection to the modifiable thing; and moreover their perfection is diminished by essential dependence upon another created being and by their inability to exist separately, to such an extent that they cannot even by divine power be conserved without intrinsically inhering in or adhering to

some subject. Yet this tenuity is to be understood relatively to things of the same order, such that substantial modes are the most tenuous substances and accidental modes the weakest accidents, although it can happen that a substantial mode surpasses an absolute accident in perfection. Above all, however, the tenuity must be understood relatively to the thing determinable by such a mode, provided that the mode is natural; for if it is supernatural, it can sometimes be more perfect than the modified being, as is evident in the hypostatic union insofar as it modifies the essential union of the humanity and unites it to the Word. This whole doctrine proceeds, as I said, concerning modes purely such. For those which identically participate in other perfections need not be of tenuous entity, especially if they are only extrinsic modes with respect to God and do not depend essentially upon another created being, as an angel indistinct from its own creation would not depend. Therefore, just as when a vegetative soul is said to be the most imperfect in the genus of soul, this is understood of a soul "purely" vegetative, so likewise in the present case.

26. Not everything hitherto said concerning the nature of mode is approved by all. For many either remove or add certain conditions according to the various definitions of mode which they construct. Yet there can scarcely be disagreement except over terminology. But against our explanation it may still be objected: a necessary cause already applied by the Divine decree to producing an effect in the individual has no indifference toward such an effect, and yet a mode of action is superadded to it. Therefore a mode does not necessarily connote an indifference which it determines. I answer: that cause has indifference of itself, as I suppose, otherwise it would not need a distinct action; and through the Divine decree it is not determined altogether independently of the action. For the decree determines insofar as it efficaciously wills the action of such a cause toward such an effect. It is not enough to will the existence of fire A and fire B in order that one be produced by the other, since both could be produced by other causes. Hence, when God wills A to cause B, He wills something else besides the entities of both, and this can be nothing except action. This action, therefore, is the formal and ultimate determination of the indifference of the cause, because it does not presuppose that indifference as ultimately determined through the decree, but only radically, namely by virtue of a certain hope or indefeasible right to the action which is to follow. Moreover, God, under the notion of efficaciously willing the action, is obliquely completed by the action itself, as several theologians hold.

CHAPTER II.
On Subsistence.

27. What a *suppositum* is; what is signified by the names "subsistence," "suppositality," or "personality"; whence the distinction of subsistence from nature in creatures is known; how subsistence can be defined; what office or formal effect it has; and certain other matters pertaining here, we explained sufficiently for philosophers in *Physica*, tract. 1, final chapter. The doctrine of that chapter must be kept before one's eyes in the present discussion. Let us now discuss some questions, but briefly and not in proportion to their importance, because this matter depends for the most part upon theological principles and is therefore treated at length by theologians. It is asked, then, 1º whether created subsistence consists in something positive or in something negative. Scotus taught the latter, and he is followed by most Scotists and by some of our authors. This opinion places subsistence, which is as it were the form of the *suppositum*, in a twofold negation, namely of actual and aptitudinal union to an alien *suppositum*; that is, in the fact that substantial nature is neither actually united to an alien *suppositum* nor naturally apt to be united to one, although it is unible through obediential potency. Indeed, speaking of an integral or total nature, subsistence according to these authors adds to nature only the negation of actual union; for the negation of aptitudinal union is in reality the positive incapacity of nature to be naturally united to an alien *suppositum*, and nature does not lose this incapacity although deprived of its own subsistence, as is evident in the humanity of Christ.

28. The contrary opinion, namely that subsistence consists in something positive, is much more common and is defended by all Thomists and by most of our authors with Suárez, d. 34, *Metaphysicae Disputationes*, s. 2, and indeed by some Scotists, who say that this matter is left problematic by Scotus. Proof 1º: after prolonged discussion against Nestorius and his followers, the Councils define that created subsistence is not in Christ and that the Word assumed humanity, or the nature of man, in such a way that He did not assume a man or human person. But this definition becomes nugatory if created subsistence consists in something negative. Its sense would then be that in Christ, once the union of humanity to the Word was effected, there is no lack of this union; and that the Word so united human nature to Himself that He did not at the same time unite to Himself the lack of union. Such a truth, being self-evident and deniable by no one except a

madman, was not worthy of so great an examination. One may say: the Councils excluded created personality from Christ in order to establish physical union against Nestorius, who admitted only a moral union compatible with a duality of persons. But this solution, although not inept, does not wholly weaken the argument. For at least the Councils endeavor to persuade us that this argument is legitimate: "Created personality is not given in Christ; therefore a physical union of humanity to the Word is given," or conversely. Yet the labor of the Councils would have been altogether superfluous if that argument yielded this sense: "A lack of physical union is not given in Christ; therefore physical union is given," or conversely.

29. The point is pressed. The Councils and Fathers directly teach that created personality was not assumed by the Word. Therefore they suppose that this matter could be doubted with some appearance of truth. But if created personality consisted in something negative, no one could doubt that it was incapable of being assumed by the Word. For who would be so foolish as to think a lack of union capable of being united? Confirmation: through union, the subsistence of the Word supplies in the humanity the office of created subsistence, as theologians teach from the Fathers. But the office of a lack of union cannot be supplied through union, since the offices of the two are contradictory; nor can any formal effect be conceived as supplied by Divine subsistence which is in any way similar to the office of a lack of union, since the sole office of this lack is to render the humanity not united to the Divine *suppositum*. Here it should be noted that although Scotus taught that an alien nature could be hypostatically assumed by a created *suppositum*, he taught this only according to the opinion concerning a positive entity, which he regarded as probable, as Mastrius explains with other Scotists, disp. 11, *Metaphysica*, q. 4. For according to the opinion concerning a negative entity, it seems evident that this cannot be done, as Suárez shows, cit. s. 2, n. 11. Hence created subsistence, according to the Scotists, adds to nature only a lack of union to a Divine person.

30. Proof 2º: the Divine personalities, even insofar as formally or virtually distinct from the nature, consist in something positive, as no one doubts. Therefore the same must be judged concerning created personality. Proof of the consequence: because created personality is some participation and imitation of Divine personality; for no one would say that the name "person" is merely equivocal with respect to Divine and created person. But participation and imitation of a positive predicate, since it implies some likeness, cannot be preserved in a mere negation; for between a positive thing and something purely negative there is no likeness. Participation can

indeed be deficient in other respects, but unless it agrees at least in positive being, there will be none. Thus, although created wisdom need not imitate Divine wisdom in all respects, because it is some participation of it, it must consist in something positive. This is also evident by induction through the other created perfections which are participations of the Divine perfections.

31. Proof 3º: the humanity depends in a special way upon the Word rather than upon the other Divine Persons, as upon the *suppositum* terminating its dependence. Scotus speaks thus, as all do. But this special dependence cannot be explained in the opinion which we now reject. For, first, to be united or communicated is not by the terms themselves to depend, since the Word is also communicated to the humanity, and the rational soul to the body, upon which it does not depend. Next, this special dependence is not *a priori*, or as upon a cause, because the Word is not the formal or material cause of the humanity, nor its efficient cause except through an efficiency common to the whole Trinity. Nor, again, is it *a posteriori*, or from a concomitant, namely as upon a term of need; for the humanity does not need union to the Word, nor another term to be supplied through this union. A lack of union cannot be supplied by its contradictory; and furthermore such a lack is not properly a term of nature's need, since it is rather a non-need or non-dependence of nature upon another term besides its own natural one.

32. In our opinion this dependence is not difficult to explain. For nature needs subsistence as a term without which it cannot be, and therefore it is said to be sustained by subsistence or by the *suppositum*, or rather by itself when it subsists in itself, because it provides for itself and intrinsically roots this support. This is not because subsistence performs the office of a subject, but because it truly supports nature and strengthens it in its own genus by adherence to itself, so that nature can stand and sustain itself in its being. Hence subsistence can be called an intrinsic support of nature, like a prop or natural staff, to speak mechanically, without which nature would totter or would not stand in being. Since, therefore, the Word united to the humanity supports it and sustains it in being, supplying eminently whatever support or strength would arise from created subsistence, He is therefore said to sustain the humanity and to terminate its dependence.

33. Proof 4º: the *suppositum*, which is the whole constituted from nature and subsistence, is one essentially, as all acknowledge; and therefore no one doubts that human nature with the subsistence of the Word constitutes one essentially, namely Christ. But this cannot stand if subsistence is placed in something negative. For if one essentially cannot result from beings of different predicaments, or from substance and accident, how much less can

it result from being and non-being, or from something positive and something negative? The *suppositum*, therefore, that is, angel, man, lion, etc., would be one accidentally, no less than the concrete "dark air" or "blind man"; hence in concrete being it could not pertain to the predicament of substance, indeed not to any predicament. I ask: by the name "*suppositum*," are nature and negation signified equally principally, or directly? Or nature directly and negation obliquely? Or negation directly and nature obliquely, or by connotation? If the first is said, even the Adversary will reject it, because by that name one essentially would not be signified. If the second, then it will truly be said, "Humanity is a man," or, "is a *suppositum*," just as it is truly said, "Air is dark"; and moreover one accidentally is not avoided, since "*suppositum*," or "man," will mean the same as "humanity not united to a Divine person," which concrete is no more one essentially than "air not united to light." If the third, then an angel or man, simply speaking, will be a negative being and will be numbered among non-beings, just as privation is, although by the name "privation" something positive is connoted or signified obliquely, namely the capacity of the subject for the form.

34. Objection 1º: provided that human nature is understood as not united to an alien *suppositum*, it is understood as not existing in another. Therefore, if every addition is prescinded from, it is understood as existing in itself, or standing in itself, which is to subsist. Objection 2º: if subsistence consists in something positive, it will be a substantial perfection connaturally due to nature. But several absurdities follow from this. It follows 1º that the Word did not assume every thing which He planted in human nature, contrary to Damascene, l. 3, c. 6. Indeed, the Apostle's words concerning Christ, "made in the likeness of men, and He had to be made like His brethren in all things," will not be fully verified; for Christ would not be like us in every substantial perfection of human nature. It follows 2º that this perfection would be substantial, as is supposed, and yet would not be substantial but accidental, both because it would supervene upon a complete substance or a substance in physical act, and would not be first act but second; and because there would be some twofold substantial form in man. It follows 3º that nature is not the whole essence and substance of the *suppositum*. It follows 4º that the humanity in Christ will be in a violent state, as lacking a perfection naturally due to it; hence by an innate tendency it will resist the hypostatic union. It follows 5º that this perfection will be assumable by the Word, since God can do whatever He wills with any created thing. But if it is assumable, a duality of persons could have stood together with the hypostatic union, contrary to the doctrine of the Councils and Fathers.

35. I answer to 1º by denying the consequence; because just as not being cold is not formally to be hot, and not being white is not formally to be here, but only inferentially, so not existing in another is not formally to exist or stand in oneself, but only inferentially, because it is as it were a secondary effect of the positive form through which nature is rendered standing in itself. Hence, if nature is prescinded from such a form, although it is conceived as existing, it will not be understood as standing in another or in itself except radically; just as, if a thing is prescinded from positive location, it will not be understood as standing in this or another place. Add that to subsist is not merely to stand in itself in any manner whatever, but to do so incommunicably; for all say that incommunicability belongs to the notion of a subsistent. But a mere lack of union to another, although it is non-communication, is not incommunicability, for the latter signifies a positive repugnance to communication. Thus lack of death is not immortality, nor lack of motion immobility.

36. To 2º: subsistence is indeed a substantial perfection due to nature, not in order to constitute it in the being of nature, that is, in the being of a radical active and passive principle as that by which motion and rest proceed, but in order to complete it in the being of a person or *suppositum*, that is, in the being of something existing for itself incommunicably. From this none of the five absurdities objected against us follows. Not 1º, because Damascene speaks of every thing pertaining to the truth of human nature or to its constitution in the being of nature. As for the rest, that personality was not assumed is defined by the Church, which by that very fact sufficiently indicated that it is some positive entity; for there would have been no need to convene Councils to define that the Word did not unite to Himself a lack of union. The Apostle, however, plainly speaks of likeness according to human nature; for it is evident that Christ is not like us according to personality, whether personality in us is positive or negative.

37. Not 2º, because the objection is retorted against the Adversaries in the hypostatic union. For this will not be substantial, nor will it constitute one essentially, since it comes to a nature as complete in the being of substance as those things which are adduced as ordered to the perfection of their genus. How could one essentially result from two substances altogether complete, such as the Word and humanity, if the latter has no incompletion in the genus of substance? In our opinion, although the humanity is complete in the being of nature, it is not altogether complete in the being of substance. Hence subsistence need not be accidental, because it does not presuppose a being actually altogether complete in its genus. Nor should it simply be called first act or second act, any more than simply a

substantial form, because it is a mere modification of nature; and the name "act" or "form" is not attributed to modes purely such, as is evident in the union of body and soul, just as the name "cause" or "effect" is not attributed to pure action.

38. Not 3º, because by the name "essence and substance of the *suppositum*" is understood that which in the *suppositum* is the radical principle of operations, or that which is formally signified by its specific definition, for example animality and rationality in man. In this manner nature is the whole essence of the *suppositum*. If, however, the name "essence" is extended to all intrinsic constituents, the Adversaries cannot deny that the essence of the *suppositum* includes something beyond nature, whether positive or negative; otherwise all the constituents of a created person would be given in Christ. Not 4º, because since the personality of the Word eminently and in a more useful manner supplies to the humanity whatever perfection, support, or strength connatural subsistence would supply to it, the humanity cannot be in a violent state or by an innate tendency resist union to the Word, which it does not require. Thus a poor man asking a rich man for a copper coin does not thereby resist one who gives him a gold one, although he did not think of it. See what was said, tract. 2 *Physica*, d. 1, c. 2, nos. 27 and 28. Not 5º, because from the same principles, namely those of Faith, from which we know that created subsistence adds something to nature, we also know that it is unassumable by the Word; otherwise the Councils would not rightly have drawn the exclusion of created personality from the hypostatic union. Nor does it pertain to God's power to elevate a created entity to something repugnant to its essential concept, as we already noted in the *Physica* concerning the elevation of anything to anything. For incommunicability to an alien *suppositum* belongs to the concept of subsistence; and this by the terms themselves is no more assumable or communicable than "incorruptibility" is corruptible or immateriality material.

Various Questions.

39. Question 2º: is subsistence a mode or a thing? The common and true opinion, held by Suárez, cit. disp. 34, s. 4, n. 33, says that it is a mode. First, because no greater than a modal distinction and perfection is required in subsistence for all its offices and its separability from nature to be preserved. Secondly, because if it were an absolute entity, it would properly and simply be a substantial form supervening upon the rational soul in man, and in every composite there would be, besides the specific form, another further

form not subordinated to it. Thirdly, because such an entity would have to be immediately operative; for an absolute substantial act altogether barren is commonly judged repugnant. But if it were immediately operative, it would no longer be something beyond nature, because Aristotle's definition of nature would belong to it.

40. One may say: the formal effect of "subsisting" does not of itself imply the modal attachment of the denominating form or quasi-form, as is evident in the mystery of the Incarnation. I grant this if the effect is prescinded from created and Divine subsistence; but I deny it if it is restricted to created subsistence. For under this account, just as it implies the imperfection and incompletion of the denominating form, so also it implies modality. One may further say: subsistence by its concept is independence; therefore it cannot essentially depend upon nature, as the notion of mode requires. I distinguish the antecedent: it is the independence of nature from an alien *suppositum*, I grant it; it is the independence of subsistence from nature, I deny the antecedent and consequence. From this doctrine one will gather that a created nature cannot, even by divine power, subsist or be terminated by another created subsistence, and therefore cannot be hypostatically assumed by an alien created *suppositum*. For a mode is essentially incapable of bestowing its formal effect upon another thing of which it is not the mode, as is evident from action, location, and union. Divine subsistence, on the contrary, since it is not a mode, can terminate a nature other than the Divine nature.

41. Question 3º: are subsistence and the existence of nature the same? This question especially has place among the Thomists who distinguish essence from existence. Some of them deny it, others affirm it, and these latter proceed more correctly according to their principles, as Suárez shows, disp. cit. s. 4. For us it must be denied without hesitation, because subsistence is distinguished from nature whereas existence is not. One may say: the existence of substance is "existence through itself," a name commonly given to subsistence. I answer: absolutely speaking, yes, insofar as "existence through itself" means the self-sufficiency of existence. But in substance there is a twofold self-sufficiency: one which excludes dependence upon a subject, which we explained in the preceding chapter, and this is identified with the existence and essence of substance; another which excludes dependence upon an alien *suppositum*, and this is distinguished from the existence of substantial nature and alone is properly called subsistence. Thus in an absolute accident there is a twofold being-in-another: one identified with the accident itself, which is an intrinsic order to

the subject of sustentation in which and for whose sake it is; the other distinct from it, which is actual inherence in the subject.

42. Question 4º: can an existing nature be deprived by divine power of every subsistence, both its own and another's? This seems to be denied with Suárez, disp. cit. s. 6, n. 27, because it seems inconceivable that an existing nature should neither positively exist in itself nor in another, and consequently neither positively sustain itself nor be sustained by another. It is nothing new that among opposite positive modes or terms one is essentially required. Hence it is commonly believed impossible that extended quantity should have no figure, or that an existing thing should lack every local presence. I said "positively," because a nature can precisely be conceived as neither existing in itself nor in another, namely at a sign prior to subsistence, as likewise happens in the same examples. Hence it also seems necessary to say, with a sufficiently common opinion, that quantity in the Eucharist, because it is not sustained by a subject, necessarily receives a certain self-sufficiency by which it in some way sustains itself. This self-sufficiency is a positive mode; and although it is not properly subsistence, for an accident is incapable of this, it is some analogical imitation of it. Hence it is commonly said that the accident in the Eucharist is conserved as though standing or subsisting through itself.

43. Question 5º: can a nature, in the composite sense of its own subsistence, be terminated by Divine subsistence? We already said in no. 38 that created subsistence is unassumable by a Divine *suppositum*. We now add that through it nature itself is rendered unassumable in the composite sense, even by divine power. The reason is that created subsistence renders nature incommunicable to an alien *suppositum*, according to all. But it does not render it merely naturally incommunicable, for nature itself is incommunicable of itself in this manner. First, because otherwise no defect of created subsistence could be inferred with any effect from the hypostatic union; for it would be no new miracle that the humanity united to the Word should retain the subsistence connatural to itself, just as it retains its accidental properties. A nature can nevertheless by divine power be terminated simultaneously by several subsistences proper to itself, although naturally it cannot because of superfluity. Hence the proper formal effect of created subsistence, concerning which we already said something in the *Physica*, can be explained thus: "fully to support a nature already constituted in the being of such a nature within the genus of substance, and to render it sustained and ultimately terminated incommunicably, namely by essentially excluding its communication to a Divine *suppositum*."

44. Question 6º: what causes does created subsistence have? Many hold that it is produced by the same action by which nature is produced, and therefore by the same agent. Hence it is commonly said that creation and generation terminate in subsistent being, or in a subsisting thing, and that subsistence is co-created or co-produced. But for the truth of such expressions it suffices that created or generated nature be intimately connected with subsistence and must subsist immediately from the first instant, as Suárez shows, cit. sect. 6. And the opinion which the same Eximious Doctor holds there and extensively defends is probable, namely that subsistence is immediately produced by nature itself through emanation. For there is no reason to deny to nature this power with respect to a mode connatural, intrinsic, and inseparable from itself, which it surpasses in perfection. Nature must also be called a material cause of subsistence, because subsistence is effected by eduction dependently upon nature itself as upon a subject. Nor does subsistence exclude communication of itself to nature, but of itself and nature to an alien *suppositum*. Nor, again, does subsistence properly inhere after the manner of an accident, because it is ultimately ordered to the *suppositum*, which is not adequately distinct from it. It is nevertheless truly sustained by nature as by a subject, and similarly "sustains" nature as a term. Thus a staff by which a sick man steadies his steps is sustained by him whom it sustains. Although, properly speaking, subsistence does not sustain nature except as that by which; for rather nature sustains itself by the aid of subsistence, which it obtains or produces for itself intrinsically.

45. Question 7º: whether, or to what extent, subsistence concurs in the operations of the *suppositum*. We have said enough concerning this in the cited final chapter of tract. 1 of the *Physica*, and tract. 2, d. 3, c. 2. See more in Suárez, disp. cit. sect. 7. Finally, it is asked whether the subsistence of a composite nature is composite. There are some who wish it to be simple both essentially and integrally; but Suárez shows by many strong arguments, sect. 5, disp. cit., that it is composite in both ways according to the condition of the nature which it modifies, and there is no leisure to repeat them here. Certain things, however, must be noted. 1º The subsistence of human nature, for example, "is composed" of three modes, two of which, corresponding to matter and soul, are related as act and potency, while the third, corresponding to the union, is the bond of both. 2º Each of these modes, taken separately, does not merit the name "subsistence" except with the addition "partial," expressed or understood. For subsistence, simply so called, means the same as personality or suppositality, that is, the ultimate term of nature which awaits no complement of the genus of substance. Yet

because these modes, taken separately, have some office of subsistence, namely to render that part of nature to which they correspond incommunicable to an alien *suppositum* to whose constitution it is not of itself ordered, each therefore denominates its own part as partially subsisting, provided it presupposes its independence from a subject. Hence the rational soul, both within and outside the body, is said to subsist, and likewise matter.

46. 3º If a part of nature depends upon a subject, the mode resulting from it does not bestow upon it the denomination of partially subsisting, nor is it called partial subsistence, but only a complement or constituent of subsistence. For the denomination of subsisting, even partially, according to common usage presupposes the independence of the thing from every subject. Hence neither union nor a material form is said to subsist partially, although each is a radical mode excluding union to an alien *suppositum* and a constituent of the subsistence of the whole composite. This depends greatly upon usage in speaking. 4º The parts of an integral or continuous whole, especially homogeneous parts or those which do not have the same indivisible form, as the parts of the human body do, truly subsist individually by their own subsistence; because they are united not after the manner of a nature to a *suppositum*, but after the manner of parts integrating one nature. Nevertheless, while the union remains, they are not said to be several subsistences except partially, and consequently not several *supposita*, but one *suppositum*, for example one fire or one body of water. But if drops or sparks are divided, they immediately become several *supposita*, though matter and form do not, because although separated they remain essentially incomplete, just as they become several bodies of water or several fires. For then, as is commonly believed, terminating points or certain small modes opposed to continuative union necessarily result in each, through which the subsistence of material things is completed in the notion of a whole. In this matter also usage in speaking largely determines the rule; from this usage an artificial, imaginary, or extrinsic division is often sufficient for there to be said to be several seas, several lands, or several mountains while continuative union remains.

CHAPTER III.

On the Concept of Accident and Its Predicamental Division.

47. Accident sometimes signifies whatever happens fortuitously. Sometimes it is taken for an accidental being, that is, one which is not one in itself. It is not so taken here, but generally for a form, or quasi-form, which

bestows a denomination that is in some way contingent and superadded to the subject in which it is conceived somehow to *inesse*. In this sense accident is divided into logical, predicamental, and physical. A "logical" or "predicable" accident is said to be that which, without corruption of the subject, can be present or absent, at least logically or metaphysically, namely, in such a way that the complete notion of the subject is conceived with some indifference in regard to such a particular form. Hence difference is predicated of genus, and individuation of species, as a logical accident. A "predicamental" accident is said to be that which is not predicated of first substance as what the thing is, that is, quidditatively and essentially, although it is not always entitatively distinguished from every substance. A "physical" accident is said to be that which has an entity really distinct from every substance; and this alone is properly and strictly an accident, the concept of which we gave in Chapter 1 together with the concept of substance.

48. The members of this division are distinguished according to greater and lesser extension. For every predicamental accident can be called logical or predicable, but not conversely; and every physical accident is predicamental, but not convertibly, as I shall presently say. A "metaphysical" accident is usually called that which is a logical accident with only a distinction of reason from its subject. The division, however, is not univocal, whether into members univocally agreeing in the being of accident, at least first-intentionally, although perhaps they agree univocally second-intentionally, or in the being of Predicable, which is treated in Logic. For the proper notion of accident implies inherence, and this is not properly found in those things which are entitatively substances or extrinsically denominate a subject; and many logical or predicamental accidents are of this kind. The name of accident is therefore attributed to these by an analogy of improper proportionality, insofar as they are conceived outside the essence of the subject and accordingly furnish their denominations as though they *inessent* or inhered in the subject.

49. But one will ask: what inherence belongs to the concept of accident properly so called? I answer: inherence may be taken 1º for the dependence of a form, in coming to be and being conserved, upon the subject from which it is educed, or which performs the function of material cause. In this sense it belongs neither to accident alone nor to every accident. Not to accident alone, because it also belongs to a material substantial form, for example, the soul of a horse. Not to every accident, because a modal accident can be given which has no material cause, or is not educed from a subject, for example, the mode of creation by which the Quantity of bread is conserved

in the Eucharist. Nevertheless, this inherence belongs both to all absolute accidents and to most, or almost all, modal accidents. But with this difference: aptitudinal inherence belongs essentially to an absolute accident, whereas actual inherence does not; for although the latter is naturally due, it can be removed by God without destruction of the essence of the accident, as happens in the Eucharist. But actual inherence belongs essentially to a modal accident to which it belongs, at least if it is not distinguished from its own eduction, because it is essentially inseparable from the subject from which it is educed. Inherence may be taken 2º more strictly for the dependence of a form upon the subject from which it is educed, for the sake of which the form principally exists. In this sense it is proper to accident alone and pertains to its essence, whether taken in act or in aptitude or exigency, according to the distinction just noted; nevertheless, it is not proper to absolutely every accident, because not every modal accident is educed, as we said a moment ago.

50. Inherence may therefore be taken 3º for the dependence of a form upon a subject for the sake of which the form principally exists and in which it exists with an intrinsic inability to exist separately. Under this notion inherence belongs to every accident properly so called and to accident alone, whether absolute or modal, because under these terms it prescinds from a subject of eduction, information, or mere adhesion, and likewise from whether the dependence and intrinsic inability to exist separately arises from material causality or from another source, namely, from the concept of intrinsic modality, which implies an intimate fastening or adhesion to the subject. It also prescinds from whether that dependence is natural or essential, that is, whether it is indefectible only naturally or even divinely. It will be said: a dependence which is not founded upon the reception or passion of a form in a subject is not properly inherence but adherence or adhesion, which is a dependence not upon a subject properly so called but upon an intrinsic term. Yet every accident must properly inhere, must regard a subject properly so called, and must presuppose it by a priority of nature. I answer: inherence strictly taken does indeed signify reception in a subject that causes passively; but just as this signification is somehow restricted by all so that it may be proper to accident alone and distinguished from the reception of substantial form, so from another standpoint it can and must be somewhat extended so as to belong to every accident.

51. Certainly, given the common opinion that a transient action is not really distinguished from passion, and therefore is not received in the agent, action as action, insofar as it formally differs from passion and constitutes a different predicament, inheres in no subject causing passively; for insofar as

it inheres in the patient, it is formally not action but passion. On the other hand, it does not inhere in the agent, nor can it be passively caused by its own term, as is evident. Nevertheless, action thus taken, at least when it is the production of an accident, has the true entity of a physical accident, although with respect to the agent it is called only a logical accident. It has, I say, the entity of a physical accident for no other reason than because it exists wholly for the sake of its term, in which it exists by intimate adhesion with an inability to exist separately. We therefore say the same of the creation of an accident taken really, for which the term serves as the subject "in which"; for the term is not said to be in the action, but conversely. The term can, however, be compared with the action as a subject not only of "adhesion" but also of "information," which is properly a subject and, as we saw in Physica, tr. 1, disp. 2, c. 2, does not from its concept require a priority of nature or causality, but at most a logical priority, or a priority in the consequence of subsisting, with respect to this individual form.

52. Accordingly, what stands formally in the concept of accident as such is dependence, or the inability to exist without a subject, under the terms proposed in n. 50. Because in almost all accidents this dependence implies passive causality, it has consequently received the name "inherence" or "inhesion"; but this name, as happens in very many other cases, is extended without impropriety to something besides that from which it was originally imposed. This may be further confirmed by the example of habitual grace, which in the opinion of many is not educed but created, and therefore does not depend upon a subject as passively causing; yet even in this opinion it does not cease properly to inhere. Hence the common definition of accident, "A being in another," and likewise the maxim, "The being of an accident is *inesse*," must be understood in such a way that "in another" and *inesse* denote, in every absolute accident and in every educible modal accident, dependence upon a passively causing subject, whether actual, aptitudinal, or exigitively according to n. 49, or even prescinding from both when the common notion of an educible accident is in question. But when they are applied to the concept of accident as such, they denote precisely dependence, or the necessity of existing within a subject, as explained in n. 50.

53. There are various divisions of accident. For 1º accident as such can be divided into absolute and modal; 2º into spiritual and material; 3º into natural and supernatural. I suppose the differences between these members to be sufficiently known from what has been said, both in this Disputation and often elsewhere. It can be divided 4º into complete and incomplete. No physical accident is a complete being, because from its primary concept it is

always ordered to composition with a subject. Substance, on the contrary, even created substance, provided it is complete in its genus, is called a complete being without qualification, because although it requires being subject to accidents, it does not have this from its quidditative or primary concept but from a secondary concept or from a metaphysical property. Nevertheless, although an accident is not a complete being, it is called a complete accident when it is perfect and consummated in its genus or species, for example, heat as eight degrees, or the quantity of a man. It is called incomplete when it is of itself ordered to the constitution of a complete accident; for example, in quality, the individual degrees of intensity, or in quantity the smaller continuative parts, can be called physically incomplete accidents. Physically, I say; for metaphysically an accident is called complete when it is placed in a predicament as genus, species, or individual; incomplete when it is conceived as a difference. Re-read what was said in Chapter 1 about the similar division of substance.

Division of Accident into the Nine Predicaments.

54. In the most famous division of created being according to the ten Categories or Predicaments, which originated among philosophers older than Aristotle, was adopted by Aristotle himself, and thereafter received by the other Wise Men in every age, in this most celebrated partition, I say, the first predicament is Substance; the remaining nine are accidents, and consequently they are as many members of a division applicable to accident as such. They are Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, Where, Position, When, and Having or Habit. Here it must be noted that predicament is sometimes taken for the entire series or order of essential predicates from some supreme genus gradually down to the individual; a pattern of this order, with regard to Substance, we gave in Logica, tr. 4. Sometimes it is taken for the supreme genus alone in each series or category. It must also be noted that, although Aristotle designated the predicaments of accidents by concrete names, namely, "quantified, qualified, etc.," he took these names according to their formal signification, under which aspect they signify the same as the abstract terms "quantity, quality, etc." Furthermore, the whole complex constituted from a subject and an accidental form, since it is one accidentally, is not considered a being of one predicament but of two, because a being capable of being placed in a predicament must somehow be one in itself; of this we shall speak again later.

55. In what sense this division of being into ten genera is immediate we already stated at the threshold of the Disputation, and Fr. Suárez explains it

more fully in Met., disp. 39, sect. 1. That it is very fitting and sufficient, or adequate, should rather be presupposed than disputed, out of respect for all antiquity. Nor should we linger over the many and various subtleties with which some attack it, several of which are proposed and subtly solved by Fr. Suárez, disp. cit., sect. 2. For, to use the example of Fr. Oviedo, just as it is not permissible arbitrarily to overturn the division of the year into twelve months against the most ancient and common usage on the pretext that the year could not unfittingly be divided into 24 shorter months or 6 longer ones, so too here. Fr. Suárez, cited sect. 2, weighs the various accounts of fittingness and sufficiency devised by authors. One seems sufficiently appropriate which derives the number of the predicaments from the number of questions or interrogations that can be made about first substance, that is, about an individual subsisting in itself, according to real or first-intentional being. For one can ask of any individual or *suppositum*: what is it? how much is it? of what quality is it? to what is it related? does it act? does it undergo? in what place is it? in what position? at what time? with what clothing or adornment? Nor will another question easily be given which cannot conveniently be reduced to one of these ten. The predicates, therefore, which answer the first question pertain to the predicament of substance, such as being a man or a tree; those which answer the second, to the predicament of quantity, such as being two cubits or three cubits; those which answer the third, to the predicament of quality, such as being white or hot; and so with the rest.

56. After this you will inquire whether accidents, by the very fact that they belong to diverse predicaments, must be really distinguished from one another; or more generally, whether the distinction of the predicaments from one another, substance included, must be real. The common opinion of our authors denies this with the Excellent Doctor, cited sect. 2, n. 21, where he cites many of the ancients, including Thomists such as Capreolus and others, who judge that a distinction of reason arising from a diverse mode of conceiving and predicating suffices. The proof is by induction. For "relation" is not really distinguished from things of other predicaments, as we showed in Logic. "Action and passion" are really identified and can sometimes be substantial, namely, when they are not distinguished from the union of substantial form. "When," or duration, is not distinguished from the substance of the thing and extrinsic time; and this time is not distinguished from motion, which in turn is indistinct from action and passion. "Position" cannot be really distinguished from the circumscriptive "where" of a body. "Habit or clothing" implies substance, for it is not artificial form alone that

clothes a man; and that very form is not distinguished from figure, which is a species of quality, or from location.

57. For this reason Aristotle himself teaches or supposes this opinion, both whenever he really identifies action with passion, as he does more than once, as we saw in Physics, and in the book of the *Categories*, where he places certain things in the predicament of "toward another," or relation, which he afterward places in the predicament of quality, and gives the reason in c. 1, "On Quality," at the end, saying: "If it happens that one and the same thing is both qualified and toward another, there is nothing unfitting in its being numbered under both genera." St. Thomas expressly holds the same opinion, not only in Opusc. 48, which is reckoned among the doubtful works, but also in Met., XI, lect. 9, at the end, where after asserting the identity of action and passion, he objects to himself that action and passion are diverse predicaments: "But it must be known," he says, "that the predicaments are diversified according to diverse modes of predicating. Hence the same thing, insofar as it is predicated diversely of diverse things, pertains to diverse predicaments." He adds the example of place, which under different considerations belongs to two predicaments, and concludes: "Similarly, motion, insofar as it is predicated of the subject in which it is, constitutes the predicament of passion; but insofar as it is predicated of that from which it is, it constitutes the predicament of action." Hence you see that many Thomists depart from the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas, whom the Complutensian Carmelites, Log., disp. 14, n. 49, cite and follow when they maintain that all predicaments must necessarily be distinguished from one another really, or modally prior to the operation of the mind.

58. But it is objected 1º: according to Aristotle, the predicaments are primarily diverse, agree in nothing, and are not mixed with one another. They are likewise real beings and therefore have diverse real essences, which cannot belong to one and the same thing. 2º It is a greater difference to differ in genus than in species or number; but things that differ in species or number are really distinguished; therefore, much more so those that differ in genus, indeed those that agree in no genus. 3º If a distinction of reason suffices to multiply predicaments, far more than ten could be numbered. I answer to 1º: predicaments are primarily diverse in that genus of distinction which they share, so that those which share a real distinction are primarily diverse really, while those which have only a formal distinction or distinction of reason are primarily diverse formally. For since a common generic notion cannot be abstracted from these insofar as they are formally distinct, they truly agree in nothing, that is, in no genus properly so called, but differ wholly from one another, see above disp. 1, n. 25, through formally

unmixed concepts. They are likewise real and truly have diverse and real essences, but not really diverse essences. Thus in man animal and rational are diverse and real predicates, but they are not really diverse, because the distinction and diversity are the work of reason. Likewise, truth and goodness in the being of an object specifying powers are, according to the Thomists, very diverse real objects and have essences so diverse that from them the intellective and volitional powers derive a real distinction and a very great real diversity; yet those objects are distinguished not really but by reason alone.

59. To 2º I deny the minor premise as regards specific distinction in the matter under discussion. For Aristotle places the same things under diverse species of quality. And St. Thomas, I-II^{a}, q. 49, a. 2, ad 1, says that passible qualities and figures, which pertain to the third and fourth species, pertain to the first insofar as they are fitting to the nature of the subject. A purely numerical distinction under the same ultimate species is necessarily real, or certainly cannot be a distinction of reason with a foundation; for it cannot be made by the intellect except through wholly similar concepts, and these do not make a distinction of reason except one made by the reasoner. But a numerical distinction which is not purely such, but conjoined with specific and generic distinction, is also found between extremes distinguished by reason, for example, between an individual action and passion. To 3º: not every distinction of reason suffices for multiplying predicaments, but only one which is taken from a comparison or relation to really diverse connotates and which, in addition, grounds diverse questions concerning first substance.

60. It should nevertheless be noted that although the division of the predicaments does not of itself imply a real distinction, neither does it exclude one. For at least four predicaments, namely, substance, quantity, quality, and where, are always really distinct from one another. Yet this distinction is gathered not from mere predicamental diversity but from other indications and is proved by other arguments. It should further be noted that all the predicaments of accidents imply a real distinction, at least an inadequate one, with respect to the substance or subject which they accidentally denominate, or of which they are predicated as accidents, although sometimes in themselves they have a substantial entity. For example, the relation of coexistence by which Peter is denominated as coexisting with Paul consists in the substantial existences of both; and therefore it is truly entitatively substance. Nevertheless, insofar as it denominates Peter relatively, it implies obliquely something distinct from Peter, namely, the existence of Paul, by reason of which the denomination

becomes contingent and accidental to Peter. Hence it follows that this coexistence, insofar as it is predicated of the subject after the manner of a relation, is extra-essential and does not belong to the predicament of substance, because it is not predicated as what the thing is, nor by it is the question "what is it?" answered.

61. Again you will inquire whether it is true, as is commonly said from Aristotle, that the predicaments are supreme genera, that is, that they have no higher genus common to all or to several of them. That substance and accident agree in no genus is established from what was said in disp. 1, nn. 53 and 54, concerning the concept of being as such; and the same considerations apply to the concept of created or finite being, which likewise transcends all the differences of substance and accident. But as regards the nine genera of accidents, if all are posited as entitatively distinct from every substance, it will be difficult to prove that accident as such is not a genus common to them all, because it is not readily apparent why it would not be univocal and non-transcendent. On our principles univocity is easily removed from what was said in n. 48. Nevertheless, it is difficult to show that physical accident, as abstracted from quantity and quality, is not properly a genus, for it is univocal, and furthermore its formal inclusion in the differences is not easy to prove. Hence many without hesitation assert that it is properly a genus. Indeed, the Scotists maintain that common being, at least finite being, is properly a genus with respect to all the predicaments, and that the latter are called supreme genera not absolutely but each within its own order or category. Nevertheless, it must be said with the common opinion that "physical accident" as such is not a genus with respect to quantity and quality, either because perhaps it formally transcends the differences, or because it cannot be signified by a simple concept or incomplex term but by one composed from two terms separately analogical. See Fr. Suárez, cited disp. 39, sect. 3.

CHAPTER IV.
On Quantity.

62. We have already said enough about the predicament of substance. Some things must now be said about the predicaments of accidents, and first about quantity, which properly or antonomastically is taken for corporeal bulk, by force of which one body is said to be greater or less than another and so occupies a place that it does not permit another body to be there at the same time. Metaphorically, however, "quantity of power and quantity of perfection" are also spoken of in incorporeal things, by which, namely, one

thing is rendered more active than another or greater in perfection, that is, better, according to Augustine's saying: "In those things which are not great by bulk, to be greater is the same as to be better." Therefore, concerning quantity of bulk it is doubted 1º whether it is an entitative accident, or whether it is really distinguished from the substance of a body. The Nominalists denied this, and all Atomists together with the Cartesians embrace their opinion. But the most received opinion affirms it with Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Scotus, whom Fr. Suárez cites and follows in Met., disp. 40, sect. 2. The chief proof is taken from the mystery of the Eucharist, where, when the substance of bread is absent, its quantity remains; and this both receives the other accidents, lest otherwise miracles be multiplied beyond measure without cause, as we argued in the treatise De Generatione, disp. 2, n. 90, and renders them impenetrable with other bodies, or incapable of being together in the same place.

63. It will be said 1º with the Nominalists: individual qualities identify with themselves their own quantity, just as substance does with its own; and in the Eucharist the quantity of the qualities remains, not that of the substance. Against this: either the quantity of the qualities prevents penetration with the quantity of the substance, or it does not. If it prevents it, how was it previously penetrated with the substance of the bread? If it does not prevent it, how in the Eucharist does it exclude a stone or another bread from the place? It will be said 2º: impenetrability there comes from the location or local presence of the bread, which is an absolute accident and remains without the substance. Against this: local presence is a mode according to common doctrine, and therefore essentially inseparable from the thing which it modifies. Who could conceive that, when the bread is absent, a real presence of the bread can be given? Moreover, if the presence of the bread is an absolute accident and renders the qualities extended and impenetrable, what does it lack in order to be quantity? It will be said 3º: there is no intrinsic impenetrability in those accidents, but God prevents penetration in order to conceal the mystery from the senses. Against this: this solution gives occasion for denying all accidents entitatively distinct from substance. Hence the Atomists eagerly seize upon it so that in the Eucharist, in place of true color, taste, and the other things which we call accidents of bread, they may substitute mere appearances or actions of God alone, which they call "objective actions." See Preliminary Dissertation to Physics, n. 32. But this consequence, or the absurdity of the position, is enough for rejecting that solution. Add that by a similar reply someone could with impunity maintain that created subsistence is essentially required for eating, walking, etc., or for having true color, figure, etc., by

saying, namely, that all these things only apparently exist or existed in the humanity of Christ.

64. It is objected: beings are not to be multiplied without necessity, but there is no necessity here, since corporeal substance could of itself perform whatever functions are attributed to quantity. I answer: perhaps no necessity can be demonstrated here by the light of nature alone. Nevertheless, the principles of Faith press the point. Philosophical arguments of no small weight can be added. For example, if quantity were identified with matter, it would also have to be identified with corporeal form, as the adversaries concede. But from this it would follow that matter and form could not penetrate one another, just as two matters cannot. It would also follow, contrary to the evidence of sense, that a man has less quantity than other bodies of equal dimensions and density; for he would have only the quantity of matter, not of form, since the rational soul identifies no quantity with itself. It may also be added that prime matter, like every created substance, must physically root some permanent property, and there is no other except quantity.

65. As regards the essence of quantity, Aristotle describes it thus in Metaph., V, c. 13: "A quantum is that which is divisible into the things which are within it, each or either of which is apt to be one and this something." By the name "quantum" Aristotle signifies the accident itself of which we are speaking, which by reason of itself is divisible into things existing within it, etc.; and therefore it is called not only quantity but a quantum. There are certain forms which denominate not only their subjects but also themselves: for a production is productive, a union is unitive, and a local presence is present. The sense of the proposed description, as it is commonly explained, is that quantity is an accident which by natural motion or by the action of a natural agent, say cutting or tearing, can be immediately and intrinsically divided into parts which it contains within itself joined by integral union, in such a way that after division each part is apt to exist separately after the manner of a whole; such is the quantity of water, wood, stone, etc. This description, however, does not present the primary concept of quantity, as all acknowledge; for divisibility by physical motion presupposes extension and impenetrability. Therefore the essential concept or primary formal effect of quantity is further investigated, in which the others are rooted. It is certain that the formal effect of quantity is "quantified," just as that of whiteness is "white" and that of heat "hot." But a clearer and quidditative notion of this "quantified" is desired.

66. Quantity has various functions. For 1º it extends its own parts and those of its subject in relation to place, so that each occupies its own part of

place and is not in the place of another. 2º It is apt to be divided in a physical manner into integral parts according to the description just given, and similarly renders the subject divisible. 3º It has the being of a measure, actively and passively, insofar as it is apt for us to measure the magnitude of another quantum by comparison or application of it, and for itself to be measured by another quantity. 4º It is the proximate and immediate subject of qualities. 5º It is impenetrable with another quantity and renders its subject impenetrable with another quantum, that is, naturally incapable of being together in the same place. Of these functions, taken proximately or formally, the first is not essential to quantity, because quantity can exist without it, at least by divine power, as happens in the Eucharist, where Christ's body has quantity without the local extension of its parts. Hence neither the second nor the third is essential, because each presupposes local extension. No one doubts that the fourth is a certain secondary function. Of the fifth we shall speak later.

67. The Thomists recognize another function, and indeed a primary one, in quantity, namely, "extension of parts in relation to themselves," or, what among them signifies the same, "in relation to the whole," or "in the whole." This extension consists in quantity's having integral parts united, not according to their whole selves, but according to their extremities, and in the same thing happening to substance by reason of quantity. They therefore maintain that the essence of quantity consists in this extension of its parts and that its primary formal effect is that substance have extension in relation to itself. There are, however, two opinions of the Thomists concerning this formal effect, according to the College of St. Thomas at Alcalá, Log., q. 8, a. 4. The first is that substance formally has from quantity not only the union of its parts but also their entitative distinction, so that in material substance, if quantity is prescinded from or excluded, there are no parts, but merely a simple and indivisible entity. Indeed, according to several Thomists, material substance even under quantity does not have substantially distinct parts, but only denominatively from the parts of quantity, although it is said to have substantial parts because the denominated thing is substance. Hence they maintain that the whole entity of substance is in reality under the whole quantity and whole under every part of quantity, just as the rational soul is whole in the whole body and whole in the foot, etc. The second opinion is that material substance of itself has really distinct parts, but formally receives from quantity the integral union of its parts according to their extremities; this union is extension in relation to itself and is identified with quantity.

The Reported Opinions Are Rejected.

68. The first of the opinions just reported, which not a few moderns hold together with the older Thomists, is effectively impugned by our authors with Fr. Suárez, cited disp. 40, sect. 4, and also by several modern Thomists, especially the College of St. Thomas at Alcalá, that is, M. Bayona, loc. cit., §§ 2 and 3. And first, that the whole substance of the matter of a man, for example, should be in the foot and in every other part of the body seems impossible to defend. For one reason, because God can, as the adversaries concede, annihilate the matter of the foot while the rest of the body remains. But then, if that matter is the same as the matter of the whole body, the whole will be annihilated and at the same time the whole will exist; and therefore the whole will simultaneously be and not be, no differently than if the soul of the human foot were annihilated while the soul of the rest of the body remained, the same soul would simultaneously be and not be. For another reason, because the matter of the foot can also be locally separated from the matter of the head and exist apart. But separability is for everyone an evident sign of real entitative distinction, since it implies that a thing be separated from itself and exist without itself. Separation does not cause this distinction but presupposes it; otherwise from the separation of the rational soul from the body, or of quantity from matter, or of one part of quantity from another, a pre-existing real distinction could not be inferred. Again, because the matter of a man would be no less simple and indivisible than the rational soul, nor the latter less composite than the former, for neither would have an entitative distinction of parts and both would have it denominatively, since both receive the parts of quantity, which according to the Thomists is received in the whole composite. Hence the Thomists will also say in vain that the soul of a horse is indivisible in comparison with the soul of a serpent or the form of fire, since in each there will be parts only denominatively from quantity, which is equally received in each. I omit other difficulties which will readily occur to anyone.

69. Next, that material substance, although not whole under every part of quantity, nevertheless has an entitative distinction of parts not from itself but formally from quantity, is rejected 1º because two parts of water, for example, are substantially distinguished, since one can be substantially annihilated while the other substantially exists. Therefore they are not formally distinguished by quantity, for whatever is had through quantity is had accidentally. 2º Because those parts are so distinguished that one really

is not the other. But they have this through themselves and not through something superadded, for everything through itself is what it is and is not something other than itself. What is more certain than that every thing by itself is distinguished from everything that is not itself, and that it identifies with itself its transcendental unity and singularity, whose formal effect is to distinguish the thing from every other? If you desire St. Thomas's testimony in so clear a matter, you will find not a few passages. As a specimen read De potentia, q. 9, a. 7, corp., where he says: "Distinction consists in this, that one thing is not another, which they do not have from anything superadded."

70. 3º Because if God conserved matter without quantity, which the adversaries admit can be done, nor could it probably be denied since quantity, which is no more connected with matter than conversely, is conserved without matter in the Eucharist, matter would still have really distinct parts. Therefore their distinction does not formally come from quantity. The antecedent is proved: because if it did not have such parts, then the matter of the foot, which previously was really distinguished from the matter of the head, would become really identified with that very matter; such matter therefore would be what it was not, and consequently would not be itself, or would simultaneously be itself and not itself. Suppose quantity were removed from all waters in the World, even waters that are divided. Then according to this opinion, astonishing to say, the whole substance of all waters would be one and the same really simple entity. But I ask whether it would be the same as before. If you deny this, you destroy the hypothesis, namely, that the substance which now exists is separated from quantity. If you affirm it, how then is it now not what it was, namely, a multiple individual with mutual independence in existing? How does the substance of the sea, which previously did not have identity with the substance of a river, now have it? How does it now identify with itself the new predicate of real simplicity, which it previously lacked and which is proper to immaterial substance?

71. It will be said: it has parts at least in potency. Against this: to have parts in potency, according to you, is nothing other than actually to have no distinction of parts, while being able to receive it from quantity. It is therefore truly simple in act and again identifies with itself an actual simplicity which it lacked. Hence it will become a perfect and complete Universal existing in reality, since it will actually be one simple nature containing many in potency, or capable of being really multiplied into several individuals of the same name and essence, whose comparison is not an actual but a potential whole. Hence it will differ in nothing from Plato's idea. Finally, if it is once admitted that several individuals or several parts of

material substance have of themselves an indifference either to be really distinguished or to be identified, and to be either one simple entity or several really distinct entities, nothing will be secure in the distinction of things. And anyone who says that all Angels can be really identified if a certain unnamed accident is absent from them, or that the nature of Gabriel, although actually simple, can be divided into parts by means of some accident unknown to us, could not be refuted by any metaphysical principle.

72. The second opinion, held by Prado, Aguirre, Bayona, Palanco, and most recent Thomists, is rejected 1º because the parts integrating one substance are united substantially, or by a substantial union. Therefore their union neither consists in quantity nor proceeds formally from it. The antecedent is proved: substance, as integrally composite, is one in itself, or, what amounts to the same, one without qualification in the genus of substance. But such a unity cannot be constituted from parts accidentally united, or through an accidental union. Therefore, etc. The major premise belongs to St. Thomas, I-II^{a}, q. 17, a. 4, corp., who says: "Whatever things are one according to substance are one without qualification and many in a qualified respect; thus a whole in the genus of substance composed from its parts, whether integral or essential, is one without qualification in the genus of substance, for the whole is a being and substance without qualification, whereas the parts are beings and substances in the whole." This is also evident from common sense, for who doubts that a man or horse, as integrated from its members, is one in itself? The minor premise is undeniable, for a unity in itself by unity of composition is constituted from the composition or union itself, as is evident. But one in itself in the genus of substance cannot be constituted from substance and accident, as is likewise certain; otherwise the predicaments would not be unmixed, but a thing of one predicament could be formally constituted by something pertaining to another precisely as such.

73. 2º Because if integral union, or, what is the same, continuative union, consists in quantity, it will be impossible to conceive matter without quantity or not constituted through quantity. For if matter by reason of itself has really distinct parts, as these authors concede, it has, taken as a whole, parts as quantity has, as is clear. Therefore, given the Aristotelian continuum, which all Thomists embrace, matter has parts divisible to infinity, so that no division can ever be made or conceived which reaches indivisibles; for such a division occurs only in the Zenonian continuum. Just as, therefore, it is impossible to conceive any quantity, however small, as not consisting of parts united continuatively and into which it can be divided, so too with matter. Hence, if the parts of matter insofar as united include

quantity, matter not constitutively including quantity will be inconceivable. The objection is pressed: matter can be conserved by God without quantity, as the opponents admit. Therefore, would some parts of matter then be united to one another, or none? If you say the first, they can therefore be united continuatively without quantity. If the second, then all the parts would be reduced to atoms, or to mere indivisibles of substance; for if they were still divisible they would certainly contain particles united to one another. Therefore matter in the integral line is primordially composed from mere indivisibles, and consequently so is quantity, for to one atom of matter there corresponds only an atom of quantity.

74. 3º Because the rational soul informs matter prior to quantity according to the Thomists, but it cannot inform parts of matter not united to one another. Hence as soon as a finger is cut off it ceases to inform it. Likewise, God could conserve the soul united to matter without quantity, in which event the parts of matter, if they did not retain integral union, would be positively or privatively divided and therefore would be numerically distinct matters. Yet according to the Thomists the same substantial form cannot, even by divine power, simultaneously inform several matters. It will be said from Bayona, or the College of St. Thomas at Alcalá: the parts of matter antecedently to quantity, although not immediately united to one another, are mediately united, or united in a third thing, because they are all united to one and the same existence, which is compared to them as act to potency. Against this: according to the Thomists the soul is united to matter prior to existence, as we noted in the preceding disp., n. 85; and on their principles matter must receive form before existence, since it neither receives existence nor is capable of it except through form. Therefore, prior to existence the soul already informs parts of matter united neither immediately to one another nor in a third thing. Moreover, the same difficulty presses concerning existence itself: how can one existence inform or actuate parts of matter which are not united? If it can do so because it unites them actually with itself although not with one another, the rational soul will be able to do the same without recourse to a superadded existence.

75. For the first opinion St. Thomas is objected, who in Quodlib. IX, a. 6, says: "Diversity of parts cannot be understood in matter unless division is understood, nor division unless dimension is understood, because when quantity is removed substance remains indivisible, as is said in Physic. I." He has something similar in I^{a}, q. 50, a. 2, and Contra Gentiles IV, c. 65. Indeed the Holy Doctor seems plainly to teach what is harsher in that opinion, for in III^{a}, q. 76, a. 3, he says: "It is manifest that the whole nature of substance is under every part of the dimensions under which it is contained, just as

under every part of air there is the whole nature of air, and under every part of bread the whole nature of bread." And from this he infers that Christ's body, because in the Eucharist it exists after the manner of substance, is whole under every part of the species of bread. I answer: in the first passage St. Thomas intends only that matter, when quantity is removed, remains indivisible by cutting or another physical motion, because a motion of this kind is exercised only upon quantified matter. Hence he denies only that parts of matter which can be cut or dissolved by physical motion can be understood without dimension. Or, as others explain, St. Thomas speaks of quantity taken not formally but radically, that is, of the order to quantity, which order is identified with matter and constitutes it in the being of body, as we said elsewhere. Accordingly, if it is mentally removed, divisibility or distinction of parts cannot be understood in matter, because incorporeal substance is not divisible.

76. In the other passage from III[a], the Holy Doctor takes the nature of substance not in the individual but in the species, namely, insofar as it underlies the specific concept or essential definition. In this sense we commonly say that the whole human species is intensively preserved in each individual and that the whole definition of homogeneous substance is verified of each integral part, for example, the whole definition of water of every drop, and the whole definition of bread of every crumb. This sense is evident because the Angelic Doctor asserts the same of divided parts. For immediately after the words objected against us he adds: "And this indifferently, whether the dimensions are actually divided, as when air is divided or bread is cut, or are actually undivided but divisible in potency." Could it have entered St. Thomas's mind that when bread is divided into two pieces, one of which remains in Europe while the other is carried to India, the same physical and individual substance of bread exists in both places, just as the same individual body of Christ exists under each fragment of a divided host? Could not one portion of the bread be eaten or converted into Christ's body while the other remains? Would the same individual substance then be simultaneously existing and destroyed? Therefore in examples an exact similarity is not sought, but a certain proportion; nor by that comparison does St. Thomas intend anything except that the whole individual body of Christ exists under every part of the species, just as the whole species of substance exists under every part of the dimensions.

77. For the second opinion St. Thomas is also objected, since he says more than once that the order of parts in the whole belongs to the notion of quantity, and this order consists in the integral union of the parts. It is likewise objected that the composition of integral parts, since it is not from

act and potency, is not substantial and consequently consists in some accident, which is nothing other than quantity. This is confirmed because if such composition were substantial it would be understood in matter prior to form; hence the first composition would not be from act and potency, contrary to Aristotle, Metaph. VIII, t. 8. I answer to 1º: the order of parts in the whole which formally proceeds from quantity is not the order of union among the parts of substance, although it is connected with and presupposes that union, just as quantity presupposes its subject. Rather it is the exigency of having such an order of presence in place as is the order of union of the parts, for example, in the human body, namely, so that the presence of the neck immediately follows the presence of the head, the presence of the chest follows that, etc. Quantity has this exigency in itself by reason of its parts and their union, and in the genus of formal cause communicates the same to substance, which already possesses its substantially united parts.

78. To 2º: not every substantial composition must be from act and potency, but only that from which results a physical nature essentially composite. Nor must such a composition be first except by primacy of dignity or in the order of intention. For since matter has its essence prior to form and, according to Aristotelian principles, cannot moreover be understood without continuity of parts, which is integral composition, this composition must precede in matter the composition with form.

79. It is replied: by the very fact that the parts of substance are united only according to their extremities they already have extension, they are already outside one another, and they already resist penetration, because an extremity is that by which one part excludes another from its place. I answer: they have entitative extension, consisting in this, that one part is not another and that both are not united according to their whole selves; but they do not have quantitative extension because they do not exclude mutual penetration. They are also outside one another if "outside" signifies that they are not identified or united according to their whole selves; but not if it denotes an immediate exigency to occupy distinct places. It is false that they resist penetration, just as it is false that one extremity of substance, apart from quantity, excludes another from its place. For this belongs intrinsically to the extremities of quantity and is communicated from quantity to substance. In general, penetration or impenetrability must not be confused with union or lack of union; for two bodies can penetrate without union and be integrally united without penetration.

The True Opinion.

80. It must therefore be said with the common opinion of our authors that the primary concept of quantity consists in its being "an absolute accident naturally impenetrable with another of the same nature." Hence its principal formal effect will be to render its subject naturally impenetrable with another quantum. The Excellent Doctor in reality holds this, cited disp. 40, sect. 4, n. 15 sqq. This explanation prescinds from the possibility or impossibility of indivisible quantity and can belong to a point or atom if a Zenonian composition of the continuum is admitted. But if it is supposed with Aristotle that every quantity is divisible or consists of parts, as is commonly supposed, and therefore nothing is called a quantum unless it has parts occupying divisible space, quantity can be defined through radical extension in this way: "An absolute accident which by natural necessity requires the extension of its parts in place," namely, so that each occupies its own distinct place, "and communicates the same necessity to its subject and its parts in the genus of formal cause." But this radical extension, or necessity of extension, is impenetrability itself, because to require the extension of parts is nothing other than to resist their penetration. Divisibility, however, or constitution from parts, although it belongs to the essence of quantity, is not its proper characteristic, because it belongs in itself also to material substance and to most qualities.

81. Now that this concept is to be preferred and is truly essential, at least as far as we are concerned, since for the most part we do not know how to explain the essence of a thing except through some principal property from which the others as it were flow, is easily proved. First, because since the proper notion of quantity, or its primary formal effect, does not consist in the distinction of the parts of substance, nor in extension in relation to itself as this is explained by the Thomists, nor in actual extension according to place, nor in any other of the functions enumerated in n. 66, it remains that it consists in the aforesaid radical extension or repugnance to penetration. Second, because this repugnance is as it were the root of the other properties or effects. From it follows and as it were flows actual extension in place, from which follow the notion of measure and divisibility by physical motion. Third, because what we first conceive of quantity is that it bestows corporeal bulk upon substance, such as does not belong to a Spirit. This bulk cannot be better explained than through an exigency to occupy and fill space in such a way that it drives and expels a similar bulk from it, or does not

allow another to enter the same space without its own withdrawal and expulsion. This exigency is what we understand by the name "impenetrability." Therefore, although this name is negative in sound, it is positive in signification, just as "immortality, incorruptibility, immateriality" are, for they signify a positive power of resistance.

82. It is objected 1º: our definition explains the same through the same, namely, quantity through the power of repelling a similar quantity. I answer: quantity is not mentioned directly in the definition but obliquely or by way of addition, for directly there is placed "impenetrable," which is not synonymous with "quantified." Nor is this manner of defining to be rejected in first genera, which do not have a strict definition. It is objected 2º: impenetrability is separable from quantity, for in fact the quantity of Christ's body is penetrated with the quantity of bread in the Eucharist. I answer: impenetrability in relation to the absolute power of God does not belong to the concept of quantity, but only natural impenetrability, that is, an exigency of non-penetration which cannot be overcome by the powers of nature. This impenetrability is not removed, nor can it be divinely removed while quantity remains, and it truly remains in Christ's body even though by divine power it is penetrated with the quantity of bread. Thus the quantity of bread itself, although divinely separated, does not cease to be naturally inseparable from a subject. Thus demons and the souls of the damned, although in fact they are burned by corporeal fire, are truly naturally incombustible. Thus the highest heat, if by divine power it were joined with cold, would still remain naturally unjoinable with it. Here it must be noted that quantity communicates to its subject, just as it makes it actually quantified, so also actually impenetrable, that is, actually possessing an exigency of non-penetration. Yet it does not make it actually unpenetrated except by aptitude or exigency, because the denomination "unpenetrated" formally and immediately proceeds from the absence of penetration and is compared with quantity after the manner of a secondary effect which can be impeded by God. It must further be noted that impenetrability does not presuppose actual extension in place but rather entails it in an extensible subject.

83. It is objected 3º: one location or local presence is also impenetrable with another, yet it is not quantity. I answer: first, location is not an absolute accident but a modal one. Second, the repugnance of two distant locations to being in the same space is not so much impenetrability as immobility by reason of their essential affixion to distinct spaces. For if a Salamanca location could be moved elsewhere, at least by divine power, it would without a new miracle be penetrable with a Roman location. Finally, if a comparison is made between two numerically distinct locations of the same

body in the same space, they cannot naturally be conjoined by reason of superfluity; but if, contrary to the exigency of the subject, they existed at the same time, without another miracle they would penetrate and indeed could not fail to penetrate. On the contrary, two quantities divinely placed in the same subject would be violent under a twofold title, namely, of superfluity and of confinement to the same place, unless one prefers to say that they would require bilocation of the subject. Hence also two homogeneous degrees of whiteness cannot exist in the same place merely by reason of superfluity in the same subject; but if they existed without a subject, they would no longer resist penetration, just as two parts of quantity existing without a subject in the Eucharist do resist it.

84. It is objected 4º: material substance, for example, that of a horse, through itself and by reason of itself requires that its integrating parts not be confused with one another; therefore it also requires that they not be penetrated. I distinguish the antecedent: not confused with one another through undue union or absence of due union, I grant; not confused with one another through lack of extension in place, I subdistinguish: through itself remotely and mediately, insofar as it requires quantity, I grant; proximately and immediately, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. You have an example in the substance of a stone, which through itself requires descent toward the center, but only remotely and mediately, namely, insofar as it requires gravity, in which consists the immediate exigency of the center or proximate power of falling. Hence you will infer that local extension or penetration would not be due to the parts of matter if separated from quantity, but either could belong to them at God's pleasure without a new miracle. In the same way a stone deprived of gravity would not be bound to descend or ascend, or to be below or above, but could be anywhere without a new violence. Therefore, if the whole substance of the Ocean were divinely deprived of quantity, it could without a further miracle either be reduced to a point of space or retain the presence of its substantial parts in the same divisible space which it now occupies, and then it would not resist penetration of itself with other bodies.

85. It will be said: if substance then retained the extension of its parts, it would have threefold dimension and could be a measure and measurable; it could likewise be equal or unequal to another and have other things which are repugnant without quantity. I answer: none of these would follow properly speaking, that is, insofar as these things are said peculiarly of quantity. For just as not every number is discrete quantity, so not every extension in length, breadth, or depth is continuous quantity or quantitative dimension, but only that which implies bulk occupying space in such a way

that another similar bulk cannot coexist there. Likewise, just as a number of men lacking quantity would be measurable by unity and truly even or odd, although its measure and measurability, like its parity or imparity, would not belong to discrete quantity, so the extension of substance deprived of quantity could be measured by God or an Angel through another extension, or its own extension could be taken as the measure of another, and it could even be equal or unequal to another; yet it would not be proper to continuous quantity because it would not imply impenetrable bulk. Substance in that state, however, could not undergo anything from a physical agent, because neither impulse nor any other material quality is received in substance except through quantity. Nor could a man deprived of quantity be wounded, because his parts would not be divided by a sword but would coexist with it in the same place; nor could he walk or sense, because the locomotive power and the other material powers would be absent together with quantity; indeed he could not naturally understand, because from the absence of the imaginative power he could not imagine.

86. It will further be said: local extension is a formal effect of quantity, at least a secondary one, which cannot fail to presuppose the primary effect. I press the objection: for the substance of a stone to be moved downward or to rest at the center, or in a lower place, is a formal effect of gravity, at least a secondary one, which presupposes the primary effect. Therefore a stone, if gravity is removed, could not be moved downward by God or conserved at the center, which is plainly false. Likewise, absence of hatred concerning object A is a secondary formal effect of love concerning the same object. Therefore the will could not lack hatred unless it had love. Accordingly, local extension of the parts of substance proceeds from quantity after the manner of a secondary effect only when it is naturally necessary, or when it results from the natural repugnance of the parts to penetration. Otherwise the same effect, taken specifically, can proceed from other causes even though it does not presuppose the primary effect. Nor must a formal effect and its necessity always proceed from the same cause, as Bayona objects. For a stone's being moved downward proceeds formally from motion, but its necessarily being so moved proceeds from gravity. Fire's being hot proceeds formally from heat, but its necessarily being hot proceeds from the form of fire. The denomination of loving God proceeds formally in an Angel from love, but the necessity of loving from the beatific vision.

87. Here it must be observed that in a substantial composite there is only one quantity, and it is immediately received in matter, of which it is a property, see De Generatione, tr., disp. 2, c. 5. Hence substantial form and qualities do not bring a distinct quantity; consequently they naturally

penetrate with matter, but by the quantity of matter they are rendered quantified, insofar as they are rendered necessarily extended and impenetrable with anything else having a distinct quantity. For since the parts of form and quality are intimately united with the parts of matter and quantity, they must follow their extension and non-penetration. But because they do not have this by reason of themselves but by reason of the subject, they are not called quantified "through themselves," but "accidentally" or "through another." The rational soul alone is not quantified according to its entity by the quantity of its subject, but only according to the parts of union and presence in place, because it is neither capable of extension of parts, since it is a simple entity, nor rendered simply impenetrable even in the state of union, since it can simultaneously exist under distinct quantities, although it cannot accidentally penetrate with quantities wholly divided. For the same soul which penetrates with the quantity of the head simultaneously penetrates with the quantity of the foot.

CHAPTER V.

On the Species and Properties of Quantity.

88. Quantity is divided by Aristotle into continuous and discrete. Continuous quantity is that "whose parts are joined by a common term," that is, by physical union, from which an integral whole results. This union is called a "common term" by allusion to the points or indivisibles which join, which most Aristotelians recognize in a continuum. Discrete quantity is that "whose parts are not joined by a term." Continuous quantity is subdivided into permanent and successive, a partition which can also belong to discrete quantity. Permanent quantity is that "whose parts exist simultaneously in time," as in a man, a horse, or a table. Four species of this quantity are numbered, namely, line, surface, solid or body, and place, that is, extrinsic place; the notions of these species we gave in Physics. Successive quantity is that "whose parts pass away in a continuous flux." To this belongs time and likewise the manifold other species of successive motion, not only local motion but also alteration, growth, etc. Discrete quantity is subdivided into number and speech. Number is "a multitude measurable by unity," that is, knowable through unity taken several times; its species are two, three, etc. Speech is here taken for any articulate utterance, whose syllables we call long or short, and likewise quantified. Quantity is also generally divided into that "which has position," that is, situation or, as others explain, permanent union of parts, and that "which lacks position." To the former member

belongs only permanent continuous quantity; to the latter, successive continuous quantity and all discrete quantity.

89. But it must be observed that not all the things thus far enumerated are properly species of quantity. For place is a certain surface, to which it adds nothing besides extrinsic commensuration or adequation with what is located; and this commensuration consists in actual extension and is reciprocal between what is located and the place. Motion is not quantified through itself, but accidentally, or by reason of another, namely, space, the movable thing, or the term. The same must be thought of real time, which consists in the motion of the Heaven or the Sun. Fr. Suárez proves these points at length and explains them according to the mind of Aristotle in cited disp. 40, sect. 7 through 9, at the end of which he concludes that no quantity is properly and intrinsically quantity except permanent quantity. And indeed successive quantity would constitute a diverse species of quantity insofar as its parts were temporally impenetrable, that is, unable to exist at the same time. But this impenetrability, although perhaps it is found in the parts of some motion, and especially in the parts of continuous duration if this is modally distinguished from the enduring thing, is not properly quantity. First, because it does not render motion impenetrable with another motion of the same nature, for Peter's motion or duration can coexist with Paul's motion or duration. Second, because it is also found in spiritual things, as in the local motion or duration of an Angel. Finally, that speech is not, in the philosophical sense, whatever may be the case in the poetic sense, a species of quantity properly diverse from motion or number is proved by Fr. Suárez, disp. 41, sect. 3, and all agree.

On Discrete Quantity.

90. There remains a doubt whether discrete quantity, which is number, is properly a species of quantity. The whole dispute turns upon the real and physical existence of number after the manner of one being in itself. For if number independently of the intellect is a being properly and in itself one, it will properly be one quantity differing in species from continuous quantity, since it involves in its concept a division of parts which continuous quantity excludes. But if number prior to the operation of the mind is not a being one in itself, but merely a multitude of quantities divided from one another which can be numbered by the intellect, it will not properly introduce a new species of quantity but in reality will be only a multiple individual within the species of continuous quantity. We are speaking only of predicamental number, namely, that constituted from several quanta, for example, several

horses, or resulting from the division of continuous quantity, for example, when one water is really divided into several waters. For no one says that transcendental number, which is formed from beings of any genus whatsoever, for example, several Angels or separated souls, is properly and in itself one.

91. There are some who wish the name "discrete quantity" to belong to every number; but Aristotle and St. Thomas attribute this name to predicamental or quantitative number alone, and call this alone properly "number," namely, insofar as "properly" is distinguished from "commonly," not from "metaphorically," for choirs of Angels are not improperly nine, nor are the souls of the Apostles improperly twelve. It is roughly in the same way in which the name "vegetable" is properly applied to a plant and the name "animal" to a brute. Others maintain that for transcendental number a real distinction of entities without division or lack of union suffices. But although this pertains to a mode of speaking, the common usage of the Doctors should be followed. Beings really distinct, so long as they are physically united as parts constituting a whole one in itself, for example, body and soul in man, are not simply called several but several in a qualified respect; and so the Doctors deny that a number of beings without qualification is constituted from them in that state. For number without qualification implies plurality or multitude properly so called, whose concept includes actual division.

92. That discrete quantity or number exists in reality and independently of an act of the soul as one in itself, not indeed by unity of conjunction among the parts, since a pair can consist of two stones one of which is in America and the other in Europe, but by a unity of order, by which, namely, the parts of the number are coordinated under the final unit as under a form giving species to the number, such as the fifth unit in five, the sixth in six, and so of others, is a doctrine very dear to the Thomists. Although in Physics, when the existence of prime matter is treated, they sharply attack the resulting of one in itself from two beings in act even though substantially incomplete, nevertheless here they form one in itself from several beings in most complete act, for example, ten from ten men, or ten horses, or ten islands insofar as they have quantity. For, as Bayona says, cited q. 8, n. 160, although each of these units is a complete being in the genus of continuous quantity, it is not so in the genus of discrete quantity. As though one could not by the same route defend that the number of Angels, or even one of their choirs or one hierarchy, is one in itself, namely, because although individual Angels are complete beings in the being of undivided being, they are not so

in the being of discrete being, or in the being of a choir, or in the being of a hierarchy.

93. The foundation of this doctrine is 1º the authority of Aristotle, who divides quantity into continuous and discrete as into two species of this predicament; but nothing accidentally one is placed in any predicament. 2º The authority of St. Thomas, who says more than once that number is one without qualification or in itself; specifically in Met. VIII, lect. 3, where he says: "Number is one in itself insofar as the final unit gives number its species and unity, just as in things composed from matter and form something is one through form and acquires unity and species." 3º Number is the object of a real Science, namely Arithmetic, and therefore must be a real being and one in itself, because there is neither demonstration nor science of what is accidentally one. Bayona adds certain other arguments from reason to prove that number is really one in itself. If they have any force, they prove the same concerning transcendental number or concerning the concrete "quantified" or "hot" insofar as it includes substance and accident.

94. But for the resolution of this doubt it must be noted that "one in itself" can be taken either properly and strictly, or improperly and broadly. In the former manner only that is called one in itself to which transcendental unity properly so called belongs, namely, that which implies indivision and is opposed to multitude or division of parts, as is established from what was said in disp. 1, n. 130 sqq. In the latter manner "one in itself" is taken very broadly and is said of any whole whose parts are somehow ordered either among themselves, under one, or toward one thing even extrinsic to them, whether the ordering is natural, artificial, moral, or intentional. Read Aristotle, Metaph. V, from t. 8, and St. Thomas there, lect. 7 and 8, where you will observe that among things one in themselves are numbered, besides other examples, one bundle of sticks bound by a cord, one people constituted from many men, and one genus constituted from many species. In the same sense wine, oil, and all liquids are called one because all can be resolved into water; and many possessors of one field are called one because they possess one thing.

95. I say, therefore, 1º that number existing in reality is not properly one in itself in such a way that the notion of one which is an attribute of being properly belongs to it. The proof: number is properly a multitude, since it is defined directly through multitude. But multitude and the notion of transcendental one are undoubtedly opposed and cannot belong to the same thing unless one wishes the same thing simultaneously to be divided and undivided. "Multitude," says Aristotle, Metaph. X, t. 21, "is as it were the

genus of number; for number is multitude measurable by one." There St. Thomas, lect. 8, lit. h, warns that "absolute plurality or multitude, which is opposed to one convertible with being, is as it were the genus of number." Likewise, such multitude "signifies divided beings," whereas the one convertible with being "is simply called an undivided being." Likewise, plurality is called "as it were a genus" because, just as transcendental one is not properly a genus, neither is the plurality opposed to it. From this it is manifest that, for Aristotle and St. Thomas, number is not so one in itself that transcendental one can properly be predicated of it. And indeed who would believe that from two quanta, for example, stones most remote from one another in place, without any superadded thing or mode, a species of properly undivided being is constituted? Certainly a pair of separated souls is not one in itself in this sense, as all admit. But there is no lesser lack of connection among stones than among souls, nor any greater union or order of numerability.

96. I say 2º: discrete quantity, or number, is not properly a species of quantity diverse from continuous quantity. This assertion follows from the preceding one, as we noted in n. 90. And it is plainly gathered from Aristotle, Metaph. X, t. 5, where he says: "Number is a plurality of units," and from St. Thomas there, lect. 2, lit. g, who says: "Unity differs from unities as that which is uttered singularly from those uttered plurally; and there is a similar relation of number to unity, because number is nothing other than a plurality of units. Hence to say that unity is the measure of number is nothing other than to say that unity is the measure of units." Hence you have that unity and number, or, what is the same, continuous and discrete quantity, differ only as singular and plural of the same name, that is, as quantity and quantities, where there certainly is no specific difference, unless one wishes man and men, or one soul and several souls, to differ in species. Add that discrete quantity neither adds a new impenetrability, as the opponents admit, nor a new quantitative extension, because division, or lack of union, or even numerability, since it is equally found in incorporeal beings, is not extension of the genus of quantity.

97. I say 3º: in a broad or improper but customary sense, number insofar as it implies or connotes an act of the intellect, at least possible, counting this many units and no more, is one in itself; and in the same sense it is a new species of quantity. This is evident from what was said in n. 94, because number so taken has some order of parts, namely, either actual numbering or numerability, or aptitudinal numbering. Nor do the arguments adduced for the Thomists in n. 93 prove anything else. For first, not everything Aristotle placed in the predicaments is one in itself properly so called.

Clothing by which a man is clothed on all sides pertains to the tenth predicament; yet it cannot properly be called a being one in itself, especially if, as usually happens, it consists of parts not sewn to one another, such as tunic, cloak, mantle, hat, etc. Health and beauty also are numbered among the species of the predicament of quality, although neither is properly one in itself. Discrete quantity, therefore, is placed by Aristotle as another species of quantity by a certain analogy, namely, because in the being of number it is commonly taken and named as one, and so taken is called great or small, greater or less, equal or unequal to another, and can be diminished or increased and measured in the human manner. All these things are both proper to quantity as such and belong differently to discrete and continuous quantity because of the diverse mode of totality. For measurability, for example, belongs to number not through extension in place but through reckoning of divided parts. Yet that these things do not suffice for number to be properly one in itself or a new species of being properly so called is clear because all of them equally belong to a number of spiritual things, as will be evident to anyone who considers the matter.

98. Next, St. Thomas calls number one in itself only in a broad sense, since he plainly supposes that number is constituted in the notion of one through an act of the intellect, as is clear from the words, "Insofar as the final unit gives number species and unity." For no unit is final in a triad of stones, for example, except insofar as it is counted by the intellect in the final place. Nor does it help to say with Bayona, q. cit., n. 165, that in reality there is in a triad a final unit, not one which "determinately and absolutely" is final, but one which is so "vaguely, disjunctively, or conditionally," insofar as some unit must conclude the others, "and any one of them," says this author, "on the supposition that in numbering we begin from the other two, will determinately be final." This, I say, does not help but rather destroys the assertion of the Thomists. For if no unit of the triad is determinately final except on the supposition that we number it after the others, then before this supposition there is no number constituted in the species of three. The consequence is proved: no form indeterminate in the being of form gives a determinate species, such as the species three in the genus of number. But before that supposition, just as every unit is indeterminate in the being of final, so too in the being of form, because it is not a form giving species to the number except insofar as it is final. Add that the third unit, even if numbered after two, will not be final if another is added, nor then will three result, but four. Therefore it is constituted in the being of final by the negation of a further unit. But this negation does not consist in exclusion of a further unit from the state of existence, otherwise there would not today

be three stones in the World, nor in local distance, which has no bearing upon number. Therefore it consists in an act of the intellect counting this many units and no more.

99. Finally, the third argument of n. 93 must be answered by everyone. For an army is accidentally one, as are also a city or a Commonwealth; nevertheless Military Science and Civil or Political Science are given concerning these objects. Medicine regards health as its object, which, since it arises from the tempering of various humors and qualities, cannot properly be called one in itself. Moreover, there are various Arts concerning artificial being which can be taught scientifically, for example, Architecture or Painting. But how could a painted image, consisting of various colors, quantity, figure, and absence of redundancy, or a large house constituted from so many parts suppositally distinct, merely contiguous, and divided from one another both naturally and artificially, be called one in itself according to philosophical propriety? What is more familiar to Thomists than that one in itself cannot result from things of diverse predicaments, especially from substance and accident? Are not the matter and form of a house substance and accident? Is not the substance of fire ordered more to quantity or heat than wood and stones are to artificial form? Why, therefore, should one in itself result from these more than from the substance of fire and heat or quantity?

100. It must therefore be admitted that the common saying that Science is not concerned with an "accidental being" or with what is "accidentally one" is to be referred both to chance beings and to those which are one by aggregation without any order of parts, such as a heap of stones. For these are those which are most properly called accidental beings and accidentally one, and they are at the greatest distance from one in itself. But other things accidentally one whose parts have some order, whether natural, artificial, or moral, can be objects of Sciences and Arts when in their composite being they have something worthy of knowledge or serving human utility. These very things are sometimes called "one in itself," even by Aristotle himself, not because transcendental unity properly and without qualification belongs to them, but because they are intended in themselves by some Science or Art, and also because they are intermediate between one in itself properly so called and one by aggregation; and things occupying a middle between two extremes are customarily given the name of one in comparison with the other. See Fr. Suárez, Met., disp. 4, sect. 4, n. 14. Indeed, all the propositions and properties which Arithmetic demonstrates concerning numbers are verified of the number of spiritual things, which the Thomists admit to be accidentally one; and it makes no difference to arithmetical demonstrations

whether a number consists of quantitative or incorporeal units. Nothing, therefore, is detracted from this Science even if quantitative number is said to be accidentally one according to physical or metaphysical rigor.

101. Accordingly, number taken completely contains, materially, units existing in reality, but formally it is constituted by an act of the intellect counting this many units and no more. By this act the real units are extrinsically denominated as ordered and reduced into number. Nor for this reason is number a being of reason, unless every extrinsic denomination from an act of the intellect is included under that name, for it does not imply a cognition which fabricates but one which in order counts real units from the first to the last. This is clear in a triad of Angels, which one would undeservedly call a being of reason. Hence the object of Arithmetic is truly a real being, physical as regards its units and intentional as regards their actual order. Observe, however, that cognition does not constitute number after the manner of a part or of a new unit, but after the manner of an artificial form, which is called not a part but the order of parts, as is clear in the form of a house, statue, army, etc. When, moreover, the final unit is called the form of number, this must be taken in that broad and improper sense in which among us the form of a statue, a covering the form of a house, and a predicate the form of a proposition are called form; and indeed in such a way that the unit is constituted in the being of final by an act of the soul which first numbers the others and stops at it. For this reason, according to the variation of that act, it is rendered diverse in the being of form, namely, now fifth, now sixth, etc., with negation of a further unit; hence it can give species to diverse numbers.

102. Observe further that one who first numbers units does not presuppose or find a number except aptitudinally, for to number is the same as to reduce into number, or to give the units the actual order and form of number. Hence only reflexive cognition, which presupposes numbering, finds the number already formed. Repeat the example of transcendental number. Finally, observe that although it is commonly said that what is accidentally one cannot be defined by one definition because it does not have one essence, this must be understood of one definition explaining the physical nature of the individual parts. It is otherwise with one definition declaring what results from all the parts collected in such a mode and order, especially if the parts in the being of the collection have an essence customarily regarded as one and signified by one name. Thus one definition cannot explain what stones, wood, nails, and the other constituents of a house are physically, but it can explain what results from all of them collected according to architectural order into one customary whole called a

"house." The same is clear in the definition of a commonwealth, city, army, and even transcendental number. By the example of this number you will easily object to and solve whatever may be brought against the doctrine thus far handed down.

On the Properties of Quantity and Its Predicamental Coordination.

103. Among the properties of quantity can be numbered those which are otherwise called secondary effects, namely, actual extension of the parts in place and their actual non-penetration with another quantum; likewise proximate divisibility by physical motion; and the notion of measure, taken both actively and passively, insofar as it signifies the aptitude of extended quantity to be assumed as the measure of another and to be measured by another. To these can be added the passive capacity for receiving qualities. Moreover, three other properties are numbered by Aristotle. 1º Not to have a contrary, that is, not to be capable of being expelled from a subject by another positive form which has an opposite function concerning the same subject. 2º Not to admit more and less, namely, intensively, because impenetrability in relation to all the powers of nature, which belongs to the concept of quantity, cannot grow intensively. 3º To be equal or unequal, namely, in aptitude, insofar as one quantity, even if supposed to exist alone, is of itself apt to coexist with another having more, less, or just as much extension. Nevertheless, not all these are properties in the fourth mode, for almost all can be found in things other than quantity, although their names, especially "extension, measure, and equality," have their first imposition from quantified things.

104. As regards predicamental coordination, quantity, insofar as it abstracts from continuous and discrete, can be called the supreme genus because, although it is not univocal in logical or metaphysical rigor, it is customarily or mathematically taken as univocal. It can then be divided into continuous and discrete as into the first subaltern species, of which the former is subdivided into line, surface, and body, and the latter into all the species of numbers. Thus through either one a series or tree can easily be formed after the likeness of that which we gave for the predicament of substance in Logic. But if you take genus for a predicable strictly univocal and containing under itself species properly so called, then only undivided and permanent quantity will here be the supreme genus, containing under itself no other species besides line, surface, and body, which are considered ultimate physical species, although mathematically subdivided into others.

Nor is it absurd that under some supreme genus there are immediately contained ultimate species, as Fr. Suárez notes, cited disp. 40, sect. 4, n. 8, for nothing follows from this against the concept of genus, which will then be supreme negatively, or by negation of a higher genus.

105. It will be said: line, surface, and body, in the opinion of Zeno, are not physically diverse species of quantity. Indeed, even in the Aristotelian continuum some deny that there are really lines or surfaces truly indivisible as regards breadth or depth, and therefore maintain that those three species are only diverse mathematical acceptions of the same quantity. Nor do Aristotelians who recognize real lines and surfaces easily preserve specific diversity, since the extension of a line is included in a surface and that of a surface in a body. I answer: the common opinion of the Peripatetics with Aristotle recognizes real lines and surfaces in the continuum and quite suitably explains the specific diversity of the three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth, as may be seen in Fr. Suárez, cited disp. 40, sects. 5 and 6.

106. If, however, one prefers to think otherwise, you can diversify the species of quantity properly so called in two ways. 1º If you say that an entitatively indivisible quantity is possible, not only after the manner of a Zenonian point, which, since it is the principle of a divisible thing, can be called divisible as that by which, but also after the manner of an integral accident which, although simple in itself, is nevertheless truly material, just as an equine soul is in the Thomistic opinion, and must inhere in a divisible subject and occupy extended space impenetrably. 2º And more easily, if you posit as possible or actually existing a quantity not intrinsically apt to receive qualities corruptive of the composite. Such a quantity will differ in species from the common quantity known in sublunary things and must be admitted in a celestial body if the Heaven is intrinsically incorruptible.

CHAPTER VI.
Some Points on the Remaining Predicaments.

107. We have said quite a few things about quality in various places of this Work. Nevertheless, we have not yet given its common concept according to our own opinion. Aristotle in the chapter "On Quality" declared it thus: "By quality I mean that by which things are said to be of such a quality." By these words he explained quality through the formal effect or denomination which it provides; and the formal effect is usually better known to us than the form in the abstract, just as man is better known than rational soul. But because "quality and qualified" differ little in clarity, just

as "quantity and quantified," or "whiteness and white," philosophers therefore seek another clearer notion of quality. Not all agree upon one, but what some approve others reject. To me this seems sufficiently apt: "A physical and absolute accident which follows form rather than matter." Here by "absolute" not all modality is excluded, but only what is purely such according to the explanation of the first mode given above in n. 24. By the name "form" is understood substantial act, prescinding from whether it is informing or absolute; and thus Angelic nature is included, which is usually called a separated and subsisting form. The verb "follows" must not be restricted to radication or natural due, but extended to some imitation or affinity, by force of which the nature of quality imitates, savors of, or reflects the nature of form rather than matter.

108. In this sense this explanation first distinguishes quality from quantity. For quantity is akin to matter rather than form, both because it is immediately rooted by matter as its property, and because it is immediately receptive of all material qualities. Since moreover it is not active except perhaps through natural resultancy or emanation, which also belongs to matter, it can be called, in the accidental order, the first subject and pure passive potency, just as matter in the substantial order. Hence there has passed into a philosophical proverb the statement that "quantity follows matter, quality form," concerning which see St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 7, and Physic. III, lect. 5, and elsewhere. Next, it distinguishes quality from the remaining predicaments because the others either are not physical accidents or are purely modal. Furthermore, there is no quality which does not have a greater affinity with form than with matter, either because it is specially rooted by form and reflects its character after the manner of a property; or because of itself it is instituted to perfect, adorn, or assist form in operating, which is also verified of Grace and infused habits; or because it has active power after the likeness of form; or at least because it participates the notion of act without participating the notion of receptive potency. Finally, no quality is a pure mode. For figure, which Aristotle numbers among the species of quality, is not properly a quality but analogically, insofar as a determinate figure, especially in living things, is due to the body more by reason of form than by reason of matter.

109. The division of quality can be manifold. For one quality is natural, another supernatural; one material, another spiritual; one vital, another non-vital; one proper, another common; one connatural or beneficial, another preternatural or harmful; one capable of intension, another not; one having a contrary, another not. Among corporeal qualities one is celestial, another sublunary; and among sublunary qualities one is primary, another secondary.

These species, like the preceding ones, have various subdivisions, either already given elsewhere or commonly known. For the convenience of disputants Aristotle divided quality into four two-membered or binomial species, giving each two names. In the first he placed "habit and disposition"; in the second, "power and impotence"; in the third, "passion and passible quality"; in the fourth, "figure and form." Fr. Suárez, Met., disp. 42, almost throughout, learnedly and accurately discusses the sufficiency and correctness of this division and its individual members. The sole or principal utility of this division is that the expressions of the Ancients may be understood.

110. Habit is not here taken for clothing of the body, for in that sense it belongs to the tenth predicament; nor for any disposition or manner of being affected, for in that sense it extends to every quality, indeed to every accident. It is therefore taken more restrictively and defined as "A quality difficult to remove from the subject." "Disposition" also can signify many things. For generally, according to Aristotle, Metaph. V, c. 19, "it is the order of a thing having parts," which order of parts, as Aristotle himself explains, can be "either according to place, or according to power or capacity, or according to form." The order of parts "according to place" signifies the same as "position," which constitutes a special predicament. The order of parts "according to form" is taken for the accidental coordination of the parts of a body among themselves according to the exigency of form, such as natural figure and due organization. The order of parts "according to power or capacity" is taken for an affection fitting to substance according to its various powers or capacities, or some one of them; and these powers, although indistinct from substance and not distinguished from one another except by reason or by connotates, are called "virtual parts." In this sense "disposition" can be said of any genus of accidents, but here it is restrictively defined as "A quality easily removable from the subject."

111. Power generally signifies capacity, aptitude, or non-repugnance for some function. But here it is taken for a natural and accidental active power, not just any such power, but one ready and strong. It is usually defined as "A quality by which nature enables the subject to operate," not in just any manner, but promptly and strongly. "Impotence" must not here be taken for the mere absence or privation of power but for a positive impediment or difficulty in operating, such as dullness of mind or weakness of bodily strength. Hence it is defined by many as "A quality impeding or retarding a subject from operating." More according to the mind of Aristotle, however, it is taken by others for an accidental power truly operative but weak, slow, or easily impeded from operating. Hence a sluggish intellect or weak sight is

placed in this species of quality not precisely because it implies an impediment to acuteness, but because it retains some power for operation.

112. Passion properly signifies reception of a form in a subject of sustentation or inherence, and thus taken it has its own peculiar predicament. Within this, by a special propriety, that is called "passion" which implies sensible alteration, especially when it is inconvenient for the subject. Here, however, this name is attributed to a quality which is caused by sensible alteration in such a way that it lasts only briefly, such as pallor from fear or blushing from shame. Hence passion here is defined as "A quality caused by sensible alteration and quickly passing away." But that quality which is caused through the motion of alteration in such a way as to be stable and lasting, or even one which causes passion in the senses, is called by Aristotle a "passible" or "passive quality."

113. Figure is here taken not for the actual position of parts in place, which is called "situational figure" and pertains to the predicament of "position," but for a mode of continuous quantity insofar as terminated, or insofar as having an extremity not united to another quantity. This mode, according to its variation, makes a body round, triangular, square, etc. Most maintain that this mode is really distinct from the extremity or termination of quantity and results from it. This, however, does not please everyone; indeed some place termination not in something positive but in absence of further union. Whatever the case may be, figure includes not only termination, or its mode, or absence of further continuity, but also implies the continuative union of the parts by which such quantity is constituted.

114. Form, as far as the present matter is concerned, is the same as the external appearance of a body, and is commonly judged not to be distinguished from figure except according to a diverse consideration. For the same mode is called figure when it is taken in the mathematical manner with abstraction from sensible matter or from the physical exigency of the subject, but form when it is taken in the physical manner in relation to the substantial nature of the body, especially in living things. Several, however, maintain that form is figure not taken in just any way but insofar as adorned with colors, for thus beauty or comeliness of countenance is called "form" in Latin. Others say that form is figure not insofar as it is a mode of quantity but insofar as it results from the termination of colors on a surface.

115. The question now is whether a real distinction is necessary among the members or species of this Aristotelian division. First, almost all agree that the two names by which each species is proposed do not necessarily signify intrinsically diverse qualities, except perhaps as regards intensity, but that one and the same quality can correspond to both names according

merely to an accidental variation of circumstances. Thus in the first species the same habit of virtue, when it begins to be acquired, is called a disposition because in that state it is easily removable from the subject; but when intensified it is called simply a habit. In the second, the same locomotive or visual power can, as disease approaches or recedes, be now sluggish and weak, now ready and vigorous, and can therefore be called now impotence and now power. In the third, heat or redness arising from a sudden alteration and quickly passing does not differ in species from lasting heat or redness. In the fourth, we have already said that figure and form, according to the common opinion, are distinguished only according to considerations that are quite extrinsic.

116. Next, as regards the four species compared with one another, or rather the first three, for the fourth deserves the name of quality only analogically, the common opinion likewise holds that a distinction of reason suffices for one quality, really one, to pertain to diverse species according to diverse formalities or reduplications. Aristotle and St. Thomas plainly suppose this, according to Fr. Suárez, cited disp. 42, sect. 4, n. 2. And given the notions which we have supplied concerning these species according to the common sense, the matter is clear. For example, the same heat can pertain to the first species insofar as it is difficult to remove from the subject; to the second, insofar as it is an operative power; to the third, insofar as it is the term of alteration or motion.

117. Nevertheless, Fr. Suárez, sects. 4 and 5, judges that these species can be so explained that qualities which pertain to one differ really and essentially from those pertaining to another. For every quality with respect to substance primarily and intrinsically belongs either to the line of operating or to the line of being. A quality belonging to the former line is either actual operation, when operation simultaneously has the notion of quality, as cognition and love do, or it is a proximate principle of operation. If it is a principle, it is either the first accidental power for some genus of operations, and thus is properly called "power" and constitutes the second species of quality; or it is a superadded power which determines, facilitates, or assists the potency in operating, and thus is properly called a "habit" and constitutes the first species. To this first species under the name "disposition" also belongs operation itself when it is a quality. A quality which belongs to the line of being is either a mode consequent upon quantity, and thus constitutes the fourth species, or it is an absolute entity, and thus is properly called a "passible" or "passive quality" and claims the third species for itself. Every quality is said to belong to the line of being which, although it has the power to operate, is nevertheless not primarily

and intrinsically instituted to operate as though this were its primary function, but to conserve, perfect, or adorn substance, or generally that substance may be well or badly disposed in its being by it. Hence the third species is extremely broad and embraces innumerable qualities.

118. From this doctrine, which is sufficiently fitting and reasonable, it follows that those famous four species, if they are defined in a metaphysical rather than a common manner, are really and essentially unmixed with one another. For to the first belong only acts and habits, including infused habits, of vital powers, and likewise intentional species, which are commonly included under the name "habit." These qualities cannot be reduced to the second because they are not potencies but either acts or superadded powers presupposing the first accidental power for the same genus of operations; nor can they be reduced to the third because primarily and intrinsically, or by their primary function, they belong to the line of operating. To the second belong vital powers and, if any such are found in inanimate things, qualities instituted primarily and intrinsically for operation, such as gravity and levity. Concerning the primary qualities, especially heat, there can be doubt, but Fr. Suárez denies that they are primarily and intrinsically for operation. No one would deny that these powers are intrinsically diverse from acts and habits, and also from qualities which do not thus belong to the line of operating. Finally, to the third belong the elemental qualities, colors, odors, and all the others which consist in absolute entity and are not vital acts, potencies, or habits, and therefore cannot be reduced to the first or second. I admit, however, that there are some difficulties in this whole doctrine. Fr. Suárez himself, sect. 4, n. 24, admits that the common manner of thinking of which we spoke in n. 116 can be sustained dialectically.

119. Concerning the predicament "toward another," or relation, we have already discussed enough in Logica, tr. 4, from c. 3, where we gave various genera and species of relations from which a predicamental tree can be formed. There also we warned that transcendental relation does not properly belong to this predicament because it transcends all predicaments under their proper concepts. For there is none which does not at least formally imbibe the concept of created being, which concept is inseparable from a transcendental order to the first Cause. Likewise every accident is essentially ordered to a subject, and every incomplete substance to its complement. Especially in this sense those beings are called relative which from their proper specific concept expressly imply an order to another and through such an order are defined and specified. Of this kind are the accidental powers of the soul, habits, and acts of knowing and appetizing, likewise all purely modal entities and the relations of the Divine Trinity.

Other beings whose specific concept does not thus expressly exhibit an order to another are called absolute. And in this way the customary division of Being as such into absolute and relative must be understood if its members are to imply things really distinct. For if it is understood of predicamental relation, it will both be unfitting for being in common and will not have members really distinct, but only distinguished by reason according to our principles.

120. Concerning "action and passion," which constitute two other predicaments, and concerning their various species, we spoke in Physics, tr. 3, disp. 1. Some exclude creative action from the predicament of "action"; some, substantial action, that is, action immediately terminated at substance; not a few, immanent action; some, even instantaneous or non-successive action. Similarly, by the same authors substantial, immanent, and instantaneous passion is excluded from the predicament of "passion." These points can scarcely be established or attacked by a firm reason. Creation was perhaps unknown to Aristotle, who with the other pagan Philosophers everywhere supposes without limitation the unshaken maxim: "Nothing comes from nothing." If, however, creation consists in a mode distinct from cause and effect, there is no reason why it should be excluded from the predicament, and the same must be said much more strongly of any eduction or passion which is purely modal. Nor is it an obstacle that some action or passion is a mode intrinsically substantial, because not every predicamental accident must be really distinct from every substance. An immanent action or passion belonging to the line of intentional operation, however, since it is not a pure mode or pure action or pure passion but a true quality with respect to the same subject, is fittingly excluded from these predicaments and included in the category of quality. It should be noted that every passion remains in the patient; nevertheless it is called transient when the patient is distinguished from the agent, because then it does not remain in the agent but follows a transient action.

121. Concerning "where and when," or "place and time," by which two other predicaments are constituted, we also spoke in Physics, tr. 3, disp. 2. We now ask concerning the form of the denominations of the predicament "where," by which, namely, a thing is denominated "located, or situated, or present here or elsewhere," whether this form is intrinsic place, that is, location, or extrinsic place, that is, the ultimate concave surface of the containing body. The latter seems to be gathered from the customary mode of answering the question "Where is it?" For when someone asks, "Where is Peter?" the common answer is given through extrinsic place, and not only through the immediate or proper place, for example, the immediate surface

of the surrounding air, but more frequently through the mediate or common place, by saying that he is in the field, in the marketplace, or at home, at Salamanca, in Spain, in Europe. This is also customary concerning immaterial substances which are not properly in place according to the Aristotelian notion of place. For when someone asks, "Where is an Angel?" the answer is "in Heaven"; "Where is the devil?" "in Hell."

122. Nevertheless, at least the principal form is always the intrinsic mode of location or presence of the thing. For Peter "to be at home" signifies the same as "to have his presence within the bounds of the house." Therefore it must be said that in denominations of this predicament taken in a moral manner, or insofar as they are used in human intercourse, the form directly is the location of the thing, while connoting or obliquely implying the extrinsic place. This suffices for the denomination to be called extrinsic, that is, not wholly intrinsic. But if the form simply necessary and by itself sufficient in the metaphysical sense for the denominations of the predicament "where" is sought, such a form is location alone, or the modal presence of the thing, because without it a thing cannot be anywhere; and with it, even if extrinsic place is absent, as in fact it is absent for the convex surface of the outermost Sphere, the thing will truly be denominated "located" or "existing somewhere." This denomination, since it is real and pertains to no other predicament, properly belongs to "where."

123. There is a similar question concerning the form of the denominations of the predicament "when," and it must be decided in almost the same way. For when a thing is said to "endure," or "to have endured today," or "yesterday," or in the preceding year, etc., the form of this denomination is duration, which directly signifies the intrinsic existence of the thing and obliquely extrinsic real time successively coexisting with the same thing. But if all real time ceased while the thing remained, there would still remain a form sufficient for the denomination "enduring," or "existing at some time," which truly pertains to this predicament, namely, the existence of the thing insofar as it connotes or obliquely implies some determinate imaginary time. This time, if duration is not a mode superadded to the existence of the thing, must somehow enter into such a denomination in order that it become contingent more or otherwise than the mere denomination "existing," for this latter does not pertain to a special predicament.

124. It should be noted here that these two predicaments extend also to Angelic locations and durations. Hence both location and duration can be divided into spiritual and material; or, what comes nearly to the same thing, location into definitive and circumscriptive, duration into aevum and the

duration of a corruptible thing. Each under either member can be subdivided into various species, either according to diversity of subject or according to variety of distance from fixed or determinate points of place or time. Two properties are commonly attributed generally to each. 1º "Not to admit more and less," namely, according to intensity. 2º "Not to have a contrary," contrariety being strictly taken for the greatest distance under the same genus of forms incapable of association in the same subject. For in a broad or less proper sense there is contrariety or repugnance of conjunction between yesterday's and today's durations, and between heavenly and infernal locations; and therefore motions upward and downward are called contrary because they tend toward contrary terms.

125. Position, insofar as it has a special category, is the "Position" or "Disposition of the parts of a body in place." From this disposition the whole body is said to have a situational figure, which we explain through the denominations "standing, sitting, lying," and similar ones. This position is really indistinct from circumscriptive location; nevertheless it pertains to a diverse predicament because of a distinction of reason and the usage of speech founded upon it. The distinction of reason consists in this, that location, insofar as it pertains to the predicament "where," is considered as making the thing be "here" or "there," with a determinate distance or proximity to the poles of the World or to other places; but insofar as it pertains to the predicament "position," it is considered only as bestowing situational figure upon the body. Common usage, moreover, has it that we speak of location or place without mention of position, and likewise that we speak of position both generically and specifically while prescinding from "here and there" and from the distance or proximity of the body to determinate places. Therefore one who is carried while sitting on a ship or horse, although he changes place, is not said to change position; and one whose feet remain unmoved but who now bends and now straightens himself, although he changes position, is not regarded as changing place. Hence also the questions "Where is he?" and "In what position is he?" are regarded as diverse, nor is the same answer given to both.

126. "Where," however, extends more broadly than "position," for the latter belongs only to bodies, especially heterogeneous ones, whether natural or artificial, such as a statue or house, and most especially to living things. Species of this predicament are standing, sitting, kneeling, lying, and many others of this kind. These can be taken as subaltern species because they are variable in many ways. For standing differs according as the body is inclined or not; sitting differs on the floor and on a seat; kneeling differs on both knees or on one only; and so of the others. Hence a certain

predicamental tree or little tree will easily arise. The properties of "position" are said to be "not to admit more and less, and to lack a contrary," whose explanation is the same as in "where."

127. There remains "Having," or "habit," which is the final predicament. Here it is taken not according to every signification of the verb "I have," which extends very broadly, but only insofar as it signifies the same as "to be clothed or adorned by something adjacent to the body," such as garments or covering arms, for example, a cuirass, helmet, etc. The denomination of this predicament can be proposed in two ways: 1º thus, "having a garment"; 2º thus, "clothed." In the former manner the denominating form is the exercise of having, or actual having and quasi-union of the garment with the body. In this sense Aristotle said, Metaph. V, c. 20, that "habit" is a middle between the one who has the garment and the garment which is had. In the latter manner the form is the garment itself, which after the manner of an extrinsic form, through its adjacency, as by a certain union, denominates the body clothed. Thus, when a body is denominated "having a soul," the denominating form is the having or union; but when it is called "ensouled," the form is the soul itself. Now the having or adjacency of a garment is nothing other than a twofold contiguous location, one of the garment and the other of the body. Although under the function of locating this belongs to the predicament "where," under the function of clothing or quasi-uniting the garment to the body it belongs to the category of "habit."

128. The most proper subject of denominations of this kind is man alone, because he alone uses clothing from need and the instinct of nature. Nevertheless, the function of subject can be extended to animals insofar as they are clothed or armed by human industry; likewise to statues clothed in the human manner; likewise to temples and houses, which are also commonly adorned with tapestries and curtains. Indeed, the denominations "gilded," "whitewashed," and similar ones are commonly reduced to this predicament when they proceed from one substance accidentally superinduced upon another after the manner of an ornament. Hence "habit" or "adornment" can be divided in many ways according to the subject or the matter from which it is made. It can also be divided according to end into arms and garments, and under either member various species can easily be assigned according to figure, workmanship, or diversity of the parts of the body which they serve. Thus shoe, breastplate, cap, etc., differ from one another and can be taken as total species both because of their lack of connection and because the whole man is denominated without qualification from each, as when he is called "capped" or "shod," etc. Hence a tree can be formed without difficulty, if desired. The property of this

predicament is said to be "to admit more and less," namely, through a certain improper or metaphorical intension, insofar as the same body, or the same part of a body, can be clothed more and more by the addition of garment upon garment.

DISPUTATION IV.
ON THE OPPOSITES OF REAL BEING.

The opposites of real being as such are reckoned to be absence of being and being of reason, not only because they do not participate in the true notion of being, that is, a true aptitude for existing really, but also because, from their proper concepts, if they have any, they exhibit a certain relation of contradiction or contrariety to the concept of being. Metaphysics, by its proper office, ought to treat of these, though secondarily, under much the same title by which Logic treats of sophisms, Moral Philosophy of vices, and Medicine of diseases. Their treatment is indeed exceedingly difficult, because these objects, being scarcely intelligible, with difficulty allow themselves to be handled by the intellect; but it is no less necessary, because without these shadows of beings the human mind can scarcely portray the images of things in their true colors.

CHAPTER I.
The Notion of Absence and Its Multiple Division.

1. The name "absence" signifies the same as "the non-being of a thing," whether the thing be possible or chimerical. Thus darkness is called the absence of light, because for darkness to be means nothing other than for light not to be. And since contradiction obtains between being and non-being, absence is reckoned the contradictory of existence. Now one absence is "virtual" or "inferential"; another is "formal" or "immediate." Virtual

absence is any positive entity incompossible with another, especially if it essentially implies the lack of it, as hatred with respect to love. Formal absence, however, is the mere non-being and mere lack of a positive thing. We are now treating only of formal absence; and in the present chapter we shall take it according to the common manner of speaking, as though it were an object conceivable in itself which in some way is in things. Whether it really is so, we shall discuss in the following chapter.

2. Absence can be divided in many ways. For 1º, one is possible, another impossible. Only the absence of God, and of each of His attributes or Persons, is absolutely impossible; for the absence of no creature is absolutely impossible, but only impossible upon a supposition; for example, the absence of an effect upon the supposition of the action, the absence of identity between animal and rational upon the supposition of the existence of man, and so in other cases. Yet an impossible absence is perhaps not mere absence, but something mixed from the being and non-being of a thing. 2º, one is contingent, as the absolute absence of any creatable thing; another necessary, as the absence of any chimerical thing, or even of a true form in relation to an incapable subject, for example, the absence of color in an Angel. 3º, one is absolute, another relative. I call absolute that which simply excludes a thing from the state of existence; relative, that which excludes a thing from some subject, or even from a determinate place. Thus, when a man has died, there is not absolutely an absence of the rational soul, since it simply exists; but there is one relative to the corpse, in which it is true that the soul is not.

3. But the celebrated and principal division of absence is into "negation and privation," than which no terms are more frequent in the Schools. Negation is not taken here for a negative act of the intellect, but for the immediate lack of a thing on the part of the object. In this sense "negation and absence" are synonymous, and are equally said of any "non-being." Yet negation is opposed to privation with the addition "pure," whether expressly stated or tacitly understood, just as vegetative with the addition "purely" is opposed to sensitive. Privation, therefore, is the absence of a form in a subject apt to have the form; negation, however, is the absence of a form in a subject not apt for the form. Thus in man the absence of sight or hearing is a privation; but in a stone it is pure negation. Hence a stone is not called blind or deaf, because these are names of privation, but purely non-seeing or non-hearing, both actually and potentially. It should be noted, however, that privation requires the existence of a subject; for a man, before he exists, is not called blind, unless perhaps with the addition "possibly," because he does not yet have a capacity for seeing, since he has nothing. Negation, on

the contrary, does not require an existing subject, nor one positively unapt, but is satisfied with one not apt, whether it be such from positive unfitness or merely from lack of existence. Therefore "non-seeing" is truly predicated of a merely possible subject, indeed even of a chimerical one, at least if the particle "non" is taken not infinitizingly, as they say, but purely negatively.

4. Indeed, negation can also be taken as though subsisting by itself without relation to a subject, as when we say that from eternity there is a negation of an Angel or of a man; such an acceptance has no place in privation. Hence, when negation is defined or distinguished through the incapacity of a subject, the discussion concerns negation insofar as it is compared with some subject. If it is asked whether privation, as such, is constituted through the capacity of the subject, the answer seems to be affirmative; because, if by the mind you set aside or prescind from that capacity, privation does not remain as privation, nor does it appear different from negation. It is therefore constituted obliquely through the subject, but directly through the absence of the form; and this suffices for its concept to be called absolutely not positive but negative. Conversely, the concept of beauty or health is not reckoned absolutely negative but positive, although obliquely it is constituted through the absence of excess. Yet if some being on the part of the thing is attributed to absences, the negation and privation of the same form will be able to differ through an intrinsic order to diverse subjects; just as through this order they are really distinguished and separable from one another, although they are removals of the same form. For this reason, when the privation of sight is not found in a man, the negation of the same sight is found in a stone.

5. And other differences commonly noted between privation and negation seem to presuppose this diversity. First, privation can admit of more and less in the same subject, insofar as there can be now a total, now a partial absence of a form having intensive or extensive latitude, for example, the privation of cold, which is less in lukewarm water than in the same water when boiling. This does not happen with pure negation, which with respect to the same subject cannot be increased or diminished. Second, privation strictly taken is always contingent, or can never be necessary, since it presupposes potency in the subject for the opposite form. Negation, however, can be necessary and be essentially required or founded by the subject. Third, privation can exist only of a possible form and concerning a real subject. But negation can be both of a chimerical form and concerning a purely fictitious subject. Fourth, negation can be conceived apart from a subject, from n. 4. But privation is inconceivable without connotation of a subject. Fifth, between negation and the opposite form no middle is given

with respect to any subject whatsoever; that is, of whatever the form is not predicated, the negation is predicated, and conversely, provided the negation prescinds from the subject's capacity and incapacity; for anything whatsoever must be either seeing or non-seeing, for example. But between privation and the opposite form, although no middle is given with respect to a capable and actually existing subject, one is given with respect to others; for a stone, for example, is neither seeing nor blind. Sixth, finally, privation can be a principle of generation, or of a body in becoming, in the manner explained in Physics; but not pure negation.

The Multiple Acceptations of Privation.

6. Since mention of privation is extremely frequent in Philosophy and Theology, its very diverse acceptations must be kept before one's eyes, so that authors may be understood. 1º, therefore, Aristotle calls that one of two positive contraries which is less perfect a privation. Hence, according to the Philosopher's mind, St. Thomas says in *Metaphysics* IX, lect. 2: "Of all contraries one is as the perfect, while the other is as the imperfect and the privation of the other. For black is the privation of white, and cold the privation of hot." Similarly, in *Metaphysics* VIII, lect. 4, together with Aristotle he calls the form of vinegar a privation of wine. 2º, privative names are sometimes said of a subject not so much because it does not have the form as because it has it badly or unbecomingly, as when a human face is called discolored or deformed; sometimes because it has little of the form, as when someone is called unteachable, needy, or naked; sometimes because it does not easily or properly exercise the functions of the form, as when one who neither easily nor properly speaks is called mute or tongueless. 3º, privation is sometimes called the negation of a form which is of itself receivable, but not in a subject of such a genus; as when we call a stone a dead thing, or say that trees are deprived by nature of sensitive power. 4º, when the subject is not incapable of the form according to the proximate genus, although it is incapable according to species, it is also commonly said to be deprived of the form. Thus they say that the mole is deprived of sight. Indeed, sometimes any negation whatsoever, when conceived as inhering in a subject, is honored with the name of privation. Hence the negation of division in being as one is said to be by way of privation.

7. 5º, privation is most commonly taken, as above in n. 3, for the absence of a form in a positively apt subject, whether the aptitude be proximate, remote, or impeded. 6º, it is taken more strictly insofar as it connotes circumstances of time, place, and others in which the form is due to the

subject. Hence an infant is not said to be deprived of the use of reason before the seventh year, nor is a puppy before the ninth day called blind. Generally, however, privation is most especially reckoned privation properly so called, particularly in moral matters, when it presupposes not only capacity but also the form's being due in the subject, or when the privation itself is undue; and it is reckoned morally greater the more either the privation itself is undue or the form is due. 7º, finally, it is taken still more strictly as connoting the violence of an extrinsic agent in the removal of the form. St. Thomas transmits all these and other less important acceptations from Aristotle in *Metaphysics* V, lect. 20, IX, lect. 1, and X, lect. 6. But the first four are improper, because either they directly imply something positive or they denote negation rather than privation. The fifth is proper and customary in the physical sense; the sixth and seventh prevail in the moral sense.

On the Return from Privation to Habit.

8. A common axiom, taken from Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VIII, c. 5, and elsewhere, is that "from privation to habit there is no return," where by the name "habit" is meant any form capable of being lost. He is speaking of an immediate return, without the subject first passing to another specifically diverse form besides the one which introduced the privation; and generally it is true of a natural return to the numerically same form once corrupted, because reproduction is not naturally possible. But as regards an immediate return to a form of the same species, it is not true in qualities which have a contrary, as Aristotle himself notes; for such a return to heat or cold commonly occurs. Nor is it true in qualities which arise without a corruptive change, such as acts of the soul and visual species, and also light, to which the air immediately returns from darkness. Nor, finally, is it true in all substantial forms; for perhaps air and water, or fire and coal, can be immediately transmuted into one another. It is therefore true only in certain forms which require determinate principles that are no longer applicable except after various transmutations of matter; thus naturally there is no return from death to life, from complete blindness to sight, from baldness to hair, etc.

I omit certain other minor questions concerning absences, which can be resolved from what will be said in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II.
On the Constitutive Principle of Absence.

9. Although all agree that by the name absence is signified "non-being," or "the non-being of a thing," there is nevertheless doubt as to what this "non-being" consists in. And the discussion concerns absence insofar as it is given in things independently of a fiction of the intellect or of a being of reason. The discussion likewise concerns formal and immediate absence, not virtual, radical, or inferential absence. There have been some who constituted absence through an act of the intellect denying the existence of a thing. But this opinion is commonly abandoned, both because, when no one is thinking, light truly is not on the part of the thing when it is lacking, and because to such an act there also corresponds its own absence or non-being, which cannot consist in another reflexive act unless one proceeds to infinity. There are therefore three celebrated opinions. The first identifies absence with some positive thing impeding the existence of the thing denied, especially with the decree of God willing that the thing not exist. Thus Fathers Antonio Pérez, Moncaeus, Cardinal Pallavicino, Gaspar de Ribadeneyra, and others cited by Fr. Quirós, disp. 107, s. 1. The second constitutes absence through nothing, that is, non-being; but to this non-being, or this nothing, it attributes a certain negative being, which some call "improper," consisting in its own intrinsic predicates, found in its own manner on the part of the thing apart from a fiction of the intellect, posited and removed in things when the thing's existence is removed or posited, truly distinguished from the thing which it removes, terminating cognition in itself, and conceivable by its own concept, though through a species not proper to itself but to the opposite being, because its whole or primary quiddity is the "removal" of positive existence. Finally, it is held to be the proper truth-maker of a proposition denying the existence of a thing. For this opinion Fr. Compton, Logic, disp. 18, s. 2, cites many; and indeed, if the accustomed manner of speaking is taken as it sounds, this opinion is the most common and the most ancient. The third denies that any constitutive principle of absence is given, or that any "being" truly given on the side of the object belongs to it, even negative or improper being, distinct from that thing which ceases to exist. This opinion is commonly embraced by our more recent authors, and among others is explained by Fathers Quirós, both in the place cited and in disp. 46, s. 2, and John Ulloa in *Prolegomena Scholastica*, disp. 7, c. 5 sqq.

The First Opinion Is Refuted.

10. That absence, at least contingent absence, does not consist in some positive created thing, whatever some may have said, is freely admitted by most authors of the first opinion; and it is easily proved, because the absence of any thing can remain when any created being whatsoever has been destroyed; and, if absences somehow are, the absences of all possible things in fact existed before the world was created. Those authors therefore have recourse to the divine decree efficaciously willing that a thing not exist. This recourse is refuted. 1º, because the decree or divine volition concerning the existence of light, for example, is not the formal existence of light but only inferential, as no one doubts; therefore neither is the divine non-volition the formal non-existence or absence of light, but only inferential. The consequence is proved both because non-volition no more removes light than volition posits it; therefore either both do this formally or neither does. And because the proposition "light does not exist" no more mentions anything divine than "light exists"; therefore, just as the latter is not immediately verified through anything divine, neither is the former. Otherwise the negative proposition would have a truth-maker infinitely more perfect than the affirmative; and since formal truth is constituted by act and object, the truth of the negative would be infinitely more perfect in the order of being.

11. 2º, because, if God's non-volition is the absence of light, it follows that there is more real existence in the absence of light than in existing light. Hence non-being will exist really more and better than being, than which nothing is more alien to common sense. 3º, because formal absence, if it can be given in things, is immediately excluded by the existence of the thing, which is its objective contradictory; but the divine non-volition concerning light is not immediately excluded by light, since it is more immediately excluded by the omission of that non-volition or by the opposite volition. 4º, because, if non-volition is absence, whenever there is no non-volition of a thing, the thing will be given. Hence, when a man sins by freely omitting a commanded act, whether the omission is pure or not pure, the commanded act itself will be given, for then there is no non-volition of it in God. 5º, because, once absence is placed in the decree, on the hypothesis that in God every free decree concerning the world were lacking, or that in God there were a pure free omission, whose possibility is disputed among theologians, it would follow immediately and intrinsically that the world existed, since

such a hypothesis formally removes the absence of the world. But the absurdity of the consequence is evident of itself. For how will the existence of the world immediately follow from God's decreeing nothing concerning the world?

The Second Opinion Is Refuted.

12. The opinion which attributes to absences some negative being conceivable in itself and truly distinct on the side of the object from every positive thing is commonly and effectively refuted by various arguments. 1º, because that "being" of absence, however much it is called negative, removative, or improper, will in reality be positive, since it is truly posited on the part of the thing and truly begins and ceases through the liberty of the first Cause; likewise it truly has intrinsic predicates affirmable of it, namely that it is really given outside God, excludes and removes its contradictory, is identified with itself, and is distinguished from everything that is not itself, etc. Certainly to such a negative being belong the quiddity and attributes of real and created being. For this being is opposed to a chimera and excludes contradiction from itself, and is now in potency, now in act, and accordingly now possible, now existing, and indeed with dependence upon another, or essential dependence upon the first Being. It also has unity, goodness, and truth. For there is one absence of one thing, undivided in itself and distinct from the absences of other things. Likewise an absence is often reckoned good, or advantageous and desirable, indeed often reckoned better and more desirable than money, for example, the absence of most acute pain. It is also true, or truly cognoscible, though not without order to the opposite thing, which likewise occurs in relatives; and although it cannot produce a species of itself, it could be known through its own proper species infused by God, in the way in which a corporeal thing is known through its proper species by an Angel.

13. Finally, absence can be divided into as many genera and species as real being is divided into. For one is "through itself," that is, outside a subject; another is "in another," or in a subject; hence one will be after the manner of substance, another after the manner of accident. And since absences are said to differ from one another according to the diversity of the things which they exclude, they can easily be distributed among the ten categories and have their own metaphysical grades in each. It may be objected that all these belong to absences improperly and abusively. Correct, indeed, if absences do not have that "being" which you assert. Yet if they do have it, what propriety is lacking here? Is not the absence of light properly

opposed to a chimera, that is, properly non-repugnant and not involving contradiction in itself? Is it not truly possible when light is present, and truly given on the part of the thing when light is absent? What is it properly to exist, except for that which previously was in potency or in the state of possibility to be actually given outside its causes? Certainly absence has causes; for heat causes the privation of cold, and a new form the privation of the old one; and the absence of light no less than light itself presupposes the first Cause and requires a free decree of God.

14. Nor does it help that some say that the "being" of absence is therefore not positive because it consists in removal, has no concept other than that of removing, and cannot be expressly understood except as removing. This, I say, does not help; for the being of a negative judgment also consists in the removal of the predicate from the subject, and the being of a non-volition of loving in the removal of love; nor can simplicity, immortality, immateriality, immensity, or impeccability be expressly understood except as removing something; and yet these are concepts of positive being. That absence has no concept except that of removal is false from n. 12, for it has other predicates truly affirmable of it. If you mean only that all its predicates are identified with removal, you gain nothing; for all the predicates of simplicity are likewise identified with the removal of parts, and so with the other examples just proposed. Add that by whatever route it is defended that absences are only negative or improper beings, although truly given in things as distinct from their opposite beings, by the same route the same thing can be defended concerning cold, blackness, dissent, hatred, non-volition, the form of a corpse, and other things whose office is to remove something more perfect.

15. 2º, because from this opinion it follows that infinitely many absences are actually given from eternity, truly distinct from one another and therefore truly constituting a multitude, since the absence of Peter is not the absence of Paul, and so with the others. But in this categorematic infinity of absences obtain the same absurdities which in Physics we considered against an actual infinity of creatable things. Indeed, an infinity of absences is much more absurd, since it cannot be prevented by God. God can indeed remove any particular absence; but He cannot cause infinitely many others not to remain, because He cannot produce so many creatures that infinitely many producible and unproduced ones do not remain. Hence God will never be able wholly to exterminate or drive away these infinite things as though they were swarming black flies; and whether He wills it or not, He will behold from eternity infinitely many contingent objects actually given outside Himself. If anything similar happened regarding the existence of creatures, it

would greatly and absurdly derogate from the independence, dominion, and perfection of God. Yet the necessity of coexisting with absences, as having a baser being, seems an even greater indignity to God, just as it would be more absurd that God were bound to coexist with a little worm than with an Angel.

16. 3º, because it also follows that the "negative being" of every absence will be immense, because it will be everywhere, or in every place, even imaginary. For since, for example, the absence of Peter not yet produced truly exists on the part of the thing, it is somewhere; and there is no reason why it should be here rather than there, since in every place it is true that Peter is not. Some maintain that there are as many absences of any given thing as there are places in which the thing can be and is not. But this is rightly displeasing to most authors of the second opinion, because, just as one thing has one being, so it has one non-being and one formal contradictory. Otherwise the existence and absence of the same thing could be given at the same time, one here and the other there; and the thing could coexist with its contradictory, indeed with infinitely many contradictories, since there are infinitely many parts of imaginary space in which it is not and can be. It may be objected: when a thing exists in one place, there is not in another place the absence of the thing but only of its location. Against this: at least when Peter is nowhere, his absence, since it is not nowhere and is no more here than there, will be immense. Again against this: when Peter is here, not only his location but his entity is here; therefore, when he is not here, there will be here not only an absence of location but also of entity. For Peter's absence is no less signified by "not being here" than his entity by "being here." Those who, to avoid multiplying the absences of one thing, constitute the privations of a form simultaneously given in many subjects capable of receiving that same form solely through absences of unions are to be refuted in the same way.

17. 4º, because necessary absence, for example the negation of a chimera or the negation of rationality in a horse, does not have some negative being distinct from every positive thing; therefore the same must be judged of contingent absence, for example, of light. The consequence seems legitimate because in both cases the whole or principal argument of the opposing party applies, namely that light truly is not on the part of the thing and, if negative being is removed, no truth-maker can be assigned for this act, "light does not exist." For likewise rationality is lacking in a horse on the part of the thing, and equally no truth-maker appears for this act, "rationality is not given in a horse," at least if the horse does not exist. The antecedent, however, is granted by many adversaries, and against many others it is

proved 1º, because, if that being is admitted, infinitely many necessary, indestructible objects, wholly independent of God's freedom, and at the same time immense and eternal, will be actually given outside God, namely the absences of all the endlessly many chimeras conceivable by us and, in each creature, the negations of the infinite beings from which it is distinct. The consequence seems plainly absurd; for if those predicates which are proper to God alone are repugnant to positive created beings, how much more to negative or improper beings devoid of all perfection? Could these beings become more like God than positive beings? 2º, because, if a distinct negation of rationality is posited in a horse, another negation of this negation will have to be posited, since the horse is no less distinct from it than from man; and since it is likewise distinct from this reflexive negation, a third will have to be added, and so to infinity. 3º, because in the negations themselves, even contingent ones, there will be infinitely many wholly necessary negations of negations; for of the negation of light all the negations of other beings are truly and necessarily denied, as when it is said, "The negation of light is not the negation of a stone," and so of the others.

The Third Opinion Is Chosen and Proved.

18. It must therefore be said that absences do not exist, do not consist, on the part of the thing; that they have no objective concept proper to themselves and no positive or negative quiddity truly distinct from the things denied, of which any predicate can be affirmed; and that, when we say there is an absence of light, the expression proceeds upon a false supposition unless it is altogether equivalent to this: "light is not given." This opinion is commonly commended by the beautiful words of the great Augustine in *De vita beata*, c. 3, where he speaks thus: "I do not know how we say, 'He has want'; for this is as though we were to say that a place lacking light has darkness, which is nothing other than not having light. For darkness does not, as it were, come or depart; rather, lacking light is precisely being dark, just as lacking clothing is being naked. Nor, when clothing is added, does nakedness flee away like some movable thing. Therefore, to explain what I mean as well as I can, 'He has want' is said just as though one said, 'He has not-having.'"

19. By these words the Eagle of the Doctors plainly denies to darkness and other absences any being whatsoever, even negative being; for this being, according to its authors, certainly "comes and departs," just as the being of light does, at least with the addition "as it were"; and it is truly "had" by air that does not have light. He also teaches that the expression "it

has darkness" is true only insofar as it means the same as "it does not have light." Finally, he plainly indicates that in common usage we cannot speak of want except as though it were an object truly had or given in things, although the expression is philosophically no less improper than if we were to say "not-having is had," or "there is a not-being-given." Most of the authors commonly cited for the second opinion seem to think the same, especially the older ones who did not expressly dispute this matter. For they commonly warn that nothing is properly said affirmatively of absences, but only negatively; and if anything is affirmed of them, by that very fact a being of reason is already feigned. See especially Fr. Suárez, *Metaphysical Disputations*, disp. 54, s. 3, n. 4, and s. 5, n. 6. But if absences had some being, at least negative being, many things could be affirmed of them apart from fiction, as is clear from what has been said.

20. Moreover this opinion is proved 1º by the refutation of the others. 2º, because that being which is not necessary in order to verify that a thing is lacking, or truly and really does not exist, ought not to be attributed to absences. But for this no being of absence distinct from the thing denied, even negative being, is necessary. Therefore, etc. The major is certain. The minor is proved: because "light does not really exist" signifies the same as "nothing of light really exists." But in order that this latter be verified, there is no need for "nothing of light" to signify a certain nothing having, on the part of the object, negative being distinct from light; otherwise, more absurdly, that proposition would be altogether false if it spoke of such a nothing, just as would these: "nothing shines," "nothing sings," and other similar propositions.

21. Furthermore, absence is pure nothing, as the authors of the second opinion concede; therefore nothing else ought to be signified by the word "absence" than by the word "nothing." But by the word "nothing," in common usage, that improper being is not signified, as is clear in these expressions: "Nothing is greater than God," or "better than God"; "Nothing resists the efficacious will of God"; "Nothing compels us to sin"; "Nothing is brighter than the Sun"; and innumerable others of this kind, undoubtedly most true. All these would undoubtedly be most false if the word "nothing" had the signification intended by our opponents, for they would yield an altogether false affirmative sense, namely: "An object having improper being, distinct from every positive thing, is greater than God," etc. All these therefore are negative propositions; and in them "nothing" means the same as "not something," "not any thing," "no" or "not any being," so that the negation affects the copula and removes the predicate from every positive thing, which alone is signified on the part of the subject. The same must

therefore be judged of the words "absence, privation, darkness, blindness," etc., namely that, unless they denote beings of reason, they do not signify any improper being given on the side of the object, but only a positive thing from which real existence is removed through an imbibed negation. Hence the expression "there is an absence of light," or "the man is blind," is negative in sense and means the same as "light is not given," or "the man does not have sight"; and conversely, "there is no absence of light" is affirmative, and so in other cases.

22. This is explained further. These two propositions plainly signify the same: "An Angel from eternity is nothing," "From eternity there is an absence of an Angel." But the former is not affirmative, nor does it signify a nothing standing on the side of the object and contradictorily opposed to the Angel's existence. Therefore neither does the latter. The minor is proved: because otherwise that proposition would be altogether false and self-contradictory, as asserting the identity of the Angel with such a nothing, and thus of one contradictory with the other. Could the Angel be indifferent so as to be identified divisively with two contradictories? It may be objected that the proposition yields a denominative sense and signifies nothingness after the manner of a form denominating the Angel. Against this: such a nothing cannot be compared to the Angel as a form except insofar as it denominates him "excluded." But its thus denominating him does not suffice for it truly to be said, "The Angel is nothing," unless by the same title one wishes it truly to be said: "Heat is cold, whiteness is blackness, love is hatred." Add that even in this sense, with whatever truth it is said, "The Angel from eternity truly is nothing," with the same truth by conversion it would likewise be said, "Some nothing from eternity truly is an Angel."

23. It is proved 3º: if the absence of light has some being distinct from light, that will be the object verifying this act, "light does not exist." But this is false. Therefore. The major is admitted by the opponents, who acknowledge nothing else as the truth-maker of such an act. The minor is proved: contradictory propositions agree altogether in object, for they are the affirmation and negation of the same thing about the same subject and in the same respect, as is known to dialecticians. But the affirmation "light exists" does not have that being of absence for its object. Therefore, etc. The point is pressed: the cognition "light does not exist" attains that absence either purely apprehensively or judicatively. If in the former manner, it cannot be verified through that absence, since no cognition is verified through an object which it neither affirms nor denies, at least implicitly. If in the latter manner, I ask whether it attains such an absence by affirming it or rather by denying it. If the second is chosen, that cognition will be false

when light is lacking. If the first, it will not be a purely negative judgment, but partly negative concerning light and partly affirmative concerning absence, namely equivalent to this complex judgment: "light does not exist, and the absence of light exists." But this is altogether repugnant to common sense, and proves likewise that the opposite judgment, "light exists," is complex; or certainly that no purely simple or categorematic negative judgment exists. It also proves against the adversaries that the truth-maker of that act is not absence alone, but absence together with light, since the latter is part of the judged object.

24. From what has been said you will infer that no constitutive principle of absence is to be sought, since there is none. Hence these questions, "What is absence? In what does it consist? By what is it constituted?" are, properly speaking, inept, self-contradictory, or based upon a false supposition; no less than if one were to ask: "What is nothing? What sort of being is no being? In what does not-consisting consist? By what is not-being-constituted constituted?" I admit that, owing to the poverty of words and custom, we can scarcely, if at all, speak of nothing except as though it were something, or undertake a discussion of absence except as though it were a certain negative object removing the existence of a thing, to which object certain offices are attributed by affirmation. Hence it comes about that outside the present controversy everyone everywhere speaks, indeed apprehends or thinks, according to the second opinion related in n. 9; which manner we also have imitated throughout the course of this whole work. But here, when the matter is being demanded according to metaphysical rigor, the difficulty of words must be resisted so that the truth may, as far as possible, shine forth. Here, if anywhere, one must think with the few, even though it is necessary to speak with the many.

25. The doctrine delivered likewise includes necessary absences, for example the absence of a goat-stag or the negation of the identity of man with a horse. For these are not negative beings either, unless one wishes these beings to be eternal, immense, and indefectible; nor do they consist formally in positive beings, at least if chimerical objects are distinguished from every possible thing. For although man through himself excludes his own identity with a horse, and therefore can be called the virtual absence of this identity, nevertheless independently of the existence of man this proposition is true: "There is no identity of man with a horse," to which in sense this is equivalent: "There is an absence of identity, etc." Likewise, although the Omnipotence of God through itself excludes the existence of all chimeras, nevertheless this proposition, "A chimera does not exist," is not immediately and formally verified through God; and, if per impossibile God

were lacking, it would not follow intrinsically on that account that a goat-stag existed.

CHAPTER III.
Certain Difficulties Are Resolved.

26. The principal difficulty here lies in explaining what the truth-making object of an act denying the existence of a thing is. For the object verifying this act, for example, "light does not exist," is not light; otherwise, with light posited, the act would be true, since its truth-maker would be posited. Nor is it another positive object, unless one has recourse to the first opinion of n. 9. It therefore remains that it be a negative object in which the absence of light consists. I answer: a negative act, in order to be verified, does not require a truth-maker that is, but rather one that is not, for it does not declare its object to be, but rather not to be. Hence that act is verified through light, not when light is posited in things, but when it is not posited; and it is false that, when light is posited, the truth-maker of such an act is posited, because light, by the very fact that it is posited, ceases to be a truth-maker and becomes a falsifier of the act denying that light is posited. Certainly it cannot be denied that light is an object, at least a partial one, judicatively known through that act; otherwise contradictory acts would not be opposed judgments of the same thing about the same subject. But whatever is judicatively known pertains to the truth-maker of the act. Therefore light is the truth-maker of that act, at least partially, precisely while it is not in reality; for while it is, it falsifies that act, as is evident. By whatever reason, therefore, you attribute to light the office of partial truth-maker, by the same reason I shall attribute to it the office of total truth-maker.

27. For clarity, some not inaptly distinguish a twofold kind of truth-maker, one "in a positive sense," another "in a negative sense." A truth-maker in the positive sense is an object which, when given, makes the act true, and when not given makes it false; and only an affirmative act is capable of this truth-maker. A truth-maker in the negative sense is one which, when given, makes the act false, and when not given makes it true; and only a negative act is capable of this. Therefore, when its truth-maker as given in reality is sought, the supposition must be denied, because such an act cannot be verified through an object that is given in reality. Light alone, therefore, verifies this act, "light does not exist"; but it verifies it according to the nature of that act, and therefore only in the negative sense. Hence, if one objects: the truth of an act is constituted by the act and the object; therefore, with the act denying and with light simultaneously existing, all the

constitutive principles of the truth of the denying act exist, which will therefore become true. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: the truth of an affirmative act, I grant; of a negative act, I subdistinguish: it is constituted by the object in the negative sense, I grant; in the positive sense, I deny the antecedent, and I deny the supposition of the consequence, namely that the truth of a negative act can have all its constitutive principles existing; for this would be to be constituted entirely in the positive sense. If that truth were constituted in this manner, it could never be fully constituted even in the contrary opinion; for it is constituted through light, since light is at least a partial truth-maker of the negative act, as I just said; but it can never be constituted through existing light.

28. But it is objected 1º: for truth to be constituted through light in the negative sense is really for it not to be constituted through light. I distinguish: not to be constituted through light that is, I grant; through light that is not, I deny. If you infer: therefore that truth is constituted through light which is not light. Again I distinguish: which is not light exercitively, I grant; which is not light significatively, I deny. For according to everyone, whatever be the case concerning absence, true light is signified by a negative act, although exercitively it is nothing; for it is said of true light that it does not exist, or that it is nothing. This negative constitution is indeed very improper; but we cannot otherwise explain the concept of truth in a negative act. Hence you have the sense in which the truth-maker of these acts is the same: "light exists," "light does not exist." For it is the same significatively, because both acts judicatively signify the same light and the same existence; otherwise they would not contradict one another. But it is not the same exercitively except negatively, insofar as it is not exercitively distinct. For light, when it does not exist, is nothing and exercitively has nothing, and therefore has exercitively neither distinction nor identity with itself. Hence it can be called negatively distinct insofar as it is not the same, and negatively the same insofar as it is not distinct. Hence you will also gather that the truth-maker and falsifier of a negative act are the same significatively but not exercitively, because non-existing light, which verifies the act, is not exercitively the same as existing light, which falsifies the act, but is negatively distinct.

29. It is objected 2º: this act, "light does not exist," represents light as not existing; therefore this "light not existing" is a representable or conceivable object; and since it is not light nor a positive being, it will be a negative being contradictorily opposed to light. I distinguish the antecedent: it represents light as not existing in such a way that the "not" stands on the part of the object, as though that act regarded some negation as its object, I

deny; in such a way that it stands on the part of the mode of representing, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. Just as in conditional, copulative, disjunctive, or vague acts the particles "if, and, or" do not represent on the part of the object some conditionality, conjunction, disjunction, or vagueness, but indicate only a peculiar mode of representing, so must one think of the particle "not" in negatives. Therefore that act represents only light as its object, but has a manner of tending that removes or dissents from its existence. It may be objected: representation is varied by the "not"; therefore the object must also be varied. I deny the consequence, because, just as in these acts, "if the Sun shines, it is day," "the Sun shines and it is day," the representation varies without variation of the object; and just as by this judgment, "man is animal," no other object is represented than by this apprehension, "the identity of man with animal," and nevertheless it is represented very differently, namely now in a judicative mode, now in an apprehensive mode; so too here. Therefore, just as the distinction of judgment from apprehension ought not to be taken from the object, neither should the distinction of a negative judgment from an affirmative one.

30. But it is still objected: this act, "light does not exist," when light exists is false, and therefore representatively difform to the object; but it cannot be representatively difform to the object, or difform in representing, unless it represents something besides light or alien from light; for otherwise it will rather then be conformable to the object, since it represents precisely that very thing which then exists in reality. I answer: for judicative representation to be difform to light, it need not represent anything distinct from light; it is enough that it represent light in an undue mode which does not correspond to the condition or state of light, namely in an assenting mode when light does not exist and in a dissenting mode when light exists. This mode, which cannot be better explained than through the formal effect of "assenting or dissenting" which it gives to the intellect, pertains formally to representative conformity and difformity, or conformity and difformity in representing, because it is inseparable from the proper representation of judgment. Hence it is not to be compared with vitality, spirituality, and other predicates enjoyed by judgment in the order of being. With light existing, therefore, the cognition "light does not exist" is rendered difform to the object because, although it represents precisely that very thing which exists in reality, it represents it in a mode then undue, namely dissentingly; for when the object is in a state of existence, an assenting mode corresponds to it. Certainly light is at least a partial object of that cognition, from n. 26; yet

when light exists such a cognition is not conformable with it; otherwise it would be true insofar as it judicatively attains light.

31. Another difficulty is that, when light is lacking, light truly is not on the part of the thing and independently of the intellect; therefore there truly is on the part of the thing a non-being of light, a lack of light, a nothing of light. But if it is given, it must have some being, at least negative or improper, opposed to light. Having granted the antecedent, I deny the consequence if that expression yields an affirmative sense, as though "non-being," "lack," or "nothing" were a subject of which the verb "is given" were affirmatively predicated. For in order that light truly not be on the part of the thing, it is enough that light lose its real being; another object called "nothing," "lack," or "non-being of light" need not be substituted in its place. Otherwise light would be identified with such a nothing, since then we truly say, "light is nothing"; and nothingness itself would also truly be splendid, because then it is most truly said, "nothing of light shines." Therefore, if these expressions are to be true and free of a being of reason, they must be taken in a negative sense, so that "nothing of light is given" means the same as "nothing of light is given," and so with the others. Think the same of certain expressions of Sacred Scripture, such as "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," "He was blind from birth," etc. They are to be explained thus: "Light was not upon the face of the deep"; "There was a man who from birth did not see, or who was positively impeded from seeing."

32. It is objected 1º: the intellect does not make, but finds and knows, the lack of light. I answer: if the lack is conceived as an object distinct from light, it is made by the intellect, because it is a being of reason. But if finding and knowing the lack of light means the same as not finding light on the part of the thing and knowing light removatively, that manner of speaking is true. Hence this proposition, "it truly happens on the part of the thing that light is lacking," is true only in this sense: "it does not truly happen on the part of the thing that light exists," or "remains." For if it signifies that there occurs on the part of the thing an object which in itself is "light's being lacking," it will be altogether false, because darkness is not an object coming or going, as Augustine taught us above in n. 18. It is objected 2º: since light is indifferent to existing or not existing on the part of the thing, something must be assigned by which light is formally determined not to exist rather than to exist. I deny the assertion, because, in order that light not exist, it is enough that nothing be given formally determining it to existence, or that its existence not be given.

33. It is objected 3º: this term, "non-existing light," does not signify light alone; otherwise it would be verified of existing light no less than the term

"existing light." This is easily solved from what was said in nn. 29 sqq. Both terms signify light alone, but one assertively, the other removatively, since it means the same as "light which does not exist"; and therefore one without the other can be verified of existing light. Thus these terms, "Peter and Paul," "Peter or Paul," have the same object; and yet it is truly said of this man, "he is Peter or Paul," but falsely, "he is Peter and Paul." It is objected 4º: for light to exist on the part of the thing is not the same as for it not to exist; therefore there are two distinct objects. Having granted the antecedent, I deny the consequence, because for light not to exist is no object at all on the part of the thing, and therefore is neither identical with nor distinct from any object. Hence the opinion of some who say that absence is identified with the thing whose existence is removed, for example the absence of light with non-existing light, is to be rejected. For that opinion falsely supposes that absence or a non-existing thing is an object having some identity, whereas rather it is nothing, that is, no object on the part of the thing, and therefore shares neither identity nor distinction, because properly speaking there is no identity and no distinction of no object. At most such an expression can be admitted in a very improper negative sense, so that the absence of light is said to be negatively identified with light, that is, not distinguished from it, and similarly negatively distinguished, that is, not identified with it.

34. To forestall other difficulties, observe 1º that no objective contradictories are given, that is, two objects one of which is the "being of a thing" and the other its "non-being," although authors everywhere speak of these for clarity as though they were divisively given on the side of the object, or in order to accommodate the common apprehension. There is therefore only intentional contradiction, namely between two acts of the intellect, one of which affirms and the other denies the same thing of the same subject. It is nevertheless true that no thing can simultaneously be and not be; not because these are two extremes, but because the same existence cannot simultaneously be given and not given. If it is asked by what light is excluded on the part of the thing when it is lacking, I answer: it is excluded inferentially through the divine non-volition of the existence of light; but formally it is not excluded in the positive sense, as though something were posited on the part of the thing by which light is excluded. It is excluded only in the negative sense, insofar as the existence of light is not posited or preserved. Observe 2º, when it is said that on the part of the thing there is a difference between darkness and silence, and think the same concerning other absences or privations, a false supposition is made unless it is merely

signified that light and voice differ from one another and that one can be lacking without the other.

35. Observe 3º in what sense various expressions extremely common in the Schools are to be understood when the discussion turns to absences. They must all be reduced to a negative sense if they are to be true and free from fiction. For example, when we say that God wills the absence of sin, or hates the omission of a commanded act, or that a man is loved by God because he does not sin, the sense is that God has a non-volition of the existence of sin, that He loves the existence of the commanded act, and that the cognition denying that the man sins moves God to love the man. Do not think that in God there is love or hatred directly terminated at absences; for these, since they are nothing, are neither lovable nor hateful, indeed they are not even cognoscible in themselves as though distinct from things. For knowing an absence is nothing other than knowing a thing through an act dissenting from its existence. You can indeed apprehend absences as negative beings in some way existing; but then you will not conceive absences truly such, but mere beings of reason.

36. Likewise, when the absence of a creature is said to be contingent, or a pure free omission to be possible, the sense is that the creature's existence is not necessary but can fail, and that liberty for loving can stand although it elicits neither love nor another incompossible act. Likewise, when you hear that this or that whole is constituted through some absence, for example a body in becoming through privation of form, or liberty through the absence of an irremovable impediment, take that constitution in the negative sense, as was said concerning the truth of a negative act in n. 27. Thus, for example, the concept of a body in becoming signifies form in matter, both assentingly for the instant of generation and dissentingly for the preceding instant; and the concept of liberty not only assentingly denotes positive principles but also dissentingly denotes irremovable impediments. Moreover, when absences are said to be known through species of beings, the sense is that through species of real beings we elicit cognitions denying their existence. Finally, when we distinguish privation from pure negation, we mean only that through the concept of negation the form is purely denied, while through the concept of privation the subject's capacity is simultaneously asserted.

37. Finally observe that one must not admit what some maintain, namely that absence is distinguished from the existence of a thing, not entitatively but predicatively, as though one could truly be predicated without the other or be subjected to certain predicates. This doctrine supposes that between extremes entitatively identified there can be an intrinsic virtual distinction

or a formal distinction from the nature of the thing, which, at least for created things, we rejected elsewhere. It also supposes that absence is on the part of the thing some predicable object capable of being a subject, although, as we have shown thus far, it is altogether nothing, that is, no object given in reality. Therefore only a negative distinction can be admitted between absence and existence, from nn. 28 and 33. Real being is indeed represented by this term, "absence of being"; but it is represented insofar as it is not actually, and therefore insofar as it is no object in reality.

CHAPTER IV.
On Being of Reason, and Whether It Is Distinguished from Every Possible Being.

38. We are not treating here of "subjective" or "effective" and denominative being of reason, concerning which see Logic, tr. 1, d. 2, c. 4, but only of the "purely objective." This is commonly defined as "that which has being only objectively in the intellect," that is, an object known by the intellect which neither really exists nor can really exist or be produced. Every being, while known, has being objectively in the intellect; for cognition, or the mental word, is called the "intentional existence of the object," or the "objective being of its term." But being of reason differs from real being in that it has this intentional existence "only"; it has, and can have, no intrinsic and real existence.

39. Being of reason is divided into "chimerical and non-chimerical," or by other terms signifying the same, into "founded and unfounded," "prohibited and non-prohibited," or "of reasoning reason and of reason reasoned." If "chimerical" means the same as "impossible," as it frequently does, every being of reason is chimerical, because none is apt to exist really, and therefore none is possible. But here that is peculiarly called chimerical which is feigned by the intellect without a foundation, for example a goat-stag or a rational stone; while that is called non-chimerical which is feigned with some foundation, motive, or occasion, for example the universal on the part of the thing, or the negative being of absence. Not every foundation, however, suffices for a founded or non-chimerical being of reason; some reason is required which at least apparently persuades that it is given in reality, and therefore attracts the intellect to judge it existing or possible. Hence the same being of reason may be founded with respect to one intellect and not with respect to another, for example the identity of light with substance.

40. Being of reason is further divided into "negation, privation, and relation." Negation or privation, taken for mere nothing or the non-being of a thing, then becomes a being of reason when it is conceived as having in itself some positive entity, or, on our principles, even some negative or improper entity, substituted for the contradictory being; as if nakedness were conceived as a positive affection of the body, or darkness as a kind of black coloration of the air succeeding light. A relation, however, becomes a being of reason when a real relation is feigned where it cannot be given, as between extremes really identified. Some think this division adequate to being of reason as such; others only to founded being of reason; others only to logical being of reason, or one fabricated in the matter of Logic, because they judge that, besides negations and privations endowed with fictitious being, not only a relation of reason but also a substance of reason, a quantity of reason, etc. can function with a foundation. See Fr. Peynado, Logic, tr. 4, d. 1, s. 2.

41. Various questions are commonly disputed concerning being of reason. But before we proceed to the others, the most important of all must be discussed: Whether being of reason is an object distinct from every possible being? The first opinion, common throughout the Schools, affirms this; its authors are given by Fr. Peynado, cited tr. 4, d. 3, s. 1. The second opinion, sufficiently probable, denies it; it is held by Fathers Herice, Antonio Pérez, Lynch, John Baptist de Benedictis, Gaspar de Ribadeneyra, and others whom Fr. John Ulloa cites and follows in *Prolegomena Scholastica*, disp. 6, c. 5. The mind of these authors is that no object can be known by the intellect which is not real or possible being; but that a real being, or an aggregate of beings, can be known by a dissonant, disordered, and essentially false cognition; and, insofar as so known, it is called a being of reason and impossible, not by an impossibility of entity but of truth or verification, insofar as no formal truth can be constituted from such an object and such an act. Hence a goat-stag, for example, insofar as it is a chimera, in this opinion is constituted from a real goat and stag, and in addition from an unverifiable cognition by which real identity is feigned between them. Consequently, "being of reason, impossible, chimera," and names of this kind, are terms of second intention, just as "universal, genus, vague individual," etc.; for they signify a real being as known unverifiably. Both opinions are armed with many arguments, of which I shall propose only the principal and more urgent.

Arguments for the Affirmative Opinion.

42. It is argued 1º from the commonly admitted definition of being of reason. Being of reason is "that which has being only objectively in the intellect." Therefore it is distinguished from every being which, besides being known, has or can have another being, namely real existence. But every possible being has or can have real existence, since "possible" signifies the same as "able to exist really." Therefore being of reason is distinguished from every possible being. Hence the opposite opinion does not seem to differ from the opinion of Pico della Mirandola, Vallés, and others whom Caramuel cites and follows in *Metalogica*, l. 2, princip. 3, who flatly deny beings of reason. For the composite or aggregate of a real object and an unverifiable cognition is in reality a real being in every respect, since it includes nothing unapt to exist really.

43. Argument 2º. This proposition, "Another God is impossible," truly affirms impossibility of some subject. But it cannot truly affirm it of any possible being. Therefore it regards as subject something distinct from every possible being. If you say that this proposition is equivalent to "A cognition denying that God is unique cannot be true," this first of all is contrary to common apprehension. And then it is refuted because at least the truth of an act denying the uniqueness of God is distinguished from every possible being; otherwise that act could already become true. But this truth can be known and is known by you when you say that this act cannot be true, which means the same as saying that its truth is impossible. Therefore some object distinct from every possible being can now be known, and the foundation of your opinion collapses.

44. Confirmation: the cognition of an object distinct from every possible being either is distinguished from every possible being or is not. If you choose the first, then since that cognition is known by you, because you deny that it is possible, something distinct from every possible being can now be known. If the second, then such a cognition is identified with a possible cognition, for no other genus of real being appears with which it can be identified. Therefore that cognition will be truly possible, as intended here. The point is pressed: this judgment, "An object distinct from every possible being cannot be known," is necessarily false. Therefore the opposite opinion rests on a false foundation. The antecedent is proved: because through such a judgment its objective subject is necessarily known, whether it is in reality distinct from every possible being or not distinct; for nothing

can be affirmed or denied of a wholly unknown subject. Therefore such a judgment necessarily falsifies itself, since it denies that a subject actually known can be known.

45. Argument 3º. This act, "Man is a horse," or "Man and horse are identified," affirms and therefore knows some identity. But not an identity possible in itself. Therefore one distinct from every possible identity. The minor is proved: because it knows and affirms identity as proper to man and horse with one another, not as alien to them or as belonging to other extremes of which no mention is made in such an act. But the proper identity of man and horse is not possible in itself. Nor is it permissible to have recourse to identity as such. First, because that act tends in the same manner as this, "Man is animal," where the proper identity of man and animal is determinately known. Second, because at least in that act there is some expression signifying identity as agreeing with and applied to these extremes. Therefore the agreement and application of identity to such extremes is known, although it is not possible. If you say that the application pertains to the mode of tending and not to the object, against this is 1º that the same will have to be said of every affirmative act, for example, "God is holy," through which therefore the objective application of holiness to God will not be known. 2º, that this act, "Man is a horse," will not represent the object otherwise than it is in itself and will not be false, since it represents nothing that is not in things, namely nothing distinct from man, horse, and identity found elsewhere, all of which certainly are in things.

46. Argument 4º. Various inconveniences follow from the negative opinion. It follows 1º that the common concept of chimerical or impossible being must be rejected, namely "that which, if it existed, would imply contradiction," or "would simultaneously be and not be." For such is not the object of the name "chimera" if it is nothing other than a real being as known by an unverifiable act. It follows 2º that nothing is properly impossible, since nothing is conceived by the mind which cannot really exist and therefore which is not truly and properly possible. Or, if some object is properly impossible, and on the other hand no object is distinct from every possible being, it will truly be said: "Something not distinct from the possible is properly impossible." It follows 3º that, just as "impossible" signifies an essentially false cognition or a real object as known through it, so "possible" will signify an essentially true cognition or a real object as known by such a cognition. "Possible," therefore, will be a term of second intention and will not belong to things in their real state. It follows 4º that God will not be connected with possibles. For it will be false that, if Peter became impossible, God would be lacking; for Peter's becoming impossible,

in the contrary opinion, is nothing other than Peter's being known by an unverifiable cognition, such as "Peter is not a man"; but from this it certainly does not follow that God is lacking.

Arguments for the Negative Opinion.

47. It is argued 1º. Being of reason is not distinguished from every cognoscible thing; otherwise it could not be known or have being objectively in the intellect. But every cognoscible thing is possible or real being, since cognoscibility is a property of real being, as coinciding with transcendental truth. Therefore being of reason is not distinguished from every possible being. The common answer is that being of reason does not have passive and intrinsic cognoscibility, which alone is transcendental truth and a property of real being; nevertheless it has extrinsic cognoscibility, by which it is rendered extrinsically cognoscible, and which is nothing other than the intellect's potency to set a being of reason before itself as object, or the possibility of a cognition terminated at it.

48. But this is refuted 1º because a potency to know an object of itself incognoscible is repugnant, just as a potency to see an object of itself invisible or a potency to produce an effect of itself unproducible is repugnant. Certainly a cognitive potency must correspond to a passive capacity in the term; otherwise by the same route it could be defended that the intellect has a potency to know an object distinct from every possible and impossible being. Add that the intellect, by knowing a being of reason, would be drawn outside its formal aspect *sub qua*, since it tends under the aspect of transcendental truth. 2º, because being of reason receives the denomination or formal effect "known." Therefore it is a subject capable of this denomination, for no form can bestow its formal effect upon an incapable subject. Either, then, this capacity is intrinsic to being of reason, or it is extrinsic to it and consists in the intellect's potency to know. If you say the first, then being of reason has intrinsic cognoscibility, which is nothing other than the intrinsic and passive capacity to be "known." If the second, then the intellect alone, and not being of reason, receives the denomination "known"; for denomination falls upon the subject's capacity, and the capacity, as regards the present matter, is not found in being of reason but in the intellect alone.

49. Argument 2º. This act, "man identified with a horse," does not conceive on the part of the object a man or a horse distinct from the true and real. It is proved: it conceives the same man and horse as this, "man is a horse." But this latter conceives a true man and a true horse. Therefore. The

major is clear, because through no act is man conceived more expressly as identified with a horse than through the judgment affirming that man is a horse. The minor is also clear from the contradictory act, "man is not a horse," which speaks of the same subject and predicate, otherwise it would not contradict the affirmative; and without doubt it speaks of real man and real horse. It may be objected: through those acts man and horse truly such are indeed conceived, but simultaneously an identity of the two that is not true is conceived, and in this formally consists the being of reason. But, first, this seems contrary to the common sense of the adversaries, who everywhere say that through such acts an impossible and chimerical man is conceived and therefore one distinct from a true man. Next, either true and real identity is conceived on the side of the object, or false and fictitious identity. If true, then nothing non-real is conceived. If false, then that affirmative act yields this sense: "man is horse by an identity not true but false"; in which sense it will most truly be said that man is horse, just as it is truly said that an idol is God, by signifying a false identity or a fictitious divinity.

50. You will answer that the identity is false in itself but is signified as true and real, and is therefore falsely affirmed through that act. Against this: if by the name "day" night were signified on the part of the object, it would truly be said in the absence of the Sun, "it is day." Therefore, if by the verb "is," or by the name "true identity," a false identity is signified on the part of the object, which is no less distant from true and real identity than night is from day, it will truly be said, "man is a horse," or "has true identity with a horse." Therefore, although identity is affirmed as true in name, the affirmation will not be false, because it will yield an innocuous sense. You will be refuted similarly if you say that the identity is real but its application to such extremes is fictitious. For once this is granted, the sense of that act will be that man is horse through a real identity falsely applied, which will certainly be true, just as a hypocrite is a saint through the false application of true holiness. The same holds if you say that the act is false because it signifies that a fictitious identity is truly and in fact given. For according to you these words, "the identity of man with horse truly and in fact is given," do not have as object a real "being-given," but a false and chimerical one; therefore in reality they are equivalent to these: "the identity of man with horse is falsely and fictitiously given."

51. Argument 3º. The impossibility or intrinsic repugnance of the goat-stag is not distinguished from the real goat and stag. Therefore neither is the essence of the goat-stag distinguished from them, since its essence must be its very impossibility, just as the essence of real being is its very possibility.

The antecedent is proved: because the repugnance of the goat-stag consists in the repugnance of goat to being stag, or in the necessary distinction of the two. For once this repugnance or distinction is prescinded from, there is nothing from which the goat-stag is repugnant; rather, its impossibility formally fails in the intellect, just as the impossibility of rational animal formally fails in the intellect by the very fact that the repugnance of animal to being rational, or the necessary distinction of the two, is not conceived. But the repugnance of goat to being stag, or the necessary distinction of the two, is not distinguished from real goat and stag, since these through their essences mutually exclude one another and are necessarily distinguished. Therefore, etc. Hence the whole impossibility of the goat-stag is the real impossibility of goat with stag; and this proposition, "the goat-stag is impossible," yields this sense: "it is necessary that goat not be stag," where nothing non-real is conceived.

52. Argument 4º. This objective concept, "Peter coexisting with his absence," is a being of reason and expressly chimerical, as expressly conjoining two contradictories. But that it does not involve anything distinct from every possible being is proved thus. It would involve such a thing because, as Fr. Peynado weighs, it involves not true Peter but one distinct from true and real Peter; for it involves that which would be in things if such coexistence were posited in things, in which event there would be a coexisting Peter, and therefore one able to coexist with his absence, who is certainly distinct from true and possible Peter. But it is false that this concept does not involve true and real Peter. It is proved 1º because that concept involves Peter contradictorily opposed to his absence, otherwise it would not involve two contradictories and would not be chimerical, and therefore Peter unable to coexist with that absence. Such a Peter, then, is not other than the true and real; for if he were another, he would be able to coexist with his absence, as you say. 2º, because that concept contains the object of this affirmation, "Peter coexists with his absence." But this has real Peter for its object, both because the contradictory negation, "Peter does not coexist, etc.," regards this same Peter, and because, if that affirmation regards Peter chimerical in himself, it will be true; for of such a Peter, on your principles, it is truly said that he simultaneously is and is not, which is to coexist with his absence, just as it is truly said of the same one, "Peter is a chimera."

53. Argument 5º. The essence of every chimera, as is everywhere said, consists in the conjunction of contradictories, or in such an object that, if it were posited in things, it would simultaneously be and not be; and because it is repugnant in things for "being" to be joined with "non-being," therefore

the essence of a chimera is repugnant. But such an object includes nothing besides "being and non-being," truly such. Therefore it includes nothing distinct from every possible being. The minor is proved. First, it includes "being and non-being" truly such, both because only true "being," not false and shadowy being, contradictorily conflicts with "non-being," and the essence of a chimera must include contradictories truly repugnant to one another, for otherwise the chimera itself would be repugnant not truly but falsely; and because it includes such "being and non-being" as are signified by the principle, "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not be," which signifies the same as "Anything whatsoever is or is not," where certainly the discussion concerns only true "being" and true "non-being." Next, it includes no object other than these extremes; for the conjunction or simultaneity of the two, concerning which alone doubt could arise, is not distinguished from the extremes themselves, because it is that to which the extremes are repugnant, and these are repugnant only to each other. Or, if it is distinguished, it must be true and real simultaneity, because the essential repugnance of a chimera consists in this, that true and real simultaneity cannot belong to contradictory extremes. Add that, if this simultaneity is a third object distinct from the extremes and chimerical in itself, it will have to be constituted from other contradictories, namely from other "being and non-being"; and concerning these the same argument will prove that they cannot fail to be truly such.

CHAPTER V.

What, Finally, Is to Be Held Concerning Being of Reason?

54. Concerning the distinction of being of reason from every possible being, the same judgment seems to be made as concerning the negative being of absence. The affirmative opinion is very common and most received in usage, not only among its patrons but even among everyone outside the present controversy. For everyone, as we also have done, in other questions where it makes no difference what being of reason really is, speaks insistently according to that opinion whenever mention arises of fictitious and impossible or chimerical being, because apprehension or imagination, founded upon the sound of words and upon the custom of distinguishing fictitious things from true ones, for example fictitious gold from solid gold or simulated virtue from genuine virtue, invites one to speak in this way. This opinion is also intrinsically probable, prevails in authority, and seems to be the mind of St. Thomas in various places. Nevertheless, the negative opinion, when this matter is weighed according to Scholastic rigor, seems

more probable by reason; nor is it destitute of authority. For besides the authors related above, it was held by the Nominalists and perhaps also by other ancient authors who did not expressly dispute this question. Indeed St. Thomas rather openly favors it in Summa Theologiae I, q. 25, a. 3, when he says: "That which implies contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can conceive it." Scotus also favors it in V, dist. 3, q. unic., where he denies that any intelligible thing or being whatsoever can be found which is formally impossible of itself.

55. But, in order that this opinion be properly understood and defended, the following points must be noted. 1º, the object of the intellect must not be weighed from the sound of words. For these words, "an object distinct from every possible and impossible being," or "distinct from every cognoscible thing both intrinsically and extrinsically," although they seem to signify an object so distinct, do not really signify one, as all admit. Nor can the intellect conceive it or have an ultimate concept of it; rather, upon hearing them, it either conceives the word alone or an object really not distinct from every such thing. The adversaries say the same about these words: "the true and real identity of man with horse," or "man is truly and really and without any fiction identified with horse." For they admit that, although the words sound as though they signify true and real identity, or identity in no way fictitious, nevertheless the intellect, however much it strives to conceive it, does not conceive such identity but rather sets before itself a chimerical identity. Likewise, then, it can be said that, although the words seem to sound as though they signify something in itself distinct from every possible being, in reality nothing such is presented to the intellect, nor can it be presented.

56. 2º, the adversaries commonly warn that not every necessarily false proposition produces a being of reason or regards an object distinct from every possible being. For a negative proposition contradicting an affirmative proposition that feigns nothing, since it does not differ from it in object, conceives nothing but the real; for example, "God does not exist," or "man is not rational." From this it follows, among other things, that, if propositions concerning the impossible can conveniently be reduced to a sense truly affirming or falsely denying something of a real object, there is no need to assign them an object distinct from the real. Thus, as several adversaries admit, because this proposition, "darkness is given," can conveniently be reduced to this sense, "light is not given," it need not regard an object distinct from light. But that propositions concerning the impossible, at least for the most part, can easily be reduced to that sense is clear in these, for example: "a goat-stag is repugnant," "another God is impossible," "God's

lying is possible"; which can conveniently be explained thus: "goat is necessarily distinguished from stag," "it is necessary that God be unique," "it is not necessary that God always be truthful." This last proposition, although false, attains nothing distinct from the real, as is seen in its contradictory.

57. 3º, to feign is not the same as to know an object chimerical in itself. For whoever falsely asserts or denies is said to feign, and the object which he then enunciates is said to be fictitious; yet it is not thereby something impossible in itself. This is clear both in the contingently false proposition "Peter runs," which attains nothing distinct from the possible, as nearly all teach, and in the proposition contradicting a necessarily true affirmative about a real object, for example, "God does not exist," which, from the preceding number, regards nothing but the real, although it is an enormous fiction.

58. 4º, a real object, insofar as it underlies an essentially dissonant or necessarily false cognition, can be called distinct from every possible being with the addition "apparently"; because, insofar as it is so known, to one looking reflexively it appears as though it had conflicting predicates. For example, the object of this act, "God does not exist," is in reality not other than true God; but nevertheless, to one reflecting upon this act in which he is deceived, its object appears as though it were non-existing God, and therefore as though it were God not God. But this appearance consists in the disordered and distorted mode of the direct cognition; and the object of this reflexive apprehension, "non-existing God," is in reality the same as that of this, "God whose existence is not falsely denied." 5º, a necessarily false cognition pertains to the essence of being of reason, and therefore makes being of reason only in the genus of formal cause; nor does the first formal intention of the knower, but the second, constitute beings of reason, as was said concerning universals in Logic.

The Arguments of the First Opinion Are Solved.

59. The arguments which we brought forward from n. 42 can now be answered without difficulty. To the first: that common definition must be understood with the addition "apparently," so that, just as being of reason is an object apparently distinct from every possible being, in the sense just explained, so it is apparently incapable of having any being other than objectively in the intellect. It can also be understood thus: that being of reason, insofar as such, cannot exist through real and intrinsic being, but only through extrinsic and intentional being, consisting in an essentially erroneous concept; which being, although real in itself or with respect to

itself, is nevertheless called, with respect to the object, "purely objective being." Thus we say that the universal on the part of the thing is repugnant, or, which means the same, the universal having as such real existence, or any being other than intentional being, which is objective being; nor do we therefore constitute the universal through something distinct from every real thing, but through a physical object and a precisive cognition. Nevertheless, among us the universal is not called a fictitious being of reason, because a precisive cognition is not fiction, but only an erroneous cognition. Hence it is clear that beings of reason are not denied by us, just as universals are not denied by those who do not constitute them through another form than a cognition real in itself.

60. To the second: that proposition, "Another God is impossible," if it is to signify anything and be true, must be explained in this sense: "God is necessarily unique," just as "darkness departs," if it is to signify anything, must be explained thus: "light is present"; otherwise it will signify nothing. Therefore that proposition affirms impossibility of no subject, but necessity of something, namely of the one God. And when we say that an act denying the uniqueness of God, or any other necessarily false act, cannot be true, we do not conceive some truth impossible in itself, but only the necessary falsity of those acts or their necessary distinction from every true act. Likewise, to answer the confirmation, when we say "a cognition of an object distinct from every possible being is impossible," we do not conceive such a cognition in itself, but the sense of that statement is that every possible cognition conceivable by us regards as its object a being real in itself.

61. It must also be denied that there is in the intellect an ultimate judgment according to the sound of this expression: "An object distinct from every possible being cannot be known." For by these words we signify only a judgment of this kind: "Every cognoscible thing is identified with possible being." I ask you whether there is in the mind an ultimate judgment altogether corresponding to these words, "An object incognoscible both intrinsically and extrinsically cannot be known," or to these, "An object distinct from every real and fictitious thing is incognoscible." If you say that there is indeed such a judgment but that it is false, because it denies that that can be known which is exercitively known by the judgment itself on the part of the subject, and which therefore is not distinct from every cognoscible thing nor from every real and fictitious thing, I infer: therefore, although this expression, "distinct from every real and fictitious thing, or from every cognoscible thing," is given on the part of the subject, it does not follow that an object so distinguished in itself corresponds to such an expression, but something very different. Therefore it will likewise be

permissible to say the same of this expression, "an object distinct from every possible being." Moreover, you yourself deny that through this judgment, "The incognoscible is incognoscible," that which the words sound is actually known. Therefore you know that concerning which you deny that it is known; otherwise you would now deny this of a wholly unknown subject.

62. To the third: words which seem to affirm identity between essentially distinct extremes signify nothing unless they are reduced to the negative sense of distinction, so that the proposition "man is a horse" means the same as "man is not distinguished from a horse," which does not signify an object distinct from the real, just as neither does its contradictory. Conversely, a negative proposition of identity between such extremes must be reduced to an affirmative proposition of distinction. Nor must one therefore philosophize similarly concerning propositions which sound as though they signify identity between extremes really not distinct; for, when exposition is set aside, some object corresponds to these propositions, but not to the former. Thus expressions which sound as though they signify darkness must be reduced to expressions significant of light, but not conversely. Certainly this proposition, "man truly and really is a horse," seems to signify real identity in the same way as "man truly and really is animal"; and yet the former, according to the adversaries, has for its object not real but chimerical identity. Therefore, just as the adversaries assign to the former assertion an object altogether alien from the sound of its words, so we assign to it, as it sounds, no object. In reality it is easier to believe that the expression "truly and really is" signifies nothing there than that it signifies the same as "fictitiously and chimerically is." This solution is shorter and more expeditious than that which has recourse to real identity found elsewhere and which was refuted in argument 3º.

63. To the fourth: those four inconveniences do not press. Not the first, because that concept of chimerical being, as arising from the contrary opinion, seems consequently to be rejected if examined according to the norm of Scholastic rigor. Or it can be admitted as a reflexive concept of true being insofar as known by an essentially false act, under which act it apparently has conflicting predicates, as we said above. But if by the name "chimera" you wish to signify an object in itself implying contradiction, so be it; but you will never conceive it in the mind, according to the judgment of St. Thomas cited above in n. 54. Not the second, because, just as something can be universal although it is not distinct from every singular, and something can be a vague individual, incapable of existing as such on the part of the thing, although it is not distinct from every determinate individual, so something can be impossible although it is not distinct from

every possible being. But this proposition, "Some possible being is impossible," is false if it denotes, as it usually does, that some possible being has in itself a reason whereby it is denominated impossible; in which sense this is also false: "Animal existing on the part of the thing is a genus." Yet it will be true if it denotes only that some possible being is extrinsically denominated impossible by an erroneous cognition, just as it is true that an animal really existing is extrinsically denominated a genus by a prescinding cognition.

64. Not the third, because independently of a prior operation of the intellect we find in things the object of this name "possible"; but not the object of the name "impossible," which according to all is nowhere before an operation of the intellect and is not an object that can be signified. It is therefore not surprising that one rather than the other is a term of second intention; and in this they are related to one another just as "singular and universal" are. Not the fourth, because impossible hypotheses by which the connection of God with possibles is commonly explained presuppose the opinion concerning being of reason here refuted, which, as we have already noted, is everywhere admitted outside the present controversy. Yet if Scholastic rigor is to be followed, these hypotheses signify nothing except that the existence of God necessarily implies the falsity of this proposition, "Peter is not possible," and similar ones. Certain other arguments commonly objected can be solved without difficulty from what was said above in chapter 3.

The Remaining Doubts Concerning Being of Reason Are Briefly Decided.

65. Doubt 1º: through what operation of the intellect is a being of reason made? I answer: in the opinion which does not distinguish it from every possible being, being of reason is properly and formally made only through judgment, whether outside or within discourse, because it is made only through a necessarily false act; and falsity properly belongs only to judicative cognition. But these apprehensions, "goat-stag," "chimera," "impossible," and other similar ones, are reflexive; nor do they make a being of reason, but presuppose it already made, just as "genus, species, predicable," etc. do not make but presuppose direct universals. Nor is it an obstacle that through these a being of reason has being objectively in the intellect; for the common definition of being of reason speaks, as most seem to think, of direct objective being, not reflexive. Other dissonant apprehensions which seem direct, such as "irrational man," "supernatural substance," and similar ones,

either are also reflexive; or, if direct, are not ultimate; or, if ultimate, are suasive and virtual judgments, and therefore virtually or inchoatively make beings of reason.

66. But in the opinion distinguishing being of reason from every possible being, it can be made through any operation of the intellect, at least a direct one, even one purely apprehensive or an altogether true judicative operation, provided it contains on the part of subject or predicate an expression of a repugnant object; as if one says, "another God is repugnant," or "man is not impossible." The reason is that any act which directly attains an object repugnant in itself gives it being objectively in the intellect; and this is to make a being of reason. It may be objected: a being of reason is not made except by feigning; but true cognition does not feign. Against this, however, stands both that this requirement is gratuitously added, since the definition of being of reason does not mention it, and that "to feign" is sometimes also taken for "to form."

67. Doubt 2º: whether other intentional powers besides the intellect make beings of reason? I answer: if we stand by the common definition, it must be denied, because a being of reason is made only by receiving "being objectively in the intellect," and it can receive this "being" only from the intellect. It must also be denied if it is true, as we judged more probable, that being of reason is made only by a false judgment. Nevertheless the will can regard as object some good impossible in itself and consequently attribute to it "being willed," or "being loved," which is objective being, although not intellectual. But whether this suffices for the will to be said to make a being of reason is a question of name. If in this you affirm it, you will both depart from the common definition and undeservedly call that being "of reason," since it is "of will." As regards material powers, these neither have false judgments, since they do not properly judge, nor attain anything except real sensible objects; consequently they in no way make beings of reason. Nor is it an obstacle that the external senses are sometimes called false, for they do not therefore attain something fictitious or non-existing, as we explained in the *Animastica*. Nor is it an obstacle that imagination proposes to itself a golden mountain and similar phantasms; for it then attains only external accidents in the manner in which they are commonly associated in a picture; or, if anything more is attained and judgment intervenes, there is already an operation of the intellect.

68. Doubt 3º: whether a being of reason is made whenever the intellect knows an object through alien species? I answer: this must be denied without hesitation. For otherwise, since in this life we know God only through alien species, either we would not know the true God but in His

place a specter impossible in itself, or we would have only false cognitions concerning God. How cognition is had through alien species, see *Animastica*, disp. 6, n. 43. It must now be observed that abstractive cognition had through alien species is sometimes said to represent the object "otherwise than it is in itself," or "not as it is in itself." Yet by this expression only the imperfection and obscurity of cognition is signified, not in any way that such a cognition attributes to the object what is not, or denies what is. For when we know God through species of material things, we do not mentally apprehend Him as material in Himself or as identified with materiality, but only as analogically similar to those things according to predicates which carry no imperfection.

69. Doubt 4º: whether God makes beings of reason? I answer: it is certain that beings of reason are known by God insofar as they are made by us, since no fiction of ours, or feigning cognition, can be hidden from God. Consequently it is also certain that some objective being, or being known, is formally bestowed upon being of reason by the divine intellect; but since this is reflexive or mediate and is superinduced upon another objective being bestowed by us upon the same object, it is not reckoned as making a being of reason according to the sense of its definition, as we already noted above. It is also certain that no cognition of God is liable to falsity. Therefore, if being of reason cannot be made except through false judgments concerning a real object, as seemed more probable to us, it is most certain that it cannot be made by God. There remains the doubt whether, once the distinction of such a being from every possible being is admitted, divine cognition can make it. Many deny this, either because they think that God does not know such beings immediately, or independently of our cognition, or because, although He knows them immediately, He judges nothing falsely concerning them and therefore does not feign. Yet many others affirm it, because they judge that every impossible thing is immediately known by God, not only in our cognition but also in itself, and therefore immediately receives objective being from the divine intellect; and they furthermore judge that a false judgment or distorted concept is not required for the production of a being of reason. Since this question is of little concern to us, we do not discuss it further. See, if desired, Fr. Peynado, Logic, tr. 4, disp. 2, s. 3.

And here at the final stage our threefold Philosophy comes to rest; yet I desire that it tend unceasingly to the glory of the Most Divine Trinity, under the auspices of the Most August Virgin Mother of God; of our Most Holy Father Ignatius of Loyola; of the great Apostle of the Indies, Francis Xavier; of the Cherubic Aloysius Gonzaga, Protector of the Schools of our Society; and of all the Princes of the Heavenly Court.

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